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Abstract 
This research focused on pre and post-disaster planning in Malaysia since the adoption of 
the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) 2005–2015 and national Vision 2020. A review of 
the existing research and practice in Malaysia including the structure and attitude of 
government officers at central and local authorities to risk was the starting point. The 
regulatory compliance to the Malaysia National Security Council MNSC Directive 20 
programme is a key focus. The MNSC Directive 20 exists as the important core of disaster 
regulation in Malaysia but the implementation is not according to plan and regulatory 
compliance was low. Failures in regulation and compliance were identified as the key 
vulnerability and disaster causes in Malaysia. The beneficiaries were actually unaware of 
non-compliance that exposed them to hazard. In general, the more developed Asian 
economies, of which Malaysia is one, have not devoted much attention to pre-disaster 
planning despite a rapidly growing capital stock of buildings including public and private 
housing. Although the Asian Development Bank has provided templates for pre-disaster 
planning, the uptake has been slow. This Malaysian case study is an important example, not 
just for the country but the region. The aim of this research is to highlight shortfalls in 
provision, training and awareness, and to recommend ways of improvement. Gathered 
actors’ perspectives in the implementation of regulatory compliance in all level of 
emergency management system in Malaysia helps to explain the reason of regulatory 
compliance failures. Measuring their attitudes towards regulatory compliance reveals actual 
commitment because regulatory compliance would require making changes to existing 
barriers in the administrative environment. These changes would have to be based, to a 
large extent, on how actors’ perceived and judged the benefits of regulatory compliance 
implementation. The research uses both quantitative and qualitative methods together that 
involved 484 respondents. They have broadly negative general attitudes towards regulatory 
compliance, arguing that currently too many barriers are present in department levels to 
make regulatory compliance implementation straightforward. They need informative advice 
and guidance to enable them to see the very probable societal benefits that can lead towards 
regulatory compliance development. The research concludes by categorising obstacles that 
need to be overcome, to encourage actors to accept regulatory compliance and recommends 
changes to department structures, systems and practices prior to regulatory compliance 
implementation.  
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CHAPTER 1 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Introduction to the Thesis  
 
“Government has a continuing role in ‘protecting people from risks they cannot handle 
themselves’-managing risk is ‘increasingly central to the business of government’, and that 
it is incumbent upon government bodies to earn back trust through greater openness and 
transparency”. 
(Burgess, 2009: 6) 
 
I volunteered to work in post-disaster recovery when the Tsunami struck Malaysia at the 
end of the year 2004. The Tsunami with a huge volume of moving seawater destroys 
buildings, trees, wildlife and people (Foong et al. 2006). In this and other activities, I was 
able to make observations on disaster sites and I concluded that there was much scope to 
improve both planning practice and training for those in the front line of disaster 
management. As I explored these issues further, I was aware that, although sufficient 
regulation existed, regulatory compliance was low. I wished to explore why there was a gap 
between regulation and performance. 
According to Foong et al. (2006) Tsunami victims in Kota Kuala Muda, Malaysia 
have shown a high level of satisfaction with the provision of temporary longhouses 
provided by the government because they were provided with the minimum 3 bedrooms to 
separate different gender and age groups; and there were also shared community space, 
storage and prayer room. 3 bedrooms’ is the minimum requirement stipulated in the 1986 
Malaysia Uniform Building by Law (UBBL) for habitable bedroom. Amenities were in 
some cases better than previous dwellings. The beneficiaries were actually unaware of non-
compliance that exposed them to hazard. A legal non-complying building is any building 
that was legal when it was built that no longer complies with one or more of the present 
regulations (Barakat, 2003). I saw many examples of non-compliance such as the bedroom 
size not according to specification; partition walls built of combustible instead of non-
combustible materials; no parking and open spaces as required; improper insulation and 
painting; and no front porch as a safety zone between the main entrance of the houses and 
2 
 
the access road. The failure of the Malaysian Government to exercise the proper conduct of 
post-disaster provision has slowed the process of restoring livelihoods.  
The Malaysian government should give extra attention to housing provision. 
Providing emergency shelter is one of the most important emergency activities because of 
safety, land use and ownership issues (Quarantelli, 1995a). This research indirectly 
explores theme issues in disaster management such as the dangerous location of buildings, 
improper construction, cultural attitudes about development and political preference 
(Quarantelli et al. 1977). However, compliance occurs when business goals and political 
interest are enhanced (Parker, 1999). Thus, I hope to highlight shortfalls in provision, 
training and awareness and to recommend improvements in implementing disaster policy in 
Malaysia. This thesis’ emphasis on disaster management policy is a result of the essential 
nature of compliance requirements in housing provision policy. 
The handling and resolving of disasters in Malaysia is currently conducted through 
the committee system that includes inter-agency and inter-sectoral approaches such as local 
authorities1
                                                        
1  The terms ‘officials’, ‘authorities’ and ‘officers’ are used interchangeably but refer to the same meaning. 
, Public Works Department and a Social Welfare Department known as the 
‘National Disaster Management and Relief Committee’ (NDMRC), that function as the 
national coordination mechanism for the management of disaster activities as stated in the 
MNSC Directive 20 (see section 4.5.1, p.107, p.3). DMRC will establish a Disaster 
Operation Control Centre (DOCC) for monitoring the progress and development of these 
efforts and to ensure that disaster management is effectively and smoothly implemented 
without compromising compliance with the national and international legislations (NSC, 
1997).  
According to the MNSC Directive 20, the important core of disaster regulation in 
Malaysia, authorities involved in disaster response are obligated to follow rules and 
regulations (e.g. Uniform Building Bylaws, Town and Country Planning Act and Road 
Transport Act) in providing housing to the disaster victims. The Malaysia National Security 
Council (MNSC) Directive No. 20 states the mechanism on the management of natural and 
technological disasters including the responsibilities and functions of the various agencies 
under an integrated emergency management system (Moin, 2007). Unfortunately, 
temporary housing built after the Tsunami did not fully comply with these rules and 
regulations.  
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Malaysia has a policy of disaster management called the ‘Policy and Mechanism on 
National Disaster and Relief Management’. This framework contains directives that relate 
to disasters and relief management, such as Directive 18 for the relief and management of 
disasters that result from terrorist action, Directive 19 for establishing a special unit called 
Special Malaysia Disaster Assistance and Rescue Team (SMART) and Directive 20 for 
relief and management of natural and technological disasters. The policy statement for 
disaster relief operations in Directive 20 was purposely put in place to mitigate the effects 
of various hazards; to prepare for measures that will preserve life and minimise damage to 
the environment; to respond during emergencies and provide assistance; and to establish a 
recovery system to ensure the affected community's return to normalcy.  
The Malaysia National Security Council (MNSC) Directive 20 clearly stated 
guidelines on the management of disasters including the responsibilities and functions of 
various agencies within the scope of national and international legislation (Shaluf et al. 
2006). The MNSC Directive 20 is one part of this policy framework and outlines the 
actions on land management according to the level and complexity of the disaster. It 
establishes management mechanisms for determining the roles and responsibilities of 
agencies at three levels namely the national, state and district levels (Moin, 2007b). Quite 
simply MNSC Directive 20 is the standard operational procedure (SOP) for all departments 
involved in disaster management.  
 This policy framework was developed from international and national requirements 
such as Hyogo Framework of Action (HFA) (as shown in Appendix 1, p.310); Yokohama 
Strategy (guidelines for natural disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation); Habitat 
Agenda (a practical roadmap for an urbanising world, setting out approaches and strategies 
towards the achievement of sustainable development of the world’s urban areas); other 
ISDR strategies (a system of partnerships for disaster risk reduction strategies which consist 
of international, regional and national agencies); and national rules and regulations. 
However, Malaysia is still in the phase of restructuring and reorganising the National 
Disaster Management Mechanism to fit in the HFA, by taking actions such as monitoring 
disaster risks, building a safety culture at all private and public levels and strengthening 
disaster preparedness in order to ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and local 
priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation.  
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 The policy document however is not available for public scrutiny (restricted as 
shown in Appendix 2, p.311) for reasons of national security. Most of the information only 
exists in the form of internal department communications. Even then, documents were 
circulated for office use only. Any training sessions for officers is based on self 
volunteering. Training is only mandatory for specific groups or individuals with certain 
technical skills (e.g. building inspectors, project managers and Special Malaysia Disaster 
Assistance and Rescue Team). Only top government officers were called by the National 
Institute of Public Administration (NIPA) and compelled by the Chief Secretary to the 
Government to attend courses on crisis management after a post mortem revealed the poor 
handling of development projects (Aini et al. 2001). One consequence is that those 
involved in disaster response received very little information about implementation and I 
saw that some of them did not really know what they were meant to do. The decay of 
policy effectiveness, from central government to the districts, parallels the small number of 
professionals who know what to do and the majority who do not.  
 There were initial efforts to implement full regulatory compliance after the 2004 
Tsunami in Malaysia. I judged that implementation was not very successful because I 
thought that regulatory compliance would require making changes to existing barriers in the 
administrative environment. These changes would have to be based, to a large extent, on 
how actors’ perceived and judged the benefits of regulatory compliance implementation. 
Local experience in Malaysia, suggested by recent academic work indicated that neither 
public office workers’ attitudes nor private managers followed regulatory compliance with 
the MNSC Directive 20 (Aini et al. 2006). I wished to explore government officers,’ or 
authorities, attitudes to regulation and compliance, in order to understand how better 
compliance could improve emergency housing in Malaysia.  
  The literature reviewed in Chapters 2, p.10; Chapter 3, p.48 and Chapter 4, p.92 has 
three themes namely, Disaster Management; Compliance and Enforcement; and Malaysia 
Context. There is lack of recent information available on the opinions and attitudes of 
actors in regulatory compliance and emergency housing (Dynes, 1993). Much past research 
has focused on levels of compliance and quotes organisational response rather than 
understanding individual attitudes towards regulatory control (Aini et al. 2006). Available 
literatures suggest that non-compliance occurs (Dynes, 1993). Davis (2007) argued that 
disaster response has become highly politicised and does not comply with guidelines 
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provided by international organisations like SPHERE and Oxfam. Then, Quarantelli (1984) 
identified disaster planning not as a tangible product, but rather as ‘a process’ (see section 
2.4, p.22, p.3). As a result, disaster itself is a failure of the social system (Dynes, 1993) and 
any development activities during a disaster can be seriously damaging (Allen, 1990) 
because communities themselves give very low priority to disaster planning and actions.  
Thus, in Chapter 3 Hutter (2001) and Meidenger (1987) suggested that research on 
regulation should focus on organisational routines, the attitudes and values of bureaucrats 
that shape governmental action and the role of culture in institutions. Enforcement and 
compliance are measured with reference to such factors as commitment to regulatory 
objectives and attitudes to compliance that increase effectiveness (Hutter, 2001). The nature 
of the institution and behaviour of authority is significant for compliance in emergency 
management programmes (Braithwaite, 2002). Research in building a better foundation for 
understanding behaviour is a necessary step before trying to improve public policy 
implementation (Cohen et al. 2000). Individual behaviour in a particular setting is affected 
by an individual’s initial emotional or normative state and then by direct experience with 
others in a specific setting (Cox, 2004). Attitudes depend much on what people do together 
to respond in an organised fashion to disaster and on the continuities between pre and post-
disaster of social organisations (Aguirre, 1995).  
In Chapter 4, in Malaysia, I found regulatory failure contributed to how the public 
service itself behaves. Aini et al. (2007) found that regulatory and organisational failure has 
contributed to greater vulnerability in disaster situations. I could read all of this in the 
literature, but it posed another question for me. Malaysia is neither a developed nor a 
developing country; it is somewhere in between. In effect Malaysia has developed world 
regulation with developing world implementation. How could implementation be improved 
through changing public officials’ behaviour?, An informed public can be a major ally in 
any attempt, because awareness can lead to action, including pressure on legislators and 
other policymakers (Anderson et al. 1998). 
 The questions I wished to ask and to whom are defined in Chapter 5, p.131. This 
Chapter is developed further from the notion of regulatory culture explained earlier in 
Chapter 3. The issue of culture remains unclear not least because culture is a complex 
construction of organisations, consisting of attitudes, perceptions, values and belief. There 
are five sources of regulatory culture with significant influences in regulatory compliance 
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(Meidinger, 1987). These are general culture, social structure, law, regulatory tradition and 
regulatory work. Nurturing a compliance culture requires an organisation to value 
compliance goals (Braithwaite, 2002). There is a need to understand behaviour to build a 
better foundation for public policy (Cohen et al. 2000). Individual attitudes will determine 
what the person will hear, think and do about the compliance issue (Allport, 1973). Franzoi 
(1996) argued that attitudes consist of three components (cognitive, affective and conative) 
(see section 3.8.1, p.86); a division I have deployed in my research design. The aim of this 
thesis is to highlight shortfalls in provision, training and awareness and to recommend ways 
of improvement. The aims were achieved by trying to answer the following broad questions 
about the concept of regulatory compliance as currently understood in Malaysia: 
1. What are Malaysian actors’ attitudes towards regulatory compliance 
implementation? 
2. What do Malaysian actors understand by regulatory compliance?  
3. What are the actors’ own perceived rationales behind regulatory compliance 
implementation? 
 
The thesis uses both quantitative and qualitative methods together (thoroughly 
discussed in Chapter 6, p.148; Chapter 7, p.198; and Chapter 8, p.227). The central premise 
(Golden, 2000) in this research is that participation of government officers in the MNSC 
Directive 20 is essential. They are the managers, clerical staff members, technical staff 
members and general officers at department level of national, state and district levels. Local 
government is perhaps best positioned to implement mitigation as they control many of the 
most effective tools to reduce vulnerability to hazards, such as land use regulation and 
building code enforcement (Prater, 2000).  
The key quantitative and the key qualitative findings (Chapter 9, p.276) are: 
1. Malaysia is unique and different from other developing countries because 
Malaysian has to consider cultural and religious matters (e.g. minimum 3 rooms in 
providing shelter and separate worship place). 
2. Actors had broadly negative attitudes towards regulatory implementation. These 
negative general attitudes were attributed to their negative thinking towards the 
level of knowledge and understanding (see section 9.1.2, p.286 and section 9.1.3, 
p.287) regarding MNSC Directive 20. 
7 
 
3. They know very little about the MNSC Directive 20. This lack of knowledge about 
regulatory compliance is due to lack of information about the programme given to 
department at national, state or district level.   
4. Generally, actors felt they did not have the required skills to comply with the 
programme. 
5. The majority of actors interviewed agreed that victims have the right to regulatory 
compliance due to equal rights and socialisation opportunities. 
6. Actors in Malaysia appear to see the process of regulatory compliance from the 
point of view of the existing public service system. 
7. Actors are aware of the many barriers and uncertainties. Actors wish to see changes 
(see section 10.2, p.299) at the department levels before regulatory compliance is 
implemented. 
8. Both methods of quantitative and qualitative proposed that more effort should be 
done to promote the importance of knowledge towards MNSC Directive 20 because 
of actors’ lack of information. 
 
These findings necessarily have direct relevance for further development in 
Malaysia because actors are actually willing to support the implementation if they are 
provided with enough support in terms of resources, training, exposure and incentives. The 
actors are knowledgeable about the scope of their own work, but not about the information 
regarding MNSC Directive 20.  
The contents of MNSC Directive 20 are suitable and practical to implement at the 
department level; however actors and victims revealed that the policy delivery system is not 
yet effective enough. And it needs to be considered that actors could not reasonably be 
accused for having this negative attitude. They need to be convinced that the efforts 
required for regulatory compliance will produce benefits for both actors and victims. They 
need informative advice and guidance to enable them to see the very probable societal 
benefits that can lead towards regulatory compliance development. Actors might be 
persuaded to accept regulatory compliance, but it cannot simply be expected that they will 
accept the programme without any changes made to the present department settings or as 
regard to the status of their working conditions. There is no doubt that actors would expect 
to triumph over barriers with additional input in the form of increased resources and extra 
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support, especially in the form of working assistants. In terms of originality, no one has 
questioned the public sector over compliance and more importantly no one has done so 
with disaster management in Malaysia. 
 Presently, Malaysia is still in the phase of restructuring and reorganising the 
National Disaster Management Mechanism to fit in the HFA and ISDR Programme (Shaluf 
et al. 2006). Hence, I recommended (Chapter 10, p.299) that these research outcomes can 
be used by the decision makers, authorities and NGOs to develop strategies and actions that 
include awareness raising and capacity building for enhancing enforcement of current 
legislation. The findings of this research might give insights into designing and planning 
the national policy and disaster management framework by restructuring and reorganising 
the present National Disaster Management Mechanism in terms of enhancing the 
coordination of responsibility between and within government bodies in the National 
Disaster Management Mechanism.  
 The decision making circle in Malaysia starts with a social learning process. In 
every project delivered by the authorities, there will be a project report and evaluation. 
Input from academic research and consultation is a must in revising and formulating new 
policies such as the National Structural, Physical and Local Plan and other related works in 
Malaysia. Policy makers should account for, and measure, what matters especially in 
assessing the needs of victims, while being realistic about any evaluation. ‘Needs’ are not 
interpreted solely in terms of economic interests, but are taken to be the necessities of a 
fully functional, harmonious, global system that incorporates both people and ecosystems 
(Earth Summit, 1992). Therefore, policy makers should consider who policy is for from 
central government to local delivery agents; and from professionals and service delivery to 
communities and service users. Support also may come from a good community leadership 
with good personalities and other local condition such as their own skills, dedication and 
experience. In addition, full regulatory compliance, as a sign of significant progress, may 
take a long time to consider. Hopefully the policy makers will be patient and persist in 
delivering humanitarian work and policy making. 
 For the future Malaysian direction, Malaysia is serious about the vision for 2020 
(Sarji, 1996), to become an industrialised and developed country if it can maintain 7 per 
cent annual economic growth (EPU, 2006). The direction is for public service reform with a 
clear emphasis on the development of a ‘clean, efficient and effective’ administration. To 
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be considered as up to world class standard, Malaysians must have a strict code of working 
ethics for implementing regulatory compliance. This culture will then shape the behaviour 
of its members. The success of the organisation itself is best achieved by ongoing 
compliance with regulatory goals (Brooks, 1988).  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Disaster Management 
 
“People want to know how others act under such extreme situations, using 
disaster as a test for bringing out what is normally hidden-the best and the 
worst in people, the abilities normal life does not tap, and the dark motives we 
all repress. As we read about disaster, in safety and comfort, we vicariously test 
ourselves and our society-How would I have behaved, how would my 
community has behaved”? 
(Barton, 1969: 43) 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Disaster research is based on disaster planning rather than the outputs (Wisner et al. 2002). 
Dynes et al. (1978) describe disaster research as a ‘social pathology’ that brings about 
disruptions in normal life. The complexities of various relationships within a disaster 
environment usually fail to diminish the vulnerability of populations with the probability of 
disasters in the future. The dynamics of disaster research subsequently expose the real 
scenario of rehabilitation or reconstruction2
 In the context of emergency management, the concept of sustainable hazard 
mitigation refers to creating places that are less vulnerable to natural and technological 
hazards and that are resilient to those events (Mileti et al. 1990). “Sustainable hazard 
mitigation consists of five elements: environmental quality; quality of life; disaster 
resilience; economic vitality; and inter and intra-generational equity” (Ronan et al. 2006: 
91). From this perspective, public risk management schemes go hand-in-hand with the 
communities in order to reduce hazards risk, disaster loss reduction and efforts in 
sustainable communities’ development. Disaster mitigation and risk reduction are seen as 
 activities following a disaster. It is still 
ambiguous to what concern much in officials’ responsibilities, whether in daily routine or 
humanitarian mechanism, due to the process of regulatory compliance per se, regulatory 
aims, or situational based on the theory of the good regulatory practice. 
                                                        
2 The terms ‘rehabilitation’ and ‘reconstruction’ were adopted from Corsellis, T. and Vitale, A. (2005) 
Transitional Settlement Displaced Populations [Online] Available at: www.shelterproject.org (Accessed: 1 
February 2007). 
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core elements of community resilience because, in general, any emergency management is 
the continuous process by which all individuals, groups and communities manage hazards 
in an effort to avoid or improve the impact of disasters resulting from the hazards. 
 Haddow et al. (2004) argued that the process of dealing with and avoiding risks is 
actually explaining a disaster management scenario. This scenario applies particularly to 
communities facing the threat of natural or human-made disasters such as floods, 
earthquakes, wind storms and industrial accidents. Disasters tend to happen to people at 
risk. They are at risk because they are vulnerable to hazards. This vulnerability can best be 
reduced by increasing people's capacity to deal with a range of social, cultural, economic 
and physical factors. Therefore, disaster management is a process of preparation before the 
occurrence of a disaster (e.g. emergency evacuation, quarantine and mass removal of 
contaminants) (Quarantelli, 1980). Disaster management is aimed at developing preventive 
ways, management platforms and collision reduction in disasters that encompass a series of 
policies and practices that go hand in hand. It can be separated into four groups that consist 
of “preparedness (prevention and recovery planning), response (actions before and during a 
hazard), recovery (actions taken after a hazard) and mitigation (continuous actions)” 
(Godschalk, 1991: 142). 
 In the past, public policy, with regard to disaster management, has been heavily 
centered around responses based on the assumption that natural disasters were almost 
inevitable as they represented an ‘act of God3
                                                        
3 Religious and philosophical belief systems that a supreme being created and overseer of the universe 
adapted from Swinburne, R. (2004) The Existence of God, Oxford University Press, New York. 
’ (natural event which is not preventable by 
any human agency) (Smith, 1996). However, over the years, this perspective has been put 
to rest by disaster researchers such as Quarantelli (1980) and Dynes (1978), who now 
define disasters as a social phenomenon, in which the emphasis comes to be on internal 
rather than external factors. In this perspective, disaster is not an outside force that impacts 
upon a social system, but a manifestation of internal flaws and weaknesses in the society. 
This manifestation is the result of interactions between hazard-triggering elements 
distributed by nature, as well as from human activity and vulnerabilities (Alexander, 1997) 
where vulnerability is commonly evolved to a physical, social, economic and cultural loss 
(Paton, 2001). Variables that widely contribute to mitigation efforts include structural 
measures to control a hazard, land use management, building regulation enforcement to 
minimum standard and warning systems (Paton, 2001). 
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In the international community, emergency management is the subject of defense 
strategy. In most cases, emergency management is an instrument of international 
cooperation, where liberty remains a political agenda. The term emergency management 
was largely replaced by civil defense after the Cold War. Cold War refers to the 
relationship that developed primarily between the USA and the USSR (with influence from 
the Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam, Hungary, the Berlin Wall and others) after World War 
Two due to the growth in weapons of mass destruction. As a drawback, the original 
intention of civil defense was limited to protecting civilians from military attack. Over the 
years, it has been transformed into describing an emergency situation. The term emergency 
management is predominantly popular at the scene of a disaster.  
Meanwhile, disaster management involves the entire process of a disaster circle (i.e. 
mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery) because disaster management must also 
consider long term protection to civilians. Within European Union countries the term ‘crisis 
management’ emphasises the political and security dimension rather than measures to 
satisfy the immediate needs of the civilian population (Norman et al. 2003). In particular, 
academics are much more comfortable using the term ‘disaster risk reduction’, especially in 
a development context (Alexander, 2002). They focus more on the mitigation and 
preparedness aspects of an emergency cycle. 
 The international community shows more concern over mitigation rather than 
response and recovery in action. This idea was unanimously agreed to and adopted as a 
resolution by delegates to ‘Yokohama Strategy’ at the ‘1994 United Nations World 
Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction’, and which stated: 
 
“The impact of natural disasters in terms of human and economic losses has risen in recent 
years, and society in general has become more vulnerable to natural disasters. Disaster 
response alone is not sufficient, as it yields only temporarily results with further exposure 
to hazards at a very high cost. We have followed this limited approach for too long. 
Prevention contributes to lasting improvement in safety and is essential to integrated 
disaster management”.  
(UNISDR, 1994: Chapter 1) 
 
13 
 
These objectives were repeated continuously and expanded at the ‘2005 United 
Nations World Conference on Disaster Reduction’ at the Hyogo Declaration (HFA) from 
18 to 22 January 2005, this stated that: 
 
“We, delegates to the World Conference on Disaster Reduction, are deeply concerned that 
communities continue to experience excessive losses of precious human lives and valuable 
property as well as serious injuries and major displacements due to various disasters 
worldwide. We recognise as well that a culture of disaster prevention and resilience, and 
associated pre-disaster strategies, that are sound investments, must be fostered at all levels, 
ranging from the individual to the international levels. We affirm that the state has the 
primary responsibility to protect people and property on their territory from hazards, and 
thus, it is vital to give high priority to disaster risk reduction in national policy, consistent 
with their capacities and resources available to them”. 
(UNISDR, 2005: 2) 
 
As a result, in many countries a specific government body is created for the 
purposes of coordinating and directing rehabilitation and reconstruction after disasters. This 
specific government body is responsible to providing all hazards mitigation, 
preparedness/planning, response, recovery and reconstruction services; continuity of 
operations, continuity of government and emergency operations planning; risk management 
and mitigation; and training and exercise design services to local, state and federal 
government agencies nationwide (Wisner et al. 2002). Wisner et al. (2002) also argued that 
this body not only formulates a complete framework but also has to make sure the plan 
works throughout the whole cycle of disaster management (i.e. warning, preparedness, 
prevention and mitigation, recovery, ongoing relief and emergency response). It is essential 
to ensure close liaison between the body responsible for recovery and that concerned with 
disaster management (e.g. hazard assessment, preparedness, warning, relief and housing 
reconstruction). Decisions taken in the course of recovery (e.g. the decision to build 
housing by using traditional methods) could themselves create serious secondary hazards 
(Tsunami or fires from earthquake) and expose affected victims to potential risks that occur 
due to the occurrence of another (primary) hazard.  
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Reconstruction of infrastructure and housing are two of the primary challenges in 
recovery efforts because a main indicator to measure the outcome of risk reduction 
indicators is the percentage of houses constructed according to building codes with 
appropriate hazard-resistant features (Christoplos, 2006). On average, studies4
 As argued by Davis (2007), officials’ integrity and professionalism are expected to 
ensure high standards of execution because behaviours associated with ‘integrity’ include 
honesty, sincerity, truthfulness, punctuality, ethics, fairness and justice while 
professionalism is characterised by expertise, generalised and systematic knowledge, a high 
degree of self control and governance by a code of ethics. The strength of a local 
government and its decision-making entities is conditional, in large part, upon the strength 
of its legal infrastructure. This legal infrastructure comprises laws that regulate the 
behaviour of employees and officials in government while promoting accountability, 
transparency and high ethical standards through enforcement and compliance (Davis, 
 on post-
disaster development are restricted to housing rehabilitation, policies and technical issues 
and practical implementation (Svetlana, 1998). Comerio (1996) argued that housing was 
the largest project section accounting for over 50 per cent of the entire project budget in 
recovery planning after disasters (A comparison of reconstruction pace across countries is 
shown in Appendix 6, p.338). Housing policies that decide the direction in providing 
housing in pre-disaster situations have a direct influence in conceptualising post-disaster 
shelter and housing programmes (Svetlana, 1998).  
 Hence, perception of potential risk to the victims and even non-compliance with 
policies would guide officials in this government body into taking appropriate actions 
(Wisner, 2004). Officials in this government body must possess sufficient knowledge of 
handling emergency situations, humanitarian works and community works at the scene of a 
disaster (Baldwin et al. 1998; Gunningham et al. 1999b). Activities at each level 
(individual, group, community) are affecting the other levels. Still, the scene of a one-sided 
response or the government response is a norm in disaster management since the matter of 
security control is a prime responsibility of the government. Authorities elected are perhaps 
best positioned to implement any disaster planning measure as they control many of the 
most effective of legislation. Therefore, efficient emergency management relies on 
officials’ integrity from the influence of emergency plans. 
                                                        
4 The terms ‘studies’ and ‘research’ are used interchangeably but refer to the same meaning. 
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2007). Enforcement and compliance are measured with reference to such factors as 
commitment to regulatory objectives and attitudes to compliance toward effectiveness 
(Hutter, 2001).  
The nature of the institution and behaviour of authority is significant for compliance 
with disaster management programmes (Braithwaite, 2002). Research in building a better 
foundation for understanding behaviour is a necessary step before trying to improve public 
policy implementation (Cohen et al. 2000). Understanding behavior of these actors will fill 
the gaps in knowledge which is shaping the culture of compliance in authorities in disaster 
management mechanism.  
 
2.2 Disaster Studies and Planning 
Samuel Prince’s doctoral dissertation in 1920, in which he investigated the response to the 
1917 Halifax shipping explosion, has had an enormous impact on disaster research 
(Scanlon, 1988; Scanlon et al. 2001). Samuel Prince makes a comparison between the 
Halifax incident and other cases that have occurred in the past. This revolutionary 
investigation was the beginning of other such subsequent collective behavioural research of 
organisational response to a range of disaster scenarios. However, it was only in 1942 that 
the first theoretical research was done by Pitirim Sorokin in ‘Man and Society in Calamity’. 
Such studies were done in greater depth only after 1950s. Sorokin found a promising 
direction for resolving crisis’ in a calamity situation by developing Integral (knowledge and 
values) culture into personal and collective action in social organisation (Ford et al. 1996). 
Classical notions were contributed by: 
1. Fritz in 1961 (restorative community: a collaborative effort with a mission to build 
the capacity and sustainability of organisations, initiatives and networks); 
2. Thompson et al. in 1962 (artificial community: accidentally come together for short 
time); Thompson et al. in 1962 (mass assault: a violent onset or attack on a 
community by physical means);  
3. Barton in 1969 (unselfish community: deliberate pursuit of the interests or welfare 
of others or the public interest);  
4. Taylor et al. in 1970 (the utopian community: an ideal community or society);  
5. Parr in 1970 (emergence: the act of emerging a disaster response structure); 
16 
 
6. Bardo in 1978 (emergent behaviour: communities operate in an environment, 
forming more complex behaviours as a collective). 
 
In 1963, the development of theories in organisational behaviour was more focused 
after the creation of the Ohio State University Disaster Research Center (DRC). Factual 
reports in disaster situations were gathered in terms of groups’ structures and 
responsibilities; and developed a dynamic typology within organisations (Quarantelli, 
1966; Dynes, 1970). 1988 was flagged as the year of vigorous grows in sociological 
research by DRC researchers (Britton, 1988). Scholars since then relied on DRC research 
outputs and theories in conducting research in relation to organisational behaviour in 
disaster scenes (Stallings, 1978; Forrest, 1978; Smith, 1978). 
 Mileti et al. (1975) summarised the events in a disaster life cycle into four phases 
termed as response, recovery, preparedness and mitigation. As the matter progressed 
further, Drabek (1986) expanded the circle of disaster more significantly in terms of human 
system responses locally and internationally. Responses from human system reflect the 
studies of emergency management and disaster situations. Drabek provided a ‘Drabek’s 
disaster encyclopedia’ as a result of varied impact assessment (Dynes, 1999; Briton, 1999; 
Scanlon, 1999; Wilson, 1999). However, there is a lack of an up to date literature review 
especially towards the issue of emergent phenomena and multi-organisational cooperation 
in the scene of disaster responses (Drabek, 1987). 
 Only after World War II in 1945, did the World unite under the United Nation 
Organisation or the UN as an international organisation in order to facilitate cooperation in 
international law, international security, economic development, social progress, human 
rights and the achievement of world peace. Later, there were serious efforts made, by 
international treaties, to deal with the inherent uncertainty associated with climate change 
and hazard events such as: 
1. Meetings at Talloires, France in October 1990 (declaration of environmental 
commitment more than 100 universities presidents from all continents);  
2. Halifax, Canada in December 1991 (specific challenge of environmentally 
sustainable development);  
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3. The Kyoto Protocol by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (Agenda 21)5
4. Swansea, Wales, in August 1993 (conclusion of the Association of Commonwealth 
Universities after the insufficient University presence at Rio de Janeiro);  
 (Earth Summit, 1992);  
5. 1997 five years of progress appraisal on the implementation of Agenda 21 (Rio +5);  
6. The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, agreed at the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development (Earth Summit, 2002) affirmed UN commitment to 'full 
implementation' of Agenda 21 are all about the concern in the unsustainable 
environmental practices and aimed at combating global warming.  
 
A number of gaps were identified in the 1997 Rio + 5 in New York, particularly 
with regard to social equity and poverty. This was largely reflected by falling levels of 
official development assistance (ODA) and growing international debt, along with failures 
to improve: technology transfer; capacity building for participation and development; 
institutional co-ordination; and reduce excessive levels of production and consumption 
(Earth Summit, 2002). 
 The concerned is also mounting in hazard events (disaster). In 1976 in Vancouver, 
the United Nations held its first conference on the issue of physical and spatial organisation 
of human life and on the national and international actions that needed to accommodate the 
growing population in urban and rural communities (UN-Habitat, 2002). However, between 
the 80s and 90s, pre-disaster housing policy then was based on framework establishment 
(e.g. community participation, housing finance and capacity building). The year 1987 was 
declared as the ‘International Year of Shelter for the Homeless’ (IYSH) in order to 
implement strategic shelter strategies. Subsequently, ‘Global Shelter Strategy’ (GSS) for 
the year 2000 was published in the year 1988 in order to rectify any flaws in the earlier 
version of strategies.  
The final version is extensively articulated in the ‘Habitat II Agenda’ in Istanbul, 
1996 (UN-Habitat, 1996). The Local Agenda 21 Planning Guide, the Habitat II action plan 
(Section IV C-11 sustainable human settlements development in an urbanising world: 
disaster prevention, mitigation and preparedness; and post-disaster rehabilitation 
                                                        
5 The 40 chapters of the Agenda 21, the international plan of action to sustainable development that outlines 
key policies for achieving sustainable development that meets the needs of the poor and recognises the limits 
of development to meet global needs (Earth Summit, 1992). 
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capabilities) are based on Agenda 21 that focuses on the quality of being capable physically 
or intellectually or legally (Wisner et al. 2004). Strategies outlined in these declarations 
endorsed an agreement towards decentralisation of the government, local authorities 
assuming a stronger major role in the disaster scene and in cooperative work ethics. The 
solutions were aimed at ensuring adequate shelter, safer and healthier; and more liveable, 
equitable, sustainable and productive environments (UN-Habitat, 2001b).  
Although the conference to review and appraisal of the implementation of the 
Habitat Agenda (the 2001 Istanbul +5) did produce some promising results, there was cause 
for disappointment when several delegations (e.g. G77 countries6
However, progress has been far from uniform across the world or across the Goals 
per se. There are huge differences across and within countries that agreed to achieve it by 
the year 2015 that include 192 United Nations member states and at least 23 international 
organisations. The World Conference on Disaster Reduction was organised in Kobe, Japan 
in 2005 and had identified priorities in implementing disaster risk reduction and had been 
) did not accept it (Habitat 
Agenda) when faced with policy planning decisions and the adoption of concrete measures 
especially the issue of the local autonomy of municipalities (administrative entity in any 
territory) and participatory civil society (UN-Habitat, 2003). 
 The Agenda 21 is a programme run by the United Nations (UN) related to 
sustainable development and was revealed at the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (Earth Summit), held in Rio de Janeiro on 14 June 1992 
(UN-Habitat, 2003). It is a comprehensive outline of action to be taken globally, nationally 
and locally by organisations of the UN, governments and major groups in every area that 
humans’ impact on the environment alongside achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) (to promote poverty reduction, education, maternal health, 
gender equality, and aim at combating child mortality, AIDS and other diseases). One of 
the significant objectives included in ‘Agenda 21’ is in ‘promoting human settlement, 
planning and management in disaster prone areas’ (UN-Habitat, 1996). It is proceeding (i.e. 
all are focused in one way or other on issues of the environment, poverty mitigation and 
sustainability) towards a diversification of approach in placing housing and settlement as an 
economic and social asset (UN-OCHA, 2006). Lack of adequate shelter was one of the 
issues addressed in the MDGs.  
                                                        
6 G77 is a loose coalition of developing nations. There were 77 founding members of the organisation, but the 
organisation has since expanded to 130 member countries (UN-Habitat, 1996). 
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adopted by the member states of the United Nations (UNISDR, 2005). The Hyogo 
Framework assists the efforts of nations and communities to become more resilient to 
hazards that threaten their development efforts especially in implementing international 
legal instruments such as the Sphere Project Handbook, Oxfam Guidelines and UNHCR 
Guidelines. All strategies (e.g. Agenda 21, the Millennium Development Goals and HFA) 
set benchmarks for the practice of improvement in disaster preparedness within the 
development agenda. 
 Finally, the establishment of Housing Policy Section in 1999 was set to assist 
stakeholders and organisations to achieve the Habitat Agenda goal in international 
instruments. It contributed to the encouragement, policy and operational execution of the 
UN-HABITAT by bridging knowledge and expertise in various thematic areas in the 
housing sector development and policy responses (UN-HABITAT, 1999). The approach 
had a strong practical role in global research, partnership and consultation, studies directed 
at the housing sector and advice in advanced technical works that hopefully might assist the 
states involve.   
 
2.3  Research in Disaster Planning 
Disasters provide a realistic environment to test the integration, stamina and restorative 
powers of large scale social systems. Disasters also provide social scientists with 
advantages that cannot be matched in the study of human behaviour in more normal or 
stable conditions (Fritz, 1961). However, McEntire et al. (2003a) notes that scholars are 
often unable to derive a definite conclusion associated with the concept of a disaster. 
Disaster is perceived as ‘act of God’ or ‘physical hazards’ that contributes to social 
instability. Although the complex physical and social aspects of disasters are difficult to 
describe briefly, agreement must be found. Quarantelli (1995a) argued that people can only 
describe disasters better by constantly trying to discover and explore disaster characters, 
conditions and consequences. Scholars’ identified three significant problems in emergency 
management research (McEntire et al. 2003a).  
1. People make an assumption that disaster management is not the same as an 
emergency; 
2. Responders have a limited jurisdiction; 
3. Emergencies are rare occurrences.  
20 
 
Hence, emergency management studies have revealed the issues of 
misinterpretation and lack of understanding.  
McEntire et al. (2003a) have identified significant interrelated concerns in 
theoretical development in the field of emergency management that consists of crucial 
concerns surrounding a disaster such as the definition of a disaster, emergency 
management, the variables that need to be studied in academic research and the actors that 
should be employed in such studies along with the phases that require priority. Thus, the 
theoretical development must retain: 
1. The findings from prior research in the field; continue to search for an accepted 
definition of disasters (e.g. disruptive and/or deadly and destructive outcome);  
2. Seek an alternative name for the field of emergency management (e.g. disaster 
management, risk management, sustainable hazards management or disaster 
vulnerability management);  
3. Emergency management must also acknowledge all types of hazards (e.g. natural, 
technological or civil);  
4. Establish a multi-causal view of disasters and appreciate complexity in emergency 
management (i.e. large numbers of variables to be studied);  
5. Embrace each of the different actors involved in emergency management (i.e. the 
public, private and non-profit sectors);  
6. Maintaining a reliance on the phases of disasters (i.e. mitigation, preparedness, 
response and recovery); 
7. Integrate research from each of the contributing disciplines (e.g. hazard and 
vulnerability analysis, land-use planning, planning, training, exercising, community 
education, grant acquisition, budgeting and sheltering). 
 
In conducting emergency management research, scholars are often confronted with 
the issue of identifying a ‘subject matter’ that is instrumental in framing assumptions 
around the research topic (Fritz, 1961). Subject matter is the focus point in every research 
and becomes the ‘back bone’ of research because it is the instrument highlighted and being 
measured all over the research work. In disaster planning and recovery, it is important to 
remember that there are a variety of other topics that have a bearing on or a relation to 
disasters that should relate to the ‘subject matter’ as the key subject of the study (Fritz, 
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1961). Researchers should also take into account the subjects such as attitude and culture, 
building code compliance, bureaucratic preferences, record keeping, handling mass 
casualties, communities with different needs and psychological effects in emergency 
management research (McEntire et al. 2003b). There was also a high level of concern in 
several disaster studies that mainly focused on the matters surrounding improper location of 
buildings, inappropriate construction, insufficient mitigation efforts and lack of cooperation 
in recovery planning and emergency (Quarantelli et al. 1977). 
 Thus, in sociological research, Quarantelli et al. (1977) argued that the sociological 
research on disaster should put more emphasis on social organisation, more on groups and 
the pre-impact period because, as argued by Kent (1987), communities are at risk not only 
from natural or technological (based in scientific and industrial progress) behaviour but also 
human behavior.  The community reasoned that the lack of availability and dissemination 
of a full written plan is usually the reason for not being prepared for disaster (Davis, 2007).  
Moreover, the use of the current written plan as a comprehensive reference distracts 
the attention of government officials away from other more critical activities for building a 
resilient disaster community, such as individual problem-solving abilities, possessing a 
positive self-view and fulfilling specific needs from a specific group of people in need. 
There is no guarantee with regards to the availability of a written plan translating itself into 
better disaster preparedness and recovery. Hence, planning is in actual fact as a process 
rather than existence of a written (documented) plan (Quarantelli et al. 1977). A 
comprehensive written plan usually involves continuous activities, practices, interactions 
and building of relationships from communities in order to improve actions taken at times 
of disaster impact (Quarantelli, 1997). 
 As suggested by Wisner et al. (2002), there are six crucial steps in disaster 
management that researchers should consider in order to understand the success of disaster 
management policy and implementation. They are: 
1. The vulnerability assessment (basis for reducing vulnerability through work by 
making it possible to anticipate problems that groups will face in the event of a 
disaster and recovery);  
2. Prevention and mitigation (preventing the physical hazard altogether and reducing 
the impact of future hazard events);  
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3. Emergency preparedness (long term development activities or programme to 
strengthen the overall capacity and capability of a country to manage efficiently all 
types of emergency);  
4. Planning, policy and capacity building (programme for disaster prevention and 
mitigation are carried out according to clear objectives, with adequate resources and 
management arrangements; and to ensure that strategies, resources, management 
structures, roles and resources for emergency response; and recovery are determined 
and understood by key actors);  
5. Emergency response (in providing immediate assistance to maintain life, improve 
health and support the morale of the affected population);  
6. Rehabilitation, reconstruction and recovery (long term reduction of people’s 
vulnerability to hazards by increasing their capacity to cope with and recover from 
present and future disaster).  
 
All of these disaster management policy and implementation components are 
discussed thoroughly in the subsequent arguments. 
 
2.4 Disaster Planning Principles 
Practical awareness of people and how they generally behave in emergency situations is 
crucial. In disaster plans, priority should be given to the prime local response without 
ignoring the lowest level of organisational authority because disaster planning is important 
in order to deploy officials and other departments in the rescue attempt (Drabek et al. 
1991). Disaster preparation has to be effective and sensitive wherein the public is expected 
to perform (Drabek et al. 1991; Tierney, 1993). Thus, adaptation to generate strategies must 
be flexible in reaction to the numbers of laws, organisations, populations, technology, 
hazards, resources and personnel involved in response (Landesman, 2001).  
 Communities and authorities are more concerned about short term development and 
achievable variables (Heide, 1989). This type of mitigation policy often leads to problems 
especially in understanding the problem itself, addressing the problem and sharing 
information effectively. Competence planning design is required to reduce the level of 
bureaucracy and is crucial in communication and cooperation (ICMA, 2003). It is practical 
to put forward issues pertaining to disaster preparedness be better described in order to 
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reduce the impact on life, property and environment following the disaster because disaster 
environment involves political interest, social and economic issues. Disaster communities 
must be able to co-ordinate long term variables (e.g. social development, education and 
viable to economy), plan and work the plan as well as evaluate their accomplishments to 
suit with other social divisions (e.g. health, poverty and genders) (Heide, 1989).  
 A process for planning must describe planning on the strategic level (strategic 
planning at national or regional level); programme (programme planning deals with the 
needs of a specific group of displaced people); and project levels (project planning 
develops and manages the activities required to undertake each project within a 
programme) perspective (Corsellis et al. 2005). It gives guidance not only to develop 
profiles (understanding to social and physical contexts such as conflict, natural disaster, or 
complex emergency by undertake community assessment) and plans (report of a detailed 
course of action in response to a profile that should include the objectives agreed by all 
stakeholders, the activities required and schedule of operations in order to achieve the 
objectives) but also describes the phases of operation for planning that presents the 
sequence of events when planning and operations occur. Phases of operation are the most 
important due to crucial participation from all disaster communities (Davis, 2007).  
Disaster community should focus on identifying, establishing and developing; and 
maintaining local and national capacities because they must know their own strengths 
before (preparedness and contingency planning to identify likely opportunities and 
constraints in responding to the expected situation), while disaster happens (emergency, 
care and maintenance to sustain the situation and recovery before next stage) and after 
(durable solutions and exit strategies for independent survivors) (Corsellis et al. 2005). 
Bendimerad (2003) suggested that disaster response must involve stakeholder 
participation, an established public policy, safer practice of reconstruction and 
rehabilitation and educate preventive culture among disaster communities because disasters 
may come from different angles (i.e. natural or manmade) (Quarantelli, 1984; Dynes, 
1993). A hazard is considered as a threat to people and their valuable possessions (e.g. 
property, environment and future generations) and risk is a measure of hazard. Specifically, 
risks are measures of the likelihood of potentially hazardous events leading to certain 
undesirable consequences (Drabek et al. 1991). Therefore, the need for a holistic disaster 
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planning is crucial to direct effort in reducing disaster risk and promoting community 
resilience.  
Comprehensive disaster planning should then assist communities to minimise their 
vulnerability to hazards by maximising the application of the principles and techniques of 
mitigation to their development and/or redevelopment7
Gathered information from past experiences in disaster management will expand the 
scope of the agencies during disaster operations to determine the type of actions that are 
appropriate and that depend on the level of vulnerability (ICMA, 2003). Besides the 
 decision-making process. People 
should understand disasters that create similar barriers in any effort to design disaster 
planning towards building a resilient community (Drabek et al. 1991; Tierney et al. 2001). 
Tierney et al. (2001) recognised that disaster communities have difficulties in identifying 
the link between disaster risk and community resilience. They also underestimate barriers 
in disaster planning by not taking appropriate and effective measures (preparedness) to 
reduce or minimise (mitigate) effects in response to disaster.  
 
2.4.1 Linking Disaster Risk to Community Resilience 
Federal, state and local regulation creates a confusing picture and often reduces short-term 
losses while allowing the potential for catastrophic losses to grow in the disaster (Mileti, 
1999). Although, authorities’ should most likely concentrate on damage assessment, needs 
entitlement and capacities of officials and availability of resources (Davis, 2007). Hence, 
‘depoliticise’, or no political influence by the government, was introduced for the best 
practice in looking for the answer to recovery planning even if it is hard to achieve (Mileti, 
1999). This type of government will make an effort to produce an accurate analysis 
regarding existing risks and try to overcome such issues before any disaster takes place. 
Scholars also suggested that governments should equip themselves with total jurisdiction of 
control over the risk that might be affected by a disaster (Davis, 2007). A good jurisdiction 
would be able to bring mutual understanding between agency leaders, initiate cooperation, 
identify the nature of future hazards and the disaster likely to occur; ascertain 
communication and establishment; and generate a procedure to assess any damage, injuries 
and deaths (Landesman, 2001).  
                                                        
7 The terms ‘resettlement’ was adopted from Corsellis, T. and Vitale, A. (2005) Transitional Settlement 
Displaced Populations [Online] Available at: www.shelterproject.org (Accessed: 1 Feb 2007). 
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assessment of the health conditions of a community, information should also be gathered 
about the risk of other types of hazards or threats, such as building safety and the ability to 
protect disaster victims from further incidence, ability to maintain air quality, food safety, 
sanitation, waste disposal, vector control and clean water (Landesman et al. 2001) and 
probable losses in economic terms including expected post-disaster challenges (ICMA, 
2003) (more about potential risk in section 2.8, p.42).  
The detailed risk assessment information can be used to expand disaster response 
and emergency planning. Risk assessment is not simply in physical perspective but a 
perception from communities, hazard information and communication and the mitigation 
measures implementation (Mileti et al. 1990; Perry et al. 1990; Mileti et al. 1993; Johnston 
et al. 1998; Johnston et al. 1999b). Meanwhile, the documentation of essential programmes 
in risk reduction must be available at all times and within reach of all stakeholders (Mileti 
et al. 1992; Mileti et al. 1997; Ronan et al. 1998; Johnston et al. 1999a) and it is possible to 
accommodate all communities (Ronan et al. 1997; Paton et al. 1998; Millar et al. 1999). 
 As argued by Christoplos (2006), any relief reduction and development can become 
a platform of lessons learnt about risk and vulnerability of the people involved. Even if the 
pattern in all events of hazards is exclusive and similar in terms of physical effect, 
communities still encounter difficulties in setting up a model that can suit a single example 
of a disaster programme that can let a community ‘bounce back’ independently (Paton et al. 
1996; Tobin, 1999; Van den Eyde et al. 1999; Lindell et al. 2000). Paton (2001) interpreted 
the meaning of resilience after disaster as the effort of the community with certain 
capabilities to act in response, or to recover effectively from the tragedy. Resilience 
describes the process of resourceful learning and the ability to recover psychologically in a 
group or individually (Paton, 2000).  
 Johnston et al. (2001) notes that active role and participation in disaster 
management has to come from the community and that involves assimilating and 
coordinating in terms of community consultation because emergency management societies 
become an element in directing the communities toward the process of change. Hence, 
more efforts have been directed towards promoting officials’ responsibilities to bridge 
information from government programme to community. Authorities encourage 
participants from within the community by providing them with enough information 
regarding potential challenges in hazard scenarios and development strategies, 
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opportunities and threats to and from the community in order to educate and involve them 
in disaster programmes (Heide, 1989). Authorities try to attract attention from communities 
by encouraging them to increase self confidence in combating weaknesses, elicit 
perceptions of hazard, focus toward goal attainment and minimise unnecessary demand 
(Lindell et al. 2000).  
However, the hazards phenomena per se limit exposure of the community to the real 
atmosphere of disaster. The rarity of hazard phenomena suggests that the process should 
focus on integrating hazard education with community development and problem solving to 
deal with existing or contemporary problems, with a focus on opportunities for growth.  
 
2.4.2 Mitigation and Preparedness in Disaster Planning 
Galea (2007) argued that the global community is increasingly aware of the fact that people 
are in trouble if the probability of hazards were to be ignored. The most appropriate way of 
battling calamities is by directing greater effort towards strategies in risk reduction rather 
than counter actions purely during a disaster aftermath. Consequently, the process of pre-
disaster planning is included within the management framework and is fundamental in 
ensuring an appropriate and well-organised feedback (O’Keefe et al. 2006). However, the 
inability of authorities to deal appropriately with a disaster scenario was reasoned as an 
institutional failure thereby leading to political consequences. Barriers in mitigation and 
preparedness must be addressed in order to enhance risk reduction strategies. 
 
2.4.2.1 Barriers to Mitigation 
Stakeholder consultations have revealed solutions in disaster mitigation strategies in 
designing a national framework and its rationale in disaster risk reduction (PSEPC, 2004). 
It was unanimously agreed that the notion of deliberate investment in mitigation is a 
necessity to restrain loss on the scene of disaster. Even key proceedings (e.g. HFA and 
Agenda 21) were also prioritised to set a preference of actions in order to decide 
government portfolios to coordinate strategies and evaluate the outcomes of actions. The 
first step towards national strategy is the primary challenge in political diversion (Lalonde, 
2007). Despite the fact that policy agenda and mitigation emerge as highly successful 
factors in disaster response, policy makers employ disregard in policy approach. Henstra 
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(2005) identified several barriers that hold back the development of mitigation strategies by 
authorities and response teams due to their hesitation concerning the issues below. 
 
A.  Hazards and Vulnerabilities 
Mitigation requires an assessment of the hazards and vulnerabilities that policies are 
intended to address. Kates (1971) and Kates et al. (1986) interpret that hazards are the 
interactions of natural extremes and social systems that take place at a given point in an 
environment. Conventional theories suggest that, research and policy in hazards focus more 
on physical events causing disasters (McBean, 2000). In fact, hazard may be viewed as any 
threat likely to happen to any valuable possessions that include people’s life, health and 
environment (Mills, 2001). O'Keefe et al. (1983) identified distinctive characteristics of 
hazards that complicate the process of disaster response such as picking the right solving 
efforts and the process of policy making such as: 
1. The magnitude of a hazard (e.g. its size, relative to past events or to a certain 
threshold) limits the options available to prevent or mitigate its impacts;  
2. Its frequency (how often a given hazard is expected to occur within a long run 
average) that influences the urgency of strategies required to deal with it;  
3. Its area extent (the space affected) that influences the range of stakeholders involved 
in the policy process.  
 
  Meanwhile, vulnerability to disaster is a function of human action and behaviour. It 
describes the degree to which a socio-economic system or physical system react as sets 
resilient to the impact of natural hazards. It is determined by a combination of several 
factors, including awareness of hazards, the condition of human settlement and 
infrastructure, public policy and administration, the wealth of a given society and organised 
abilities in all fields of a given society and organised abilities in all fields of disaster and 
risk management (UNISDR, 2001).  
 
B.  Misinterpretation of Benefits and Costs  
Policy is presumed to be defined, formulated and implemented locally. Unfortunately, as 
noted by Wolensky (1990) the limited discourse on local disaster management indicates 
that this is a particularly problematic area for local policymakers. This is due to the 
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uncertainty of the potential mitigation in benefits and costs. In the absence of the specific 
predictions regarding future hazards or evidence of future threat, local government is 
reluctant to invest in preventive measures. Godschalk (1985) emphasised that immediate 
and potentially significant costs must be addressed in any associated benefits.  
 
C. Uncertainty Surrounding Public Demands 
Citizens generally perceive a low probability of loss associated with hazards, except in 
jurisdictions where disaster occur frequently (Larsson, 1997; Lindell, 2001) and thus show 
little interest in disaster planning or loss reduction (Cigler, 1988). As a result, elected 
officials have few political incentives to allocate adequate time and resources to mitigation, 
when it is prioritised against other competing priorities such as economy development and 
political interest (Wright et al. 1981).  
 
D.  Lack of Direction in Organised Support 
Following a disaster, a special inquiry commission by the government elected is required to 
report on the situation and make suggestions for improvement. After analysing data and 
hearing testimony from people involved before, during and after the event, members 
produce a report, usually with specific recommendations (that may or may not be 
implemented) regarding how similar disaster can be prevented, avoided or minimised 
(Drabek, 1986). In the best interests of the public, problem solving should be undertaken by 
the government and authorities should be set up as alternatives to existing mitigation plan 
(physical, social and economic) that should then be able to transform social learning into 
effective policy responses (Henstra, 2005). The route to success requires time and support 
from disaster victims who are uncertain about their own strength and roles in disaster 
planning. 
 
E.  Fragmented Plan of Incentives and Resources due to Lack of Political Will 
Inter-governmental collaboration is difficult to organise and sustain (Wolensky, 1990) even 
though this type of collaboration is still considered as an essential key to develop and 
implement policies for disaster mitigation (Mushkatel et al. 1985). Local government are 
perhaps best positioned to implement mitigation due to their close proximity to hazards as 
they control many of the most effective tools to reduce vulnerability to hazards, such as 
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land use regulation and building code enforcement (Prater, 2000). Given that the 
probability of a disaster in any particular community is low, local officials are not likely to 
see mitigation as a pressing priority (Wright et al. 1981). Moreover, due to most of the 
financial costs of recovery after a disaster being shouldered by insurers and national 
governments, local government appear to have weak economic incentives to invest in loss 
reduction measures. 
 
F.  No Determination in Disaster Policy Making  
Most disaster management policies are formulated in the immediate aftermath of a disaster 
and are a reflection of political interest. In the scene of a disaster, political agendas emerge 
as a weapon that broadens the interest by the electronic and print media to draw attention to 
the situation in an effort to seek immediate actions from other communities (Cigler, 1987). 
Consequently, post-disaster policies are expanding in terms of government eligibility and 
budgeting in the future disaster programmes. Thus, political interest is the most popular 
agenda when disaster happens rather than an emphasis on preparedness and mitigation 
efforts in order to win the support from the public (May et al. 1986). For this reason, as 
suggested by Perry et al. (1984), it is better to make policies for disaster mitigation during 
normal periods, where there is less political pressure to act quickly and where policy can be 
formulated without specific reference to the most recent catastrophic events. 
 
2.4.2.2 Barriers to Preparedness 
Disaster planning requires support from both the public and local government. The 
responsibilities of the public do not rely only on the local government. The dynamic role of 
the public plays the key role in a successful disaster prevention and protection program. 
Communities, for instance, should find out how to obtain a first-aid kit or out how to get 
information if a disaster should occur; plan how to evacuate the home in a fire and learn 
how to deal with crisis reactions (Denis, 1995). They should be aware of food supply 
sources and take out personal insurance policies (Drabek, 1986; Drabek, 1987). 
Unfortunately, many people are not interested in preparedness and are unwilling to take 
precautionary measures themselves. Disaster communities prefer to participate in activities 
or programmes which are not time consuming, cheap and without the need for specific 
skills. Members of the general public tend to participate in voluntary services to avoid real 
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commitment with authorities if necessary, due to the uncertainty of disaster occurrence and 
finding no real reason for the need to prepare (Cigler, 1988). Other reasons for lack of 
action may be that people do not know what they should do, what to prepare if disaster is 
uncertain. 
 Less public awareness might lead to a backlash where the civilians blame the 
government for not making them aware of their actions during a disaster situation (Larsson, 
1997). The government should come up with a more concrete public awareness programme 
instead of a simple paper orientation (ICMA, 2003). Local government usually pays less 
attention to these issues based on assumptions that disasters occur rarely. Local government 
assumes that their responsibilities in disaster relief are limited only to providing road repair 
and crime prevention. Then, the concept of preparedness planning is subsequently lost 
(ICMA, 2003). The government should be aware of the principle in any post disaster 
development from disasters that focus on the crucial participation of affected communities, 
in order to study how to provide income generation, or rebuild social support networks, 
activities essential for maintaining cultural identities and reviving and conserving the often 
protective but vulnerable ecosystem (Johnston et al. 2001). People should be centrally 
involved in planning the recovery and rehabilitation of their own communities.  
 Therefore, in order to overcome obstacles in preparedness, the collaboration 
between national, state and local politicians is a necessity. As suggested by Davis (2007), 
although the stage of policy implementation rests at the district level, policy planning is 
predominantly the stronghold of the central government. The portfolios of central 
government officials should be transparent in the application of professional skills where 
leaders demonstrate the best examples of practice to other officials. Then, government 
officials establish a good relationship with disaster communities identified as instrumental 
for understanding disasters situation. Cooperation from all levels in the disaster mechanism 
and the public is the ultimate goal in order to deliver a national disaster programme. The 
leaders need to work closely with officials to make sure that all related parties are included 
in the planning of disaster preparedness (ICMA, 2003).  
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2.5 Roles of Government  
National public and media expectations of humanitarian post-disaster activities require 
action by the central government. Scholars found that there are four reasons why 
researchers have focused on government reactions to disaster management: 
1. Government is responsible for implementing government policies (Perry et al. 
1984).  
2. Government is the most trusted body elected by the people (Herman, 1982).  
3. The third is the transition of power from the federal to local government (May, 
1985). 
4. The comprehensive plans of disaster management make it easy for all parties to co-
operate with the federal, state and local agencies (Cigler, 1987).  
 
Government has close involvement with hazards, as they control many effective 
tools to reduce vulnerability to hazards such as land use regulation and building code 
enforcement (Prater, 2000).This usually results in the involvement of local government, 
line ministries and the emergency services along with the armed forces, in order to 
demonstrate the state’s social responsibility. Despite these developments, however, the 
government’s willingness and capacity to meet new expectations is often lacking. The 
government is still facing the same old issue of disaster management plan implementation 
because of the intergovernmental problem (Cigler, 1987). This common government 
recovery strategy appears without changes to any significant organisation (Davis, 2007). 
Lack of investment in preparedness and response capabilities becomes quickly obvious at 
the time of an emergency (Davis, 2007). Thus, Wolensky et al. 1990 notes that the overall 
performance of government and its officials emerges as problematic and still the focus of 
disaster response. 
 
2.5.1 Government Measures in Disaster Phases 
The dilemma of credibility and government commitment in deciding the best model to 
reconstruct buildings and infrastructure is one of the most challenging tasks for the 
managers in disaster response (Davis, 2007). This relates to more fundamental issues in the 
recovery planning. Whether, for example, emphasis should be given to satisfying short-
term basic reconstruction needs, or rather to focus on addressing long-term needs that may 
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provide a better measure of risk reduction. There are four phases of actions involve in 
disaster planning as describe below. 
 
A.  The Pre-disaster Period  
In the recent years governments have directed their activities towards mitigation and 
preparedness planning due to state mandates (Hoetmer, 1983b; Perry et al. 1984; 
Wolensky, 1986). The task of meeting a certain level of satisfaction in public service is 
getting more difficult to achieve in terms of competencies within the workplace, proper 
application of knowledge related to the position, punctuality and the ability to work well 
with other employees (Cigler et al. 1987). These experiences of handling disaster 
management increases organisational capability in planning (Mileti et al. 1975; Drabek, 
1986) and seems to apply to all local governments because it is the constitutional 
framework that must be tested by law; it is the dynamics of the relationship itself, the ways 
that each seeks to influence the other; and it is the impact of each on the wider issue of 
local governance, the overall experience of the citizen (Rossi et al. 1982).  
However, not all local governments are willing to apply all their efforts to 
comprehensive hazard management. Some of them only take action in particular hazard 
management without considering any other responsibilities such as defenses, social 
development and criminal laws requirements (Perry et al. 1984; Cigler et al. 1987). Thus, 
local government always makes sure it stays away from: 
1. Providing insufficient conceptualisation of the planning practice (e.g. government 
philosophy and ideology, priorities and time availability); 
2. Inadequate authenticity for planning (e.g. ad-hoc and situational based); 
3. Unproductive planning practice (e.g. unattended victims needs and unachievable 
project objectives) because planning processes are normally initiated by planning 
jurisdictions at central government. 
 
B.  The Emergency Period 
Dynes et al. (1972) suggested that communities are actually vulnerable in disaster and not 
ready to cope with the effects of a disaster and get back to their normal life as before the 
disaster strike. In the scene of an emergency, communities have not always been well 
organised throughout the emergency phase. Overall community resilience revealed the role 
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of the local government. Scholars found that there is a failure in implementation of disaster 
planning whenever the local government tries to cope with disaster problems without 
adequate collaboration with other public committee and other related agencies (Jacobson, 
1962; Barton, 1970; Dynes, 1970). Even some local governments admitted that they still 
manage to administer disaster situations without a clear definition of their own capabilities 
in terms of adequacies (Dynes, 1970). Perry (1985) argued that some local governments 
take advantages in times of emergency in given benefit to certain groups, especially in term 
of financial support from foreign assistance.  
At some point, there might be a possibility that some authorities completely 
disappear from the disaster scene and let the army to take action (Quarantelli, 1995b). 
However, there are ways to tackle weaknesses and problems in local government 
performance especially in the matter of unproductive government configuration, leadership, 
awareness of preparedness and unnecessary demands. First of all, local government has to 
increase local officials’ experience, quality and personality (Clifford, 1956; Moore, 1963; 
Barton, 1970; Slovic et al. 1974). The organisation in local government also must have the 
willingness and ability to configure a comprehensive plan (Cullen, 1976; Perry, 1985; 
Godshalk, 1988). As suggested by Stalling et al. (1987), local government formation must 
work toward decentralised authority that gives less of a role to central government; 
decentralisation increases ‘semi-autonomous’ agents, less dependent on central control and 
an establishment that can establish coordination in emergency situation.  
 
C.  The Early Recovery Period 
At this stage, researchers proposed the approach of ‘principle of continuity’ that link the 
similarities in pre and post disaster (Quarantelli et al. 1977). This approach limits flexibility 
and adaptability. For example, a custodial or maintenance oriented pre-disaster government 
will give highest post-disaster priority to streets, roads, garbage and other custodial tasks, 
while other functions such as recovery administration, intergovernmental coordination and 
conflict adjudication (judicial determination) will receive less attention (Wolensky et al. 
1981). Local government depends on the state government for options similar to an 
emergency (Stallings et al. 1987). They also start looking for other unavailable resources 
like funding and professional staff (Francaviglia, 1978). Normally, smaller governments are 
comprised of a minimal capacity of staff compared to larger local government 
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organisations.  Due to bureaucratic and legal restrictions, decision making at local 
government stage is slower compared to private organisation like NGOs (Haas et al. 1977) 
because NGOs involve a small organisation or less complications. 
 
D.  The Long-Term Recovery Period 
Again, local governments are slower in providing necessity such as foods, first aid and 
other basic amenities compared to speedy initiatives in terms of planning and 
implementation by private organisations due to less bureaucracy (Haas et al. 1977). Private 
organisations have more expertise compared to elected officials well known for ‘rubber 
stamp staff approvals’ that will act based on their superiors’ instruction and decisions in an 
organisation (Francaviglia, 1978). Compared to the short-term recovery period, long-term 
recovery phases also experiences the same situation with the influence from the 
communities (Norton et al. 1970; Wolensky et al. 1983).  
One of the main issues in long-term recovery is hazards mitigation and adjustments 
of land use. Local government has to be sensible in handling disaster management 
especially in new land development that may cause more vulnerability to affected 
community (Smith et al. 1979). Therefore, the local government must be able to establish 
high level of consistency in providing assistance in the pre and post disaster (May, 1985; 
Ender et al. 1988). Scholars found that in most cases the local governments are often 
unable to administer straightforward laws and regulations and disregard putting effort into 
hazard and risk management especially in providing housing due to time constraint and 
conflict of interest from many parties in terms of equality, adequacy and discriminations 
(Rossi et al. 1982).  
 
2.5.2 Government Dilemma 
With regard to issues concerning environmental protection and natural hazard mitigation, a 
majority of the affected population and regulators usually seek minimal government 
involvement in order to avoid steep taxes and more importantly avoid bureaucracy that 
would complicate the situation (e.g. legal actions and mass media attentions) (Turner et al. 
1986). However, those subject to regulation expect the local authorities to draw an 
appropriate relief plan along with expectations of a safe and secure environment. The local 
government is then held responsible for finding appropriate resources in order to make the 
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exact interpretation of differences between responsibility and resources (internal and 
external) dilemma (Langran et al. 1982). The local government will work through their 
legislative structures to discuss these responsibilities with agencies involved and achieve 
the desired outcome within the capacity of resources available, such as professional and 
financial support and accessible equipment. 
The problems within local governments have a deep impact in implementing federal 
government programmes in disaster planning. The problem in local management can be 
interpreted as an example of unpredictability and inconsistency in providing adequate 
resources to the stakeholders in disaster relief works based on existing legitimacy and 
organisation objectives. It is also considered a weak local government if they fail to place 
right officials with or without professional qualifications within their organisation to get 
public support. Weak leadership and planning also contribute to the failure of local 
governments in action (Nilson, 1985). Thus, the issue is much more complex than it seems 
in the scene of disasters.  
Nowadays the local government is more concerned with producing more 
professionally trained officials in order to achieve the desired level of effective 
management. The new management puts more emphasis on enhancing local government 
standards and legitimate action; lawful authority; an encouragement in sustaining action; 
and resources of institutional interest. However, the ideal planning design stands to be 
unsuccessful if the officials’ fail to blend together correct attitudes and translate this into 
policies. Officials initially require an understanding of the internal structure of the 
organisation as a result of adequate information about the direction of the organisation 
(Wolensky et al. 1990). Adequate information will then influence officials to the correct 
attitudes in policy implementation. 
 Scholars pay extra attention when it comes to the critique of: 
1. ‘Apathetic/unconcerned politics’ patterns in disaster planning at the local level 
(Wright et al. 1981); 
2. Lack of initiative in designing local disaster policy-making (Cigler et al. 1987), no 
fair consideration in appointing officials (Hoetmer, 1983a);  
3. Officials not well trained or not prepared (Dynes et al. 1972); 
4. Officials make an assumption that disasters would never occur (Petak et al. 1982); 
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5. Officials in organisation have trouble working together as a team (Ruchelman, 
1988).  
 
These are all the reasons that contribute to unachievable disaster planning 
objectives.  Problematic local government is a government that relegates them to a low 
priority in disaster response, adopts responses in a manner consistent with other 
government roles and responsibilities (without trying to suit the local atmosphere) and 
leaves private interests to make decisions. The problem worsens if any local government 
fails to consider public requirements in the designing and application of disaster 
programmes (Wolensky et al. 1990). Scholars have also argued that local government 
stability is not the only reason in implementing policies and optimising resources. It is 
actually the reality of the political base that should be established along with 
decentralisation from federal government and two-way interactions (Dynes, 1983; Drabek, 
1985, 1987). 
 As a result, the disaster victims and other members of the general public are more 
concerned about the availability of resources to support life recovery, ignoring any 
weaknesses of the local government (Abney et al. 1966; Wolensky et al. 1981). Almost 
certainly, this is the main reason why local governments are keener on delivering material 
resources rather than working along with internal organisational affairs. At the scene of a 
disaster, officials are often caught in the middle between working with ethics and 
programmes’ implementation whilst they have failed to fulfill requests from the disaster 
victims and public. This internal structural dilemma must be understood by the local 
government as a learning process towards a better strategies for formulating a 
comprehensive disaster planning to suit the demands from organisations in local 
government, officials and other members of the general public. 
 
2.6 Learning from Imperfections of Disaster Planning 
Quarantelli et al. (1977) argued that communities give very low priority to disaster 
planning. Drabek (1986) points out that even developed countries like the United States of 
America also face issues of authority uncertainty (i.e. regional cooperation between the 
province and the municipalities especially to access tax fund), task domains (i.e. regional 
board faced the problem of land use within the municipalities) and support from the public 
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(e.g. public unaware of disaster victims, what is the right treatment, who and when to refer 
and how to deal long term treatment issues). However, developed countries do encourage 
activities and training in disaster mitigation especially from federal governments through 
federal grants; utilisation and integration of crisis services (e.g. hospital and community 
base); utilisation of mental health professionals and support personal; form ‘crisis teams’ 
from outside the disaster area to support response team; use available local and outside 
network and financial support; and constitute educational forums amongst local experts 
(Quarantelli et al. 1977; Newkirk, 2001) that should inspire other countries to do the same. 
 In the process of social learning, most of the successful disaster planning by local 
government is established from their experiences in handling previous disasters such as 
learning from disaster planning rectification, enhancing local government coordination and 
cooperation from disaster communities. The development of a two way relationship 
between community leaders and key officials elected in disaster management mechanism 
and maximising resources available are considered as key factors of success in disasters 
programs. However, it is not often that local governments try to educate the communities to 
the hazards that might threaten them. Hence, the community must take the initiative to 
understand a disaster perspective, and how they as an organisation attempt to cope and 
assist in the recovery process. Quarantelli (1980) suggested that the community must first 
keep the effort simple and not over organise, create a good relationship with authorities and 
unaffected neighbouring areas, learn the national emergency framework and learn from 
previous attempts in disaster and never start without any clue. 
  Planning for a disaster should be differentiated from managing a disaster 
(Quarantelli et al. 1977). Disaster planning involves pre and post-disaster phases. Managing 
a disaster is the outcome base approach when disaster strikes. Such planning is an ongoing 
process and not a product. It is based on likely events, not worst possible cases. It aims for 
appropriate, not necessarily speedy responses. It is based upon accurate knowledge of 
disaster behaviour and on patterns of everyday routines. And it avoids ‘command and 
control’ structures (see section 3.2, p.49, p.4). Wenger et al. (1980) acknowledged 
weaknesses that planning officials have faced in implementing programmes in disaster 
management. They include: 
1. Assumptions that their behaviour not reflect to disasters and public response; 
2. A firm mind-set that disaster planning is not their working culture; 
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3. Assumptions that disaster planning is not a process but a product; 
4. Failure to overcome the barriers in understanding what comprises an emergency and 
rather wait for further top administration orders; 
5. Failure to prepare and react to an effort of information distribution to surrounding 
communities; 
6. Failure to act quickly in setting up command centers and communication; 
7. Inability to compare between the real instruction from the administration and their 
own responsibilities;  
8. Failure to responds as required due to lack of preparation. 
 
Therefore as argued by Faupel (1987) disaster planning largely ignored the sense of 
sociological human ecology that consists of population, surroundings, social organisation, 
customs and technological scope of communities. Environmental and behavioural aspects 
in sociological act as priorities as shown in Table 2.1 that considered as the influential 
factors (i.e. organisational, supervisory, operator, regulatory and technical) in 
organisational administration (Toft et al. 1999). 
 
Table 2.1: Social Categories and Properties of Errors 
Category Sub-category Properties 
Organisational Procedural Rules and regulations; operating procedures and manual; 
administrative controls; documentation; and communication 
Training Competency and inadequate knowledge 
Management Leadership, policy and resources 
Safety-specific Safety policy; emergency planning; maintenance; inadequate 
design; monitoring/auditing; lack of corrective action; poor 
accident reporting; and 
detection and alarm facilities 
Failure to learn Cover-up accidents and fail to learn from previous accidents 
Supervisory  Fail to recognise unsafe operation; lack of professionalism; 
disregard for higher authority; not adhering to rules and 
regulations; apathy attitude; and failed to correct problems 
Operator  Incompetence; sub-standard practices; violation of rules and 
regulations; and ignorance 
Regulatory  Ineffective monitoring by regulators; outdated laws and 
regulations; poor inter-agency co-ordination; inadequate 
resources of regulators; complacency of regulators; and 
Ineffective communications between agencies 
Technical  Equipment failure 
      Adapted from Toft et al. (1999) 
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In additional, Meidinger (1987) argued that people uses culture to adapt to new 
environments and environmental change that is influenced more by social than by 
biological variables (e.g. genders and races). They depend much on human interaction with 
surroundings (natural environment). In the natural environment (i.e. biological and 
economic foundations), human ecology provides a broader and cross-disciplinary 
perspective that is influenced by physical environmental, political, legal, psychological, 
cultural and societal forces that should be explained as key influences in implementing 
disaster planning strategies. 
 
2.7 New Emergency Management Model 
A new diverse element of emergency management creates a multi-disciplinary; multi-
organisational; and two-way event of nature and technologies (Harrald, 2006). Based on the 
various recent studies as shown in Table 2.2, scholars found out that emergency 
management framework requires utilising of organisation resources such as: 
1. Humans, technology, financial and equipment;  
2. Ought to consider influence factors such as economic, cultural, educational, 
political, legal and organisational;  
3. As well as functions such as communication, coordination, information sharing and 
decision making.  
 
Any procedure in emergency response must be based on the combination of a socio-
technical system and human organisation in order to put together technical and 
organisational response to protect vulnerable communities (Comfort et al. 2006). The 
combination of these resources, factors and functions determine the system of successful 
emergency management in a large-scale system.  
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Table 2.2: Success Factors in Emergency Management 
Study Mentioned Factors 
Marincioni (2007) Interpersonal interaction, disaster knowledge sharing and 
transferability 
Gopalakrishnan et al. 
(2007) 
Integrated disaster risk management; preparedness/warning, 
reconstruction/rehabilitation and disaster mitigation agencies; disaster-
related laws, regulations and statutes; culture, tradition and customs; 
adaptability of the measures to the local conditions; access to 
information; information availability; information transferability; 
affordability of possible solutions; decision making autonomy; political 
and managerial accountability; improved multi-agency collaboration; 
optimal resource management; participation of public and private 
agencies, individuals and communities; shared collective experience 
and wisdom of disasters and knowledge of local conditions 
Fedorowicz et al. (2007) Collaborative network 
Harrald (2006) Agility (creativity, improvisation and adaptability) and discipline 
(structure, doctrine and process) 
Horan et al. (2006) Socio-technical systems, inter-organisational factors, time-critical 
information services, human-computer interaction, organisational 
policies and IT utilisation 
Corbacioglu et al. (2006) Organisational flexibility; information infrastructure; cultural 
openness; effective coordination and collective response; and 
information flow 
Kapucu (2006) Communication system, effective source utilisation; knowledge and 
technology; and trust among public, private and non-profit 
organisations 
USGAO (2006) Clearly defined leadership roles, responsibilities and lines of authority 
for the response at all levels; effective communication; and fast 
decision making 
Dawes et al. (2004a) Integrating; information sharing; social and technical structure; and 
larger political and organisational environments 
Dawes et al. (2004b) Political, social, economic, cultural, organisational, technical 
environments; collaboration among public, private and non-profit 
organisations; volunteerism; leadership, trust and risk management; 
and communication 
Dawes et al. (2004c) Effective use of information and communication technologies; and 
organisational competence and experience 
Dawes et al. (2003) Capabilities of the technical tools 
Schoenberger (2002) Interoperability during emergency and public policies 
Bardach (2001) Effective communication and trust 
Comfort et al.(2006) Organisational learning; cultural openness to new information; 
important in influencing both organisational flexibility and technical 
structure in practice; coordination; and organisational authority, skills, 
knowledge, resources and capacity 
Dynes et al. (1977) Communication for organisational decision making and coordination 
                                                                                        Adapted from Ozceylan et al. (2008) 
 
 As a starting point, a well planned emergency management should put emphasis on 
roles of officials, responsibilities, clearly define the task at different levels and should 
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encourage efficient communication and decision making. Efficient decision making in turn 
depends on well trained and highly qualified leaders with enough exposure and experience, 
provided with adequate access to a wide range of information in order to make things 
happen. The leaders should possess a clear objective in carrying out duties and should be 
capable to carry out specific tasks with desired results, supported with a combination of 
resources including people, protocols, funds and technologies. Consequently, disaster 
management mechanism urges to ensure availability of effective planning, coordination, 
training and practices. These planning, coordination, training and practices in emergency 
management should be realistically tested on problems encountered and within reach of 
other stakeholders (USGAO, 2006). 
 Harrald (2006) argued that in terms of preparedness and prevention, it depends 
much on the level of awareness and the strength of internal institutions to create and 
maintain a better understanding based on realistic response plans. It is essential to discover 
capability to initiate reaction and mobilisation in order to obtain access to a better 
organisational network and resources. Thus, any country must clearly define phases of 
organisational integration especially with the effort to define which organisation holds 
greater responsibility to implement disaster plans. The extent of prior warning is the first 
move in dealing with an emergency. Immediate action in any emergency response is crucial 
in setting up post control; as is mutual understanding and coordination between emergency 
providers; and formulation of communication networks.  
 Finally, the indicators to measure a successful output in disaster response are 
identified as rapid action, massive funding, improved working conditions, community 
outreach and integration of relevant institutions (Inam, 1999). End products are expected to 
reach the disaster victims in a correct manner that in turn depends on organisational 
productivity. Williams et al. (2000) argued that the government should always notice levels 
of improvement in the engagement programme as a result of this learning process. 
Ozceylan et al. (2008) concluded the notion by identifying six formulas of success in 
emergency management that would act as a universal national emergency management 
mechanism. A model of an ideal emergency management mechanism is influenced by 
technological factors, cultural factors, socio-economical factors, organisational factors, 
political factors and risk factors. Still, these factors of success depend on each country’s 
specific conditions and capabilities.  
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2.8 Potential Risk of Post-Disaster Recovery  
Post-disaster recovery is a multi-faceted and lengthy process including physical, economic, 
physiological, social services and natural and ecological aspects (May, 2007). In any post-
disaster planning and recovery, reconstruction of infrastructure and housing are two of the 
primary challenges, such as ensuring enhanced seismic design and construction quality 
because a main indicator to measure the outcome of risk reduction indicators is the 
percentage of houses constructed according to building codes with appropriate hazard-
resistant features (Christoplos, 2006). The question inevitably arises whether the 
development of the affected community is free from potential risk.  
 According to the sociological perspective, risk indicates the possibility that a certain 
course of action will trigger future injurious effects such as losses and destruction (Giddens, 
1990). The terms of risk, danger and hazard are used as interchangeable and overlapping 
because risk is defined as the probability of an injurious effect resulting from a hazard 
(Kaplan et al. 1981). Risk may also be defined as the possibility that a certain course of 
social action is already set to create undesirable effects (e.g. losses, destruction and effects 
of future generations). The concept of risk is considered as an opposite to security where 
the higher the risks the lower the security of the displaced populations (Luhman, 1993). The 
potential risks of post-disaster recovery to the affected community are reflecting to 
‘impoverishment’ and consider as potential risk of moderate or serious harm to the health 
and safety of the occupiers (or others) of the residential premises.  
 Displacement risks to the people are the result of a multifaceted process of 
displacement components towards impoverishment known as landlessness, joblessness, 
homelessness, marginalisation (the social process of becoming), food insecurity, increased 
morbidity (incidence of a disease), loss of access to common property resources and 
community disarticulation (cause to separate). Therefore, with the help from authorities 
strategies should be taken to change from landlessness to land-based resettlement, from 
joblessness to reemployment, from homelessness to housing reconstruction, from marginal 
to social inclusion, from increased morbidity to improved health care, from food insecurity 
to adequate nutrition, from loss of access to restoration of community assets and services 
and from social disarticulation to networks and community rebuilding (Cernea et al. 2000). 
The sign of significant progress may take a long time to consider as full recovery because 
43 
 
the process of redevelopment requires full participation from other members in 
communities (NGOs, private sectors and public sectors).  
 Authorities also have an important role to play in contributing to the overall housing 
supply (Dorris, 1998) because secondary disasters (collateral disaster) are often cause far 
more damage and problems than a primary disaster (a first disaster such as an earthquake 
that causes or brings in its wake one or more disasters such as a fire or tsunami) (Comeria 
et al. 1996). Unacceptable housing conditions partly or entirely due to non-compliance with 
building codes and other related legislation is considered as potential risk of moderate or 
serious harm to the health and safety of the occupiers (or others) of the residential premises 
such as: 
1. Physical injury (burns, wound and serious bodily injury);  
2. Psychological distress (sadness, frustration, anxiety and a number of other negative 
mood states);  
3. Emotional and psychological trauma;  
4. Psychosocial effects as a result of secondary disaster (Levine et al. 2007).  
 
Emotional and psychological trauma is the results of extraordinarily stressful events 
that ruin a sense of security, making victims feel helpless and vulnerable in a dangerous 
world. Traumatic experiences often involve a threat to life or safety, but any situation that 
leaves victims feeling overwhelmed and alone can be traumatic, even if it doesn’t involve 
physical harm. Psychosocial effects are psychological developments ranging from 
individual interaction and relationship with a social environment or community culture. 
Psychosocial support is an approach to victims of disaster, catastrophe or violence to 
promote resilience of communities and individuals (Chemtob et al. 1997). It aims at easing 
continuation of normal life, facilitating the participation of affected people and preventing 
pathological (caused by disease) consequences of potentially traumatic situations. 
The ability of the built environment to withstand the impacts of natural forces plays 
a direct role in determining the casualties and economic costs of disasters. Disaster resistant 
construction of buildings and infrastructure is an essential component of local resiliency 
(Cernea et al. 2000). Engineering codes, standards and practices have been acknowledged 
and practiced for natural hazards prevention. However, investigations after disasters have 
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revealed shortcomings in construction techniques, code enforcement and the behaviour of 
structures under stress (Mileti, 1999).  
There are circumstances however where it is necessary to enforce housing standards 
to protect the health, safety and welfare of occupiers, the public and occasionally the wider 
community. It is the purpose of framework or policy to ensure that where it is necessary to 
enforce standards that authorities achieve and maintain a consistent and balanced approach. 
Thus, relevant legislation will be used and consideration will be given to codes of practice; 
statutory guidance; and best practice. Any post-disaster recovery framework or policy in 
providing housing must come with specific rules and regulation such as Housing Act, 
Building Codes and Law of Property Act. Such rules and regulations will give authority or 
local authority powers to intervene where housing conditions are unacceptable to reduce the 
risk of human casualties (Imrie, 2007).  
 
2.8.1 Risk Reduction in Housing 
Work in providing shelter is perhaps more complex than any other kind in emergency relief 
work due to land ownership issues. Often the pressures of time, limited contingency budget 
and people’s needs counteract the demands of quality and suitability (Morago, 2005). Post-
disaster housing recovery encompasses four components that appear in succession:  
1. Emergency shelter;  
2. Temporary shelter; 
3. Temporary housing; 
4. Permanent housing (Quarantelli, 1995b).  
 
As the disaster recovery period lengthens, temporary housing can begin to take on a 
permanent character, even if the housing is not suitable for long-term habitation. This 
remains a concern of many planners and policy makers (Schwab et al. 1998). Scholars have 
long noted that authorities vary widely in terms of the disaster-related policies they adopt, 
due to political and economic factors and disaster experience (Godschalk et al. 1998). This 
scenario demands certain standards and guidelines that initiate benchmarks to the way 
monitoring and evaluation can be done in humanitarian response. The improper use of 
standards and guidelines may lead to the under-provision or over-provision of outcome 
(Corsellis et al. 2005) due to insufficient use of all requirements, under-represented or 
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excluded from the standardisation process. Therefore the proper use of standards and 
guidelines must in balance by asserting the objectives, rationale of existence, 
standardisation and representative.  
There are five key principles of better building regulation practice for displaced 
people from authorities that should include:  
1. full application of all related laws and securing compliance and also means relating 
enforcement action;  
2. Consistency in approach;  
3. Targeting of enforcement action where the hazards are least controlled;  
4. Transparency in what is expected from regulates;  
5. Accountable to the public for their actions (OPDM, 2005).  
 
In order to achieve compliance with statutory requirements in providing housing, 
authorities will also, where possible, work informally with occupants or other members of 
the public in removing or reducing risks to the health and safety by reconsidering the use of 
all other relevant legislation to remove or reduce those risks. Responsible authority is 
committed to being independent, fair and objective to deal with all members of the 
community equally, irrespective of age, gender, sexual orientation, ethnic or national 
origin, religious beliefs, political views, illness or disability (Imrie, 2007). Therefore, 
authority must be aware of the obvious breach of the law; reckless disregard for the 
environment; deception that may or may not result in a loss or potential loss of public 
funds; and failure to comply in full or in part with a statutory notice or order. There are two 
types of mechanism for improving regulatory or authority compliance through enforcement 
activity:  
1. Direct order and inspection; 
2. Provide them with incentives to comply by increasing the probability of detection 
and the expected penalties when caught out of compliance (Weil, 1992).  
 
However, regulatory compliance is a complex, flexible, dynamic and interactive 
process that can include various states of affairs from ongoing efforts to achieve and 
maintain regulatory requirements to go ‘beyond compliance’ as a target. Thus, enforcement 
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by authority involves more than prosecutions (Hutter, 1997). The topic of regulatory 
compliance will be discussed thoroughly in the next chapter.  
 
2.9 Conclusion  
People most probably misjudge disaster due to the fact that they have never been in a 
disaster situation in the past (Larsson et al. 1997) thus they give very low priority to 
disaster planning (Quarantelli et al. 1977). The general public seems to underestimate 
disasters until they experience it themselves. Even developed counties do not allocate big 
budgets in disaster management, time and other resources in planning for disasters due to 
rare occurrence of disasters (Davis, 2007). However, most of them are prepared in terms of 
regional networks, budget allocations, awareness on insurance coverage and many more 
(Newkirk, 2001). Unfortunately, developing countries are more prone to be predominantly 
hit by the disasters compared to developed countries (IFRCRCS, 1993). Even development 
plans do not usually take form in most cases in developing countries (Isbister, 1994). As a 
result, 95 per cent of fatalities occurred after disasters in less privileged countries (PHO, 
1994). Thus, people live in developing country are, most likely, more vulnerable to hazards. 
A hazard is the result of an increasing impact towards vulnerability on humans and society. 
In this respect disasters are not isolated events, but a sign of the insufficiencies and 
weaknesses within society, tempted by human-determined paths of development. However, 
considerations by society have been made concerning pre and post-disaster planning. 
Alternatives in thinking and planning to incorporate needs that are involved in post-disaster 
reconstruction have also been highlighted. Recovery requires an intensive approach that 
will support the foundations of community sustainability and capacity building and that 
will eventually reduce risks and vulnerabilities to future disasters. Government alone, as 
elected authority with overall control of legislation, is unable to facilitate recovery efforts 
without knowing the needs of a community. This is where the real challenge begins 
especially in housing reconstruction. Shortages of qualified people to handle impact 
assessments, the time taken for normal processing of building consents that require a more 
flexible approach and the need of government roles as the authorities elected are always the 
issues in disaster planning and recovery. Furthermore, routine regulatory and legislative 
processes would not facilitate regulatory bodies coping with the volume of work associated 
with the reconstruction efforts and administration routine at the same time after disaster. 
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Recently, new routines in the emergency management model, focuses more on government 
responses because of hands-on experience with the communities. Problems related to the 
government were highlighted in advance before addressing actions in disaster phases. The 
following chapters will examine the groundwork of present investigations to disaster 
management development in terms of international and national legitimacy, legislations, 
compliance and the way officials respond to it. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Compliance and Enforcement 
 
“Laws only exist because men can be guilty of injustice. Where it is possible for people to 
act unjustly among themselves, it is also possible for them to act unjustly toward each 
other”. 
(Aristotle, Book V, Chapter VI) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
There has been too great an emphasis on inputs, rather than outcome and impact in post-
disaster recovery (Bennett et al. 2006). The monitoring/reporting formats used by all the 
agencies concentrated mostly on physical distribution. As a result, disaster survivors do not 
get what they deserve and expect; what is accomplished is rather what the government 
wanted. The survivors’ development cannot be tracked systematically due to lack of 
interaction with government (Bennett et al. 2006). Thus, compliance with regulation is not 
prescriptively based on input. Planners in government should also look into the fact that 
disaster is not the only cause of disaster victims; human actions, especially by those who 
have legal control over disaster planning are also to blame.  
 Contemporary debates in regulatory studies concerning the relationship between 
science evidence and the regulatory policy (art) of policy making (at government level and 
judiciary) are expanding (Irwin et al. 1997). Regulation is an art (Weinberg, 1972). A 
design of regulation is a sociological approach that represents uncertainties and structural 
conflicts in the policy process resulting from the different perspectives, interests and 
rationalities of different groups involved. However, it is difficult to define based on the 
level of uncertainty especially when dealing with the issues of risk and environmental 
hazard because of the relationship between the presence of scientific evidence and the 
making of policy decisions making (Weinberg, 1988).  
Weinberg (1972) suggested that regulatory science should be treated as ‘a new 
branch of science’ because the norms of proof are there and similar to the norm of ordinary 
science or academic science (e.g. in speculative research related to regulatory evidence 
such as chemical toxicity/environmental hazard); in development and validation of 
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regulatory tests (specific test to the chemicals for potential hazards); and in regulatory 
compliance testing (measure by using scientific services). 
 Regulation might be translated into a package of dependable rules that is governed 
by a mechanism known as an organisation (i.e. public entity) in order to monitor and 
promote regulatory compliance (Baldwin et al. 1998; Gunningham et al. 1999b). In a 
broader context, the concept of regulation is the method of enforcement of rules that 
includes the system of taxation measures, subsidies and relevant incentives by using 
mechanisms available (Baldwin et al. 1998). Based on this definition, the regulatory 
environment is controlled by actors within the government and external such as 
corporations, professional organisations, international stakeholders, non-government 
organisations (NGOs) (Brereton, 2003), other community assemblies and private 
communities.  
 Thus, Haines (2002) identified key themes that are considered as main indicators in 
the regulatory practice towards good governance (see section 3.2, p.49) by regulators. 
Regulators should be aware of the regulatory aims and any flexibility allowed in the 
process, especially the priority to execute decisions, rather than prescriptive compliance 
with rules. They should emphasise enhancement in self-regulation; ‘culture of compliance’ 
promotion; strong leadership; and utilise experts’ availability in order to ensure that both 
regulatees and regulators satisfy the process of regulatory compliance. However the 
question inevitably arises whether regulators can fully comply with regulatory framework 
(as shown in Appendix 7, p.339) set in disaster plan or uses disaster (often the pressures of 
time, budget and people’s needs) situations as an excuse. Disaster is not just an 
environmental tragedy it is also a human rights disaster due to governments’ political and 
socio-economic pressures. 
 
3.2 Regulatory Compliance 
Generally compliance refers to “acting in accordance with an influence from the source” 
(Payan et al. 2005: 72). Actors are obliged to obey the regulation contents stipulated in 
their jurisdiction. They will be compared in terms of proper conduct to a formal description 
of the corresponding (legal) obligation (Lange, 1999). The process involves a requirement 
in mandatory reporting, site inspections and penalties (Hutter, 1997). However, the formal 
definition is different from the real scenario of regulatory compliance because compliance 
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is considered as the process of negotiated outcome between a social actor and an 
enforcement officer (Fairman, 2005).  
 There are many models of compliance and enforcement to regulation. The 
traditional model of compliance and enforcement only describes two strategies known as 
‘compliance-sanctioning’ (penalties) and ‘compliance-deterrence’ (punishment) (Reiss, 
1984). Both strategies encourage a cooperative, problem-solving approach in an ongoing 
working relationship between regulators and regulatees. Regulators will only use punitive 
sanctions as a last resort because they are viewed as a failure of the regulatory system to 
achieve compliance. Both strategies however were not very instructive and useful in the 
design of real-world regulatory tools and techniques (Hawkin, 1984). Then, the model of 
‘responsive regulation’ was introduced in early 1980s (Scholz, 1984). This model was 
developing further from ‘compliance-deterrence’ that will apply punitive sanctions at last 
resort but with an introduction of ‘regulatory forgiveness’. Regulators setting a minimal 
level of compliance where negotiation and cooperation strategies were put in place until 
regulatees agreed to comply in order to avoid non-compliance.  
In a recent development, as a result of this classical thinking, scholars have revealed 
two approaches in regulatory compliance recognised as ‘enforcement pyramid’ 
(compliance from all regulators that starts at the base of the pyramid consist of persuasion 
and self-regulation to the top pyramid that consist of sanction and punishment) 
(Braithwaite, 2002) as shown in Box 3.1 and ‘smart regulation’ that has been practiced by 
most of authorities nowadays (Sigler et al. 1988, 1991).  
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Box 3.1: Enforcement Pyramid 
 
                                                      Source: Braithwaite (2002) 
 
The ‘smart regulation’ presents a comprehensive approach to the design, 
implementation and enforcement of environmental regulatory requirements that include 
‘Interactive Enforcement Pyramid’ and the influence from outside enforcement pyramid of 
both commercial and non-commercial (third parties) (Gunningham et al. 1999). However in 
any model, Parker (1999) argued that enforcement agencies must understand the difficulties 
of compliance and should make a right judgment about evaluation of compliance before 
they really present it to the regulatees where there are the real challenges from being 
questioned by public.  
 Modern regulatory forms often avoid the forcefulness of ‘command and control’ 
approaches and ‘prescriptive rules’ (how things are supposed to be/totally depending on 
rules) because regulated parties are more responsible for their own internal regulation and 
risk management (Parker, 1999). The model of ‘command and control’ is naturally 
considered as the best conventional way to represent disaster organisational preparedness 
and only applicable in an emergency situation where the military poses as the only choice 
(Drabek, 1986). This is a systematic rigid military concept that applies hierarchy in a highly 
structured social organisation (Dynes, 1983). Generally, the command and control model 
presumes that disasters create a remarkable instability with everyday life that lowers the 
effectiveness of individual behaviour and reduces the capacity of the social organisations 
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involved. According to this model, planning is the centre on the development of mechanism 
to control adaptation of individual behaviour and on the creation of ad hoc structures to 
replace the disruptive and non-functioning social organisation in the disaster area. 
 However, the vital role of the ‘command and control’ regulation is not practical in 
the today’s ‘regulatory mix’ concept that involve participation of all authorities, agencies, 
NGOs and communities (Mazerolle, 2000; Ransley, 2002). Current regulatory forms 
encourage the approach of ‘regulatory mix’ that includes types of policy instruments, 
including policy through law with crucial input from regulatees. The ‘regulatory mix’ 
depends largely on the perception of legitimating within the political system and on the 
political actors that shape and drive the issues arise. This new regulatory concept invites 
other related parties such as: 
1. NGOs and community participation (Mazerolle et al. 1998);  
2. Introduces incentive schemes to the regulators such as promotion and professional 
expansion (Gunningham, 1999a; Brereton, 2003);  
3. Has self-regulation base (that puts procedures in place and require particular 
activities so it can manage regulators’ behaviour and effectiveness in terms of 
performance, organisation direction and compliance so regulation can deliver on its 
own priorities as well as those of government and regulators);  
4. Has co-regulated with the support and guidance by the top level (Gunningham, 
1999a);  
5. Requires reports presentation (by regulators because report is critical to the process 
of identifying the needs from every parties involve in disaster situation) 
(Gunningham et al. 1999b).  
 
This new good governance concept of ‘new regulatory state’ contributes to less 
‘rowing’ but more ‘steering’ efforts (Osborne et al. 1992; Parker et al. 2003) because 
government should not stop running everything they in charge of rather should use 
legitimacy to create opportunities for public to act and contribute. They emphasise in 
empowering government agencies (two way interactions) rather than serving public (one 
way interaction). 
 Hence, efforts towards the term ‘beyond compliance’ such as regulations based on 
outcome (e.g. ‘enforcement pyramid’ and compliance culture establishment-attitudes 
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towards law-abidingness/adhering to the law and rule-following) are designed in order to 
achieve regulatory goals (Fairman, 2005). Even though, penalties and punishment were 
found to be the most effective towards higher regulatory compliance (Haines, 2002), more 
solutions should be found towards full regulatory compliance efforts because penalties and 
punishment technique is only a single set of regulatory goals and encourages ‘prescriptive 
rules’ and ‘command and control’.  
 Thus, regulatory scholars began to focus their attention on researching compliance 
rather than deterrence and began to realise the importance of persuasion and cooperation as 
a regulatory tool for gaining compliance by adopting an accommodative process of 
regulation (willingness of institutions to adjust to differences from internal and external 
influences in order to obtain agreement in regulatory compliance) (Braithwaite, 1985) 
rather than by an assimilative process (people engagement in selective and self-regulatory 
activities based on the present internal capability of institution) (see also section 9.1.2, 
p.286). According to the ‘accommodative model’, regulatory agencies prefer to see 
themselves as ‘social actors’ (consultants-give advice about how to comply) through 
cooperation rather than as strict law enforcement (punishment). Regulatory enforcement 
tends to view regulatory compliance partly because of belief in the rule of law and partly as 
a matter of long-term self-interest (Scholz, 1984). The focus to be more oriented toward 
seeking results in compliance rather than looking for punishment from non-compliance. 
 
3.3 Research in Regulatory Compliance  
Compliance plays a major role in jeopardising the management effectiveness and is still far 
from complete (Sutinen et al. 1990). Linder et al. (1987) notes that for the last decade 
scholars recognised that studies in public policies have been subjected to the way a 
government acts especially the federal government. Therefore, analysis regarding policies 
and government instruments were more towards consulting federal governments. Individual 
officers in the government are those who are responsible in shaping government’s 
behaviours. Most likely, individuals prefer to achieve their own self-interests rather than 
organisational goals that can impose harm on others (Smith, 1759). Thus, when deciding 
whether to comply, self-interested individuals influence the potential illegal gain against the 
strictness and certainty of approvals (Sutinen et al. 1990). It was also encouraged that the 
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public be given bigger part contributing to issues toward institutional compliance (Ransley, 
2002). 
 Sutinen et al. (1990) argued that recent research in psychology and sociology 
emphasises the importance of socialisation processes that affect behaviour. The key 
psychological theories to explain socialisation processes are divided into two parts that 
consist of cognitive and social learning elements (Kohlberg, 1969, 1976, 1981; Levine et 
al. 1977; Tapp et al. 1977). The theory in cognitive is more relevant to the individual 
developmental process. This theory emphasises the morality variable within an individual’s 
personal and individual’s moral development. On the other hand, social learning theory 
focuses primarily on the conditioning effects of the environment (Aronfreed, 1968, 1969; 
Bandura, 1969; Mischel et al. 1976; Akers et al. 1979; Akers, 1985). The key variable in 
the social learning theory is determining opinions according to perception of compliance 
from peers and the individual (see section 3.8.1, p.86) and social influences (see section 
5.10, p.138). Thus, general hypothesis in rules and regulations chosen are related to 
individual internal and external capacity with influences from working environment (Akers, 
1985) because researchers try to link socialisation process between individuals and society. 
 There are two essential perceptions in sociology literature on compliance known as 
‘instrumental’ and ‘normative’ (Tyler, 1990). The ‘instrumental’ perspective is more 
towards individual self-interest and immediate changes respond, motivated by incentives 
and strictly obligated to punishment. The key variables determining compliance according 
to ‘instrumental’ perspective are the severity and certainty of sanctions. The ‘normative’ 
perspective emphasises what individuals consider truthful and honest, instead of what is in 
their self-interest. Individuals tend to comply with the law to the extent that they perceive 
the law as appropriate and consistent with their internalised norms. The key variables 
determining compliance in the ‘normative’ perspective are individuals' perceptions of the 
fairness and appropriateness of the law and its institutions (Tyler, 1990). Thus, compliance 
with a law or regulation is influenced by the extent to which individuals accept legitimacy 
in enforcement agencies. Legitimacy is compared to a normative (relating to 
standard/model) assessment by individuals of the appropriateness or right of enforcement 
agencies to restrict their behaviour. Compliance is higher when individuals carry out a high 
level of legitimacy and make constant normative assessment to the enforcement agencies.  
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3.4 Compliance Assessment to International Standards 
Even though it is impossible to achieve ultimate compliance, the system of regulation and 
enforcement only works if there is no major cause of concern from stakeholders and 
continuous efforts are being undertaken to improve it (Hutter, 1997). There are three stages 
of assessment in compliance systems:  
1. Institution should identify and rectify related laws and other social responsibilities 
involve; 
2. Institution would have determined the substantive (firm basis in reality and 
important) or considerable outcomes that the assessment guideline is guaranteeing 
(or at least improving) the institution accomplishment of the regulation objectives 
(e.g. product safety, environmental health in the local area and worker health); 
3. Whether the institution is utilising its own outcome monitoring tools in designing 
and improving its own compliance system (Johnston, 2004).  
 
If there is no internal assessment tool available, the institution will normally turn to 
international standards. 
 ISO 9000:2005, ISO 9001:2008 and ISO 9004 in quality management systems are 
some of the standards produced as a result of the international standards restriction by ‘The 
International Organisation for Standardisation’ (ISO) (ISO, 2009). The organisation 
officially disseminates global industrial and commercial proprietary standards. They are 
also an official consultant appointed by company or organisation and certain governments. 
However, the compliance application is still much influenced by the present system of a 
country (Oke et al. 2007) such as: 
1. In Australia, the subject of compliance and its demand is increasing. The revised 
‘2006 AS 3806-Compliance Programs’ is the main reference according to the 
Australia Standards (AS, 2006). The new compliance regime requires companies to 
have enough resources (e.g. human, technology and financial) and skills in order to 
strengthen and establish a risk management system. There are some changes to 
cover additional principles’ in aspects from the original 1998 standards. The 
Australian regulators are encouraged to endorse the standard practicality when 
establishing a compliance framework by regulation (Parker et al. 2006). 
56 
 
2. In the United Kingdom (UK), some restrictions are governed by legislation in the 
European Union. Various bodies claim to have responsibility to monitor regulatory 
compliance such as the ‘Financial Services Authority’ (FSA), ‘Environment Agency 
and Scottish Environment Protection Agency’ and ‘Information Commissioner's 
Office’. Mainly, the ‘Data Protection Act 1998’ covers important compliance issues 
for large and small organisations. The ‘Freedom of Information Act 2000’ covers 
for the public sector (Warren, 2001). 
 
Meanwhile, approaches to risk have a wide diversity in the UK government within 
and between institutions. The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) in the United Kingdom 
develop ‘Risk Strategies Tolerability’ that combine qualitative and quantitative aspects 
(Baldwin et al. 2001) in order to measure probability of risk of non-compliance with 
legislation framework in the UK. Risk assessment procedures are encountered across the 
UK government, with emphasis on assessing potential hazards such as infringements, 
inflexibility and a lack of responsiveness in civil rights. However, not all countries try to 
assess risk in regulatory compliance. Only a few countries have a history of formally 
incorporating risk in regulatory policy and have developed institutional frameworks to 
support this. Only the United Kingdom and Iceland reported requiring risk assessment for 
all regulation (Burgess, 2009). The European Union (EU), the United States of America 
and Australia reported that it is required for major regulation and a number of other 
countries like Japan and Korea reported that it is only required in non-specified selected 
cases only (Burgess, 2009).  
 
3.5 Enforcement of Disaster Planning Framework 
White (1996) has noted that a particular weakness of public policy formulation is the failure 
to learn from experience with existing policy. Essentially, public policy in disaster recovery 
planning must be concerned with planning to respond to disasters, rather than planning to 
mitigate or prevent them (Wisner et al. 2002). This policy is needed at “national, 
provincial/district and local levels to ensure that common goals are set and common 
approaches are used. Without a shared (distributed) disaster management policy that applies 
to all relevant sectors and all levels, prevention, preparedness and response are likely to be 
fragmented, badly coordinated and ineffective” (WHO, 1999: 4).  
57 
 
Developing and monitoring policies for disaster management requires an active 
process of analysis, consultation and negotiation. This process should involve consultation 
among a wide variety of institutions, groups and individuals. The outcome from the policy 
should reflect society’s definition of the limits of acceptable risk and its commitment to 
protecting vulnerable populations. This policy should also result in a clear definition of the 
roles and responsibilities of all the partners in emergency management. Therefore, there is a 
need to examine a policy framework in crisis and disaster that allows a better understanding 
in decision making (Wisner et al. 2002).  
 As argued by Wisner et al. (2002), in many countries other than the country with 
ad-hoc programme approach in disaster management, the policy in disaster management is 
purposely formulated in order to identify hazards and their possible effects on communities; 
activities or organisations and their prevention capability; and response to disasters. The 
range of issues in disaster management policy development should be addressed holistically 
from every parties involve. They are the issues of: 
1. In emergency preparedness and development planning;  
2. National emergency law and other relevant enabling legislation;  
3. National emergency management organisation, responsibility and the major mission 
of National emergency management organisation;  
4. Tasks of the emergency management organisation;  
5. Community and provincial emergency preparedness;  
6. Health sector emergency preparedness; involving other groups, management and 
citizens in emergency;  
7. Managing resources, evaluating an emergency preparedness and response 
programme;  
8. Priorities in implementing emergency preparedness (WHO, 1999).  
 
The framework in disaster planning should be able to complement the concepts of 
these present ‘disaster management’ issues (Barton, 1969; Tierney, 1993; Quarantelli, 
1997; Tierney et al. 2001). Thus, the framework may facilitate the formulation of effective 
policy in disaster risk reduction crisis (Pennings et al. 2008) because the framework 
expectedly resolves the main issues in disaster management by processing adequate 
information and correct decision-making (Quarantelli, 1997). The framework requires 
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appropriate utilisation by community members in the scene of disaster through effective 
management process (i.e. social, psycho-social and cognitive decision making) (Tierney et 
al. 2001). 
 Scholars had suggested that coordination and communication might be best to be 
implemented in order to distribute adequate information in disaster management more 
effectively and realistically (Mileti et al. 1990; Quarantelli, 1990; Mileti et al. 1992). 
Communication is important in disaster because it will end up establishing bodies of work 
in disaster management and generating unanimous decision making in emergency 
circumstances (Fritz et al. 1954a; Fritz, 1961; Barton, 1969; Drabek et al. 1969; Dynes, 
1970; Sims et al. 1972). Decision maker has to consider two dimensions of decision 
making process (post-disaster) (see section 2.4, p.22, p.3) to respond to potential of risk 
(see section 2.8, p.42) based on existing disaster plan: 
1. It refers to the content of risk (immediate impacts such as hygienic, injuries and 
resources supplies) and likelihood exposure of disaster community to it; 
2. The secondary impact that would have greater impacts (impoverishment or 
psychosocial effects).  
 
The second dimension reflects the likelihood of the risk content that actually 
becoming obvious in disaster scenes. This likelihood can either be known or unknown) and 
depends on how well the disaster community is prepared for it (Pratt, 1964; Arrow, 1971; 
MacCrimmon et al. 1986; Slovic, 1987; Pennings et al. 2004). Thus, authorities with access 
to the planning framework have to make sure the programme is benefiting the disaster 
community in order to reduce risk and overcome challenges in implementing it.   
 
3.5.1 Policy Implementation and Challenges 
Decisions as regard to any policies is known as the ‘implementation’ process (Pressman et 
al. 1973). Dunsire (1978) introduced two perspectives as the sensible approach for an ideal 
administration and policy implementation. First, the manager and other superiors apply the 
‘top down perspective’ that encourage them to implement policies rather than providing 
written plans. Simultaneously, the wave of enforcement should move backwards that 
involves the lowest level of organisation known as ‘The bottom up perspective’ (Yates, 
1977; Lipsky, 1980). This ‘street level bureaucrats’ approach requires more understanding 
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to the real situation and which policy needs to be put in place (Peters, 2001). As suggested 
by Hjern et al. (1982), the main aspect to measure the level of success in policy 
implementation must consider local control rather than hierarchy. Therefore, a number of 
policy involvements in political systems are apparently challenging.  
The multiplicities of rules that govern a regulatory framework consist of civil and 
criminal laws, regulatory statutes and codes of conduct that administer the practicing bodies 
(Johnston, 2004). Foremost, regulators focus on the outcomes as a result of the 
accomplishment of regulatory aims. This is the type of governance concerning the culture 
of compliance with prescriptive rules (Black, 1997; May et al. 1998). However, Parker 
(2002) encouraged regulators to allow some flexibility in order to achieve greater 
outcomes.  
Flexibility in regulatory practice creates a growing uncertainty regarding the state of 
designing or understanding policy implementation due to conflict in dealing with crime 
accusation, misconduct and dishonesty (Linder et al. 1987). The conflict is the subject of 
political issues and not an activity caused by technical measures. The issues are always in 
relation to responsibility and the risk to misconceptions of ‘political contests’ (preference 
adaptation). Even the political pressure is a nature of any industry (Hancher et al. 1998; 
Haines et al. 2003) it still depends on how well the organisation encounters the issue of 
regulatory techniques in this political challenge.  
 Thus, scholars suggested that a successful administration with successful policy 
implementation must be steered by a focused leader (Hopkins, 1995) that keeps away from 
using only rigid (prescriptive) regulations (Sitkin et al. 1994; Black, 1997; Parker, 2002); 
encourage advance self-regulation (Ayres et al. 1992); committed towards promoting 
compliance culture as a priority in organisation (Gunningham et al. 1999a; Parker, 2002); 
launching regulatory aims and business goals simultaneously (Parker, 1999); and supported 
by other additional aspects like penalties and punishments for non-compliance (Ayres et al. 
1992). However, a combination of these aspects may still lead to conflicts because of under 
or over reacting or expectation towards regulatory outcome.  
 Hood (1976) found out that there are three options in order to come across the 
failures in administration: 
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1. Failure in implementation due to disruption during the process of implementation. 
At this stage the failure occurs either intentionally or accidentally depending on the 
official’s determination to comply with circulated instruction or law.  
2. Failure at design stage that involves programme formulation. As argued by 
Hogwood et al. (1985), some programmes are simply ‘crippled at birth’ because the 
policy itself was not competent.  
3. Stage of failure to achieve organisational target in implementing policies because in 
some cases organisational and regulatory aims are different. For example, different 
institution carry different target in humanitarian works (e.g. political interest, gender 
discrimination and profit base) and deflect the main target in certain development 
projects.  
 
Sieber (1981) notes that efforts in relief are more difficult compared to other normal 
planning (e.g. higher education, labours) because implementing disaster planning and 
recovery must consider immediate action, interaction and co-ordination rather than 
planning a perfect design. 
 
3.5.2 Relief Co-Ordination 
Coordination always involves an organised direction of activities before, when disaster 
occurs and after the disaster. However, weak co-ordination is considered as a barrier in 
emergency management and was found as a major issue in disaster response (Carter, 1979; 
Tierney, 1985; Heide, 1989). Co-ordination requires efficiency in disaster planning, 
effectiveness in relief works and knowledge exchange amongst relief workers and victims. 
The present standard of co-ordination is considered insufficient due to inadequate disaster 
resources (e.g. managing the flow of goods, information and finances) that remain as key 
principle in disaster operation (ProVention Consortium, 2004).  
Simultaneously, scholars argued that the degree of relief co-ordination by many 
international governmental and non-governmental organisations is not sufficient to 
effectively meet the needs of disaster victims (Hogg et al. 1988). Affected countries, as 
well as the governmental agencies and non-governmental organisations still lack a strong 
relationship and networking especially with other international communities (Kent, 1987). 
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Without national and international coordination, delays in disaster response may occur due 
to repetitions of effort and limited exchange of information and technology (Canter, 1989).  
 Normally, the contacts among relief workers are often difficult (Minear et al. 1995) 
because information is generally lacking in the scene of disasters (Quarantelli, 1988). The 
loss of power and phones lines and destruction of transportation networks limits 
communication between humanitarian organisations and victims and among relief workers 
themselves. Thus, there is always a dilemma in local, national and international 
governmental and non-governmental agencies at the disaster scene concerning abundance 
of relief efforts by aid agencies (Cuny, 1983). It is often unknown that resources are 
available and even the involvement and contribution of suppliers is unpredictable. This 
creates many redundancies and duplicated efforts and materials (Simpson, 2005). This 
scenario is chaotic and creates difficulties in order to make any changes and improvement 
in relief works (Heide, 1988). This confusion happens because of a failure to communicate 
and understand their own strengths, resources, roles and responsibilities in disaster works.  
 Meanwhile, co-ordination in relief works is also ineffective due to different 
objectives and values from NGOs in providing relief. As argued by Minear et al. (1995), 
international organisations have to consider their own programmes in disaster relief. They 
pose themselves as international relief bodies but always give priority in pursuing their own 
objectives for example, promoting their own brand and commercial agendas. As a result, 
the humanitarian works turn to self-interest in the name of relief works. The real relief 
workers from local and national organisation unanimously disagree with the nature of this 
adopted emergency approach (Minear et al. 1995).  
The relief organisations also struggle when it comes to budget allocations in 
running any humanitarian works (Guarnizo, 1993). Without financial support, any 
humanitarian work meets with a dead end. Funds in these cases depend upon charities and 
donations and organisation reserves. In some cases, organisations seem even keener in 
collecting funds and donations rather than encouraging humanitarian works. They put their 
name within the international system rather than the international relief network. 
Consequently, disaster victims are the real victims here not only from natural or 
technological behaviour but also human behaviour (Kent, 1987). Thus scholars suggested 
that there is a need for more ‘collaborative problem solving’ in the response of institutional 
disaster risk reduction (Mileti, 1999). This collaboration (national and international) should 
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concentrate on consultation and understands roles and responsibilities between agencies 
involve (Clapton et al. 2006).  
 This collaboration will also encourage exchange of technologies (e.g. rescue 
equipment, early warning systems and building constructions and materials) in order to 
reduce immediate and future impacts by reducing the vulnerability of the people and 
societies involved. Unfortunately, lack of opportunities exists among relief workers 
especially government officers to utilise knowledge in technology transfer due to 
distractions from other components of a post-disaster reconstruction project (Barakat, 
2003). Berman et al. (2007) notes that organisations that work in disaster relief and post 
conflict reconstruction focused on non-housing sectors as the first step to livelihood like 
governance issues; donations; budget; disease control; violence and armed conflict; and 
social capital because housing is the last resort after all considerations are resolved.  
On the other hand as argued by Christoplos (2006), shelter/housing is the primary 
protection for disaster victims from hazards in the scene of disaster. Unfortunately, officials 
underestimate specific challenges at the disaster scene because in any post-disaster 
planning and recovery, reconstruction of infrastructure and housing is the main indicator to 
measure the outcome of risk reduction (Christoplos, 2006). Compliance with regulations 
(e.g. building codes and planning acts) and technology requirements is the key to higher 
hazards resistance. For example, an effective design of earthquake-resistant buildings 
especially to the enactment of effective seismic-design regulations would have safer 
protection even still remained seismically vulnerable in earthquake regions (Bruneau, 
2002). 
 
3.5.3 Dilemma in Assistance to Post-Disaster Housing  
Sauders (2004) found that the major topics of discussions amongst disaster workers and 
policy makers in response to post-disaster recovery were based on the issue of actors 
getting the wrong idea about the terms of shelters; inappropriate terminology used; 
uncertainty in project projections; unproductive communication between disaster workers 
especially in technical support; improper approach to merge resources to local context; 
policy development implementation; lost leadership direction; and the insufficient initiative 
to merge livelihood features. It was suggested that disaster community look at the 
international solutions in terms of consultations and guidelines (handbook) (Crawford, 
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2002). Besides of the main reference (e.g. the UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies and The 
SPHERE Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response), there are 
many other guidelines that will be selected depending on situational issues and suitability. 
There are at least 15 international bodies that have been contributing to the shelter sector 
over the last 24 years, including UN agencies, NGOs, training organisations, university 
departments and individual experts as shown in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Guidelines in Disaster Response 
Year Publisher Title 
1978 Oxford Polytechnic press Shelter after Disaster, Ian Davis 
1979 OXFAM Lessons learnt by Oxfam from their Experience of Shelter 
Provision, Disasters Vol. 3 
1981 OXFAM Plastic Sheeting: Its Use for Emergency Housing and 
Shelter 
1982 UNDRO Shelter after Disaster 
1985 Intermediate technology Modern Stoves for All 
1986 Ross institute Small Scale Sanitation 
1993 Intermediate technology Appropriate Building Materials 
UNHCR First International Workshop on Improved Shelter Response 
and Environment for Refugees 
Intermediate technology Field Engineering 
1994 UNHCR People Oriented Planning at Work 
UNICEF Assisting in Emergencies 
MSF Public Health Engineering in Emergency Situations 
ITDG/REDR How to Make Low Cost Building Blocks 
UNHCR Shelter and Infrastructure: Camp Planning. Programme and 
Technical Support Section 
MSF Feasibility Study Alternative Shelter Materials 
USAID Field Operations Guide 
Shelter Project RedR Construction in Emergencies Handouts 
1995 OXFAM The Oxfam Handbook of Development and Relief Vol. 2 
MSF Shelter International Research Project 
Intermediate technology Rural Building Course 
North Africa Institute Shelter Provision and Settlement Policies for Refugees, 
Studies on Emergency and Disaster Relief 
1996 OXFAM Water, Sanitation and Shelter Packs 
1997 UNHCR Environmental Guidelines. Domestic Energy Needs in 
Refugee Situations 
UNDP Emergency Relief Items 
MSF Refugee Health An Approach to Emergency Situations 
RRN Counting and Identification of Beneficiary Populations in 
Emergency Operations 
MSF Guide of Kits and Emergency Items 
1998 UNHCR Refugee Operations and Environmental Management 
MSF Logistic Catalogue 
RRN Temporary Human Settlement Planning for Displaced 
Populations in Emergencies 
1999 Shelter Project Cold Climate Emergency Shelter Systems, A Research 
Project for Humanitarian Organisations, Manfield and 
Corsellis 
2002 ITDG/REDR Engineering in Emergencies 
RRN Babbister 
SPHERE Sphere Project Handbook 
                                                                                                     Source: Crawford (2002) 
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However, agencies suggested that states utilise local solutions and procurement 
instead of prefabricated or imported shelter with the use of international guidelines as 
reference (Crawford, 2002). The biggest problem is that the bureaucracy's ability at 
national level to convince officials of the importance of international standards in the 
international context (ProVention Consortium, 2004). Officials usually want something 
more definitive from government in terms of clarification (dissemination of information) to 
the importance of international specification (standards) that is accepted and endorsed 
(based on previous empirical experiences) on a world-wide basis (Davis et al. 2002). Users 
of standards also want something that can make outcome distinctions based on a unanimous 
understanding (official announcement or endorsement) over the use of international 
specifications in a national context because they will give some assurance that their efforts, 
resources and trusts will provide positive results.  
 However, each disaster situation is unique and requires distinctive (different) 
proceedings. The dilemma in disaster response is not only limited to producing a well-
planned settlement based on the present legal infrastructure but also a solution for people to 
‘bounce back’ in the direction of normal life or even better (Corsellis et al. 2005). Thus, 
Johnson (2002) introduced two specific considerations in order to provide a solution for 
temporary accommodation:  
1. The potential of the particular community’s human and financial resources;  
2. The possibility of project durability (hazard resistant and constructive livelihood).  
 
Efforts in relief assistance should focus on the approach to utilise optimum 
resources and sustain project durability. Generally, national relief programmes (disaster 
plan) comes with a complete legal infrastructure inspired by national and international 
experiences (Corsellis et al. 2005). From this notion, the only way to comply with the 
specific requirement in providing temporary accommodation is by establishing 
collaboration between emergency reliefs and mechanism in rehabilitation; and to 
implement planned programmes (Chalinder, 1998). This productive solution and 
atmosphere enables stakeholders to adopt appropriate recovery strategy and meets the need 
of the population. Thus, scholars suggested that the approach in housing resettlement 
should be based on the reason why houses are provided (Turner, 1977; Burgess, 1978). 
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 The understanding concerning housing as a product and as the process of achieving 
those products is vital mainly in terms of temporary shelter before reconstruction of 
permanent housing (Davis, 1987). There are always arguments between the term ‘housing’ 
compared to ‘houses’. "In English, the word ‘housing’ can be used as a noun or as a verb. 
When used as a noun, housing describes a commodity or product. The verb ‘to house’, 
describes the process or activity of housing” (Turner, 1972: 151). John F.C. Turner has 
been the most influential writer about housing in the developing world in the post-war 
period (Harris, 2003). John F. C. Turner (see section 3.7, p.78) went to Lima, Peru to work 
in the ‘Barriadas’ (squatters housing) that inspired him to develop his own housing theory. 
The ‘empowerment’ (participation) of local people is significant and should be sufficient in 
the process of redevelopment (Turner, 1977; De Soto, 2000). Housing should be treated as 
a process rather than simply a product. “There is a difference between a concern with 
houses and a concern with housing, whereas houses are cultural and social objects and 
consumables, housing is a cultural process and a social activity” (Robbins, 1989: 58). 
 
3.5.3.1 Emergency Housing 
Emergency housing or temporary accommodation refers to disaster-affected families’ 
provisional place to stay at the earlier stage of disaster until they get permanent housing 
(Corsellis et al. 2005). It is actually the period of physical, social and emotional recovery in 
rehabilitation phase. Unfortunately, rehabilitation is often overlooked by related agencies to 
the rights of disaster victims (Blaike et al. 1994). Blaike et al. (1994) suggested that there 
are two simple steps of approach (other than complicated) in providing emergency housing 
that are the approach to satisfy the individual family and then the community as a whole. 
These approaches acquire ambitious plans of community reconstruction, disaster victims’ 
participation, guided self-help construction and holistic measures of development 
(Lizarralde, 2000).  
Literatures as shown in Appendix 8, p.340 (e.g. Anderson et al. 1998; Bhatt, 1999; 
Lizarralde, 2000) provide for a wider angle of post-disaster reconstruction theories that 
emphasise the response according to phases concerning social aspects of the housing 
reconstruction process. They note that housing is an industrialised product that is provided 
to the affected community.  However most cases of post-disaster reconstruction revealed 
unachievable project missions and dissatisfaction results within the last three decades 
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because disaster community exclude the fact that housing the victims after disaster is also 
the work of providing houses to the community as a whole (Lizarralde, 2000). The rights to 
housing however preserved in the international legislations to the rights of adequate 
housing (see section 3.6.2, p.76). 
 ‘Shelter after Disaster: Guidelines for Assistance’ is the first guide on shelter and 
housing inspired from diverse 1970s disasters experience (UNDRO/OCHA, 1982). 
Unfortunately, very limited supplementary work has been done in order to enhance the use 
and content (UN/OCHA, 2006). The ‘transitional settlement: displaced populations’ draft 
was then produced as a result from the revised version between 2002 and 2004 in order to 
inspire new ideas in risk reduction response (Corsellis et al. 2005). According to this guide, 
the term ‘emergency management’ typically means a major focus on the preparedness and 
response phases of disasters.  
The use of ‘disaster plans’ frequently refers to the full range of activities from 
mitigation through recovery (Quarantelli, 1984). However, the summary guidelines that 
include entries on the shelter sector and that are published by most operational 
organisations (international specification) do not have a significant body of literature to 
refer to, and found to have repetition of a few key guidelines (Crawford, 2002). 
Consequently, the operations guidelines was introduced in order to avoid confusion in 
emergency housing over the meanings of commonly used terms such as ‘emergency 
shelter’, ‘temporary shelter’, ‘temporary housing’, ‘permanent shelter’, ‘dwellings’, 
‘housing’, ‘building’, ‘recovery’ and ‘reconstruction’ as shown in Diagram 3.1 (Corsellis et 
al. 2005).  
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Diagram 3.1: From transitional Settlement to Housing Reconstruction, Shelter Centre 
 
 
                                               Source: Corsellis et al. (2005) 
 
These terms are commonly use from transitional settlement phase (tent, temporary 
shelter) to permanent housing reconstruction phase (from the period of disaster impact to 
project accomplishment) in order to find an easier situation to describe, support and 
integrate its contribution for a wider response. 
 Simultaneously, states also facing with dilemmas in implementing national rules 
and regulations. For example, the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) has 
identified the key issues, as overlap and conflict with other legislations, with 
recommendations for improvements to United Kingdom building regulations; increased 
complexity and lack of clarity and consistency; increasing reference to third party 
legislations to British Standards (e.g. Buildings Regulations 2000 and design of structures 
to BS EN 1991-1-7); robust detail and trade association guides; implementation of new 
regulations; and self certification of electrics and plumbing by accredited people (RIBA, 
2006). The building regulations have lost their clarity and effectiveness over the past two 
decades since 1986 (Crawford, 2002). The conflict of standards-guidelines and enforcement 
of the regulation by the enforcers will make assistance in disaster not like what the victim 
expected.   
 Recently, the Sphere Handbook outlined key dilemmas and challenges (summarise 
in Table 3.2) faced by humanitarian agencies concerning issues emerged in providing 
accommodation in disaster scene. This handbook is the most considerable because the 
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operational organisation (the ‘Sphere Project’) keeps updating from time to time (Crawford, 
2002). ‘InterAction’ from the United States of America memberships and the Steering 
Committee for Humanitarian Response (e.g. Care International, Caritas Internationalis, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies) constituted a project called Sphere Project in 1997 for setting the 
standards in this guideline that contribute to an operational framework for accountability in 
disaster assistance efforts.  
 
“Sphere is based on two core beliefs: first, that all possible steps should be taken to 
alleviate human suffering arising out of calamity and conflict, and second, that those 
affected by disaster have a right to life with dignity and therefore a right to assistance. 
Sphere is three things: a handbook, a broad process of collaboration and an expression of 
commitment to quality and accountability”. 
(Sphere Project, 2004: 5) 
 
This ‘Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards’ is based on the principles and 
provisions of international humanitarian law, international human rights law, refugee law 
and the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief. This handbook identified 
minimum standards to be attained in disaster assistance, in each of five key sectors (water 
supply and sanitation, nutrition, food aid, shelter and health services). The matrix in Table 
3.2 describes the handbook reviews.   
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Table 3.2: Handbook Review 
Publisher SPHERE 
Title British Red Cross Annual Review 2000 plus 2000 Trustees’ Report and 
Accounts 
Date 2000 
Description This guide is set out as a series of sections each specifying minimum standards 
and offering key indicators and guidance notes. It refers too many of the key 
texts discussed in this report and works through detailed steps to carry out, for 
example, a needs assessment. Effective disaster response is set out as a process 
and much emphasis is put on not operating in isolation from other over-arching 
sectors like logistics. 
Common 
standards 
1: Participation (e.g. local capacity, communication and transparency and 
sustainability) 
2: Initial assessment (e.g. checklists, assessment team and sources of 
information) 
3: Response (e.g. meeting the minimum standards, capacity and expertise) 
4: Targeting (e.g. targeting mechanisms and monitoring errors of exclusion and 
inclusion) 
5: Monitoring (e.g. use of monitoring information and information sharing) 
Shelter and 
settlement 
standard 
1: Strategic planning (e.g. return to home; land and building ownership; and 
natural hazards) 
2: Physical planning (e.g. access to shelter locations; and access and emergency 
escape) 
3: Covered living space (e.g. safety and privacy; duration and climate context) 
4: Design (e.g. materials and construction; and ventilation and participatory 
design) 
5: Construction (e.g. sourcing of shelter materials; and labour and construction 
standards) 
6: Environmental impact (e.g. sustainability and the management of 
environmental resources) 
Key advise 1: Standard, indicators and guidance notes 
2: 3.5-4.5 m2 per person in a shelter 
3: Kit list of utensils, tools and soap 
4: 45 m2 per person in a camp 
5: Minimum space between dwellings and site gradient 
6: 1 km2 of forest could serve up to 500 people 
7: Annual fuel wood consumption 600-900 kg per person 
 Need Implementation Response 
Policy 3 scenarios: people stay 
at home; people are 
displaced and stay in 
host communities; and 
people are displaced and 
stay in clusters 
  
Process Standard Indicator Guidance 
Priorities Analysis (needs 
assessment) 
monitoring, evaluation 
and consultation 
Site selection, planning, 
security and 
environmental concerns 
Housing, living quarters, 
clothing standard, 
household items, 
livelihood support and 
environmental concerns 
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Provision  Human resources, 
competent staff and local 
capacity 
 
Pie chart 
showing 
handbook 
structure 
 
                                                                                            Source: Crawford (2002) 
 
This guideline describes the core principles that govern humanitarian action and 
restore the right of populations affected by disaster and live with dignity. Other guidelines 
contents are considered as being repetitive of a limited number of basic principles, not 
making coherent sense and consistent progress over time, being difficult to source and 
generally outdated (Crawford, 2002). 
Practically, there is a need to have a consolidated international assistance in housing 
provision especially to assist less–develop nations with their own capacities if possible to 
reduce hazards and vulnerability as well as strategies designed to protect the environment 
and to improve economic growth, levels of education and living conditions of the entire 
population (Brown, 1979; Drabek, 1986; Burton et al. 1993; Guarnizo, 1993; Dynes et al. 
1994). Once the relevant authorities are unable and/or unwilling to fulfill their 
responsibilities, they are obliged to allow humanitarian organisations to provide 
humanitarian assistance and protection as stated on the Humanitarian Charter and 
Minimum Standards (Sphere Project, 2004).  
Most scholars conclude that development is the solution in solving disaster 
problems and that the level of satisfaction in development and level of satisfaction to meet 
certain needs of disaster victims are related (Drabek, 1986; Burton et al. 1993). The United 
Nations also looks at any development as an important objective in relief assistance 
(Lechat, 1990). However, the reduction of disasters in any development comes along with 
both benefits and flaws. The benefit of any legitimate development might be seen as guided 
by international legislations. Due to the provision of development and reconstruction, 
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compliance with the law is the only way to deliver better enforcement techniques. 
Unfortunately, uncertainty in an international legal context and lawmaking is also 
contributed to a dilemma in relief assistance especially to the framework convention on 
victims’ rights to adequate housing. 
 
3.6 International Legal Context in Shelter/Housing Sector 
A consideration of appropriate and specific legal tools is beyond the scope of the guidelines 
provided by the international treaties. International guidelines only present the legal context 
for the implementation of emergency housing ‘responses’ and do not represent a law 
(Corsellis et al. 2005). The guidelines highlight some of the legal considerations that should 
be taken into account when planning settlement strategies, programmes and project matters. 
These guidelines outlined are based upon the consideration of law and human rights. It is 
important to reflect these guidelines on advocacy tool (e.g. presenting proposals to states 
authority or negotiation to relevant agencies), to understand the socio-political in the 
context of regulatory awareness and also to understand the rights of affected groups in legal 
context (Corsellis et al. 2008). Hence, there is a need to develop laws further, on both 
national and international levels, in order to deal with several aspects of emergency housing 
(Corsellis et al. 2005). 
 The international guidelines (SPHERE Handbook, Oxfam and UNHCR) provided 
are the simple documents of instructions (Corsellis et al. 2008). These guidelines related to 
the reasons for considering the law and human rights. In these numerous legal documents 
the terms ‘shelter’ and ‘housing’ are highlighted concerning emergency housing. 
Unfortunately, the definition of shelter is not legally binding (Corsellis et al. 2005).  
However, according to the United Nation Declaration, shelter and housing matters 
in the context of emergency can become binding if the particular social setting established 
patterns of behavior known as ‘customary law’ is achieved and community/agencies utilise 
human rights law as an advocacy tool (Corsellis et al. 2005). ‘Customary law’ is 
recognised, not because it is backed by the power of some strong states’ individual or 
institution, but because each individual in community/agencies recognises the benefits of 
behaving in accordance with other individuals' expectations. Fuller (1969) proposed that 
‘customary law’ might best be described as a ‘language of interaction’. A ‘language of 
interaction’ is necessary for people to effectively engage and expect meaningful social 
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behaviour to increase the happiness or diminish the misery of other people (Fuller, 1969). 
This type of interaction can only be accomplished by establishing clear (although not 
necessarily written) codes of conduct, enforced (generally acceptable by 
community/agencies) and supported by common laws (legal sanctions). Although, 
according to this understanding there is still no clarification concerning the status of rights 
of an individual in a community after disaster.  
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 is the first international law 
commonly promulgated by the United Nations. Subsequently, other international covenants 
and conventions, codes, rules, principles, guidelines and standards were developed. Some 
of the most important international laws with regard to the status of rights to emergency 
housing sector are those relating to human rights and housing rights. There are many 
international laws that could relate to the status of rights to displaced people in an 
emergency when responding to the issue of the peoples’ rights to adequate housing such as:  
1. The ‘Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (CESCR) notes that 
there is a connection between housing law and emergency housing concerning 
forced evictions for refugees and IDPs (CESCR, 1997);  
2. The ‘Agenda 21’ in Section 7.6 describes that “National and international action 
should be a fundamental in creating access to safe and healthy shelter is essential to 
a person’s physical, psychological, social and economic well-being” (Earth Summit, 
1992: Section 7.6);  
3. The UNHCR notes that “Having a secure place to live is one of the fundamental 
elements for human dignity, physical and mental health and overall quality of life, 
that enables one’s development” (UNHCR, 2004: 2).  
 
Based on these statements, countries affected should be obligated to give fair 
treatment to all displaced people (Corsellies, 2005). However, law stipulated by the 
international communities concerning human rights in order to implement durable solutions 
for transitional settlement is still not enough because legal action is under states 
jurisdiction. 
 The traditional position at International Law was that self-governing independent 
states were free to treat their own nationals as they chose without threat of external 
interference (IC, 2002). However, recent developments in International Criminal Law 
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affirm that the advances of international human rights law have decided that a state’s 
treatment of its own nationals as also an issue of international concern (IC, 2002). Any 
sorts of infringement to the international legislations by any states (especially the UN 
members) in the international convention are liable to be judged within any existing 
international statutes capacity such as:  
1. The ‘Statute of the International Tribunal for the Persecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed 
in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991’;  
2. The ‘Rome Statute for the Establishment of a Permanent International Criminal 
Court (1998)’;  
3. The ‘1977 Geneva Protocol 1 Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts’ 
(IC, 2002).  
 
The International Criminal Tribunals and Special Courts (e.g. in Rwanda and 
Yogoslavia) where’s Rome Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002, has currently 
jurisdiction for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. However, Wilkins et al. 
(2006) argued that there is no such thing as an explicit, universally agreed definition of 
‘international law crimes’ in treaty law except in ‘customary international law’ that has to 
be refined such as war crimes in the ‘1949 Geneva Conventions’ and prohibition against 
torture in the ‘1984 Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment’. Thus, there is no final concept and certainties in international 
humanitarian law regarding protection to the displaced people in emergency or disaster 
(Wilkins et al. 2006). 
 Even the practical application and enforcement of human rights in the field in 
emergency situations is often difficult due to certain country’s internal political reasons 
(Corsellies, 2005). These might be the crises in public sector, failures of policy and crisis to 
response to this policy (Gray et al. 1998) because one of the main issues in implementing a 
disaster programme is the liability to disaster community. As argued by Drabek (2000) 
liability is the principle legal issue that arises from administration of a disaster management 
programme. There are a wide range of legal issues confronting disaster management 
community. Both decision makers and operation personnel need to increase their 
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understanding of potential liability associated with emergency actions. It is essential that 
emergency managers are aware of the principle areas of potential conflict between disaster 
management actions and statutory or constitution rights because strict liability means no 
flexibility (to promote compliance) (Parker, 2002; Comfort et al. 2006).  
 Thus, under ‘customary law’, offenses to codes of conduct in an organisation’s 
operation are treated as ‘torts’ (private wrongs or injuries) rather than crimes (offenses 
against the state or the ‘society’) (Fuller, 1969). In addition, strategies (reduce/avoid 
liability) need to be devised for legal reform in numerous areas, ranging from decisions to 
issue warnings to ‘Good Samaritan’ legislation in order to increase support from a disaster 
community in a disaster programme. The ‘Good Samaritan’ doctrine is a legal principle. 
According to this principle, rescuers are free from prosecution or consequentially being 
sued for 'wrongdoing’. This acknowledgement has been done in order to encourage 
voluntary work and humanitarian responses. Therefore, this doctrine was mainly developed 
for first aid providers and humanitarian assistance at a disaster scene (Drabek, 2000). Still, 
the best protection against infringement/violation of rights is to ensure that regulatory 
measures are implemented by the disaster community and enforced fairly (Anderson et al. 
1991a) even though some actors in disaster scene have regulatory flexibility (lenience or 
forgive). 
 
3.6.1 The Human Rights Violation in Disaster Scene 
As stated by the ‘International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies’ (IFRC) 
in the ‘Article 25 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, “every 
world citizen has the rights to health and well being and the rights to security in the event of 
disaster under such circumstances beyond (his or her) control” (McEntire, 1997: 222). Any 
action that leads to the ineffectiveness of disaster response is considered as a violation 
according to this international norm. However, the support from major dominant players in 
the world within the United Nations Security Council always leads to frustration due to 
different ideological battles and veto powers [e.g. in the absence of a right decision to solve 
the Cold War caused millions of live (Borton, 1993) and domination in deciding the United 
Nations Security Council Resolution, 2002 (Richardson, 2003)].  
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The studies in disaster management show that human rights are often exploited 
more during calamities (Conway, 2002). Research shows that many political leaders refuse 
to admit that their nation has been affected by disaster (Portsea, 1992). Penetrations by the 
international community in humanitarian works depend on a willingness of the nation’s 
governments to accept assistance in order to save face and avoid displaying their 
weaknesses and inabilities to neighbouring countries. Then, even if aid is received after a 
calamity, nations may violate the rights of their citizens by distributing relief preferentially 
(Bommer et al. 1987). Often the pressure of time, limited contingency budget and people’s 
needs counteract the demands of quality and suitability (e.g. amenities and service 
provided) (Morago, 2005) that also contribute to rights abuse.  
Moreover, in order to avoid violence and domestic political conflicts, masses often 
migrate into neighbouring countries that are not capable of sustaining large quantities of 
refugees. At this stage, rights abuses among disaster victims are always expected due to 
limited availability of resources from international communities, pressure from the new 
country to which refugees migrated and large amounts of refugees that increase challenges 
to humanitarian workers. Thus, it is obvious why refuges are considered a major weakness 
of the international relief community (McEntire, 1997). Thus, there is no assurance that 
disaster victims are protected by international law in disaster scene. It depends much on 
national commitment and capability to implement comprehensive disaster planning 
strategies to protect the rights of their own people.  
 
3.6.2 The Human Rights Violation to Adequate Housing  
Every man, woman and child has the right to highest possible standard of health and also 
has the right to access to shelter. States shall adopt necessary measures for the protection of 
health of the people and also by providing adequate shelter to them. The human right to 
housing is explicitly set out in the ‘Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948)’, 
‘International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)’, ‘International Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951)’, ‘International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965)’ and ‘International Labour Organisation 
Convention No. 117 Concerning Social Policy (Basic Aims and Standards) (1962)’. 
Governments or states (UN state members) are obligated to these international provisions 
of human rights law that guarantee everyone the human right to adequate housing. 
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Commitments from any states must include quotations from the UN Committee of 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR8
The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is 
assigned by the international community with monitoring compliance with the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. It is also assigned to provide the sole 
authoritative interpretative pronouncements as to the content of the covenant
) (entry into 
force 3 January 1976) states that: 
 
"The States Parties to...[the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights] recognise the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his 
family, including...housing...Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take 
steps...with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised in 
the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of 
legislative measures". 
[ICESCR, Articles 11(1) and 2(1)] 
 
9
 
. Despite 
extensive recognition of the human right to adequate housing, according to the 1996 report, 
the UN Centre for Human Settlements (HABITAT) estimates that over 1 billion people 
worldwide live in inadequate housing and 100 million are homeless, that includes those in 
housing that is insecure or temporary and often the product of poor construction quality. 
For example squatters who have found accommodation by illegally occupying someone 
else's home or land and are under constant threat of eviction; those living in refugee camps 
whose home have been destroyed; and those living in temporary shelter for example the 
250,000 pavement dwellers in Bombay (UN-Habitat, 1996). 
 In the UN-HABITAT Agenda II at the Istanbul Declaration on Human Settlements 
(1996), the United Nations has defined ‘shelter’ as providing adequate houses that should 
protect the people from the outside hazard, provide liveable space, victims have a rest and 
storage space, privacy and emotional security (UN-HABITAT, 1996). Adequate shelter 
should have:  
                                                        
8 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by the UN General Assembly resolution 2200A 
(XXI) of 16 December 1966. 
9 Covenant is an international agreement, whether bilateral or multilateral, whereby any States (United 
Nations state members) agree to bind themselves under international law to conform to its provisions 
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“…adequate privacy; adequate space; physical accessibility; adequate security; security of 
tenure; structural stability and durability; adequate lighting, heating and ventilation; 
adequate basic infrastructure, such as water-supply, sanitation and waste-management 
facilities; suitable environmental quality and health-related factors; and adequate and 
accessible location with regard to work and basic facilities: should be available at an 
affordable cost”.  
      (UN-HABITAT, 1996: 38) 
 
Thus,  
 
“…in shelter and urban development and management policies, particular attention should 
be given to the needs and participation of indigenous people. These policies should fully 
respect their identity and culture and provide an appropriate environment that enables them 
to participate in political, social and economic life”.  
         (UN-HABITAT, 2003: 4)  
 
Uvin et al. (2003) argued that all of these declarations aim to represent a dramatic 
rethinking of the functions of justice in a post-disaster society, stressing community 
participation over existing states’ legal procedure and request for restorative justice. “All 
partners of the Habitat Agenda, including local authorities, the private sector and 
communities, should regularly monitor and evaluate their own performances in the 
implementation of the Habitat Agenda through the status of project implementation. All of 
these partners’ capabilities should be strengthened and assisted at all levels, especially the 
local level” (UN-HABITAT, 2003: 108). However, the international community has rarely 
invested seriously in justice and human rights as part of an attempt to restore peace and 
promote democracy and understanding in post-disaster recovery period (Uvin et al. 2003).  
 
3.7 Community Participations 
Assessments of needs should be based on the expressed priorities of affected communities 
because recovery is not just in physical appearance in order to restore normality (Arslan et 
al. 2007). The principle in any development from disasters focus on the crucial 
participation from affected communities in order to study how to provide income 
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generation, rebuilding social support networks, activities essential for maintaining cultural 
identities and reviving and conserving the often protective but vulnerable ecosystem 
(Cernea et al. 2000). Therefore, people should be centrally involved in planning and 
implementing the recovery and rehabilitation of their own communities based on closed 
consultation amongst planners, policy makers and communities (Wisner et al. 2002).  
The affected population must be strongly represented on the body that directs 
recovery. They should be incorporated, coordinated and extended as part of the recovery 
planning process. Participatory planning must involve people from the start of the planning 
process. It is not enough simply to ask them for their opinion of a plan that has already been 
drawn rather listen to communities concerned as input to recovery plans especially related 
to housing resettlement or reconstruction.  
 It is important to examine information related to people who are going to live in the 
buildings because lessons can be learned on the involvement of local residents (Spence, 
2009). Local residents have knowledge of the place they live in. It would be crucial to 
establish timely contact with local residents and use the information to guide the rescue 
effort and fulfill what local residents expect to receive. Without understanding local needs, 
it would result not only cause confusions, but also waste of resources (Xiulan, 2008). 
However, planners or service provider and people in the community often have different 
priorities and perceptions (Wisner et al. 2002) (as discussed in section 2.5.1, p.31; 2.5.2, 
p.34; and 3.8, p.83, p.3). For example, an architect or planner may think that improving 
drainage is most important due to health control, while the residents may view the gender 
separation as more urgent. The conflict of interest, priorities and perceptions between 
affected group of population and service provider or authority are further argued by John 
Turner10 and Rod Burgess11
 Since the end of the 1960s the government was called upon to support ‘self-help’ 
housing and should enable the users of housing to participate in housing activities (e.g. 
planning, organisation of building and maintenance) (Abrams, 1964). Turner (1968) notes 
that the idea of ‘self help’ especially for the poor was further developed from Ernest 
 below. 
                                                        
10 Among those who have written about housing policy in the developing world there is no one who has had 
more influence than John Turner. Charles Abrams is closest competitor in terms of academic influence in the 
housing field but in Abrams’ work there were many insights toward housing issues, but no single line of 
argument (Harris, 2003). 
11 Rod Burgess criticised John Turners’ work in Burgess, R. (1977) Self-help housing: A new imperialist 
strategy? A critique of the Turner school, Antipode 9, pp.50–60. 
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Weissman and Charles Abrams in the 1960s with crucial participation by government to 
help people to acquire modest homes by building their own house known as ‘aided self-
help’. Self help is the practice by which people house themselves outside the formal market 
(Turner, 1977). Even though the idea of this ‘aided self help’ was originated in Peru with 
support from The World Bank (Site-and-Service Schemes) in the early 1970s, the 
implementation at site can be learned by other developing countries especially the 
government. Turner (1968) argued that resettlements should be viewed more as a solution 
than as a problem and urged the government to stop trying to work for these people and 
started trying to work with them because they know what is best for their family and 
community. 
 However, Burgess (1978) argued that the ‘self-help’ concept was highly 
controversial due to the question of ‘priority’ because the service provider (the government) 
has issues with bureaucracy. On the other hand, capability of the people is also being 
questioned in building their own house according to situational needs without reference to 
building codes. Housing should be built according to rules and regulations, controlled by 
authority through inspection, incentive and punitive measures. The problem with ‘self-help’ 
is that this concept was introduced to the lower income group that the issue is obviously 
back on the basis of costs. The cost of contraction was the main constrain to this people that 
limit the quality of construction. Nevertheless, according to the ‘self-help’, poor people in 
developing world understand better to address their own problems (Turner, 1977). The 
settlements that these poor people create are better fitted to their immediate needs and 
circumstances. Although at the beginning of development these settlements may seem 
disorganised and inadequate, they will be improved from time to time based on a family’s 
financial income (Turner, 1967).  
Housing designed by architects and built for governmental agencies was condemned 
by John Turner because the poor people have to accept fixed building standards (Burgess, 
1977). As argued by Turner (1977) in some cases these people need more than just limited 
space provided by the standards. In contrast, Burgess argued that the issue is back to the 
common way of housing development that should comply with building codes, 
sustainability and long term benefit to the people, community and environment. Thus, 
Burgess (1978) concludes that one of the most significant weaknesses in Turner’s work was 
that he ignored elements of minimum standards according to building codes.  
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 Nevertheless, both John Turner and Rod Burgess agreed that housing problems in 
the developing countries is best be understood as the product of the general conditions (e.g. 
city migration, overcrowded and financial limitation) of commercial development rather 
than the product of particular technological or organisational systems (Turner, 1977; 
Burgess, 1978). These general conditions are based on all the typical problems of the 
resettlement process and urbanisation. They suggest that government and the affected 
people must find ways to understand each other because neither the urban nor the housing 
problem can be handled with isolation and both sides must work together (Turner, 1977; 
Burgess, 1978). The case of ‘Grootboom’ revealed the real scenario of community that had 
been neglected by government to the rights of adequate housing and against the suggestion 
made by John Turner and Rod Burgess towards essential interaction between government 
and community. 
 However, there is boundary between involvements of victims in post recovery work 
(Arslan et al. 2007). Commonly, most of the victims were in a traumatic case even they had 
no injuries or damaged buildings (Mulwanda, 1992). The state of this current situation 
limits active participation from victims due to low capability and readiness physically and 
mentally. They must know their own capability and readiness before they can get involved 
in the decision making process because mitigation effort demands consideration to legal 
framework (Mulwanda, 1992). Disaster victims must take rational action that facilitates 
government to establish self-reliant communities so as to reduce their vulnerability to 
natural disasters. For example, one of the reasons for failure in the ‘Grootboom’ case (see 
section 3.7.1, p.71) was that the community did not have enough knowledge about the 
national housing programme (De Vos, 2001). 
 
3.7.1 The ‘Grootboom’ Case and the Rights to Adequate Housing 
Mrs. Irene Grootboom was part of a group that included 390 adults and 510 children living 
in terrible conditions in an informal settlement called ‘Wallacedene’. Her home/belongings 
were demolished to make way for new affordable government housing project. They then 
illegally occupied nearby land from where they were evicted. They therefore moved to a 
sports field nearby as squatters. After complaints from the locals, Irene and the community 
were evicted from the site and their housing materials destroyed.  
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With legal support, the community took the government to court over the rights to 
shelter clause in the South African Constitution. On the 4 October 2000 in a unanimous 
decision, it was noted that the Constitution obliges the state to act positively to improve the 
difficulty of people living in terrible conditions throughout the country (Kende, 2004). The 
court stressed that all the rights in the ‘Bill of Rights’ are inter-related and mutually 
supporting (De Vos, 2001). The High Court found that the children and their parents were 
entitled to shelter under section 28 (1) (c), of the Constitution and ordered that the national 
and provincial governments as well as the Metropolitan Council and the Municipality 
should provide them with tents, portable latrines (trench toilets) and a regular supply of 
water as minimal shelter. Finally, a provincial court in Cape Town agreed with the 
community and ruled that the local government must make available a community hall for 
this purpose. 
 Unfortunately, Irene could not demand a house from the state due to the political 
atmosphere South Africa. For example, it is essential that a reasonable part of the national 
housing budget is allocated to the homeless, but the precise allocation is for the national 
government to decide. This statement reveals the court’s remarkable balancing act. It forced 
compliance with the constitution but gave government diplomacy on how to go about 
complying (Kende, 2004). The court’s remedy was incomplete (Kende, 2004) and this 
policy has not been implemented reasonably (De Vos, 2001). The court should have made 
clear that the government had to put the shelter needs of the homeless ahead of other 
housing needs. A community hall was provided to the Grootboom community but was not 
provided with running water and unmaintained toilets. In contrast, according to 
international guidelines every person has a right to toilets, running water and cover from 
the outside elements (hazards) (Crawford, 2002). Irene could only demand that the state act 
reasonably to implement a housing policy and not to provide them adequate housing. One 
of the reasons for failure in the ‘Grootboom’ case was that the community she represented 
failed to explain the precise extent to what the government must prioritise the needs of the 
poor in policy decisions (De Vos, 2001).  
Irene died in 2008 in a shack instead of a house because new housing policy for the 
homeless was not implementable even after 8 years of court ruling. There is now a new 
wave of social and economic rights discussion in many countries because the ‘Grootboom’ 
case was set as a landmark case in terms of government responsibility and the rights to 
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adequate housing. Government is not invincible to judicial prosecution. The most important 
lesson of the ‘Grootboom’ case is that the social and economic rights are about the duty on 
government to attend, as a matter of priority, to the basic needs of the poorest. 
 
3.8 Behaviours of Government Institution in Disaster Planning 
In most disasters, traditional institutions exist for managing emergency response such as 
army, civil defence agency, fire brigade, Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and other 
humanitarian agencies. A stronger institution is essential for sustaining a successful risk 
reduction plan. In land development processes, rules (i.e. social, political and economic) are 
conceived in institutions that affect human behaviour as shown in Table 3.3 (Keogh et al. 
1998).  
 
Table 3.3: The Institutional Environment for Property Analysis 
Category Properties 
Political structure 
 
Form of local and national governance; 
political risks; constitutional conventions; and 
participation in international blocs 
Economic structure 
 
System of resource allocation (market;  
exchange rate, interest rate and inflation 
experience; industrial structure; the spatial 
structure of economic activity; organisation and 
development of financial and asset markets; 
degree of market openness; taxation; and 
incentive system) 
Social structure 
 
Race and culture; social attitudes, class 
structure; unwritten codes of ethics; and social 
relations 
Legal frameworks 
 
Planning law and property law; law of contract; 
inheritance and tax law; constitutional law; 
legislation versus case law, practice and 
interpretation; regional differences in the 
application of legislation; and influence of 
international law 
                                                                                                Source: D’Arcy et al. (1996) 
 
However not every country is capable of administering long term strategies and 
actions in risk reduction programmes. Weaknesses in institution (i.e. social, political and 
economic) are always to blame for this failure (Aysan, 2006). Scholars found that 
behaviour from social system outcome was one of the main contributions to this failure 
(Dynes, 1993). 
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 Social psychologists (Messick, 1999), evolutionary psychologists (Cosmides et al. 
1992), sociologists and anthropologists (Kollock, 1998; Boehm, 1999) and political 
scientists (Axelrod, 1984; Simon, 1997; Axelrod et al. 2000) are all concerned about 
building a better foundation for understanding behaviour as a necessary step before trying 
to improve public policy. Rules, policy and organisations were found to be the main 
considerations in deciding ‘institutions’ as a complete package that must supported by 
positive agents (e.g. peer groups, work place and education) and society attitudes (Omar, 
2002).  
In additional, institutional economists consider the fact that ‘economic theory’ in 
rules and institutions is also part of the package because for control over public services 
government agencies commonly employ a ‘fair rate of return’ principle (Mair et al. 1992). 
According to the ‘fair rate of return’ principle governments earn a profit from expenditures 
and investments, and will then turn to service upgrades for the public. Government has to 
balance their responsibility in competing values and their ideological position (political 
preference) in the free market condition (business governed by the laws of supply and 
demand) outside of organisation. Competing values describes organisational culture in 
terms of what appear to be commonly important dimensions of value to the institution such 
as structural control or flexibility and focus on internal or external stakeholders. Competing 
values have implications for a variety of organisational phenomena, including decision 
making, and strategic management with high-quality leadership. 
 In organisations, officials experience social dilemma and conflicts over individual 
achievement and institutional outcomes as a group in making decision (Schelling, 1978; 
Lichbach, 1995). Officials may feel isolated from other representing officials and settings 
due to lack of knowledge concerning the latest organisation updates. In some cases, a 
member prefers to be a ‘free-rider,’ which might affect the whole group performance. 
Surveys on commitment in a very large number of international public services show that, 
of the amount of contributions by members, only 40 to 60 per cent make the optimal level 
of contributions (Davis et al. 1993; Sally 1995). In terms of internal motivation, persuasion 
for personal gain is important in achieving institutional objectives. However, officials in 
one jurisdiction (or one department within a larger jurisdiction) may put the interest of their 
own unit ahead of achieving objectives requiring full participation of all units.  
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 Hence, Jones (2001) argued that humans are adaptable creatures depending on the 
situational constraints that they find themselves in. Humans are capable of learning norms 
(e.g. to learn, discover, understand, or solve problems) and full analytical strategies from 
one and another and give and receive feedback from the world (surroundings) (Simon, 
1999). Normal processes of learning may vary depending on individual’s experience within 
any particular situation. Most certainly, they know how to differentiate and adopt both 
short-term and long-term perspectives depending on the opportunities they encounter 
(Ostrom, 2007). Initial emotion, direct experience by others and normative (common) state 
are the main influences concerning particular behaviour in a specific setting (Cox, 2004; 
Cox et al. 2005).  
Scholars have concluded that the similarity of issues in the public and private sector 
does require similar attention in finding ways of solving problems (Ostrom, 2002). Scholars 
also identified those factors influencing institutions that govern human social interactions 
are the traditions and informal customs (Graaskamp, 1992). They are a result of socio-
economic formal rules, political and legal systems (Healey, 1992; Van Der Krabben, 1995; 
North, 1996). 
 The perception of this organisational culture is growing in management, steering 
organisational behaviour from the right attitudes toward efficiency in regulatory 
compliance (Weick, 1987; Westrum, 1992). The management of habits, folkways (practice, 
custom, or belief shared by the members of a group as part of their common culture) and 
norms of organisational culture are the keys that shape action at the end (Westrum, 1992; 
Pidgeon, 1998; Toft et al. 1999). The role of managers and supervisors as leaders is the key 
contribution for consideration when commencing a planning structure (Deaux et al. 1993). 
They must be able to communicate with group members and initiate planning structure to 
define organisational aims, communication and procedures.  
 Even if institutions may or may not involve organisation, compliance with planning 
structure must become institutionalised because institutions provide structure, guidelines 
for behavior and shape human interaction (Luttig, 2000). Compliance culture in any 
institution is important due to an ‘attitude’ of the members set values in conjunction with 
regulatory aspiration (Makkai et al. 1993; Parker, 1999; Luttig, 2000). Compliance culture 
needs to become an everyday business (Gunningham et al. 1999a). This corporate culture 
then shapes behaviour so that members act in a manner that recognises the success of the 
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organisation is best achieved by ongoing compliance with regulatory goals (Brooks, 1988). 
As a result, clarity in a regulatory regime will increase and reduce prescriptive rules.  
 
3.8.1 Officials’ Attitudes in Disaster Planning 
Generally, diverse recent information is available on the opinions and attitudes of officials 
in disaster planning. However, recent academic worked proposed that neither work by 
public officers nor private officers follow regulatory compliance with disaster planning in 
Malaysia (Aini et al. 2006) (see section 4.4, p.101). Much past research (national or 
international) has focused on organisational behaviour and quotes rather than understanding 
the nature of attitudes towards compliance with disaster planning programme. Studies into 
understanding attitudes are important because the ‘attitude’ of an organisation in disaster 
situations sets the aspiration that leads to fostering a compliance culture (Makkai et al. 
1993; Parker, 1999; Luttig, 2000). The correct attitude in approach is vital because 
compliance culture needs to be considered in everyday activities in order to meet the goals 
set out by the regulatory compliance bodies (Gunningham et al. 1999a). This mutual 
culture subsequently shapes the behaviour of members in an organisation and is best 
achieved by on-going compliance (Brooks, 1988). Consequently, bureaucracy can be kept 
to a lowest consequence and increase the clarity and efficiency of regulatory administration 
simultaneously.  
 
3.8.1.1 Attitudes  
An attitude is a mental process that determines both the actual and potential responses of an 
individual in the social world (Allport, 1971). Actual and potential responses are usually 
directed towards some entity and are described as a mindset judgment of a person towards a 
value (Allport, 1971).  
 The entity about which an individual holds an attitude is called an attitude object. 
Attitude objects can be something that is discernable or an object of thought (Jonas et al. 
1995) such as the self, people, concrete objects, or abstract entities like social policies, 
ideologies. Therefore Allport (1971) described attitude objects as an inspirational act 
organised through experience that depends much on mental state readiness to response to 
all related objects and situations. Mental state is an essential human property in a definite 
period of time (Allport, 1971). Characteristics of the state of mental readiness are based on 
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motivation and determination to achieve a goal, as well as activity levels, and the capability 
of self-regulation. Meanwhile, Jonas et al. (1995) defined attitude as a state of 
psychological evaluation that is influenced by ones surroundings. Attitudes were also 
understood by scholars as a summary of cognitive expression from an internal evaluation 
towards an object (Smith et al. 1995). 
 A person’s attitude towards an attitude object can be positive, neutral or negative 
and can vary in intensity. This intensity normally reflects the person’s evaluation of the 
object as being weak or strong. As the person’s evaluation of the object becomes more 
salient and more involved, his/her rejection or acceptance of it increases and his/her 
indifference towards it decreases.  
 
3.8.1.2 Attitude Development 
An individual develops attitudes in the process of interacting with the attitude object. A 
person’s attitude will determine what the person will hear, think and do about the object 
(compliance issue) (Allport, 1971). Beliefs about the object’s positive or negative 
characteristics, feelings and emotions towards it, and past and current behaviours towards it 
were found as three main factors that develop a person’s attitude towards an issue (Smith et 
al. 1995, Jonas et al. 1995; Franzoi, 1996). 
 As mentioned by Smith et al. (1995), attitudes enable an individual to make sense 
of the social environment and forge connections with other persons. Attitudes assist a 
person to master the environment through the function of object (knowledge) appraisal 
(Smith et al. 1995). This function of attitudes enables a person to focus on the attitude 
object characteristics so that it can be dealt with meaningfully. Attitudes allow a person to 
classify new information and accommodate it along with established, existing information 
so that the complex world can be simplified (Stahlberg et al. 1992). 
 Attitudes enable a person to forge links with others, or in other words to gain and 
maintain connectedness with others. This social identity function may also be known as 
value-expressive function (Smith et al. 1995). As mentioned by Stahlberg et al. (1992), 
attitudes serve the purpose of protecting individuals from negative feelings towards 
themselves or their own groups and enable them to voice values or convictions when 
standing up to certain issues concerning the attitude object. These two functions of attitudes 
do not necessarily exist separately from each other. 
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3.8.1.3 Measurement of Attitude 
A person’s attitudes towards an object are very difficult to measure because it is an abstract 
in nature and thus, it cannot be measured directly (Lindgren, 1973; Stahlberg et al. 1992; 
Smith et al. 1995). Scholars make an assumption that collecting his/her opinions or beliefs 
about the attitude object is the correct way in attitude measurement (Stahlberg et al. 1992). 
Thus a person’s attitudes can be inferred from his/her evaluative statements and other 
expressions about the attitude object (Lindgren, 1973). As suggested by Smith et al. (1995), 
measuring a person’s attitudes involves two key factors: (1) the direction of his/her 
attitudes towards the attitude objects (i.e. for or to it) and (2) the intensity of his/her 
attitudes towards it (i.e. strong, neutral or weak). 
 Two ways to measure attitudes, are either by asking the person directly about their 
evaluation concerning the attitude object, or by observing their overt behaviours towards it 
(Lindgren, 1973; Stahlberg et al. 1992; Smith et al. 1995). This second form of indirect 
measurement usually involves the measurement of people’s attitudes without them being 
aware that their attitudes are being measured. 
 
3.8.1.4 Attitude Scales 
There are several ways of developing attitude scales to measure attitudes. Attitude scales 
are used to measure both the direction and the intensity of a person’s views about the 
attitude object. The scales normally consist of a series of questions asking the respondent 
how strongly he/she agrees or disagrees in his/her evaluation of the attitude object. 
Respondents choose from options that range from an extreme negative evaluation through a 
neutral point to an extreme positive evaluation (Smith et al. 1995). Classically, there are 
four popular approaches used to develop an attitude scale (Lindgren, 1973; Stahlberg et al. 
1992). These are: Thurstone’s equal appearing interval, Semantic differential, Likert scale 
and the one-item rating scales. For the purpose of the study, the Likert scale had been 
chosen in designing survey questionnaires that are specifically described in the 
methodology chapter. 
 
3.8.1.5 The Three-Component Model  
According to this model, attitudes consist of three components (Triandis et al. 1986; 
Stahlberg et al. 1992; Smith et al. 1995; Jonas et al. 1995; Franzoi, 1996). The three 
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components are cognitive, affective and conative. For the purpose of this study, the three-
component model of attitudes offers a way to analyse actors’ attitudes towards regulatory 
compliance. The three-component model allows for relatively ‘fine tuning’ and relating to 
changing attitudes in the initial descriptive phase in order to identify what are actors’ 
attitudes to regulatory compliance implementation. Analysing attitudes in terms of their 
cognitive, affective and conative components will help to detect the relative strength of 
each of the three dimensions. Given the nature and scope of this study, the three-component 
model has been adopted because it is descriptively adequate. 
 
A. Cognitive 
Cognitive information is what a person knows intellectually about an attitude object (i.e. 
the facts). The cognitive aspect of attitude formation assumes that it is largely our 
knowledge and understanding that shape our attitudes. Stahlberg et al. (1992) notes that the 
cognitive aspect is a judgment held concerning the attitude object as a result from 
information, knowledge or thought influence. 
 A belief is a perceived link between an attitude object and the attribute associated 
with it that tends to shape an individual’s concept of the attitude object. Since it tends to be 
highly accessible, a belief formed by personal experience of an attitude object influences an 
individual’s judgment, frequently thought about and comes quickly to mind. Besides 
experience, acquiring more information of a perceptually main nature about an attitude 
object can also influence a person’s beliefs and contribute to a strong effect on judgment. 
Hence, individuals are likely to hold positive attitudes towards objects they think may have 
good attributes and negative attitudes towards objects they think may have bad attributes. 
On the other hand, a belief about a category of people is often called a stereotype. A 
stereotype is a belief that members of a particular group of people have certain common 
traits or attributes.  
 
B. Affective 
Affective information consists of how an individual feels about the attitude object and 
involves the feelings, moods, emotions or sympathetic nervous system activity that is 
aroused in a person in relation to the attitude. Attitudes therefore are the positive or 
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negative evaluations a person gives to an attitude object and this evaluation has degrees of 
intensity attached to it. 
 The emotion attached to the attitude object may not necessarily be closely related to 
cognitive understanding. The mere increase of exposure to a particular attitude object may 
lead to the development of a more positive attitude to that object. This phenomenon is 
called the ‘mere exposure effect’, and does not require the development of any beliefs, nor 
does it assume any underlying motive that shapes the attitude (Franzoi, 1996). Hence, 
people may form an attitude based on an affective response rather than a belief about that 
object.  
 
C. Conative 
Conative information gained through personal experiences is one of the important bases of 
attitude development, since it is held that it is our behavioural response to the attitude 
object that helps to shape our attitude, involving as it does intentions to behave that are not 
necessarily expressed in action (Jonas et al. 1995).  
 
“…some sort of predisposition to a certain kind of attitude-relevant action that is the 
readiness to behave towards a certain attitude object in a special way…” 
(Stahlberg et al. 1992: 143) 
 
Therefore, if attitudes influence overt behaviour, an individual with a positive attitude to an 
object should engage in behaviour that moves towards the attitude object. Those with 
negative attitudes should move away from it. 
 
3.9 Conclusion 
There is a straightforward link between compliance and the conventional ‘command and 
control’ regulatory regimes. For many years, regulatory regimes rely on ‘command and 
control’ regulatory philosophy in order to protect public and achieve regulatory goals. 
Regulators also assume that enforcement is only restricted to the specification in 
regulations. Consequently, the trend in enforcement is towards prescriptive detail without 
any efforts to minimise loopholes in organisations’ administration. However, this type of 
enforcement is typically more effective and enforceable to regulation restriction in 
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equipment utilisation, strict components process or procedures. On the other hand, this type 
of enforcement is often less effective in ensuring compliance with those detailed procedures 
that are affected by various operational parameters. Thus, the ‘good governance’ concept 
was introduced to provide an enabling environment for disaster risk reduction, which would 
translate into political commitment from decision-makers (Davis, 2007). The Good 
governance concept will assist the presence of national policies that provides the 
framework for decision-makers, planners, practitioners and civil society to act and 
implement risk reduction priorities accordingly. An effective policy shall be able to assist 
an organisation to achieve stipulated strategic objectives, typically to reduce disaster risks, 
strengthening the legislative framework, generate or distribute funds, utilise human 
resources and optimise available capacities without ignorance to international requirements. 
This comprehensive disaster reduction policy is able to integrate an effort toward multiple 
development and environmental policies and legislation simultaneously. Ultimately, it is 
the application of legislation through risk reduction practices and tools that will bring about 
the desired changes at all levels of intervention and reduce vulnerabilities in the long-term. 
‘Good governance’ in other words is able to ensure a high level of compliance with 
standards in construction, continuous policy enforcement without compromising the quality 
of health and educational facilities (Aysan, 2006). Apparently, the demand acquiring 
enforcement sensitivity to the community is increased due to access to human rights. In the 
case of ‘Grootboom’, negligence of authority contributes more to a community’s 
vulnerability. Legitimacy is just an excuse used by authority to ignore what a community 
deserves according to international conventions. ‘Attitude’ in responsible enforcement has 
changed from the conventional perception of regulatory system avoidance (e.g. inspectors, 
permit writers, staff as enforcement) to institutional misunderstanding. Factors influencing 
general actor attitudes towards regulatory compliance have been the focus of many studies 
undertaken in various countries in the world. The next chapter will attempt to extract from 
these studies some of those factors that have been found to influence actor’s attitudes to 
comply with disaster management framework in the context of Malaysia.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Malaysia Context 
 
“Malaysia is serious about the 2020 vision to become an industrialised and developed 
country with a ‘clean, efficient and effective’ administration of public service sectors”. 
(Sarji, 1996: 21) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Malaysia is a federal constitutional12
 The state governments are headed by ceremonial State Rulers. The Ruler acts on the 
advice of the State Executive Council that is chaired by the Chief Minister. The state 
legislature has the autonomy to pass any law so long as it is consistent with federal laws. 
Local government comprises two levels, district administration and local authorities. 
District administration is the major administrative body at the district level for both the 
state and federal governments. The District Officer heads the District Council and is 
responsible for the development of the district as a whole (include local authority). 
 monarchy with a bicameral federal legislature 
(Parliament) and unicameral (one legislative) state legislatures (Rawlings, 1986). 
Parliament is the national legislature (bicameral-Peoples’ Hall, Nation’s Hall and the 
‘King’ as the third component). Malaysia has a three-tier government structure: federal, 
state and local.  
The Cabinet (council of ministers who are accountable to the Parliament) is the 
highest coordinating executive body of all government activities and interests. “The 
Cabinet is assisted in the discharge of its functions by two national councils, the National 
Economic Council (NEC), responsible for coordinating all development programs and the 
National Security Council (NSC), responsible for national security. There are three other 
national councils, the National Council for Local Government, the National Land Council 
and the National Finance Council” (Rawlings, 1986: 240) to improve and enhance 
coordination within the government machinery especially influence over the state 
governments. The national body responsible for local government is the Ministry of 
Housing and Local Government, assisted by the National Council for Local Government. 
                                                        
12 This Constitution is the supreme law of the Federation and any law passed after Merdeka Day 
that is inconsistent with this Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void [Article 4 (1)]. 
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Coordination of the development activities is done through various committees, chaired 
mostly by the District Officer (Rawlings, 1986). 
 According to the ‘2004 United Nations Development Programme’ (UNDP) Human 
Development Report, Malaysia is in the medium Human Development Index (0.79- 
between 0.500 and 0.800, countries are part of the Medium Human Development group) 
and is ranked 59 out of 175 countries worldwide (UNDP, 2004). The HDI (a summary 
composite index from 0 to 1) is an indicator of a country’s life quality based on long life, 
educational standard and living standard from GDP. Malaysia’s per capita GDP, estimated 
at USD 5,083 in 2006 and growing (USD 6,956 in 2007), measured on equivalence basis of 
purchasing power was estimated at USD 359 billion, classifies it by the World Bank as a 
middle-income economy (IMF, 2008). Although Malaysia is still considered as a 
developing country, it is no longer a third world country (WHO, 2005). Hence, civil 
servants in Malaysia benefit from much higher salaries compared to other neighboring 
countries (Quah, 1986). 
 In national administration, it is acknowledged that policies, being major 
organisational documents, are usually well studied prior to publication and enforcement 
(Kaufmann et al. 2007a). Recently, scholars differentiate measuring indicators (measuring 
good governance) of written formal laws or rules compared to practicality on setting 
(Kaufmann et al. 2007a). In Malaysia, indicators show that the score for the quality of 
public administration rates as average 78.8/+0.90 (World Bank, 2009a). Higher values 
(percentile rank 0 to 100) indicate better governance ratings. Meanwhile estimates of 
government measured on a scale from approximately -2.5 to 2.5 with higher values 
correspond to better governance. Other indicators related to the level of governance in 
Malaysia as mentioned by the World Bank (2009a) are:  
1. Voice and accountability (31.3/-0.55); 
2. Political stability and absence of violence (52.4/+0.20); 
3. Regulatory quality (trade policy and business regulatory environment) (67/+0.53); 
4. Government effectiveness (efficiency of revenue mobilisation/public expenditures, 
budget management, quality public administration, management of external debt) 
(82.9/+1.07); 
5. Rule of law (property rights) (65.2/+0.53); and 
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6. Control of corruption (transparency, accountability and corruption in public sector) 
(62.3/+0.19). 
 
Subsequently, scholars emphasised the need for state public administration to: 
transparently disclose and account for the margins of error in all indicators; represent from 
a range of indicators and exploit similarities among them; present all indicators to thorough 
public and academic analysis; and learn the lessons in order to be realistic in the 
expectations of future indicators (Kaufmann et al. 2007b).  
 
4.2 Quality of Public Service Administration  
The ‘Global Competitiveness Report’ recently placed Malaysia as 26th out of 160 countries 
(WEF, 2007). However, this rank is considered weak once compared to the competitors in 
the region like Singapore (5th), Hong Kong (11th), Taiwan (13th) and South Korea (24th). 
The problems with Malaysian public service in global competitiveness are the low integrity 
levels and ethical behaviour. Bureaucracy atmosphere in Malaysia is never free from 
bribery prosecution (Navaratnam, 2004). Leong (2006) argues that Malaysia must 
overcome the issues of dishonesty; bureaucracy; incompetence and professionalism; 
confusion of procedures; and non-competitiveness of public service so as to compete with 
other developed countries. Malaysia is still working to rectify any weaknesses in public 
service sector. Nevertheless, the development in the Malaysian public service sector is 
encouraging due to continuous dedication for change either from political or administrative 
levels (Siddiquee, 2007a). 
 The new direction of Vision 2020 was introduced in 1991 for public service 
transformation towards an efficient, effective and clean administration (development and 
implementation of government policy) (Sarji, 1996). One important move toward the 
accomplishment is by establishing comprehensive policies in all national directions. An 
establishment of robust policies is vital in the process of shifting and improving value in 
public governance. The policies motivate Malaysians to perform at high standards, increase 
productivity and performance (Taib et al. 1992).  The latest approaches and procedures 
(from international recognitions) were implemented in administration and unnecessary 
protocols were abandoned as value-added to policy implementation (Sarji, 1996; Siddiquee, 
2006). 
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 However, such positive features and benefits do not act as an assurance that public 
governance in Malaysia is free from inconsistencies and deficiencies. Malaysia is still 
struggling with the issue of poor records and ratings (Siddiquee, 2007a). Efforts have been 
taken to reduce red tape, reorganisation of work procedures and methods since the early 
1980. They still ineffectively fulfill the demand and expectation from the public.  
Each year, an estimated 3500 complaints regarding incompetent performance and 
‘red-tape13
The varieties of legal framework in the civil services (i.e. the body of employees in any 
government agency other than the military) in the five ASEAN countries (e.g. Malaysia and 
Singapore) were created according to the former colonial heritage and constitutional 
provisions of the country (Quah, 1986). The Malaysian Government inherited the executive 
administration left by the British Government (colonial) (Aini et al. 2005). The orientation 
of colonial bureaucracy was towards the preservation of a restricted developmental 
revenue-collection and law and order. The most challenging period in Malaysian 
administration covered the period of pre and post-independence. The focus towards the 
administration system was more on changes to civil servants
’ by public administrators are received by the ‘Public Complaints Bureau’ (PCB) 
(PCB, 2006; EPU, 2006). Forty eight per cent of the complaints were concerning delays 
and non-committal in taking actions. Other than those complaints, there were also 
complaints regarding delayed procedures, unreasonable decision making, misconduct and 
regulatory non-compliance. The public were also concerned about the poor quality of 
services and discrimination, particularly in land and permits issue (PCB, 2006). Thus, 
Malaysians require greater effort in order to witness efficiency and responsiveness in 
governmental operations because intentional goals and benefits in Malaysian public service 
are not yet reflecting the end results (Taib et al. 1992; Ho, 2002; Common, 2003; 
Siddiquee, 2006).  
 
4.2.1 Framework of National’s Public Service Sector 
14
                                                        
13 The terms ‘red-tape’ were adopted from Kaufmann, H. (1993) Social Psychology, The study of human 
interaction, USA: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston Inc. as the collection or sequence of forms and procedures 
required to gain bureaucratic approval for something, especially when oppressively complex and time-
consuming. 
14 Civil servants are the civilian public sector employee working for a government department or agency 
(Sarji, 1996). 
 perception as an independent 
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nation. The primary role was then expanded to promote and enhance institutional building 
and development in the public sector (Osman, 2003). 
 The legal basis of the Malaysian Civil Service (MCS) is found in the Federal 
Constitution (PSD, 1996). This legal basis specifies the appointment, dismissal, reduction 
in rank, secondment/transfer and protection of pension rights of civil servants. In addition, 
the Constitution also provides a legislative statement with relevant details of their 
membership and functions. The conditions and terms of service and operational procedures 
of civil servants are administered by the general orders issued by the Public Services 
Department (PSD) in accordance with Article 132 (2) of the Federal Constitution (Omar, 
1980). The PSD's aim is to formulate, plan and implement policies to ensure that the civil 
service consists of personnel that are efficient, dedicated and trained to implement all 
national policies and objectives (Marican, 1980).  
The PSD has implemented the new performance appraisal system (NPAS) on 1 
January 1992 (PSD, 1996). Performance appraisal is done for various reasons: professional 
and career development, accountability linked to recognition and compensation references 
for disciplinary procedure and, most commonly, as a mechanism to determine salary 
increment and as a promotion exercise (Abdul-Aziz, 1999). There are two types (i.e. 
individually and departmental) of yearly appraisal (once in June and once in December) 
that involve the process of comparison between planned programmes and projects (i.e. 
based on the central government policy and planning, budget allocation, staffing and 
facilities allocated) to actual achievement. The standard of work achievement will be 
measured based on cost, quantity, quality and time (Public Service Department, 1996). The 
completed individual self-assessment form as well as the assessment of his/her superior 
officer will be assessed during the interviews by the promotion board (Performance 
Appraisal Committee-PAC) as reflected in the annual and special confidential reports 
(Shaan, 1980).  
 The Staff Training Centre (STC) was formed in 1963 as part of the assistance 
programme known as New Zealand/Colombo Plan (Esman, 1972). Increased levels of 
awareness about the importance of skills and training in the civil service, the government in 
1965 hired two public administration experts from the Harvard, United States of America, 
John D. Montgomery and Milton J. Esman to examine Malaysia's administrative system 
and make recommendations for improving and suggest developments to its capacity (Omar, 
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1980). As a result, most of the national security and safety rules and regulations (e.g. 
OSHA) are inspired from the United States of America. Even, most of the local experts 
were trained in the United States of America.  
Then, the Malaysian Administrative Modernisation and Management Planning Unit 
(MAMPU) was established in 1966 to upgrade professionalism in all categories of 
employees in the civil service through educational and training programmes. National 
Institute of Public Administration (NIPA) or its Malay equivalent, Institut Tadbiran Awam 
Negara (INTAN), was formed in September 1972 and was expected to contribute to the 
better construction of national civil servants training centre in a way by providing 
government employees with the knowledge and skills required in the management of public 
policies and programmes (Omar, 1980). Most of the courses were still relevant and 
upgraded from time to time (Marican, 1979).  
 
4.3 Malaysia and Asia15
 Recently, Asia has been experiencing strong economic growth and investing 
massive capital into infrastructure and disaster management. The Asian community has 
 
Asia comprises two thirds of the world’s population, over 50 per cent of the world’s 
surface, 50 per cent of the global’s economy, 45 per cent of the world’s military and is 
home to 70 per cent of the world’s disasters (Ausaid, 2008). Asia acquires physical losses 
approximately worth USD 39.5 billion annually (ADB, 2008). In the year 2005 only about 
650 severe natural hazard events were recorded worldwide, 42 per cent of these happened 
in Asia with estimated USD 21 billion physical damage and a shocking 80 per cent of the 
worldwide death toll (Ausaid, 2008).  
The geophysical and geographical characteristics of Asia make the region more 
vulnerable to natural disasters. Ausaid (2008) notes, that 75 per cent of the world’s active 
and non-active volcanoes are in Asia. Asia also experiences 90 per cent of the globe’s 
earthquakes. The region suffers from 37 per cent of the world’s recorded natural disasters, 
57 per cent of deaths, affecting 89 per cent of population affected and damages to 44 per 
cent of property and infrastructure affected from the year 1975 to 2005. Ausaid (2008) also 
found that weather-related hazards contributed approximately two thirds of the natural 
disasters in Asia and Pacific region. 
                                                        
15 Malaysia is part of Asia that consists of 47 countries (ADB, 2008). 
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both the need and to some extent the capacity, to focus on disaster risk management at the 
national and regional level (Ausaid, 2008). Unfortunately, there exists the embarrassment 
of regional mechanisms (bodies, organisations and venture) particularly in focused and 
broader regional engagement. The South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC), Association of South East Asia Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Community (APEC) are non-effective entities insecurely associated with 
individual regional organisations and national policy agendas (ADB, 2008). The support 
from international institutions is obvious. The United Nations, Red Cross Movement and 
other international humanitarian organisations have established a number of regional 
headquarters and also enduring disaster risk management programmes (e.g. warehousing 
stores, groups’ coordination and training center) in Asia. However, there is still no 
formulation of a comprehensive disaster management framework between countries in Asia 
(Ausaid, 2008).  
 Basically, Malaysia and all other Asian countries have established their own 
National Disaster Management Mechanisms and for most this is a civilian Disaster 
Management Mechanism supported by variable levels of associated legislation, regulations 
and resources, including military capabilities (Shaluf et al. 2006). Civil society (including 
local non-government organisations and faith-based organisations) form an important 
component to the region’s preparedness, response and recovery capabilities.  
However, coordination and cooperation of agencies; and expertise, resources and 
knowledge of best practice in humanitarian action are diverse within this environment that 
is often challenging. Current disaster relief efforts have not lived up to the high standards 
because efforts in humanitarian and action plan have been frequently frustrated by the 
rejections from individual states authorities under the name of ‘sovereignty’ (supreme, 
independent authority) (Lai et al. 2009). ADB (2008) concludes that the Asia landscape of 
disaster risk management is complex and rather confusing (ADB, 2008).  
 
4.3.1 Action Plan 
ADB introduced the ‘Disaster and Emergency Assistance Policy’ (DEAP) in 2004. The 
DEAP was mainly initiated to provide guidance towards encounter response in the situation 
of country conflict, natural, technological and environmental hazards and health 
emergencies in Asia. It encourages developing countries to adopt strategies (suggested by 
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international treaties) in disaster risk reduction by incorporating it into their planning and 
development processes. The DEAP was formed from lessons learned from two earlier 
disaster policies in 1987 (Rehabilitation Assistance to Small Disaster Management Centers Affected by 
Natural Disasters) and 1989 (Rehabilitation Assistance after Disasters) and its implementation is 
directed more to rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance (ADB, 2004).  
 However, recent drastic approach and implementation only came to reality after 
Tsunami stroke Asia in 2004. Even the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management 
(ACDM) was already established in 2003, ASEAN still suffers from ineffective and 
inadequate collaboration network amongst members, for example, no warning system 
before Tsunami strikes in ASEAN (Lai et al. 2009). The ASEAN Agreement on Disaster 
Management and Emergency Response (AADMER)16
 In Asian countries after the Tsunami, interviews with individuals within and outside 
of government bodies, the UN and international NGO community suggest that the capacity 
of the newly formed national entities to manage disaster response was inadequate due to 
untrained and inexperienced personnel being placed in important decision-making roles 
(Bennett et al. 2006). UNISDR (2008) notes that the updated policy by the World Bank in 
March 2007 concerns earlier policies’ lack of awareness to prevention and mitigation. The 
policies in relief efforts were focused only on the areas of the benefit from unlisted 
activities (e.g. donations, distributions of resources and executive orders). Bennet et al. 
(2006) argued that a range of mitigation measures for example, should be incorporated in 
 was only signed by the member 
countries in July 2005 in Laos as a result from a significant feature of the agreed HFA 
framework (Lai et al. 2009).  
The support also comes from international institutions. According to Article 11 of 
Kyoto Declaration, developed countries are obliged to provide financial resources and 
technology transfer to developing countries (UNISDR, 2005). Subsequently, the United 
Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UN-ISDR), with the World Bank 
and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) announced a joint cooperation, 
during the Bali Disaster Risk Reduction Forum in May 2009 that placed a framework for 
technical support from the UN and the World Bank to help the ASEAN formulate and 
implement strategies and action plans for disaster risk reduction and management (World 
Bank, 2009b). 
                                                        
16 Measures for standard operating procedures, training and capacity building, disaster information sharing, 
communication network, and rapid assessment team in ASEAN Countries. 
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international policies and by the major contributor (i.e. the World Bank) during recovery to 
promote vulnerability reduction such as land-use; environmental issues and community 
planning; improving building codes; and construction regulations. Thus, UNISDR suggests 
that all agencies in emergency projects need to be flexible in giving full cooperation and 
other partners in supporting comprehensive recovery. The output of the policy revision by 
the UNISDR (2008) reflected the need of aid agencies to accelerate the entire emergency 
project circle, be more transparent on risks in emergency operations and address early 
recovery implementation and financing.  
 Meanwhile, Oxfam, its partners and other NGOs began to advise and assist 
governments (i.e. Sri Langka, India and Bangladesh) on how to provide shelter as people 
there felt the quality of shelters provided to them did not match the standards specified in 
the SPHERE Guidelines (2001) (Telford et al. 2006). The shelter design after Tsunami in 
2005 suffered from neglect from authority due to lack of consultation with users especially 
in design (Morago, 2005). Therefore, Telford et al. (2006) suggests that a regulatory system 
(worldwide) is necessary to ensure predictably high quality in international disaster 
response. The international relief system should establish an accreditation and certification 
system to distinguish agencies that work to a professional standard in a particular sector. 
Disaster victims’ satisfaction and guidance to the authority will be met appropriately with 
sufficient accreditation and a certification system for the international relief system. 
 The World Bank launched the ‘Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and 
Recovery’ (GFDRR) in 2006 in order to sustain the Hyogo Framework of Action (HFA) 
and International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR). GFDRR will expand and 
implement risk-reduction strategies in disaster prone areas, promote long term 
commitments and partnerships in the participated low and moderate income countries 
(ADB, 2008). Subsequently, provisions also have been made to set up ‘corporate 
emergency’ in ADB in order to mobilise resources from the World Bank and funds from 
donators (ADB, 2008). This corporate emergency is a rapid response committee for 
strategic advice and deploys trained emergency task teams. Emergency operations will then 
go through a single decision review meeting so as to speed up the process and authorisation 
of negotiations with the affected country. 
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4.4 Malaysian Experience 
From 1968 to 2004, Malaysia had experienced 39 disasters. The Tsunami in the year 2004 
was the worst (Foong et al. 2006). 49 per cent was contributed by natural disasters. Heavy 
rain (primary disaster) caused floods and landslides (secondary disaster) dominated most of 
those natural disasters (Ismail, 2003). Poorly controlled land use, design of buildings, 
maintenance of equipment and machinery; attitudes of personnel in regulatory compliance 
all inevitably added to the potential of the disaster (secondary disaster) (Ishak et al. 2004). 
Moreover, failures in regulation and compliance were identified as the key vulnerability 
and disaster causes in Malaysia. Aini et al. (2007) found that organisational error and 
regulatory failures were the main types of hidden error that contributed significantly to the 
disasters with 53.6 and 37 per cent respectively. Unfortunately, local experience in 
Malaysia suggested by recent academic worked proposed that neither work on public 
officers’ attitudes nor private officers follow regulatory compliance with the MNSC 
Directive 20 (Aini et al. 2006). However, there are four main contributions which explained 
the real scenario on local perceptions regarding public policy implementation in Malaysia.  
 Aini et al. (2006) argued that previous studies in Malaysia have gauged subject 
knowledge, attitudes and practices in sustainable development of teachers and general 
public but none on public officers. After a research, she found that public officers possessed 
good basic knowledge (70.1 per cent) in their own field and a positive attitude (mean of 
3.86 on a scale of 1 to 4) towards compliance with policy framework. The research also 
showed that the level of compliance was rather fine (mean of 3.00) that indicates that those 
activities were fairly implemented. However opportunity for improvement is still wide 
opens particularly in optimising the use of available resources provided by their department 
(Aini et al. 2006). This research work in public officers’ behaviours proposed that studies 
should be done to understand barriers that inhibit behaviour change from public officers in 
implementing national policies. It is important to identify the practical principles for public 
officers’ participation because they should realise crucial roles and responsibility in 
sustainable development as an example to the public (Aini et al. 2006). 
 Perspective from the managers in private sectors’ about the Malaysian National 
Security Council (MNSC) Directive 20 (see section 4.5.1, p.107) is the second main 
contribution to this research. The analysis from this research showed that 30 per cent of the 
Private Safety and Health Managers were unaware of the guidelines (Shaluf et al. 2003a). 
102 
 
However, 62 per cent of them believe that this MNSC Directive 20 is an essential guideline 
in the Health and Safety practice. They argued that the enforcement of the disaster 
regulations is the responsibility of authorities (Shaluf et al. 2003a). Thus, they (78 per cent) 
suggested that agencies responsible should be aware and ensure that application of the local 
and the international standards to the health and safety culture of Malaysia is always 
maintained at the highest standards (Shaluf et al. 2003b).  
 Thirdly, is about job satisfaction amongst employees (private and public officers) in 
Malaysia. They were only comfortable with their normal daily routine but not that of the 
MNSC Directive 20. Recently, managers find it hard to ignore the issue of job satisfaction 
at a time when the demand of meaningful work (work that is autonomous/self-sufficient 
towards effort and reward minded) is increasing. Ramayah et al. (2001) found that 
managers obligated as part of their moral responsibility to provide their employees with a 
satisfying work environment. The behaviour of satisfied workers will make positive 
contributions to the organisation. Studies have shown that income has a direct influence on 
job satisfaction (Fishbein et al. 1975; Fishbein, 1980). However, salary by itself was not an 
important factor to keep an employee in the job (Ramayah et al. 2001). They ranked 
confirmation of work placement as the most important followed by supervision and 
promotion. Meanwhile, co-workers assistance was ranked as average or neutral (not 
necessarily supportive) and argued that genders issue is not important to achieve job 
satisfaction. Thus, these variables are significant in doing research in relation to employees’ 
behaviors in Malaysia (Ramayah et al. 2001). 
 The fourth contribution is about the level of disaster victims’ satisfaction to 
temporary housing provided by the government in Malaysia. According to Foong et al. 
(2006) Tsunami victims in Kota Kuala Muda, Malaysia have shown a high level of 
satisfaction with the provision of temporary longhouses provided by the government 
because they were provided with the minimum 3 bedrooms to separate different genders 
and age groups; and there were also shared community space, storage and prayer room. 
Amenities were in some cases better than previous dwellings. However, the beneficiaries 
were actually unaware of non-compliance that exposed them to hazard. Temporary housing 
built after Tsunami did not fully comply with national rules and regulations (e.g. building 
codes and planning acts). There were many examples of non-compliance such as the 
bedroom size not according to specification; partition walls built of combustible instead of 
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non-combustible materials; no parking and open spaces as required; improper insulation 
and painting; and no front porch as a safety zone between the main entrance of the houses 
and the access road. The failure of the Malaysian Government to exercise the proper 
conduct of post-disaster provision has slowed the process of restoring the livelihoods 
(Foong et al. 2006). 
 
4.5 Evolution of Disaster Planning in Malaysia 
Historically, the May 13 Incident (13 May 1969 racial riots) in Kuala Lumpur involving 
mainly Muslim Malays and non-Muslim Chinese, resulted in the establishment of the 
National Operation Council (Majlis Gerakan Negara-MAGERAN/NOC) on 16 May 1969 to 
restore and implement law and order by establishing an unarmed ‘Vigilante Corps’, a 
protective army and battalions of police force. The Government also declared a national 
emergency state and suspended Parliament until 1971. When peace was restored, NOC 
(MAGERAN) was suspended. On 23 February 1971, the Government decided to establish 
National Security Council (Majlis Keselamatan Negara-MKN) to strengthen the public 
security and national defence and to maintain public order in the country (Aini et al. 2005). 
  The major transformation in the Malaysia Disaster Management Mechanism came 
only after the tragedy of the luxury condominium of Highland Towers collapsed on 11 
December 1993. The chaos occurred when the explanation given by various parties on the 
causes of the disaster differed greatly. At first, no agency is admitted to takes responsibility 
for carelessness and negligence. The noticeable lack of local expertise in specialised rescue 
operations, improper planning of disaster management and lack of standardise rules and 
regulation prompted the government to review the existing provisions for disaster 
management and institute a new mechanism for disaster relief and management (Aini et al. 
2005).  
 Even international communities were disappointed due to the absence of a pre-
agreed emergency response plan when response teams from Japan, France and Singapore 
came to offer their assistance (Soh, 1998). The Highland Towers’ tragedy set an exemplar 
and reference for future disasters management. Subsequently, the ‘Policy and Mechanism 
on National Disaster and Relief Management’ (see section 4.5.1, p.107) was formulated by 
National Security Council in May 1994 to coordinate all emergency agencies and handle 
relief activities during any major on-land disaster incident (Fakhru'l-Razi, 2001). In 1995, 
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the MKN office was reorganised and renamed as the National Security Division (NSD) 
(Bahagian Keselamatan Negara-BKN). Nevertheless, on 24 July 1997, BKN was again 
renamed as the National Security Council (NSC) (Majlis Keselamatan Negara-MKN) (Loo, 
1999). 
 Back in 1968, The Royal Commission of Enquiry found the existing Kuala Lumpur 
Municipal Building By-Law to be outdated and recommended the formulation of the 
uniform building by-law throughout the country in order to meet the changing needs of the 
construction industry. The commission recommended, among other matters, changes in the 
present laws and bye-laws affecting the building industry that covered proposals for the 
introduction of new legislation for the control, tendering procedures and regulation of 
building operations on site. It also proposed the introduction of legislation regarding the 
workers safety and health (Barakbah, 1971). On January 1986, The Uniform Building by 
Law (UBBL) was finally implemented. Standard enhancement in UBBL never ends and 
keeps updating from time to time to meet latest developments in building and construction 
technology (Aini et al. 2005). 
 In order to keep up the standard of construction development in Malaysia, the 
Malaysian Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB) was formed under the federal 
statutory body in 1993 so as to co-ordinate all construction industry activities in Malaysia. 
The official name of CIDB is ‘Lembaga Pembangunan Industri Pembinaan Malaysia’. The 
Act was subsequently gazetted on 7 July 1994 and appointed on the 1 December 1994 for 
the date the Act came into force (Abdul-Aziz et al. 2007). In the middle of 1996, the 
Building Control Unit was established under the Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government. The Unit was required to coordinate and draw up guidelines, plans and 
procedures as well as provide expert advice to local authorities on the safety and stability of 
buildings (Jaapar, 2006).  
 Malaysia never set any specific annual budget in risk reduction. Approximately, the 
Malaysian government reserves a sum of USD 20 million per year for an emergency fund 
(ADRC, 2006). Meanwhile, a ‘National Disaster Relief Fund’ under the NSD has been set 
up to fund efforts in disaster relief. There are continued efforts by respective agencies 
(government’s machinery) in risk reduction as shown in Diagram 4.1 guided by the MNSC 
Directive 20 in the national ‘Policy and Mechanism on National Disaster and Relief 
Management’ (see section 4.5.1, p.107).  
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The establishment of National Disaster and Information Management (NADDI) by 
the Malaysian Centre of Remote Sensing (MACRES), ‘National Tsunami Early Warning 
System’ was commissioned by the ‘Malaysian Meteorological Department’, the ‘Storm 
water Management and Road Tunnel’ (SMART) that was developed by the Malaysian 
Drainage and Irrigation Department (DID) are just some of examples in risk reduction and 
mitigation efforts made by government agencies. Several local universities initiated 
research centers related to landslide hazards in Malaysia such as the ‘National Soil Erosion 
Research Centre’ (NASEC) by the ‘University of Technology Mara’ (UiTM) and the 
‘Mountainous Terrain Development Research Centre’ (MTD-RC) by the ‘PutraUniversity 
of Malaysia’ (UPM) funded by the MTD Capital Berhad (Jaapar, 2006). 
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Diagram 4.1: Malaysia Disaster Management Programme 
              Source: NSC (1997)        
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4.5.1 The MNSC Directive 20 
Malaysia has a policy of disaster management called the ‘Policy and Mechanism on 
National Disaster and Relief Management’ (Aini et al. 2001). This framework contains 
directives that relate to disasters and relief management such as Directive 18 for the relief 
and management of disasters resulting from terrorist action; Directive 19 for establishing a 
special unit called Special Malaysia Disaster Assistance and Rescue Team (SMART) and 
Directive 20 for relief and management of natural and technological disasters. The policy 
statement for disaster relief operations in Directive 20 was purposely put in place to: 
1. Mitigate the effects of various hazards;  
2. Prepare for measures that will preserve life and minimise damage to the 
environment;  
3. Respond during emergencies and provide assistance;  
4. Establish a recovery system to ensure the affected community's return to normalcy.  
 
The MNSC Directive 20 is actually an executive order by the Prime Minister as the 
Standard Operating Procedures (S.O.P) that stipulates the procedures to take in times of 
disaster (NSC, 1997). 
 In the MNSC Directive 20, a disaster is defined as “an incident that occurs 
suddenly, is difficult in nature, destructive of property or environment and may cause loss 
of life and disrupts the daily activity of local community” (Aini et al. 2001: 46) that include 
natural disasters like flood and landslide and technological disasters like factory explosion 
and fire. Through this directive in the NSC (1997), the disaster management is controlled in 
accordance with the scale of disasters as follows:  
 
A. Level 1 Disaster  
Local incidents which are within control and do not have the potential to spread. It is not 
complex and could cause only small damage to life and property. The form of disaster 
would not jeopardise local daily activity at a large scale. The District Level Authority is 
capable of controlling such incidents through district level agencies without or with limited 
assistance from outside. 
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B. Level 2 Disaster 
More serious incidents, covering a wide area or exceeding two districts with a potential to 
spread. Possibly would cause death and damage to a large number of properties. The 
incident also affects public daily activities. Being more complex than Level I Disaster and 
difficult in terms of search and rescue. The State Level Authority is capable of controlling 
such incidents with or without limited help from outside. 
 
C. Level 3 Disaster 
Any incident caused by Level III Disaster is more complex in nature and affects a wide area 
of more than two states. Such incidents could be handled by the Central Authority with or 
without foreign help. The classification on assessment relies on the district level authority 
or state level authority or central authority depending on the scale of the disaster and also 
determines if help from higher authorities is needed. 
 
The Malaysia National Security Council (MNSC) Directive 20 states the 
mechanism on the management of natural and technological disasters including the 
responsibilities and functions of the various agencies under an integrated emergency 
management system (Moin, 2007a). The directive states that when a disaster occurs, the 
Disaster Management and Relief Committee (DMRC) have to be established at three 
different levels depending on the severity of the disaster, i.e. at the federal, state and district 
(NSC, 1997). Representatives from various private and government agencies fill up the 
place in this committee such as local authorities, Army, Police, the Civil Defense 
Department and many other relevant organisations as shown in Diagram 4.2.  
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Diagram 4.2: Disaster Management Mechanism of Malaysia 
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The committee at the federal level is chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister. The 
state level is chaired by State Secretary, while the District level is chaired by District 
Officer. The National Security Council (NSC) is the secretariat at each level. Being the 
Secretariat, NSC will establish Disaster Operation Control Centre (DOCC) in order to 
coordinate all forms of disaster relief efforts as well as monitoring the progress and 
development of these efforts (NSC, 1997). The DOCC is responsible for forming:  
 
A. District Disaster Management and Relief Committee (JPBBD) for Level I Disaster 
JPBBD is headed by the District Officer and should be mobilised to ensure all preparation 
activities for search and rescue operations, preparation of facilities and machinery, and 
other emergency aid (i.e. food and treatment) are executed and managed in good order and 
fully coordinated. On receiving a disaster report, the District Chief Police Officer and 
District Fire Brigade Chief should take appropriate steps assisted by main rescue agencies 
and supporting agencies and other organisation and voluntary bodies responsible in giving 
aid and rehabilitation to disaster victims. District Chief Police Officer and District Fire 
Brigade Chief would be commander and deputy commander of disaster operation 
respectively. 
 
B. State Disaster Management and Relief Committee (JPBBN) for Level II Disaster 
JPBBN headed by State Secretary should be mobilised to ascertain that disaster 
management is carried out smoothly and well coordinated. The State Police Chief and 
Director of State Fire Brigade will be a commander and deputy commander of disaster 
operation respectively at this stage. 
 
C. Central Disaster Management and Relief Committee (JPBBP) for Level III Disaster 
JPBBP headed by a minister appointed by the Prime Minister should be mobilised to ensure 
that all aspects concerning policy and decision making in search and rescue operation is 
carried out in a professional and effective manner. All related agencies and sources 
including search and rescue teams and emergency aid at district and state level shall be 
combined to face disaster that occurred under JPBBP. The Director of Internal Security and 
Public Order, Royal Malaysia Police (PDRM) and Deputy Chief Director of operation, 
JBPM respectively will be the commander and deputy commander of disaster operation. 
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‘Control Post on Scene’ (PKTK) and ‘Disaster Operation Controlling Centre’ 
(PKOB) should be established at the scene of disaster. Assistance required may be 
delivered to the district or state level in terms of expertise and equipment if it is found to be 
necessary. Membership of every committee is as shown in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1: Membership of Every Committee in Disaster Mechanism 
National Disaster Management and Relief Committee (JPBBP) 
Chairman: Honorable Minister appointed by Prime Minister (2009 Minister of Information Datuk 
Ahmad Shabery Cheek) 
Members: 
1 Minister of Finance 
2 Minister of National Unity and Community Development 
3 Chief Secretary of State 
4 Commander of the Armed Forces 
5 General Director of Police Department 
6 General Director of Health 
7 General Director of National Security Division 
8 General Director of Fire Brigade and Rescue Malaysia 
9 General Director of Atomic Energy Licensing Board 
10 General Director of Broadcasting 
11 General Director of Information 
12 General Director of Transportation Department 
13 General Director of Public Work Department 
14 General Director of Environmental Department 
15 General Director of Social Welfare Department 
16 General Director of Working and Health Security Department 
17 General Director of Meteorology Service Department 
18 General Director of Civil Aviation Department 
19 General Director of Geology Research Department 
20 General Director of Irrigation and Drainage 
Representative of General Solicitor 
Budget Director for Minister of Finance 
General Director of RELA 
Also Present: Other Concerning Officers 
Secretary: Director of Crisis and Disaster Management Unit,  
National Security Division (BKN) 
Prime Minister’s Department 
 
 
State Disaster Management and Relief Committee (JPBBN) 
Chairman: State Secretary 
Members: 
 State Police Officer Chief 
 Brigade Commander (ATM) 
 Director of State Fire and Rescue Department 
 Director of State Health Department 
 Director of State Public Works Department 
 Director of State Social Welfare Department 
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State Disaster Management and Relief Committee (JPBBN) 
 Director of State Information Department 
 Director of State Broadcasting Department 
 Director of State Civil Defence Department 
 Director of State Environment Department 
 Director of State Workers Security and Health Department 
 Director of State Meteorology Department 
 Director of Civil Aviation Department 
 Director of State Irrigation and Drainage Department 
 Director of State Geological Survey Department 
 Director of Transport Department 
 Director of Malaysian People Voluntary Alliance (RELA) 
 Manager of State STMB (Malaysia National Telecommunication Agency) 
 Manager of State TNB (Malaysia Electrical Power Agency) 
Also Present: Other relevant officers 
Secretary: Director of National Security (BKN) State Division  
 
District Disaster Management and Relief Committee (JPBBD) 
Chairman: District Officer 
Members:  
 Chief of District Police Officer 
 District Health Officer 
 District Engineer, Public Works Department 
 Representative from Malaysian Armed Forces (ATM) 
 District Council Secretary 
 District Social Welfare Officer 
 Officer of District Civil Defence Corporation 
 District Information Officer 
 District Engineer, Irrigation and Drainage Department 
 District RELA Officer 
 District TNB Officer 
 District STMB Officer 
Also present: Other related officers 
Secretary: Assistant Director, National Security Division (BKN) District Division 
                                                                                                             Source: NSC (1997) 
 
Moin (2007b) notes that officials must comply with the MNSC Directive 20 
alongside other national legal frameworks in development process (see section 4.5.2, p.114) 
as follows:  
1. Land conservation Act; 
2. Environmental Quality Act 1974; 
3. Local Government Act 1976; 
4. Road, Drainage and Building Act ; 
5. Occupational Safety and Health Act; 
6. Uniform Building By-Laws; 
7. Town and Country Planning Act 1976 (Act 172); 
8. Infectious Disease Act; 
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9. Road Transportation Act; 
10. Internal Security Act; 
11. Police Act; 
12. Criminal Procedure Code; 
13. Fire and Safety Act;  
14. Related Acts etc. 
 
Simultaneously, any related international guidelines are considered as the same 
reference in emergency management and relief work because the Malaysian Government 
agreed to implement the contents in Hyogo Framework (Moin, 2007a) (see section 4.5.2, 
p.114). Two main basic texts provide the foundation for the response of the international 
community and aid organisations in humanitarian emergencies as mentioned by Corsellis et 
al. (2005) as follows: 
1. ‘Handbook for Emergencies’ (UNHCR, 2000a);  
2. ‘Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response’ (Sphere 
Project, 2004). 
 
Recently there is another new version of shelter guidelines called 2008 Preliminary 
draft Shelter Standards and the 2010 Edition ‘Humanitarian Charter and Minimum 
Standards’ in Disaster Response (Shelter Centre, 2007). However these standards are still 
waiting for comment by the stakeholders in disaster community. 
 The Malaysian Government hopes that with the creation of a Disaster Management 
Mechanism as reflected in MNSC Directive 20, the handling and resolving of disaster could 
be carried out in a more coordinated manner with the integrated involvement and 
mobilisation of related agencies. All these will in turn ensure that Malaysia has credible 
disaster management machinery that is able to perform in unpredictable disasters (CDM, 
2005). The policy document however is not available for public scrutiny for reasons of 
national security especially restriction of other directives (e.g. Directive 18 is regarding 
terrorist action and Directive 19 in establishment of special unit). Most of the information 
only exists in the form of internal department communications (i.e. written executive 
orders). Even then, documents were circulated for office use only. 
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4.5.2 Compliance with the MNSC Directive 20 
Malaysia has taken the preventive measures as a result of international and national 
pressure to protect the public (Shaluf, 2003b). However, Malaysia is still in the phase of 
restructuring and reorganising the National Disaster Management Mechanism to fit in the 
HFA (Aini et al. 2007). Malaysia has just adopted the HFA in the National Disaster and 
Fund Management Committee Meeting on November 2005 during the National Disaster 
and Relief Management Committee Meeting chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister. The 
committee meeting was held as a result from the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster 
Management and Emergency Response (AADMER-HFA input) in July 2005 in Laos.  
According to the HFA, states (country) must consider acceding to, approving or 
ratifying, relevant international legal instruments (e.g. the Humanitarian Charter and 
Minimum Standards: based on the principles and provisions of international humanitarian 
law, international human rights law, refugee law and the Code of Conduct for the 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental 
Organisations) and to make sure they are implemented. Implementing the HFA will also 
help Malaysia to reach the ‘2001 Millennium Development Goals’ (reducing extreme 
poverty, reducing child mortality rates, fighting disease epidemics such as AIDS and 
developing a global partnership for development by 2015 by all United Nations members’ 
states) (Moin, 2007b).  
 Moreover, an important element in the plan of action of the Habitat Agenda is the 
need to monitor progress towards the goals of the Agenda. Malaysia is one of the countries 
out of 171 governments which has adopted the Habitat Agenda at the Habitat II17
According to the Habitat Agenda, it is essential to evaluate the impact of policies, 
strategies and actions on the provision of adequate shelter and the achievement of 
sustainable human settlements development. As a result, Malaysia is now in the phase of 
enhancing the coordination of responsibility between the government bodies in terms of 
disaster management mechanism. Subsequently, the features were adapted to the Malaysian 
, Istanbul 
1996 (UN-HABITAT, 1996). Malaysia, as a member of the UN, was obligated to adopt the 
goals and principles of adequate shelter for all and sustainable human settlement 
development in an urbanising world, especially the right to adequate housing, as provided 
for in international instruments (UN-Habitat, 2001a).  
                                                        
17 It emphasises that all partners of the Habitat Agenda (including local authorities, communities and the 
private sector) should monitor their own performance in the implementation of the Agenda regularly. 
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standard operating procedure in disaster management (MNSC Directive 20) (Aini et al. 
2007). The preventive measures have been taken through establishment of authorities to set 
major hazard control regulations, enforcing the regulations, assessing the safety reports and 
emergency plans, conducting audits and accident investigations (Shaluf, 2003a).  
 In the Disaster Operation Control Centre (DOCC), NSC (as the secretariat to 
DMRC) will monitor and ensure that disaster management are effectively and smoothly 
implemented without compromise to comply with the national and international legislations 
(NSC, 1997). DOCC have to ensure that policy and mechanisms in disaster management 
are observed and at the end to carry out a disaster post mortem (enforcing of the relevant 
regulations; and carry out inspections, reports and audits) (NSC, 1997). ‘Crisis and Disaster 
Management Unit’ (CDM) under this NSC was established in 2003 and responsible for 
development strategies and recommendations to improve inter-agency and inter-stakeholder 
collaboration on environmental management, development planning and biodiversity 
conservation of the highlands and to ensure sustainable economic development (NSC, 
1997). The major compliance control in Malaysia is accomplished through three elements 
stipulated in the MNSC Directive 20: they are identification, prevention and mitigation 
(Shaluf, 2003b). 
 Executive order in the MNSC Directive 20 by the Prime Minister is the standard 
operational procedure to comply with (S.O.P) for all departments involved in disaster 
management. Even if the complete version of the MNSC Directive 20 is restricted, the 
contents circulated are clear to all departments in the Mechanism of Disaster Management 
in Malaysia. The MNSC Directive 20 specifies in writing what should be done when 
disaster strikes, when to use certain clauses of it, and where responsibility lies. This 
directive includes objectives, scope of areas, stages of the process, responsibility and 
review of implication at the end to make sure that the procedure continues to be useful, 
relevant and up to date (Aini et al. 2007). The MNSC Directive 20 also provides:  
1. An opportunity to demonstrate professionalism, professional accountability and 
responsibility to government;  
2. Platform tackle any issue in the right way parallel with other government 
departmental SOP such as Health, Safety and Environmental Policy; department 
desk file; department work procedure manual; and the National Urbanisation Policy 
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(Sarji, 1996). Most importantly, SOP will guide the agencies responsible to comply 
with rules and regulations in it. 
 
Whenever non-compliance was identified, it is a useful means of reviewing 
procedures and identifying any that may need modifying because non-compliance will 
affect the performance and vulnerable to potential risk to regulatees and even to agencies 
involved. Non-compliance refers to any failure to comply with the federal regulations or the 
requirements or determinations of the MNSC Directive 20 (Fakru’l-Razi, 2001). Non-
compliance can be relatively minor, such as trouble with bureaucracy and scopes of work 
within agencies involved, or it can be serious, such as non-compliance that adversely 
effects the rights and welfare of regulates and participants, such as inhabitable18
 Finally, agencies involved must conduct review or report in a way that protects the 
rights and welfare of human subjects. This review or report is to differentiate the definitions 
 rooms; 
incompatible materials (e.g. non-combustible and toxic materials); no open spaces or buffer 
zone for gathering point in case of fire; improper insulation and painting; unacceptable 
ventilation; no running water supply; unmaintained toilet; and unsafe workplace for the 
agencies as service provider (Shaluf, 2003b). All of the hazards (e.g. health, fire and 
chemical reactivity) will expose the victims as occupants and also the agencies working 
around them.  
Caution must be exercised according to rules and regulations in the MNSC 
Directive 20 so as to avoid introducing a potentially more hazardous situation and the 
agencies responsible can do the job effectively and safely (Shaluf, 2003b). Although 
changing procedures in MNSC Directive 20 without unanimous approval from DMRC puts 
agencies in a state of non-compliance. In such cases, bureaucracy in the process of decision 
making might be the cause of changes to the procedures in the MNSC Directive 20. 
Bureaucracy is even more complicated at some point in the process of decision making 
throughout the agencies involved in disaster management mechanism that include the 
amount of specialisation in areas of work and responsibility; the levels of management and 
their consequent size; the grouping of departments together for functionality of expertise; 
and the kind of integrative mechanism for control over work done. Bureaucracies will 
ultimately determine how efficiently the desired goals will be acquired (Mouzelis, 1968).  
                                                        
18 The term inhabitable refers to ‘not fit to live in’ adapted from Lawrence, R. J. (2005) Housing and Health: 
A Way Forward, Built Environment, Alexandrine Press, 31.4.315-325. 
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of MNSC Directive 20 variations according to rules and regulations and issues of non-
compliance from undesirable events. The review or report will than send to the DMRC for 
further action. Any amendment must first inform to the knowledge of the Prime Minister as 
the honourable executive decision maker in the DMRC (Moin, 2007b). 
 
4.6 National Housing Rights Legislations  
According to the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) in 2001, there was no 
information in the United Nation database on relevant legislative clauses of national 
housing rights legislation available from the United Nation country members of Malaysia, 
Thailand, Singapore, Myanmar and Brunei Darussalam (UN-HABITAT, 2002). However, 
Article 8 by Clause (1) in the Constitution of Malaysia provides that ‘all persons are equal 
before the law and entitled to its equal protection’. Malaysians are all protected under 
present laws such as:  
1. The Syaria Law (only applicable to Muslims);  
2. The civil and criminal codes; land use, planning laws and regulations;  
3. Building codes and standards, development laws; and environmental standards 
(Hashim, 1976).  
 
 In some cases there are some inconsistencies of national laws with international 
human rights standards. For example, the considerations are most likely to the subject of 
culture, race and religious. According to Constitution of Malaysia, there are special clauses 
such as under Article 153 for the reservations and special provisions for the Malays19 and 
the Bumiputras20
 Smith (1981) argues that housing policy can only be a part of overall policy 
formulation towards urbanisation and that its scope and achievements interact with other 
sectors. That is the main consideration in placing any housing programme to suit with other 
policies in any country. Housing is the matter of physical development to fit into the 
broader pattern of present national economic and social objectives by trying to rectify what 
 of Sabah and Sarawak and under Article 149 that allows the Parliament to 
pass laws to suspend a person's fundamental rights if a person is a threat to national 
security.  
                                                        
19 A native racial category encompassing peoples of South East Asia and sometimes the Pacific Islands 
(Hashim, 1976). 
20 The ethnic group located primarily in the peninsula of Malaysia and parts of Sumatra and Borneo (Hashim, 
1976). 
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is wrong with the housing ‘envelope’ such as reactionary (eliminate housing problem for 
cosmetic reasons), alien (the use of imported technologies and colonial legacies) and 
innovative (create, develop and manage within available limited resources). Thus, housing 
policy most commonly does not ‘stand alone’ (Smith, 1981).  
 In Malaysia, there is no comprehensive national housing policy in terms of any 
housing development (Shuid, 2006). Most of the housing development refers to the 
guidelines such as the New Economic Policy and Vision Development Policy (as shown in 
Appendix 9, p.341). The main reference is the Malaysia Planning that is renewable every 
five years (Razali, 2001). Malaysia Planning comprises the components of thematic areas to 
the right to adequate housing such as general policy statements on housing, legal security of 
tenure, protection against forced eviction, provision of affordable housing for the poor and 
compliance with national laws (e.g. Housing Developers Act; Environmental Quality Act 
1974; Local Government Act 1976; Road, Drainage and Building Act 1974; Strata Title 
Act 1985; Uniform Building By-Laws; and Town and Country Planning Act 1976).  
 However, as argued by Barakat (2003) the policies and requirements for providing 
housing after a disaster should be defined clearly because housing is considered as an 
essential necessity for human being and provides a platform to livelihood and other survival 
opportunities. In Malaysia, the MNSC Directive 20 in the ‘Policy and Mechanism on 
National Disaster and Relief Management’ is the main instrument for providing housing for 
a post-disaster programme (Aini et al. 2005).  
The process of providing shelters to disaster victims started from temporary shelters 
(e.g. conversion of community hall, cabin and relatives’ accommodation), transitional 
housing and permanent housing (Foong et al. 2006). Still, emergency housing policy is not 
clearly defined in Malaysia and it is always controversial due to budgeting, quality of 
construction, procurement and sustainability issues in project developments. Considerations 
are not only shown to the international legislation rather to situational legislation (local 
demands) in providing emergency housing in Malaysia. For example, the requirements 
(according to national standards) are even higher than other international standards such as 
3 bedrooms to separate different genders and different worship halls for different groups of 
people due to religious and cultural demands. 
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4.7 Emergency Housing in Malaysia 
In the land development process in Malaysia as shown in Diagram 4.3, related written and 
unwritten rules (regulators’ behavior and skill) on land and property may initiate constraints 
on agents’ decisions to undertake land development (Omar, 2002). Besides the positive 
effect of planning and controlling, environmental requirements (e.g. soil condition, 
pollution and secondary hazards) may lengthen the duration of the land development 
process.  
 
Diagram 4.3: Land Development Process in Malaysia 
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                                                                                               Source: Tan (2001) 
 
Foong et al. (2006) notes that the challenge in rehabilitation and reconstruction 
projects for natural disaster stricken areas have always posed questions to the physical, 
                                                        
21According to the Uniform Building B-Laws 1984 [G. N. 5178/85] of Malaysia, the Certificate of Fitness is 
an official document issued by the Local Authority to acknowledge that a certain building is safe and can be 
occupied. 
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social and financial aspects of the disaster victims. She added that livelihoods of the 
affected community could be better restored with appropriate measures undertaken by the 
respective governments in executing rehabilitation and reconstruction projects. Thus, 
enhancement (rectification) of socio-economic rules and administrative frameworks in 
Malaysia is a must from time to time to suit the latest requirements in the process of land 
development and the needs from disaster victims (Abdul-Aziz, 1999).  
 Foong et al. (2006) also describes that the Tsunami in 2004 was the first time in the 
history of Malaysia that its government was forced to manage such a great disaster and 
might be the benchmark to rehabilitation and reconstruction. Emergency evacuation and 
relocation plans were constructed quickly. In Kota Kuala Muda, construction of temporary 
longhouses as shown in Fig. 4.1 and rehabilitation works started three weeks after the 
disaster and was completed within two weeks.  
 
Fig. 4.1: Temporary Longhouses and Typical Floor Plans 
 
 
                                                                                 Source: Foong et al. (2006) 
 
 
One hundred and four affected families whose houses were no longer inhabitable 
due to the Tsunami in thirteen fishing villages were relocated to these temporary 
longhouses before being moved to their permanent housing. One hundred and twenty units 
of temporary hybrid (e.g. timber and steel) longhouses were constructed approximately one 
kilometer inland from the affected shore. Each unit of the temporary longhouses is 
approximately 70m² in floor area, with three bedrooms, a living/dining room, a kitchen and 
two bathrooms. Ninety-six tsunami affected families whose houses were totally destroyed 
and eight affected families whose houses were being repaired were relocated to these units. 
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The remaining units are used as management office, community room, prayer room and 
room for storage. Proposals for developing permanent housing (i.e. a New Town 
Development Plan) are being carried out in collaboration with a sole developer, The 
National Housing Corporation (SPNB), established under the Ministry of Finance of 
Malaysia as shown in Fig. 4.2. 
 
Fig. 4.2: Rumah Mesra Rakyat Programme (RMR) Housing and the Loan Repayment 
Scheme 
 
 
                                                                                         Source: SPNB (2006)                                                                                          
 
However, the Tsunami affected community in Kota Kuala Muda shows that they 
were more concerned about their financial and social recovery compared to physical 
recovery (Foong et al. 2006). A majority of them are still struggling for their livelihoods 
after the disaster despite showing a high satisfaction level with the provision of temporary 
longhouses and the new permanent housing. Foong et al. (2006) concludes that 
rehabilitation measures for immediate relief have failed to recognise that the major cause of 
the slow progress in restoration is due to the inability of the disaster victims to secure their 
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livelihoods. The failure of the Malaysian Government to exercise the proper conduct of aid 
provision has dragged the process of restoring the livelihoods of many disaster victims 
(Foong et al. 2006). Thus, Lizzarralde (2001b) suggested that developing countries should 
also learn not only from international legislations and cases from developed countries but 
also from neighbouring countries that locally similar in many aspects.  
 
4.7.1 Emergency Housing in other Developing Countries  
Trends in housing policy are very similar in the developing countries after a disaster strikes 
(Smith, 1981). The trends in many reconstruction programmes in the third world countries 
however continuously fail to help poor communities recover from destruction (Lizarralde et 
al. 2001a). Globally, most reconstruction programmes implemented by important 
institutions in disaster-relief have produced insufficient results to respond to the demand of 
post-disaster housing and development in the long term. As mentioned by Lizarralde 
(2001b), most frequent paradigms used in post-disaster reconstruction strategies are the 
local community and limited technology-based approaches. In the last fifty years, these 
strategies have led to a variety of organisational and technical responses and have been 
applied in four main levels that consist of the reconstruction policies, the reconstruction 
strategy, the project for reconstruction and the output per se (Lizarralde et al. 2001a).  
 Thus, Bhatt (1999) argues that on site services and projects were condemned due to 
the possibility of them being ‘rubber-stamped,’ that is the development being copied 
exactly or nearly the same from other developments without appropriate consideration to 
the new adaptable situation (e.g. repetition, inappropriate distribution of private and public 
spaces and overcrowded houses). These types of services also led to failure in 
reconstruction programmes especially in the aspects of technical, architectural design, 
organisational design, logistics and administration because lack of local understandings.  
Da Silva (1980) recommended the ‘pluralist’ approach (in project application) that 
empasised different levels of services in project reconstruction; project groundwork and 
management; components production and erection (assemble); and funding. Meanwhile, 
Keivani et al. (2001) introduced ‘multiplicity’ in the provision of housing that include all 
beneficiaries (participants) in the reconstruction project. Both approaches are supporting 
each other toward accomplishment of project missions even in developing countries where 
building progression has almost entirely been done ‘in-situ’ (in the place). According to the 
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‘pluralist’ approach, seven variables (five in project preparation and two in management) 
were identified in order to maximise opportunity and participation from survivors and 
providers in reconstruction programmes as follows: 
1. Define Outputs: The process of post-disaster situation in identifying and building 
sensible initiatives (benefit to victims) at multiple levels (Anderson, 1999); 
2. Acquisition: Potential home owners, land owners and renters (Gilbert, 1997; Gough, 
1998); 
3. Architectural flexibility: They should consider architectural diversity at four levels: 
(i) plot sizes (and even forms), (ii) different housing designs (in cases where designs 
are done or suggested by professionals), (iii) flexibility to adapt the house to 
different occupancy needs and (iv) flexibility in the house to grow in the future 
according to developing needs or desires of residents (Bhatt, 1999). Learning from 
the previous cases (see section 4.8, p.124) such as in earthquake aftermath in 
Turkey and China, the design also should improve the quality of life of numerous 
families; reducing residents’ vulnerability to future natural hazards and yielding 
accepted; and desirable construction forms and technologies (more case studies of 
reconstruction project are as shown in Appendix 10, p.343); 
4. The policy is usable in any possible different scenarios: A complete reconstruction 
policy requires tackling the demand of both provisional and permanent housing for 
each of these cases: (1) non-affected housing, (2) housing affected by the disaster 
subject to safe conditions for the residents (repairing the house is more effective 
than reconstruction), (3) housing affected by the disaster that cannot be occupied 
due to unsafe conditions for the residents (repairs are more difficult or more 
expensive than reconstruction: affected residents in this group might be 
homeowners or renters) and (4) shortage of pre-disaster housing and homelessness 
(Lizarralde, 2000); 
5. Housing typologies: Creative typologies and innovation in post-disaster housing 
(e.g. spread low-density layout, lack of community spaces and sensibility in the 
design of the units) ( Gunawan, 1999); 
6. Resources: To address different needs in reconstruction programmes of the 
survivors according to their existing (and very often inadequate) resources. Some of 
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those resources might come in the form of materials, loans, subsidies, tax 
incentives, education and tents (Hewitt, 1998);  
7. Information and education: To the affected community, mass media, donors and 
decision makers (Davis, 1981). 
 
Lizarralde et al. (2001a) suggested that project planner should put into consideration 
the organisational internal aspects (e.g. funding, physical space, qualification, information 
presentation, resources available) in delivering any reconstruction projects. Multiplicity in 
the provision of housing, that is to say, in the sharing of responsibilities and the 
organisational arrangements between the participants involved in housing initiatives. 
Keivani et al. (2001) describes that participants are the public, private, private unofficial 
sector or the community base organisations. In the general performance, procurement has a 
direct influence in reconstruction progress (Mohsini et al. 1992; Katsanis et al. 1997). The 
arrangement of organisational and responsibilities distribution must then consider the 
aspects of local participation in decision-making in the building process in housing 
provision (Lizarralde, 2000). 
 Every reconstruction programme has particular characters that are not easy to 
generalise because every disaster is unique (Yin, 1984). Therefore, Keivani et al. (2001) 
suggested that communities must be ready for the new pluralist and multiplicity 
(participation) approach of the affected community. The regular housing policies in the 
Third World adopted, as a model, a more integrated housing policy of plurality inspired by 
developed countries (Keivani et al. 2001) and translated by the World Bank (2000) and 
UN-Habitat (2001a) in order to implement it in the developing countries. 
 
4.8 Lesson Learned from Disaster Cases in Housing 
The natural disaster cases in Asia and developing countries were, typically, likely to relate 
to seismic behaviour other than heavy rain (Spence, 2009). Dogangun (2005) argued that 
most houses in the third world countries are built by local builders and owners who do not 
need to adhere to seismic codes. The housing stock there is what can be described as 
‘second generation’ housing where traditional techniques and materials are mixed with new 
materials, such as reinforced concrete. This new breed of housing lacks funds and 
understanding of earthquake resistant techniques, making these houses vulnerable (Spence, 
125 
 
2009). Below are some examples of non-compliance cases where some buildings collapsed 
while others did not. 
 
A. Marmara Earthquake, Turkey and Reinforced Concrete 
Many important steps were not taken in Turkey prior to the 17 August 1999 Marmara 
earthquake that caused numerous structural (physical) damage and casualties (Bruneau, 
2002). Bruneau (2002) argued that most existing structures were not built in compliance 
with building codes and the degree of structural damage and number of casualties would 
have been greatly reduced if had more effective enforcement to these codes. The existence 
of the latest 1998 and 1975 Turkish building code represented much of the knowledge on 
how to design effective earthquake-resistant buildings especially to the enactment of 
effective seismic-design regulations. One such example of a building with minor damages 
in the Marmara Earthquake was the Hyundai plant, designed in 1997 in dual compliance 
with the latest Turkish and Korean seismic provisions with the use of correct materials (e.g. 
reinforced steel bars instead of smooth bars normally used for residential buildings and no 
plastic/steel hinges at the structure surface) and building design where the structure consists 
of long span moment resisting frames. The design was accomplished in awareness of the 
numerous fractures observed following the Northridge Earthquake, 1994 (Bruneau, 2002).  
 In earthquake, the ability of reinforced concrete columns, beams and beam-column 
joints to sustain deformation demands depend on how well the seismic design and detailing 
requirements were followed, both in design and in construction (Bruneau, 1993). Thus, the 
community (officials and public) requires the need for earthquake preparedness, 
implementation and enforcement (identify hazards created by buildings design and 
construction) of a comprehensive code for the design and construction of new earthquake-
resistant buildings. The seismic codes are providing an adequate level of protection and a 
financially sensible formulation that will be compatible with societal expectations 
following a major earthquake (Bruneau, 1997). However, as argued by Bruneau (1997) the 
situation still remains that earthquake resistant design is not mandatory in many parts of the 
world because to comply with seismic codes is back on the basis of costs. 
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B. The Kocaeli and Duzce Earthquakes, Turkey and Traditional Woodframe Buildings 
Traditional wood frame buildings were commonly constructed in Turkey until 
approximately 1960. After that, reinforced concrete and masonry buildings have been 
preferred. However, reinforced concrete buildings presented a high level of damage 
compared to traditional buildings which performed relatively well during the 12 November 
1999, Kocaeli and Duzce Earthquakes (Dogangun, 2005). These wood construction 
buildings are protected by brick fire breaks as required by the Turkey legislations 
(Tobriner, 2000). The brick walls (i.e. masonry infill) contributed significantly to the lateral 
stiffness of buildings during the earthquake and controlled the lateral drift and elastically 
resisted seismic forces. Once the masonry infill’s failed, the lateral strength and stiffness 
had to be provided by the frames alone, which then experienced significant inelasticity (if 
constructed by reinforced concrete) in the critical regions (e.g. slope area and unstable soil) 
(Bruneau, 2002).  
 In most cases as revealed by building inspectors after a sequence of earthquakes, 
buildings depend much on the level of elasticity resistance and methods of structural 
construction connected to the base platform or soil stability (Dogangun, 2005). The failure 
of platform or soil to sustain seismic activity could most possibly contribute to 
building/structure instability. Wood frame buildings have better seismic behaviour or 
performance compared to reinforced concrete because wood naturally high in elasticity 
(Dogangun, 2005). Statistically, 60 out of 814 reinforced-concrete structures were heavily 
damaged or collapsed, only 4 out of 789 two-to-three-story traditional buildings collapsed 
or heavily damaged (Gulhan et al. 2000). It was suggested by researchers that buildings 
with traditional wood structural systems should be used in the earthquake regions instead of 
reinforced concrete buildings due to the nature (e.g. crack, loosening and dislodgement) of 
concrete and masonry (Dogangun, 2005). 
 
C. Wenchuan Earthquake, China and Rapid Development 
The Chinese Government learned from the 1979 Tangshan Earthquake that killed a quarter-
million people. Since then, the government requires that new structures be built able to 
withstand major quakes. However, in the 30 August 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake, many 
residential buildings remained intact while many others, particularly schools and hospitals 
crumbled. China's earthquake regulations class this province as equivalent to a 7 on the 
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Mercalli Intensity scale (effects of an earthquake on the Earth's surface, humans, objects of 
nature and man-made structures on a scale of I through XII that XII is total destruction). 
The collapse of schools, hospitals and factories raises questions about China’s enforcement 
of building codes, adding to existing concerns over environmental standards, energy 
consumption and overall public investments (Wang, 2008). 
 Xiulan (2008) argued that the major lesson learned is probably the lack of adequate 
awareness and attention for disaster risk reduction (prevention and mitigation) during 
national rapid development. China went through rapid construction development from the 
year 2000 until now (Xiulan, 2008). The central government was urged to provide free 
education and improve the quality of rural school building or built new facilities within 
limited funds. As a result, legislation was backed by investment. Since then, evidence has 
indicated that the enforcement of building codes is a major problem and building safety was 
largely ignored (Wang, 2008). Shoddy construction was likely to have contributed to 
building collapses after the earthquake (Xiulan, 2008). China Earthquake Administration 
(the government body) reported that the steel rods in column, concrete block and load 
bearing walls were obviously thin and did not comply with the building code (Wang, 
2008). Arguably, China is the world’s largest producer of cement (Wang, 2008). Reports 
also revealed that if buildings were designed according to building code, the building 
structure would have at least been sustained for a few minutes critical for saving lives 
(Spence, 2009). A firm example would be the 1970s building of Liu Han Hope School that 
did not lose a single student even though the school building was also severely hit by the 
earthquake (Wang, 2008). The school was built using reliable construction methods (e.g. 
the use of building-grade concrete) that comply with the national building code. 
 Moreover, it was reported that the disaster community in China lacked the capacity 
for quick appraisal of emergency situations; inadequate preparedness (equipments for 
rescue operation and materials for emergency response); and coordination mechanism for 
the involvement of NGOs and civil society in general (volunteers) (Wang, 2008). There is 
also the issue of catastrophic risks preparedness, including the needs for disaster insurance 
and other financial mechanisms (Henjian et al. 2003). Chinese government was advised by 
scholars to learn from Japan which has policies to make school buildings of a higher 
standard against earthquake hazard that not only protect students but also serve as local 
evacuation centres when disasters happen (Noji, 1997). 
128 
 
D. Hurricane Andrew, USA 
Building codes are often not enforced in hazard-prone areas (Colin et al. 1989). Building 
codes designed to protect the structure against hurricanes in the case of Hurricane Andrew, 
are not well enforced. A significant amount of Hurricane Andrew’s damage on the 1 
August 1992 could have been prevented if building codes had been enforced and 
individuals taken protective measures (e.g. window storm shutters and install roof straps or 
additional clips) in advance of the disaster. Unfortunately, authority had inadequate staffing 
and training to enforce these codes (Burby et al. 1998). On the other hand, individuals 
perceived a low probability of a disaster causing damage to their home (Kunreauther, 
1996). Most homeowners, private businesses and the public do not voluntarily adopt cost 
effective measure to reduce their potential losses from future storms. According to the 
Insurance Information Institute, USA, twenty five per cent of the insured losses could have 
been prevented through better building code compliance, enforcement and individual 
preventive measures (Kunreauther, 1996).  
 
E. Highland Towers, Malaysia 
The first block of twelve stories apartments collapsed on 11 December 1993 after ten days 
of continuous rainfall. Quite surprisingly, the remaining two blocks are still standing but 
remain unoccupied for fear of instability. There were multiple probable underlying causes 
of the disaster were: improperly designed rubble walls, the drainage system was not 
constructed according to plans, old rail piles used for the foundation, the indiscriminate 
chopping of trees around the area, soil movement, buckling of the steel foundation, and 
sloppy management by the construction company were attributed to the disaster (Wong, 
1999). However, the Court concluded based on a report from the commission of inquiry by 
The Ampang Jaya Municipal Council (local authority) that the immediate cause of the 
disaster was due to the high wall behind the second tier car park of Highland Towers 
Condominium sliding and moving backwards. After thorough investigation a few years 
after the tragedy, the local authority was found guilty due to laxity and negligence in their 
responsibilities for non-compliance with the present legislations.  It was apportioned fifteen 
per cent of the post-disaster contributions (Aini et al. 2001). Consequently, a new 
mechanism for disaster relief and management in Malaysia was established and other 
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related engineering and building codes were updated and re-enforced (Fakhru’l-Razi, 2001) 
(see section 4.5, p.103). 
 
4.9 Conclusion 
Three are two types of disasters known as natural and ‘man-made’ disasters. In the last 
decade, the global constituency has experienced every type of disasters. Asia and the 
Pacific were not so fortunate in escaping the occurrence of disasters and are considered as 
the highest in the world. As a learning outcome from experiencing natural, man-made and 
subsequent disasters, there was an evolution of disaster response and management policies 
in Malaysia indicated by the establishment of the national policy of MNSC Directive 20 
that commenced in 1997. However, the effective and successful implementation is yet to be 
fabricated. Actors were only comfortable with their normal daily routine but not to the 
MNSC Directive 20. As argued by Davis (2007) significant experience of recovery 
management and existence of well established disaster management mechanism contributes 
to a better disaster management structure. The system must also be supported by 
comprehensive operational procedures, preliminary planning and a well-practiced 
administrative system. The question inevitably arises as to how acceptable it is to generalise 
findings from this research as officials involved never looked at the actual copy of the 
national disaster plan (MNSC Directive 20) per se. Malaysia has a strongly centralised 
Mechanism of Disaster Management with firm control exercised by the Prime Minister’s 
Department. SOPs are guidelines that can be seen in any form of official written 
instructions. Direction of this MNSC Directive 20 is clear and understandable. Distinctive 
elements in this policy are uncompromisable due to existence of international concerns to 
risk reduction and community resilience that will only be meaningful after officials can 
demonstrate compliance with this policy. The professional experience of the actors and the 
historical evolution of professionalism within a particular national system facilitate some 
findings explanation. Generally, the case of Malaysia is not adequate to come out with a 
concrete conclusion given to the smallest scale of the impact of the disaster as well as a 
small number of houses that has to be built. Perhaps at certain point Malaysia might be the 
leading developing and small country in action to cope with disaster prevention and 
mitigation. However, they are employed here to inform the findings of my investigation 
into the Malaysian situation. The findings will then shape the instruments that will be used 
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and will also be referred to in the discussion of the current research. It was observed that 
attitude by all actors was a prerequisite for effective partnership in the research and 
development process. Actors’ attitudes towards regulatory compliance are formed by 
multiple causation and they are not easily predicted, they are result of different causes and 
in particular are dependent on all five categories of variables.  These variables are discussed 
in the next chapter. They are: 
1. General culture-related;  
2. Social structure-related;  
3. Law-related; 
4. Regulatory tradition-related; and  
5. Regulatory work-related.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Research Methods 
 
“The aim of the Shelter Standards project is to improve the appropriateness and 
coordination of response to transitional shelter needs following conflicts and natural 
disasters”. 
(ShelterCentre, 2000: 11) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter is devoted to a discussion of the importance of the whole study that leads to 
the methodological design in the next chapter (Chapter 6). The research process adopted by 
this study was guided by the realistic approach according to the current situation of the 
disaster management environment in Malaysia to find answers to the research questions. 
This chapter begins with an exploration of the problem statement and ended up with the list 
of methodological caveats in disaster management research. 
 
5.2 Statement of the Problem 
From my experience at disaster sites, I saw many examples of non-compliance such as the 
bedroom size not according to specification; partition walls built of combustible instead of 
non-combustible materials; no parking and open spaces as required; improper insulation 
and painting; and no front porch as a safety zone between the main entrance of the houses 
and the access road. The failure of the Malaysian Government to exercise the proper 
conduct of post-disaster provision has slowed the process of restoring the livelihoods 
(Foong et al. 2006). 
 Internationally, the process of regulatory compliance takes place through strict 
obedience to the law (Meidenger, 1987; Hutter, 2001).Traditionally in Malaysia, actors will 
generally comply with Ministerial Directives. They will therefore be likely to implement 
regulatory compliance, but will they put in the necessary effort and commitment to make it 
a success? It would be far from ideal if regulatory compliance with the MNSC Directive 20 
existed only because the Prime Minister’s Department regulations required them to do so. It 
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would be catastrophic to the recovery development of disaster victims if they were viewed 
by actors as an annoyance and burden. 
 The Prime Minister’s Department receives and studies reports concerning the 
developments in regulatory compliance in other countries of the world. It details these 
proceedings and makes an adjustment to the Malaysian context (Shaluf et al. 2006). 
Malaysia is still in the phase of restructuring, reorganising the National Disaster 
Management Mechanism to fit in the HFA by taking actions such as monitoring disaster 
risks, building safety culture at all private and public levels and strengthening disaster 
preparedness in order to ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and local priority 
with a strong institutional basis for implementation (see section 4.5.2, p.114).  
Subsequently, the MNSC Directive 20 exists as the important core of disaster 
regulation in Malaysia (Moin, 2006), but the implementation is not according to plan and 
regulatory compliance and was low because the implementation of regulatory compliance 
will probably involve making changes to what are considered as barriers to the present 
department environments and these changes will have to be based, to a large extent, on how 
actors’ perceive and judge the introduction of full regulatory compliance implementation.  
 As argued by Wolensky et al. (1990) the ideal planning design stands unsuccessful 
if the officials’ fail to blend together correct attitudes, roles and responsibilities and 
translate these into policy administration. One significant reason contributed to existence 
gap between regulation and performance is that actors involved in disaster response 
received very little information about the MNSC Directive 20 implementation. Actors also 
received inadequate training and even some of them do not get any training at all. 
Consequently, no one really knows what they are meant to do. Wolensky et al. (1990) also 
argued that officials initially require an understanding of the internal structural work of the 
organisation as a result of adequate information about the direction of the organisation. 
Adequate information will then influence officials to the correct attitudes in policy 
implementation. 
 
5.3 Objective of the Study 
As stated in the MNSC Directive 20, the National Disaster Management and Relief 
Committee is responsible for monitoring the progress and development of these efforts.  
And to ensure that disaster management is effectively and smoothly implemented without 
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compromising compliance with the national and international legislations (NSC, 1997). 
The success or failure of regulatory compliance with the MNSC Directive 20 in Malaysia 
depends much on the readiness of actors to accept responsibility to implement at every 
level. 
 The introduction of full regulatory compliance will inevitably widen the range of 
needs of the disaster victims at the scene of a disaster. Presently, actors in Malaysia are 
required to attend in service training in order to acquire the knowledge for their roles as 
disaster workers. Undoubtedly some actors have reservations about accepting regulatory 
compliance. This reservation might be a key to the main issue in this research.  
 Thus, the overall research objective is to determine the present attitudes of 
Malaysia’s actors towards the planned introduction of full regulatory compliance and if 
necessary to initiate strategies to assist their anxieties. By undertaking a study of actors’ 
attitudes towards the intended implementation, at the end of the research a better 
understanding of actors’ attitudes will be gained. Any recommendations will be made 
particularly on the basis of the study content and will not relate to any of my other 
professional experience or expertise.  
 
5.4 Originality/Value  
This research presents an overview on attitudes of actors in the National Disaster 
Management Mechanism to the MNSC Directive 20 particularly in the public service 
sector. There is no evidence of prior work in this field in Malaysia (Aini, 2006). 
 
5.5 Assumptions  
Respondents were asked to express their feelings about their views with respect to a 
potential sensitive issue: (obligatory) compliance with international and national standards 
and regulations. It was recognised that the issue of questionnaire (regarding work ethics) 
might have a negative impact on the validity of the study. Thus, McMillan et al. (1997) 
suggests that researchers in sociological studies should make assumption that multiple 
realities in social community were constructed through individual and collective definitions 
of the situation. McMilan et al. (1997) also encourage researchers must not assume that 
respondent have all the information because the social learning theory is determining 
opinions according to perception of compliance from peers and the individual (see section 
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3.8.1, p.86) and social influences (see section 5.10, p.138). They may be reluctant to admit 
that they do not know or, being anxious to please and guess because behavioural intention 
and actual behaviour were not always highly correlated (Payan et al. 2005). There was an 
important distinction between actual compliance and an estimate of the probability of future 
compliance. Researchers must avoid giving the impression that respondents ought to know 
(McMillan et al. 1997). Additionally, any research design also suffers from error that 
researchers ought to reduce/eliminate (see section 6.6, p.185). Such error variables were (or 
assume to be) randomly distributed or, at any rate, distributed in such a way as not to affect 
the results (Oppenheim, 1992).  
 
5.6 The Importance of the Study 
In the field of disaster management, geography and sociology have conquered most of the 
disaster research since the 1950s (Quarantelli, 1988). However, more advanced research in 
sociological context was formulated by developed nations compared to locals in developing 
nations (Drabek, 1986). Local people are encouraged to find new ways to solve old 
problems in their country because local residents have the knowledge of the place they live 
(Spence, 2009) and each disaster situation is unique that requires distinctive (different) 
proceedings (Corsellis et al. 2005).  
 Thus, it is important to do research in disaster because disaster situation reveal the 
real capability of local organisations to implement laws and regulations (Barakbah, 1971). 
In Malaysia, Disaster Management and Relief Committee at the Prime Minister’s 
Department is monitoring and reviewing the MNSC Directive 20 from time to time. Any 
input (external research) to the awareness about the progress is important. As argued by 
Cohen et al. (2000) research in building a better foundation for understanding behaviour is 
a necessary step before trying to improve public policy implementation. Even, the public 
should also deserve their rights by knowing the reality of enforcers’ attitudes (Anderson et 
al. 1991b). An informed public can be a major ally because awareness can lead to action, 
including pressure on legislators and other policymakers to improve the present situation 
(Anderson et al. 1998).  
 The findings from this research are also important in order to measure how far till 
now the Malaysia Vision Development Plan (2001-2010) has been achieved towards the 
main national ambition to be a developed country by the year 2020. One of the indicators 
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towards the achievement is the level of work ethics in the public service sector and the 
accomplishment to provide housing to community as a whole. Alexander (1997) argues that 
the prospect for improvement is still wide open in the approaches to improve and develop a 
comprehensive model over existing models in disaster planning. There is a need on both 
national and international levels to extend laws further in order to resolve aspects in 
emergency the housing sector (Corsellis et al. 2005). 
 
5.7 Contributions 
This research provides thorough analysis of the views and perceptions of officials in 
Malaysia towards the implementation of regulations as set out in the MNSC Directive 20 
with respect to emergency housing standards. Actors’ views on the implementation of full 
regulatory compliance will inspire the government and related agencies to design a holistic 
organisation that perhaps will diminish negative disaster likelihoods as the nations’ 
progress. The outcome of this research reveals the reasons why it is important to ensure that 
policy makers have to be responsive and have a grasp on current research findings in 
particular to the subject of policy implementation status.  
 Malaysia is still in the phase of restructuring and reorganising the disaster system to 
fit in the HFA and ISDR Programme. Thus, these research outcomes can be used to 
develop strategies and actions that include awareness raising and capacity building for 
enhancing enforcement of current legislation. The findings tend to originate as a practical 
guide to more effective responses especially in enhancing the coordination of responsibility 
between and within the government bodies in the National Disaster Management 
Mechanism with an active participation from other disaster communities. 
 As a result of the establishment of compliance culture, empirical evidence in this 
research suggests that the provision of adequate and appropriate emergency housing can 
contribute significantly to the recovery of victims post-disaster and to their long term 
rehabilitation. The findings will hopefully be useful to the following groups of people:  
1. Prime Minister’s Department of Malaysia; 
2. Public service sectors; 
3. Disaster management training centre; 
4. Researchers in disaster management and public administration;  
5. General public; 
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6. NGOs;  
7. Private sectors. 
 
5.8 Limitation 
Life cycle in a disaster model is comprised of four phases that include pre-disaster planning 
in mitigation; preparedness; response in emergency; and recovery and reconstruction 
(Haddow, 2003). The importance of the focal response will come from the governments 
with coordination efforts of local, state and federal agencies (Clay, 2004; Levine et al. 
2006). For that reason, the research will only focus on emergency housing in Malaysia 
provided by the government/authorities in the National Disaster Management Mechanism 
in disaster phases. The scope of the study is limited to attitudes to compliance with the 
MNSC Directive 20, especially the degree of government agencies acting accordingly 
(Gelderman et al. 2006). The main considerations upon commencing this research were as 
follows: 
1. The range of respondents available for the study. Of necessity, owing to limitations 
of funding and time, it was restricted to the 5 states instead of 13 states in Malaysia; 
2. There are other issues that could have been investigated in the reality of regulatory 
compliance, for example:  
a. The managing of physical and training material resources;  
b. International involvement in the MNSC Directive 20;   
c. Outside communities’ acceptance of actors in disaster relief;  
3. Answers given by the actors were restricted for some issues due to data protection 
and confidentiality.  
 
5.9 Regulated Population to Justify Biographical Data 
Those involved with disaster fall into two groups that consists of service receivers and 
service providers (Hodgkinson et al. 1998). In this research, service providers were the 
subject groups. UNDRO (1982) suggested that these two groups (service receivers and 
providers) may be further categorised on the dimension of direct or indirect involvement. In 
the National Disaster Management Mechanism in Malaysia, not all the actors are involve in 
providing emergency housing. Thus, biographical data (see section 6.4.6, p.164, p.3 and 
6.5.1, p.173) will decide actors who are involve directly and indirectly in providing 
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emergency housing in Malaysia. Hodgkinson et al. (1998) describes that actors (service 
providers, the rescuers and helpers) are often the forgotten survivors of disaster. In the 
scene of disaster, these regulated population comprising of industries; individual companies 
and business; employers and employees. Behaviours of organisations in this regulated 
population set trend for the way actors behave towards the culture of regulatory 
compliance.   
 Generally, there are three levels of audience in response to disaster that consist of 
tertiary level (national) as policy making administrators, secondary level 
(regional/provincial) as project managers of shelter or housing programme and primary 
level (local) as local groups (surviving community) (UNDRO, 1982). For the purpose of 
the study and to suit the local context, every level of the Malaysia Disaster Management 
Mechanism had been explored from national, state and district level. Staff members in each 
level had specific roles and responsibilities (Macpherson, 2004). The focus of enforcers at 
an organisational macro level (policy administration) was upon the safe system of work. 
Meanwhile, at micro level the focus is more towards people categories (e.g. employer and 
employee; specialist and generalist; skilled and unskilled; and the experienced and 
inexperienced) (Hutter, 1997). 
 At the national level, the government (facilitator) always looks for a solution model 
to counter emerging problems by workers and employers (Scholz, 1984a). Level of 
compliance with government programmes is one of the ways to identify emerging problems 
by workers and employers. Less identified barriers will assure a higher level of compliance. 
Therefore, compliance may change over time (Meidinger, 1985). The level of compliance 
depends on how far the employer decides to strengthen enforcement (Hutter, 1988). The 
enforcement activity is a function of effective control over related regulations. Greater 
enforcement leads to greater compliance, while greater compliance leads to less 
enforcement (Grey et al. 1993).  
An established compliance culture at the workplace is essential and might lower the 
levels of risk to disaster community (Wayne et al. 1989; Deilt et al. 1991). However, it 
depends on location of workplace and in some cases it is situational (local expectations). 
Significantly, regulatory compliance of any enforcement regime depends on inspectors’ 
behaviour in enforcing regulations (May, 2003). They will act better if they have 
knowledge (trained) and understand the activities they do (Heide, 1989). Thus, factors 
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influencing enforcement over compliance in organisations depend on the existence of 
regulation to control over-related regulations; enforcers to enforce such regulation; and 
knowledge (trained and skills) of actors regarding regulations related to their roles and 
responsibilities. 
 Members of organisations are prepared to face numerous conflicting demands in 
their work atmosphere such as discrimination, time constraint, work pressure, improper 
work space and introduction of latest technology, external collaboration and greater 
uncertainty (Murray et al. 1986; Hall et al. 1986). In Malaysia, factors influencing an 
organisation were identified as divergence, career progress obstruction, isolation, work 
overload and poor work environment (Aizzat et al. 2005).  
As argued by Ramayah et al. (2003), team size and varieties of task had no impact 
on team effectiveness. However, internal group dynamics significantly influence team 
effectiveness in Malaysia. Ramayah et al. (2003) found that better team effectiveness 
resulted from stronger positive internal group dynamics. Relationships of team members 
play the most important role in order to promote high team performance and members’ 
satisfaction (Lurey et al. 2001). In addition, team members’ satisfaction also could be 
enhanced if supported by a strong team leadership in Malaysia (Ramayah et al. 2003). 
However, communicating face-to-face and social communications do not have any impact 
on the teams’ effectiveness. 
 
5.10 Research Approach 
Banton (1964) describes the sociological approach as ‘a cultural perspective’. Culture is an 
understanding entity created by the people that make it possible for them to perform 
together (Burgess, 1984). This cultural approach focuses attention upon the issues that 
conflict with the understanding of the social world, the bureaucracy resolution of these 
conflicts and the social adaptation. In recent research works, culture has become a 
fundamental construction of administrative regulation (Hawkins, 1984; McGarity, 1985; 
Bell, 1985; Meidinger, 1985; Jasanoff, 1986). Unfortunately, this development is still 
considerably uncertain due to the nature of organisational behaviour that consists of 
attitudes, perceptions, values and beliefs (Harvey et al. 2002). Much of the recent 
scholarship in this area has focused on how organisational routines; the attitudes; and 
values of bureaucrats shape governmental actions (Golden, 2000). Actors’ attitudes were 
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found to be a significant instrument for influencing levels of compliance (see section 3.8.1, 
p.86). Scholars suggested that, in order to measure compliance, researchers should 
recognise, the factors of commitment from officials to objectives, and attitudes to 
regulatory and compliance, management quality the ability of an organisation to comply 
and employers’ hospitality (Baldwin et al. 2001). There are five sources of regulatory 
culture with significant influences in regulatory compliance. They are general culture, 
social structure, law, regulatory tradition, and regulatory work (Meidinger, 1987). 
 
5.10.1 General Culture-Related 
It would be impractical for people to act with each other without proper definition of 
culture. People can only work together if they are willing to share understanding of 
regulatory culture (Becker, 1982; Barley, 1985). In order to understand regulatory culture, 
people should first familiarise themselves with the factors influencing the organisation as 
follows: 
1. Local and general culture: They can have shared understandings to local and general 
culture (Geertz, 1973). Most commonly, local cultures are copied in response to 
show associations between one social group and another; 
2. Partial incoherence/clarity: It is not necessary that all the assumptions and 
expectations of a given culture framework be either logically consistent with each 
other (Giddens, 1984); 
3. Individual, character and difference: Culture defines the content of typical forms of 
characters (according to interest). Individual identities within a group can vary but 
still be jointly understandable (Minz, 1982). Culture also creates social space for 
individuality and difference; 
4. Political interaction: Members of the organisation are also influenced by political 
interaction. They have to define and realise different visions of appropriate social 
behaviour (Leff, 1978). The most innovative political interaction is often trying to 
make a new way of action in social relationships; 
5. Density: Culture is extremely detailed and complicated. It covers everything from 
the nature of a good colleague and how to treat them, to how and where to sit in the 
presence of another type of colleague (McGarity, 1985); 
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6. Partial indeterminacy/poorly defined: Cultural understanding is likely to introduce 
structure and constrain behaviour without determining it (Meidinger, 1987);  
7. Problem solving: A particular culture is created in the process of problem solving 
(Barley, 1985). A given social group may simply fail to develop a set of cultural 
understandings capable of solving common problems.  
 
5.10.2 Social Structure-Related 
Every social system has a structure. It is revealed through relationships within the system 
and through distributions within the system. Relationships are identified through statuses, 
roles, the division of labour, through communication channels, the socioeconomic 
relationships and through groups and organisations. Structure is also revealed through 
distribution of goods: power, wealth and income, property, prestige and access to education 
(Johnson, 2000). Social structure is also known as a contributing agent. Harre (2002) 
argued that changing the social world can be achieved only by changing the rules and 
active customs people follow. Social structure is defined as the complex framework of 
societal institutions and the social practices that make up a society and that organises and 
establishes limits on people's behavior (Udy, 1992). Specifically, status, roles, social groups 
and institutions are elements of social structure. 
 A status is a position in the hierarchy of society based on a characteristic that fits a 
person into a particular category (Strydom, 2002). Two types of status are ascribed and 
achieved (Abbott, 1981). An ascribed status is based on characteristics that a person is born 
with race, gender and certain disabilities. On the other hand, there are characteristics that a 
person creates through their own actions. These characteristics create achieved statuses. 
Examples of achieved statuses include becoming a spouse, becoming an enforcer and 
becoming a convicted criminal. Roles are sets of expectations, rights and privileges that 
accompany statuses (Mokhiber, 1988). For example, the status of a manager is 
accompanied by the expectations that a manager will manage subordinates in organisation 
and related things that make up a managers’ role.  
A social group is a collection of people that come together for a purpose, whether it 
is to provide support and assistance (Rytina, 2000). Social groups can be primary (intimate, 
small) or secondary (larger, task-oriented). Meanwhile institutions are patterned ways of 
doing things (Genn, 1993). Institution is an abstract concept that embodies how things are 
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traditionally done within these specific groups. For example, the institution of the family 
includes all families both past and present and serving the functions of reproduction and 
socialisation of children. 
 
5.10.3 Law-Related  
It is all about law, regulation and policies. Regulations establish requirements that can be 
enforced by law. Laws are based directly on the National Constitution. Regulations define 
the laws; created by the Secretaries and the President's/Prime Minister’s Cabinet; and 
details the procedures, processes and related work for compliance (Torjman, 2005). 
Legislative resolutions concerning regulatory form and substance are generally stated in 
statutes. As authoritative guidelines for agency action, statutes are regularly cited in 
regulatory interactions. In cases where, for whatever reason, there is a gap in the 
requirements, the enforcer may use policy to establish appropriate subject criteria. While 
policy does not have the force of law, in order to carry out any mandate, inspectors verify 
compliance with policy criteria. A public policy is a deliberate and (usually) careful 
decision that provides guidance for addressing selected public concerns (Torjman, 2005). 
Owners and operators are advised of deficiencies and encouraged to comply. 
 
5.10.4 Regulatory Tradition-Related 
General culture, social structure and law contribute to the traditions in regulatory 
communities and become as important factors in regulatory interactions. Policies, standard 
operating procedures, conventions, or regulatory culture are the terms that play a central 
role in organising regulatory interactions (Meidinger, 1987). Regulatory strategies that 
commonly use are direct orders, command and control, self-regulation, crosscutting 
requirements (i.e. generally applicable requirements compulsory on virtually all relevant 
policies to further various national social and economic policies), crossover sanctions in 
departmental legislations (e.g. position transfer and disciplinary actions) and partial 
preemption (i.e. displacement of a lower jurisdiction's laws) (Ayres et al. 1992). 
 The focus in regulatory tradition is about the changes in regulatory practice (namely 
performance based regulations, engendering compliance cultures, increasing the possibility 
of the enforcement threat and increased focus on the liability of the individual) because 
regulatory theorists seek to motivate regulators’ behaviour that goes ‘beyond compliance’ 
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(Gunningham et al. 1999). Indeed agencies may simply go beyond compliance due to the 
uncertainty created in general rules about what minimal compliance might actually mean. 
Regulators prefer to go beyond compliance because they are free from liability. Avoiding 
liability in regulatory compliance has only an indirect contribution to improved regulatory 
outcomes (Sitkin et al. 1994; Haines, 2002). Avoiding liability is one of other broad 
regulatory techniques that unable to provide a useful means for resolving regulatory 
conflict.  
 
5.10.5 Regulatory Work-Related 
The burden of much of the factors on regulatory culture is that critical aspects of regulation 
are in fact worked out in the daily interactions of members of regulatory communities. In 
this interaction, structure constraints, political pressure, general culture assumptions, legal 
requirements and bureaucratic procedures are actually turned into a form of regulatory 
culture that organises the activity of regulation. It depends on professional training, 
knowledge and experience of the regulators at the ‘operational’ scene. Without knowing 
much more about how regulation works at the ‘operational’ or ‘street’ level, scholars are 
unlikely to be able to offer good diagnoses of its strengths and weaknesses (Meidinger, 
1987). 
 There is an ideological interface between the two bodies of law (public welfare 
versus free market) (see section 2.5.1, p.31; 2.5.2, p.34; and 3.8, p.83, p.3) at the 
operational scene. Law is always the expression of a particular ideology (Sutherland, 1983). 
The interface between bodies of regulation must be an ideological interface. Any decision 
to regulate a matter or to allow the ‘free market’ to regulate is a political decision 
(Hawkins, 1984). It requires a balancing act between the ‘market’ ideologies that succeed 
in commercial systems against ‘public welfare’ concerns that may not be met by the free 
operation of the market. This balancing is a political process (Shearing, 1993). The clash 
between market ideology and public welfare leads to the kind of market failure (Baldwin, 
1999).  
However, until now, government has been reluctant to tackle this problem. Rather 
than resolving these boundaries by making difficult political decisions, central governments 
try to deny their responsibility and focusing the conflict on regulatees (Haines et al. 2003). 
The government has diverted the conflict to regulators’ responsibility to rationalise the 
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crisis that is messy and politically dangerous process that hopefully is expected to be 
resolve within political sphere (Habermas, 1976; Haines et al. 2003). The only cure for the 
problems created by this ‘regulatory struggle’ is for central governments to take greater 
responsibility for rationalising the competing political demands they face (Habermas, 
1976). However, they have to be exact in terms of funding and powers (see section 3.8, 
p.83, p.3). Habermas (1976) suggested that government must transparent to announce 
targeted goals especially in any programmes for regulators and regulatees.  
 
5.11 Relevance of the Three-Component Model of Attitudes on Regulatory 
Compliance 
The implication of the three-component model of attitudes (see section 3.8.1, p.86) implies 
that actor attitudes towards regulatory compliance would be dependent on some or all 
available cognitive, affective and conative information about what would be involved in the 
process of regulatory compliance. It is this information that will shape their thoughts, 
feelings and intended behaviour, that is, their overall attitudes towards accepting the 
intention of full regulatory compliance implementation. 
 The cognitive element of actor attitudes would be influenced by actors’ perceived 
knowledge of regulations in the MNSC Directive 20. This knowledge could have been 
developed through actual experience of interacting among themselves and the disaster 
victims. If the experience had been positive, it could be assumed that they might have 
developed a positive outlook about their colleagues and disaster victims and they would 
have a favourable view of the regulatory compliance process. But if their experience had 
been negative, they might eventually view the concept of regulatory compliance with a 
negative perception.  
Besides personal experience, perceived knowledge of the MNSC Directive 20 could 
also have been acquired through reading and listening to others. This knowledge would 
naturally shape actors’ beliefs about and perception of disaster management directions in 
Malaysia. This in turn would influence their attitude towards regulatory compliance. It is 
important that actors’ knowledge or beliefs about the MNSC Directive 20 be taken into 
consideration prior to regulatory compliance implementation, since the actors’ ideological 
perceptions of this programme do not start from a neutral point. Hence the cognitive 
144 
 
component of attitudes would be a guiding factor for actor reaction towards regulatory 
compliance implementation. 
The affective component of attitudes would in some measure relate to the 
humanitarian side of actors’ characteristics. Even if actors have negative feelings or are 
non-committal about the regulatory compliance process, repeated exposure to the emotional 
experiences of disaster victims might change their expectations and might gradually shift 
their feelings from negative to positive. 
 As for the conative component of attitudes, this again is strongly shaped by the 
previous amount of personal involvement an actor has had with disaster victims, or by their 
knowledge of these disaster victims in the line of duty towards regulatory compliance. 
Their past behavioural response to these disaster victims or what they had heard or read 
about them could have moulded their attitudes and this in turn could determine their 
behavioural predisposition towards these disaster victims being treated in the scene of 
disaster. This predisposition to act is usually derived or inferred from the affective and 
cognitive elements of actors’ attitudes.  
 Actors’ attitudes towards the implementation of regulatory compliance could be 
determined by their beliefs, knowledge and feelings towards regulations in the MNSC 
Directive 20 and the disaster victims. These three elements could, either patently or 
inadvertently, determine both their actual and potential responses to complete regulatory 
compliance implementation. Hence, actor attitudes in general could determine what 
individual actors will see, hear, think and do if the intention of full regulatory compliance is 
achieved. And for change to occur there is need for proper planning. The standard of 
regulatory compliance needs to be brought to the attention of as many actors as possible, 
especially to newly qualified actors from training. In order for actors to gain positive 
attitudes, federal and local authorities have an important role to play. Workshops and other 
forms of professional development could be helpful for creating what is called the 
‘compliance culture’ (see section 5.10, p.138) among serving actors. Training actors, 
however, need to learn more about the regulatory compliance and advancement in their 
carrier. 
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5.12 Research Aims  
Arising from the aims of this research, a series of hypotheses have been set out for the 
quantitative research and specific questions for the qualitative research. The aims of the 
research are as follows: 
1. To assess attitudes towards and reasons for compliance and non-compliance with 
the regulations in the MNSC Directive 20; 
2. To identify the level of difficulty in understanding the MNSC Directive 20 by the 
actors; 
3. To highlight the causes of any shortfall in understanding and applying the MNSC 
Directive 20; 
4. To assess the accessibility of regulations and identify ways to ease understanding 
and application of the MNSC Directive 20; 
5. To gauge the level of understanding of the role of disaster workers; 
6. To identify the level and standard of communication from Authorities;  
7. To assess the degree of understanding that regulatory compliance has an impact on 
both the actors and disaster victims. 
 
The aims were achieved by trying to answer the following broad questions about the 
concept of regulatory compliance as currently held in Malaysia: 
1. What are Malaysian actors’ attitudes towards regulatory compliance 
implementation? 
2. What is the understanding of Malaysian actors about regulatory compliance? and 
3. What are the actors’ perceived rationales of regulatory compliance implementation? 
 
5.13 Core-Hypothesis 
Actors in the National Disaster Management Mechanism and their perceptions are 
correlated to working environment and sociological culture. 
 
5.13.1 Hypothesised Attitude Domains  
Hypothesised domains of attitudes towards regulatory compliance were selected to generate 
the items content of survey questionnaires are as follows:     
1. Philosophy of regulatory compliance; 
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2. Principles of the emergency management according to Malaysia disaster 
management context; 
3. Effect on the disaster victims under the responsibility of the Malaysia National 
Security Council when disaster strikes; 
4. Effect on social, emotional and cognitive development of victim after disaster as the 
result of regulatory compliance; 
5. Cognitive development of the actors; 
6. The behaviour of the actors; 
7. Effect on emergency housing development as the result of implementation of 
regulatory compliance; 
8. Effect on actors’ current workload as the result of implementing such regulations; 
9. Perceived ability of actors to comply with such regulation;  
10. Perceived readiness of actors to adopt such regulation. 
 
5.14 Specific Research Questions for the Interviews 
This study will try to answer the following specific research issues: 
1. What are the general attitudes of actors towards the intended implementation of 
regulatory compliance? 
2. How do actors’ backgrounds influence their general attitudes? 
3. What are the actors’ understandings of regulatory compliance? 
4. How do actors’ perceived ability to comply with regulations and compare their 
willingness to support regulatory compliance implementation? 
5. What do the actors and disaster victims get from the implementation of regulatory 
compliance? 
6. How effective is the present MNSC Directive 20? 
7. What are some training developments to support regulatory compliance? 
8. What are some resources to support regulatory compliance?  
9. Is there any effect if the department has actors to look after regulatory compliance, 
related directly to the scene of emergency housing, have specific regulations been 
implemented to ensure compliance with the regulation? 
10. How do disaster victims influence regulatory compliance? 
11. How do disaster victims respond to the regulatory compliance? 
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12. What are some of the key changes actors feel they need to be undertaken prior to 
regulatory compliance implementation?  
13. How do actors’ backgrounds influence these components of attitudes? 
 
5.15 Conclusion and Methodological Caveats 
There are four methodological caveats in disaster management research (Yates, 1977). The 
first is clarification of the terms disaster and management. Most of the explanation had 
been explored in the previous chapters. Secondly, data base availability concerning the 
topics selected in doing research work. A continuous effort has been done to gain, improve 
and expand information by doing case studies, keep updating to local and international 
development without bias to any small, middle and larger cases. The third caveat concerns 
conflicting professional statuses due to multiplicity in disaster management functions led 
by amateur, semi-professional, or professionally trained individuals especially regarding 
differentiation agencies responsibilities. In this research, disaster management communities 
were stratified into groups concerning level of participation in Malaysia Disaster 
Management Mechanism (e.g. district, state and national). Actors selected were based on 
their responsibility solely according to their respective level/function rather than focus on 
officials’ responsible. Fourthly, the purpose of this research is not in measuring variables to 
predict institutional disaster management capacity rather to reveal response from the actors 
in conjunction with the implementation of MNSC Directive 20 in disaster management 
process in Malaysia. Thus, the researcher was considerably aware of the issue, correlating 
the capacity in disaster management in particularly the community social; cultural; 
chronological variables; and its leadership. The next chapter will give details of 
methodological design and the results from data collection. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Research Methodology 
 
“For the emergency or public safety professional are the ones to whom the community will 
look for leadership and guidance in the event of a disaster. For them, more than anyone 
else, it is a test of all their training, experience and ability; for them disaster is the ultimate 
emergency”. 
(UN-Habitat Agenda, 1996: 5) 
 
6.1 Research Design 
Research is a procedure whereby the researcher attempts to find in systematical order 
within verifiable facts to the solution of a problem (Kerlinger, 1986; Merriam et al. 1998). 
A research design is a plan, structure and investigation strategy in order to obtain answers 
to problems identified in earlier stage (Kerlinger, 1986). The design formulates a 
framework of research that includes strategies of data collections. This framework will then 
become an administrative guide to provide valid and accurate answers to the research 
question (McMillan et al. 1993). Therefore, research design has two purposes. Research 
design should be able to control the experimental work and provide answers to research 
questions (Oppenheim, 1992). There are two types of research design known as qualitative 
and quantitative research.  
Design in quantitative research implies a ‘positivist philosophy’ with certain 
objectives involving numbers, statistics and experimental control to quantify phenomena 
(McMillan et al. 1993). A quantitative approach assumes that the social environment 
constitutes an independent reality and is relatively constant across time and setting (Gall et 
al. 1996). Meanwhile, qualitative research is the process of inquest to understand a social or 
human problem. The researcher is requiring determining conceptual framework by using 
holistic design, word analysis, citing views from informants in a natural setting. Qualitative 
methodology is specially designed to clarify the meanings of social situations and focus 
upon the way different people experience, interpret and structure their lives (Burgess, 
1984).  
 For the purpose of this research it was decided to utilise both qualitative (semi 
structured interviews/focus groups) and quantitative (structured interview/surveys/self 
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completion questionnaire) approaches. Often a combination of the two approaches is 
appropriately used. Quantitative and qualitative approaches can complement each other by 
supporting discovery and confirmation (Gall et al. 1996; Neuman, 2006). The main purpose 
of the structured interviewed (quantitative study) was to collect information to develop the 
focus group interviews (qualitative study). The structured interview (surveys) was used 
mainly due to the large sample framework in Disaster Management Mechanism of 
Malaysia. Not all of them in this mechanism involve in providing emergency housing. The 
purpose of questionnaires (surveys) distribution was also to identify the focus group for the 
next phase that only involve actors who are only involve in providing emergency housing 
in Malaysia. Thus, this research employs the surveys research method. This research 
method examines either large or small group of population to verify the sociological and 
psychological variables relativity, distribution or interrelations (Kerlinger, 1986). Indeed, 
Silverman (2006) argues for combining both quantitative and qualitative approaches on the 
grounds that this yields a fuller picture. Data collection regularly uses questionnaires and 
semi-structured interviews. These two techniques were chosen because they represent a 
systematic method for collecting data (Fink, 1995).  
 
6.2 The Relationship between Qualitative and Quantitative Method in This Study 
 
6.2.1 Connection between Quantitative (Survey) and Qualitative (Semi-Structured) 
In conducting qualitative research, the type of questions asked will determine the kind of 
research strategy that must be adopted (Yin, 1994) (see section 6.6, p.185). A case study 
approach is appropriate for investigating ‘how’ questions. In seeking an answer, the 
researcher does not try to influence or to control behavioural events. The subject studied is 
a contemporary and real-life phenomenon. The term ‘case study’ has been defined in many 
ways. There is no common understanding of what constitutes a case study (Lincoln et al. 
1985; Merriam, 1998). Case study in an in-depth study involves a particular event, 
circumstances or situations that might escape from broader surveys (Allison, 1996). Thus, a 
case study may be based on a combination of quantitative and qualitative evidence (Yin, 
1994).  
There are advantages and disadvantages of combining both methods. There is no 
single technique that could claim a control on assumption in combining both methods. 
150 
 
However, recently researchers have witnessed an increasing trend towards combining both 
methods (Trow, 1957) by combining both field work and survey methods in the same study 
(Sieber, 1973). Surveys often test hypotheses generated through fieldwork which 
subsequently provide ‘representative information’ that is then elaborated through 
qualitative data (Vidich et al. 1955). Thus, each method has usefulness in a specific 
situation or phase of the research process and considered as ‘complementary’.  
 In contrast to the conventional research design, situationalists focus on research 
methods and maintain that both approaches have value. The two approaches cannot be 
combined because different paradigms (i.e. inductive and deductive) (see Appendix 11, 
p.344) are ‘mutually exclusive’ (Burrell et al. 1979; Smith, 1983). The ‘purists’ believe that 
assumptions about knowledge and social reality lead directly to one or the other 
methodology (quantitative or qualitative) and that there is no way of combining these two 
research methods. 
 A false division of assumption exists between these two types of data (Denzin, 
1970). Nevertheless, scholars will separate both research techniques in order to get a 
significant research outcome (Daft, 1983). However, both research techniques have 
inherent weaknesses that contain an inherent strength too (Sieber, 1973). The trick is to 
make the most efficient use of both in attempting to understand social phenomena. 
Qualitative and quantitative methods can contribute to one another in the design, data 
collection and analysis phases of a project (Sieber, 1973; Madey, 1982).  
  
6.2.2 Strategy in Combining Both Methods in This Study 
Strategies in combining both methods requires understanding in merging methods, to link 
paradigms to methods and triangulate all study phases into research designs known as 
‘Triangulation22
                                                        
22 The weakest part in this thesis might be that the actors tried to make it safe and low profile in given their 
honest answers in surveys to protect their own interest that resulted to the predictable answers. The 
participants could only report their personal perceptions that were limited to their own understanding and by 
the emotional that might lead to inaccurate answer or over emphasised issues. In order to overcome these 
weaknesses, qualitative method was chosen that hopefully can produce evidence (barriers, suggestion and 
reasons.) to illuminate & articulate the findings established by the questionnaires to support aspects especially 
those concerning negative aspects or feelings towards the issue.  
’. Triangulation is not a method. Triangulation will neutralise any inherent 
bias from the sources of data, investigators and methods (Jick, 1979). The main task was to 
combine the two paradigms at all phases in the design into one.  
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 The model of combined design that is the most suitable for this study is the ‘Two-
Phase Design’ approach. This approach will separate the conduct of the qualitative phase 
with the quantitative phase of the study. This model was selected because both paradigms 
are clearly separate. At the same time, both paradigm assumptions are clearly defined 
behind each phase.  
 Phase 1 is a quantitative study that looked at the statistical relationship between 
actors’ attitudes and outcomes in their department. Following this macro level analysis, 
phase 2 looked within a specific disaster site, using qualitative/case study methods to better 
understand the dynamics of actors’ attitudes. Biographical data from biographical 
background (see section 6.4.6, p.164, p.3 and 6.5.1, p.173) gathered from survey 
questionnaires were used to select the suitable respondents as focus group (actors directly 
involved in emergency housing development-see section 6.5, p.172) for the next phase 
(Phase 2-qualitative study).  
 Results are also presented in terms of phases. The quantitative results present 
descriptive comparisons and relationships. Then the case study results will be presented in 
terms of themes and subthemes. In the final analysis, this study shows a ‘Two-Design 
Model’, even though limited to the method, results and discussion sections. The final 
discussion highlights the quantitative results and the complexities that surfaced from the 
qualitative results supported by quotes. The parallel and opposite results are discussed in 
the final conclusion. Both phases are of equal stature and the study has all the advantages of 
an extensive use of each paradigm of research and the limitation of a clear convergence of 
the results from both phases of the design. Overall research design was based on the 
instrument framework in Diagram 6.1. 
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Diagram 6.1: Instrument Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attitudes 
Culture Related 
Structure Related 
Law Related 
Tradition Related 
Work Related 
Knowledge 
Experience Professional 
Status 
Gender Level 
Control 
Years of 
involvement 
1. Chairman 
2. Manager 
3. Technical 
4. Clerical 
5. Others 
1. Male 
2. Female 
1. National 
2. State 
3. District 
                                                                                                                                                                                      Source: Author 
Current issues in Malaysian regulation and 
emergency housing, hypothesized as domain of 
attitudes towards compliance 
 
Philosophy of regulatory compliance 
 
Principles of the emergency housing according 
to Malaysia disaster management context 
 
Effect to the disaster victims under the 
responsibility of the Malaysia National Security 
Council when disaster strikes 
 
Effect on social, emotional and cognitive 
development of disaster victims after disaster as 
the result of regulatory compliance 
 
Cognitive development of the disaster victims 
 
The behaviour of the disaster victims 
 
Effect on emergency housing development as 
the result of implementation of regulatory 
compliance 
 
Effect on actors’ current workload as the result 
of implementing such regulations and guidelines 
 
Perceived ability of actors to comply with such 
regulations and guidelines 
 
Perceived readiness of actors to adopt such 
regulations and guidelines 
 
Three components of attitudes: 
 
Cognitive 
Affective 
Conative 
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As a result of using the three-component model, the actors’ attitude scale was 
categorised into three components: (1) cognitive, (2) affective, and (3) conative, for each of 
the ten hypothesised domains (current issues). Section A (cognitive) was for the purpose of 
gaining information on actors’ perceived knowledge of the MNSC Directive 20;  section B 
(affective) was to elicit information on how actors feel about the programme; and section C 
(conative) was to determine under what circumstances actors would be willing to accept the 
implementation. 
Besides categorising the current issues as the hypothesised domains, each domain 
was further subdivided according to the five groups of variables (culture related, structure 
related, law related, tradition related and work related) that had been influential in shaping 
actors’ attitudes. Interrelating of the ten hypothesised domains with the three-component 
model of attitudes, and with the five groups of variables resulted in the production of matrix 
grid (Table 6.3, p.162) in the quantitative phase, and themes (Table 6.12, p.179) in the 
qualitative phase which was used as a guide for item construction (questionnaires). 
 Also included in the questionnaire were items pertaining to various actors’ 
biographical variables (experience, professional status, gender and level of control). Actors’ 
biographical characteristics are mentioned in several international studies (Chapter 2, 3 and 
4) on enforcement and compliance as being influential in shaping actors’ attitudes. Thus, 
the aim of the biographical items was to ascertain actors’ background characteristics which 
may be responsible for shaping their exhibited attitudes towards regulatory compliance. 
The central premise of this research stipulates that the participation of government 
officers are the actors in the MNSC Directive 20 programme is essential (Golden, 2000). 
These government officers are the managers, clerical staff members, technical staff 
members and officers in the Disaster Management Mechanism in Malaysia, who work at 
national, state and district levels. Local government is perhaps best positioned to implement 
mitigation, as they control many of the most effective tools to reduce vulnerability to 
hazards, such as land use regulation and building code enforcement (Prater, 2000).  
 
6.3 Questionnaire and Interviews 
A questionnaire asked the same questions of all the study’s respondents. Respondents could 
reply to each item in a questionnaire either verbally or in writing. The main advantage of 
using a questionnaire was the low cost of sampling respondents over a wide geographical 
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area; the time required to collect the data could therefore be minimised. This research used 
a questionnaire to gauge actors’ attitudes towards regulatory compliance implementation in 
Malaysia. The questionnaire tried to elicit these actors’ perceptions of their knowledge, 
feelings and intended behaviour towards regulatory compliance. Collecting data through 
questionnaires, and analysing it using statistical methods, is useful for describing:  
1. Actors’ general attitudes to regulatory compliance and its components; 
2. Actors’ background characteristics and their influence on these attitudes;  
3. The relationship between three major components of attitudes.  
 
Besides providing a general description of actors’ attitudes, the findings of the 
questionnaire were used both to modify items planned for the interview schedule (the 
second phase of the study) and to generate new items for it too.  
 Interactions between both interviewer (me) and interviewees (actors) involved oral 
questions in the interviews. Interviews typically involve individual respondents, but group 
interviews were also an option. Respondents in an interview reply to interview questions in 
their own words. Responses from respondents can be recorded through hand written or 
computer-generated notes and also either by verbally on audiotape or videotape (Gall et al. 
1996). 
 For this research, interviews were used to produce evidence to illuminate and 
articulate the findings established by the questionnaire. They were used to support 
reasonable explanations as to why actors responded to the questionnaire in the way they 
did, and to cover aspects of the research that the questionnaire was not able to yield, leading 
to greater clarity and understanding actors’ attitudes. The interviews were able to generate 
relevant data, both to actors and to decision makers at every level in charge of the 
regulatory compliance implementation. It was considered that carrying out post-
questionnaire interviewing would increase the chances of obtaining information that actors 
would not normally reveal under other circumstances, especially those concerning negative 
feelings towards the issue (Gall et al. 1989). Interviewing as a method of information 
gathering is generally a more flexible procedure compared with questionnaire completion 
concerning attitudes towards the issue under investigation (Clough et al. 1991; Rubin et al. 
2005; Paker, 2005). 
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 An in-depth, semi-structured (i.e. with open-ended questions), face to face form of 
interview suggested by Oppenheim (2000) was employed. The purpose of the interview 
was exploratory so as to get an in-depth understanding of the data collected from the 
sample of completed questionnaires.  
 
6.4 Quantitative Method: The Survey 
 
6.4.1 Sampling 
Oppenheim (1992) argued that the research design should decide on target group(s) as well 
as the specific questions a researcher should ask. Decisions in choosing the right target 
population (e.g. individuals and groups) were vital for this research. The next stage was to 
get authorisation and assess the accessible population. In bigger organisations it was very 
important to select the right department, section or individual. It is important to interview 
the right person from the organisation rather than most important individual (Ghauri, 2005). 
 The critical test of a sample design is that it be representative of a larger population. 
The validity of a sample depends on its accuracy and precision. An accurate sample is also 
one without bias (Cooper et al. 2001).  
 There is no guarantee that a larger sample will give better approximate population 
parameters. The accuracy of a sample is, therefore, more significant than its size 
(Oppenheim, 1992). The sampling technique that was considered suitable for this research 
was ‘Random Systematic’ sampling, selected because the data collections involved actors 
who were only directly responsible for disaster management, particularly in providing 
emergency housing throughout the country. Although probability sampling was generally 
the preferred method of sampling, both non-probability and probability sampling 
procedures were used in this research due to practical considerations (Cooper et al. 2001). 
Sampling methods were categorised according to the approach to ensure that probability of 
a particular group/cluster was included. Convenience samples were non-probability 
samples with no restrictions on who was included in the sample but still under the sample 
framework. Thus the participants in this study were included on the basis of the following 
criterion: 
1. Each participant must have had experience related in the Mechanism of Disaster 
Management of Malaysia; 
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2. The participants needed to verbally understand the questionnaires and able to 
communicate their feelings, thoughts and perceptions because they should be aware 
and rationale to the issues in disaster management in Malaysia;  
3. The participants needed to express a willingness to be honest with the researcher. 
 
The subjects were the actors of a regulated population in Malaysian Disaster 
Management Mechanism, consisting of the administrative divisions of 13 States and 63 
Districts. Nevertheless, only 5 strategic districts were selected in the states of Johor, 
Selangor, Penang, Kedah and Kelantan. The main criterion of selection was the distance of 
every state from the central administration of Putrajaya, Malaysia. The locations were 
selected in order to avoid bias and to encourage accuracy. The actors were stratified 
according to their involvement in the National Disaster Management Mechanism. The 
Disaster Management and Relief Committee in Malaysia, in order to justify proper disaster 
response concurrency to its level, has to form the following:  
1. District Disaster Management and Relief Committee for Level I Disaster;  
2. State Disaster Management and Relief Committee for Level II Disaster; 
3. Central Disaster Management and Relief Committee for Level III Disaster. 
 
6.4.2 Survey Respondents 
 
Table 6.1: Survey Respondents (Q1 to Q39) 
  Johor Kelantan Penang Kedah Sabah Total 
1 District 32 32 30 31 32 157 
2 State 40 44 39 44 35 202 
3 National  54 
 Total  413 
Source: Author 
  
All of the enforcers from each of the departments in Disaster Management 
Mechanism in Malaysia were called actors. They were managers, clerical staff members, 
technical staff members and officers involved in disaster management, especially in 
providing emergency housing. In total, 413 respondents participated in this surveys as 
shown in Table 6.1, 66 departments (157 from district level, 202 from state level and 54 
from central level) were accessed based on Disaster Management Mechanism of Malaysia 
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as shown in Table 6.2. Disaster victims were the victims who were affected by disaster. 
Disaster victims’ group is the group consisting of disaster victims under the actors’ 
advocacy. 
 
Table 6.2: Actors Responded to the Survey  
Department Actors n 
National 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Minister of Information (Datuk Ahmad Shabery Cheek) representative  1 
Minister of Finance representative  3 
Minister of National Unity and Community Development  3 
Chief Secretary of State representative  - 
Commander of the Armed Forces representative  3 
General Director of Police Department representative 3 
General Director of Health representative  3 
General Director of National Security Division representative  2 
General Director of Fire Brigade and Rescue Malaysia representative  2 
General Director of Atomic Energy Licensing Board representative  - 
General Director of Broadcasting representative  2 
General Director of Information representative  2 
General Director of Transportation Department representative  3 
General Director of Public Work Department representative  3 
General Director of Environmental Department representative  3 
General Director of Social Welfare Department representative  3 
General Director of Working and Health Security Department 
representative  
3 
General Director of Meteorology Service Department representative  2 
General Director of Civil Aviation Department representative  - 
General Director of Geology Research Department representative  2 
General Director of Irrigation and Drainage representative  5 
General Director of RELA representative  4 
Secretary: Director of Crisis and Disaster Management Unit, representative  1 
National Security Division (NSD): Prime Minister’s Department 
representative  
1 
Sub-total 54 
State 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State Secretary representative  9 
State Police Officer Chief representative  10 
Brigade Commander (ATM) representative  9 
Director of State Fire and Rescue Department representative  12 
Director of State Health Department representative  9 
Director of State Public Works Department representative  13 
Director of State Social Welfare Department representative  9 
Director of State Information Department representative  8 
Director of State Broadcasting Department representative  8 
Director of State Civil Defence Department representative  10 
Director of State Environment Department representative  9 
Director of State Workers Security and Health Department representative  9 
Director of State Meteorology Department representative  5 
Director of Civil Aviation Department representative  5 
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Actors n 
Director of State Irrigation and Drainage Department representative  13 
Director of State Geological Survey Department representative 10 
Director of Transport Department representative  11 
Director of Malaysian People Voluntary Alliance (RELA) representative  15 
Manager of State STMB (Malaysia National Telecommunication Agency) 
representative  
11 
Manager of State TNB (Malaysia Electrical Power Agency) representative  12 
Secretary: Director of National Security Division (NSD), state 
representative  
5 
Sub-total 202 
District District Officer representative  9 
Chief of District Police Officer representative  10 
District Fire and Rescue Officer representative  12 
District Health Officer representative  9 
District Engineer, Public Works Department representative  13 
Representative from Malaysian Armed Forces (ATM) representative  11 
District Council Secretary representative  9 
District Social Welfare Officer representative  9 
Officer of District Civil Defence Corporation representative  10 
District Information Officer representative  11 
District Engineer, Irrigation and Drainage Department representative  15 
District RELA Officer representative  13 
District TNB Officer representative  11 
District STMB Officer representative  11 
Secretary: Assistant Director, National Security Division (NSD), District 
representative  
9 
Sub-total 157 
TOTAL 413 
                                                                                                                   Source: Author 
6.4.3 Instrument for the Questionnaires 
An actors’ attitude scale (attitudinal scale) was specially developed for this study from 
‘Strongly Disagreed’ (numbered as 1) to ‘Strongly Agreed’ (numbered as 5) as describe in 
section 6.4.5, p.160 and shown in Appendix 12, p.346. Three important considerations were 
taken into consideration during the survey questionnaire construction:  
1. The questionnaire had to be able to generate information to describe actors’ 
attitudes towards regulatory compliance implementation 
2. Its findings had to be able to suggest guidelines in the development of items for the 
interview schedule 
3. Information yielded had to provide guidelines in selecting disaster area as samples 
for the qualitative part of the study 
4. Questionnaire design must also be aware of the standardised questionnaire normally 
used in international arena in relation to actors’ attitude research.  
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However, the standardised questionnaire was not suitable in this research. There 
were three reasons for rejecting standardised questionnaires on actors’ attitudes to 
regulatory compliance, developed internationally as follows: 
1. The model of attitudes chosen for this study was the three-component model 
(cognitive, affective and conative). All of the standardised questionnaires found 
during the literature search were based on a one-component model of attitudes. No 
standardised questionnaire on attitudes based on the three-component model is 
available; 
2. All of the standardised questionnaires included items on ‘regulatory compliance’ 
not recognised by or not under the responsibility of the Prime Minister’s 
Department. Thus these items were not appropriate;  
3. Standardised questionnaires developed internationally were also not suitable 
because: (i) cultural differences and (ii) differences in organisational structure, 
system and practices;  
4. Standarised questionnaire refers to the ‘Theory of Reasoned Action’ (TRA) 
(Fishbein et al. 1975). According to this theory, behavior is consistent with a 
consciousness of personal choice (not based on external institutional influences) and 
carried out, with intent by an individual. Hence, the instruments in the questionnaire 
were designed on the principle of individual action rather than institutional 
influences. 
 
In additional, it was not the intention of the study to produce a standardised scale to 
measure actors’ attitudes towards regulatory compliance. Questionnaires provide an 
appropriate platform to answer enquiries regarding knowledge, beliefs, attitudes and 
behaviour from targeted people by collecting information (Boynton, 2004). The assumption 
made in developing the instrument was that respondents answering the questionnaire are 
able and sufficiently motivated to disclose their true attitudes towards regulatory 
compliance and not simply give what they thought are the answers desired by the 
researcher. The questionnaires involved paper and pencil responses and the main intention 
was to evaluate actors’ attitudes towards regulatory compliance. This was clearly stated to 
all respondents and the researcher encouraged the respondents to question the wording of 
any of the survey items according to their personal attitudes.  
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6.4.4 Questionnaire Designs 
The research design was devised with the assumption that at some later stage the plan 
might have to change. Most surveys went through the same stages or cycles of stages 
(Oppenheim, 1992). Thus, questionnaire design was based on day to day progress and 
flexible upon stipulated aims and theories. General aims then lead to a statement of specific 
aims and these should be turned into operational aims. Operational aims are a specific set of 
practical issues or hypothesis investigated. These aims then lead to the construction of 
statements inspired from the variables measured. At the end of the questionnaires design 
process, the researcher should be able to formulate a set of questions, scales and indicators 
(Oppenheim, 1992). 
 The design should specifically focus on precision, logic-tightness and efficient use 
of resources. A loose credibility in designing survey questionnaires will waste case material 
and resources that may result to inaccurate answers, too many conclusion loopholes, 
generate greatly irrelevant information and little generalisation (Oppenheim, 1992). 
As a result of using the three-component model, the attitude scale was categorised 
into three components for each of the ten hypothesised domains: (1) cognitive; (2) 
affective; and (3) conative.  
 Section A (cognitive) of the attitudinal scale (describe in section 6.4.5) is for the 
purpose of gaining information on actors perceived knowledge of regulatory compliance in 
Malaysia; Section B (affective) is to elicit information on how actors feel about the 
regulation in emergency housing; and Section C (conative) is to determine under what 
circumstances actors would be willing to accept maximum regulatory compliance.  
 Instrument building and questionnaire composition were based on specification of 
the variables measured (as shown in the questionnaire-Appendix 12, p.346). Rationales of 
the questionnaires are as shown in Appendix 13, p.350. For each variable, the order of 
questions within each module is developed using a ‘funnelling’ approach: a concurrent flow 
of a very broad question progressively narrows down in scope in order to reach some very 
specific points (Oppenheim, 2001). 
 
6.4.5 Factors Related to Actors Attitudes 
Besides categorising the ten hypothesised domains of the attitudinal scale into the three 
components of attitudes, each domain was further subdivided according to the five groups 
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of variables that had been found in previous studies to be influential in shaping actors’ 
attitudes towards regulatory compliance. These five groups of variables were classified as: 
(1) general culture-related; (2) social structure-related; (3) law-related; (4) regulatory 
tradition-related; and (5) regulatory work-related. 
 Interrelating the ten hypothesised domains with the three-component model of 
attitudes and with the five groups of variables resulted in the production of a 10 by 3 by 5 
matrix grid that was used as a guide for attitude scale items construction (as shown in Table 
6.3). 
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Table 6.3: Matrix Used as Item Content Guide for the Attitude Scale of the Survey 
Questionnaire 
[Number in the grid (1 to 39) indicates the item number as it appears in the attitudinal 
scale] 
Hypothesised Domains Cognitive Affective Behavioural Relation 
1. Philosophy of regulatory 
compliance 
1  31 Culture 
   Structure 
    Law 
  32 Tradition 
 10, 11, 12  Work 
2. Principles of the emergency 
management according to Malaysia 
disaster management context 
 
2   Culture 
   Structure 
 13,     Law 
   Tradition 
 14  Work 
3. Effect to the disaster victims under 
the responsibility of the Malaysia 
National Security Council when 
disaster strikes 
   Culture 
 15, 16, 17 34 Structure 
   Law 
   Tradition 
   Work 
4. Effect on social, emotional and 
cognitive development of disaster 
victims after disaster as the result of 
regulatory compliance 
   Culture 
   Structure 
   Law 
   Tradition 
 18, 19, 20  Work 
5. Cognitive development of the 
actors 
   Culture 
   Structure 
 26, 27, 28  Law 
   Tradition 
   Work 
6. Actors behaviour    Culture 
 24  Structure 
   Law 
 23  Tradition 
 25  Work 
7. Effect on emergency housing 
development as the result of 
implementation of regulatory 
compliance 
 
 21  Culture 
   Structure 
   Law 
   Tradition 
   Work 
8. Effect on actors’ current workload 
as the result of implementing such 
regulations 
   Culture 
 22  Structure 
   Law 
   Tradition 
   Work 
9. Perceived ability of actors to 
comply with such regulation 
 
  33 Culture 
   Structure 
   Law 
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Hypothesised Domain Cognitive Affective Behavioural Relation 
 3, 4, 5, 6 29 36 Tradition 
   Work 
10. Perceived readiness of actors to 
adopt such regulation 
7, 8, 9  39 Culture 
   Structure 
  37 Law 
 30  Tradition 
  35, 38 Work 
                                                                                                                   Source: Author 
 
A total of 40 items was initially produced. As a result of the pilot study (see section 
6.6.2, p.186) one item from Section A was deleted because the possibility of bias regarding 
the actors’ race. The numbers of items in the attitudinal scale for the actual study are 39 and 
the number of items for each of the three sections is as in Table 6.4.  
 
Table 6.4: Numbers of Items in the Attitudinal Scale According to Section 
Section A (Cognitive) Section B (Affective) Section C (Conative) 
9 21 9 
Source: Author 
 
The majority of items are constructed in Section B because gaining information on 
actors’ feelings towards regulatory compliance is crucial for its successful implementation 
in all departments and levels. The assumption was that if the affective component of actors’ 
attitudes is positive, they would make an effort to search for and acquire the knowledge 
needed to apply regulatory compliance. It was also assumed that a positive affective 
component would also make them more willing to react positively toward regulatory 
compliance. 
 The particular method of measuring attitude is known as Likert Scales (Likert, 
1932). A Likert/Semantic Differential Instrument was used for measuring actors’ attitudes. 
These scales, according to Taylor et al. (1996), have become one of the dominant methods 
of measuring social and political attitudes. Likert scales are by far the most common type of 
survey item; the usual response categories are ‘Strongly Agree’, ‘Agree’, ‘Don't Know’, 
‘Disagree’ and ‘Strongly Disagree’.  
 The ‘probabilistic summated-rating method’ developed by Likert was used to record 
the responses to the attitudinal scale. Respondents were requested to express the extent of 
their agreement or disagreement to every item statement on a five-point forced-choice 
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continuum as shown in Box 6.1. An intermediate category ‘Undecided’ was provided 
between the two extremes of the continuum. 
 
Box 6.1: Range of Response to Item Statement 
                     1: Strongly Disagree (SD) 
                     2: Disagree (D) 
                     3: Undecided (U) 
                     4: Agree (A) 
                     5: Strongly Agree (SA) 
Source: Author 
 
6.4.6 Term Used for Item Construction 
The criterion adopted in choosing the wording of items was that all the responding actors, 
regardless of their background, should clearly and easily understand the statement content 
of each individual item. In order to fulfill the aforementioned condition, usage of technical 
terms, usually associated with emergency housing, was avoided. Furthermore, the survey 
phase questions were constructed as generally as possible in order to justify the right actors 
for the interviews phase. Only those who were involved in the National Disaster 
Management Mechanism were selected based on their biographical background. 
Items in the survey questionnaire used for the study were divided into three parts:  
1. Biographical data; 
2. Attitudinal scale;   
3. Open-ended questions. 
 
Different backgrounds reflect the responsibilities of individual staff members 
(Macpherson, 2004). Biographical data explained the background of the actors and level of 
involvement in disaster management.  
 Items in Section A and C were constructed to serve three purposes. The first was to 
find out the actors’ perceptions of their knowledge and abilities to comply with rules and 
regulation in the MNSC Directive 20. They also expressed their likely reaction to these 
disaster victims if included in their group. The second purpose was to ascertain actors’ 
perceptions of their colleagues’ knowledge and abilities to meet the demands of regulatory 
compliance. It was also to gather their views on the likely reaction of other actors to 
regulatory compliance implementation. In order to achieve research objectives (see section 
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5.3, p.132), the term ‘actors’ were used for every item in Section A, B and C of the attitude 
scale. 
 Most of the items in the attitudinal scale were worded only positively for Section A, 
B and C to avoid confusion. Only six negatively worded items were involved in Section B. 
An agreed response to positively worded items would represent a positive evaluation for 
the attitude component concerned. A disagreed response to negatively worded items would 
also represent a positive evaluation for the attitude component related to it. The opposite is 
true for both negatively and positively worded items. The arrangement of positively and 
negatively worded items in the attitudinal scale was not made in any particular order. A 
summary of the positive and negative worded items as they appear in the survey 
questionnaire is shown in Table 6.5. 
 
Table 6.5: Positive and Negative Worded Items in the Survey Questionnaire 
Section Positively Worded Items, Q Negatively Worded Items 
A 2, 3, 7, 8, 9 - 
B 10, 13, 15, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 26, 
27, 28, 30 
12, 21, 22, 23, 25, 29 
C 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 - 
                                                                                                Source: Author 
 
6.4.7 Background Characteristics of Actors 
Table 6.6 describes the background characteristics of the actors involved in this research. 
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Table 6.6: Background Characteristics of Actors 
 
Gender 
 
 
No. of Years Service 
 
 
 
 
 
Professional Status 
 
 
 
 
 
Level Control 
 
 
 
Attended In-service Courses 
 
 
Availability of Trained Actors 
 
 
Actors to Look after Regulatory Compliance 
 
 
Department Related to the Scene of Emergency 
Housing 
 
Department has Specific Regulation Towards 
Regulatory Compliance  
 
 
Male 
Female 
 
Under 5 
6 to 10 
11 to 15 
16 to 20 
More than 20 
 
Chairman 
Manager 
Technical 
Clerical 
officer 
 
National 
State 
District 
 
Yes 
No 
 
Yes  
No 
 
Yes 
No 
 
Yes  
No 
 
Yes  
No 
 
291 
122 
 
81 
106 
61 
81 
84 
 
9 
59 
102 
109 
134 
 
54 
202 
157 
 
169 
244 
 
174 
239 
 
175 
238 
 
172 
241 
 
139 
274 
 
                                                                                                 Source: Author 
 
6.4.8 Data Analysis 
Attitudes (to regulatory compliance) are complex and multifaceted (Allport, 1971). 
Therefore it was recognised that they cannot be captured by a single score, as is done in 
many attitude studies, or for that matter, by several scores in order to highlight certain 
issues on attitudes to regulation compliance. The study limits itself to five main scores (1, 
2, 3, 4 and 5 as shown in Box 6.1) for each of the three sections of the questionnaire. 
Before analysing the data, respondents’ scores for negative items in the attitudinal scale of 
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the survey questionnaires were reversed as shown in Box 6.2 in order to maintain 
uniformity of item scores. 
 
Box 6.2: The Reverse Scoring for Negative Items of Attitudinal Section 
      Choice of 1 was Scored as 5 
      Choice of 2 was Scored as 4 
      Choice of 3 Remains 
      Choice of 4 was Scored as 2 
      Choice of 5 was Scored as 1 
                                                         Source: Author 
 
6.4.8.1 Sub-Scale of the Attitudinal Scales of the Survey Questionnaire 
The process of creating sub-scales using a combination of items in Section A and B of the 
attitudinal scale was undertaken prior to data analysis. These sub-scales or factors were not 
created using the factor analysis method for the reason that is was not the intention of this 
study to produce a standardised instrument to measure actors’ attitudes to regulatory 
compliance. Factor analysis attempts to identify the relationship between all variables 
included in the analysis set. Factor analysis is used to reduce a large number of variables 
into fewer numbers of factors and to study the patterns of relationship among many 
dependent variables by using mathematical computation (Darlington et al. 1973) 
particularly to discover variance that can only be give details representing smaller number 
of variables as a whole (Gorsuch, 1983).  
The purpose of this research is different and not to find latent/hidden variables. 
Relationships of both independent and dependent variables were clearly defined so that in 
analysis the relationship between variables is directly measurable by using other techniques 
like ANOVA and MANOVA. It was constructed by grouping several items in sections A 
and B so as to produce descriptive information regarding attitudes to regulatory 
compliance. This was done in order to give a fuller description of actor attitudes towards 
regulatory compliance implementation. These sub-scales or factors created are as shown in 
Table 6.7.  
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Table 6.7: Sub-Scale of the Attitudinal Scales of the Survey Questionnaire 
Sub-scale Items 
Number 
Description 
K1 Knowledge of regulatory 
compliance 
1, 2, 7, 8, 9 Item statement deals with knowledge of the 
rationale and objectives of implementing 
regulatory compliance. It is also concerned 
with the propagation of information about 
regulatory compliance at the department level 
K2 Ability to comply  3, 4, 5, 6 Item statement deals with the ability of actors 
to comply with the MNSC Directive 20 
F1 Advantages/disadvantages 
of regulatory compliance to 
the actors and disaster 
victims 
18, 19, 20 Item statements deal with the 
advantages/disadvantages of regulatory 
compliance for the functional development of 
actors and disaster victims 
F2 Appropriateness of the 
MNSC Directive 20 
26, 27, 28 Item statements deal with the suitability of the 
MNSC Directive 20 for the implementation of 
regulatory compliance 
                                                                                                                    Source: Author 
 
A. Scoring of Attitudinal Scale, Each Section and Sub-Scales 
A total score for the attitudinal scale, individual sections of A, B and C, and the four sub-
scales for each respondent was calculated by summating the scores of every item included 
in each category. Composite mean scores (CMS) for every category of item was calculated 
by dividing the summated total score by the total number of items in each category. The 
range of CMS is from 1 to 5. 
 
B. Interpretation of CMS 
In order to quantify actors’ attitudes towards regulatory compliance using the CMS, 
differences in CMS range were divided into five equal intervals, where each interval 
constitutes a score of 0.8 as shown in Box 6.3. 
 
Box 6.3: Divisions of CMS 
 
                           1            1.8            2.6            3.4            4.2              5 
 
 
 
Source: Author 
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Using Box 6.3 as a reference, the interpretations of CMS made are as follows: 
1. A mean score of 2.60 and less was interpreted to mean that actors have a negative 
attitude towards regulatory compliance (labeled Group 1); 
2. A mean score between 2.61 and 3.4 would indicate that actors have a non-committal 
attitude towards regulatory compliance (labeled Group 2);  
3. A mean score of 3.41 and above would indicate that actors have a positive attitude 
towards regulatory compliance (labeled Group 3). 
 
Labeling of actors according to the three groups of attitude to regulatory compliance 
was done so that the percentage of actors having positive, negative or neutral attitude could 
be calculated for the various issues of regulatory compliance discussed in the study 
findings. 
 
6.4.9 Analysis 
Data analysis was the process of systematically searching and arranging the interview 
transcripts, field notes and other materials that were accumulated to increase the 
understanding of the findings and to enable the presentation of what had been discovered 
by others. Analysis involves working with data, organising it and breaking it into 
manageable units; synthesising it, searching for patterns and discovering what is important; 
and what is to be learned and deciding what peers would be told (Bogdan, 1972). 
 
6.4.9.1 Statistical Analysis 
Once the complete questionnaires were received, coding was assigned to the respective 
questions and categories. The completed questionnaires were assessed to ensure they were 
correctly completed before entering the data onto data file. Counter checked if necessarily 
in order, to get a complete questionnaire.  
 Parametric statistical tests using the SPSS statistical package were used in the 
questionnaire data analysis. This was justified in terms of the large size of the sample (i.e. 
413) since it is generally appropriate to use a normal distribution-based test rather than a 
non-parametric test when the size of a sample is large enough (i.e. greater than 100). In 
general as sampling size increases, the shape of the sampling distribution approaches the 
normal even if the distribution of the variable measured is not itself normal (Norusis, 1994). 
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Prior to data analysis, efforts were made to identity extreme CMS for the general attitude 
scale, for sections A, B and C and for the four sub-scales. Five highest and lowest CMS 
were identified. Since these highest and lowest CMS were typical of the other mean scores 
they were retained during data analysis. In data analysis, three methods of statistical 
analysis were employed, as follows: 
 
A. Descriptive (summarise data) 
Descriptive statistics were used to attain a general description of actors’ attitudes towards 
regulatory compliance and issues involved in its implementation (i.e. mean scores and 
standard deviation, frequency and percentage count were employed). 
 
B. Comparison (differences) 
Actors’ background characteristics and their influence on attitudes towards regulatory 
compliance were also ascertained for the study, using comparative statistics. Three 
statistical tests were used: t-test, one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) and multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANOVA). Post-hoc Tukey-HSD was utilised to determine groups 
mean differences for both ANOVA and MANOVA tests if α was statistically significant at 
0.05 levels. 
 The independent t-test was used to compare one dependent variable with one 
independent variable consisting of two groups or sets of actors. The one-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) was used to compare one dependent variable with one independent 
variable consisting of three or more groups or sets of actors. If tests were statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level (p< 0.05), the post-hoc Tukey-HSD test was used to determine 
group mean differences. 
 The MANOVA was used to compare two or more dependent variables with one 
independent variable. Multivariate 'main effect' statistics were calculated using WILKS' 
Lambda (Wλ) and the statistical significance level for the 'main effect' chosen was 0.05 (p< 
0.05). For significant multivariate 'main effect', results of univariate f-tests were used to 
identify the dependent variable(s) that was responsible for producing the 'main effect'. If the 
affected independent variable(s) consisted of three or more groups or sets of actors, 
ANOVA followed by post-hoc Tukey-HSD was used to determine group mean differences. 
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C. Relationship (pattern to find strength) 
Besides description and comparison, inter–relationship between sections, sub-scales and 
items of the attitudinal scale were also determined. The statistical test used for this purpose 
is bivariate Pearson correlation. 
 
6.4.9.2 Analysis of Open-Ended Items 
Actors’ written comments on both closed and open-ended questions were also analysed and 
incorporated as part of the findings.  
 
A. Item 40 
Item 40 describes actors’ views on the MNSC Directive 20 implementation. A total of 413 
actors responded to item 40 of the survey questionnaire. The number of actors and their 
professional status that responded are as shown in Table 6.8. 
 
Table 6.8: Number of Actors and their Professional Status who responded to Item 40 
Professional Status Number 
Chairman 
Manager 
Technical 
Clerical 
Officer 
9 
59 
102 
109 
134 
                                                                                           Source: Author 
 
 Of 413 actors, 9 were the chairmen, 59 were the managers, 102 were the technical 
staff members, 109 were the clerical staff members and 134 were the officers. Actors 
responded to item 40 were coded into three categories: 
1. Disagree with the plan to implement regulatory compliance. Actors in this group 
were those who expressed their opposition using words such as: impractical; 
disagree with the idea; do not support the idea/plan; maintain the present 
administration system; disaster victims with difficulties should remain only under 
specialist and related actors. Included in this category were also actors who did not 
use the phrases quoted when expressing their views on item 40, but expressed the 
problem(s) if full regulatory compliance is implemented in their department. These 
categories of actors were coded as ‘disagreed’. 
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2. Undecided in their opinions towards the implementation of regulatory compliance. 
Actors included in this group were those who agreed with the idea of regulatory 
compliance with reservation(s). These actors used ‘but’ and ‘if’ when expressing 
their opinions. These categories of actors were coded as ‘undecided’.  
3. Agreed with the plan to apply full regulatory compliance in the disaster 
management. The words used by these actors were ‘agree’ with the idea, ‘good’ 
idea and ‘need to be supported’. These categories of actors were coded as ‘agreed’. 
 
 Reasons given by actors for disagreeing, being undecided and agreeing were coded 
as shown in Appendix 14, p.351, and analysed and discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
B. Item 41 
Item 41 describes actors’ views about changes need to be made at the department level 
before regulatory compliance implementation. A total of 413 actors responded to item 41 of 
the survey questionnaire. The number of actors based on professional status who responded 
is listed in Table 6.9. 
 
Table 6.9: Number of Actors and Professional Status who responded to Item 41 
Professional Status Number 
Chairman 
Manager 
Technical 
Clerical 
Officer 
9 
59 
102 
109 
134 
                                                                                           Source: Author 
 
 Of 413 actors, 9 were the chairmen, 59 were the managers, 102 were the technical 
staff members, 109 were the clerical staff members and 134 were the officers. Suggestions 
given by actors for disagreeing, being undecided and agreeing were coded as shown in 
Appendix 15, p.352, and analysed and discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
6.5 Qualitative Method: Interviews 
Cherry (2000) argued that a qualitative exploratory research design is very useful when the 
researcher knows little about a group of people or phenomenon. The actors involved in 
Malaysia disaster management clearly identified from the list in Malaysia Disaster 
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Mechanism structured in the MNSC Directive 20. Focus groups were only identified after 
the phase of quantitative analysis because there is no information at the moment in 
Malaysia about the specific group or agency directly involve in providing emergency 
housing (Shuid, 2006). 
 Biographical data gained in the quantitative phase were used to stratify focus groups 
for the interviews in the qualitative phase. Only the special body appointed by the 
government (building contractors, consultants, CIDB and OSHA) were already identified as 
directly involved in emergency housing development (Foong et al. 2006). These special 
bodies appointed by the government are linked to the government agencies or under the 
government entities. For this focus group, a qualitative research design was preferred 
because the researcher had little control over the events and the researcher is unaware about 
the real life of focus group current state context (McMillan et al. 1993).  
  
6.5.1 Biographical Data 
Also included in the survey questionnaire were items pertaining to various Malaysian 
actors’ biographical variables (i.e. the department related directly to the scene of emergency 
housing, actors who attended an in-service course in disaster management, actors’ 
departments which have trained actors for regulatory compliance, actors’ departments 
which have officers to look after compliance with the regulations and actors’ departments 
which have specific regulation to make sure compliance with the regulation). Actors’ 
biographical characteristics are influential in shaping actors’ attitudes toward the 
implementation of regulatory compliance.  
The aim of the biographical items was to ascertain Malaysian actors’ background 
characteristics that may be responsible for shaping their exhibited attitudes towards 
regulatory compliance. Information on biographical (actors’ lives) data gained from the 
quantitative approach were used as guidelines for selecting respondents for the qualitative 
approach. The main aim of the interviews was to illuminate and articulate the questionnaire 
findings. Biographical variables chosen for regulatory compliance were: Actors’ 
Experience; Professional Status; Gender; Level Control; and Administration or Technical; 
and Dealings/contact with Disaster Victims. Thus, those who were only directly involved 
with emergency housing were selected for interview sessions. 
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6.5.2 Interview Sampling 
There are two types of approaches to qualitative sampling: the traditional social science 
approach and the phenomenological approach (Cherry, 2000). In this study, a 
phenomenological approach was used, employing biographical data to determine strategic 
decisions about who should be included in the study. Thus, a purposive sampling method 
was used. It was an appropriate way of choosing information rich cases for in depth study 
(Patton, 1990). 
 Information on biographical data gained from the quantitative approach was used as 
a guideline for selecting respondents for the qualitative approach. Only actors involved in 
the quantitative part of the study were considered for this phase, since the main aim of the 
interviews is to illuminate and articulate the questionnaires findings. Only actors involved 
directly in providing emergency housing were selected to interview sessions. Thus, not all 
of the respondents based on the Disaster Management Mechanism from the quantitative 
survey were involved in the qualitative interviews.  
 The subjects were the actors from a regulated population in Malaysian Disaster 
Management Mechanism, consisting of the administrative divisions of 13 states and 63 
districts. Nevertheless, only 5 strategic districts were selected in the states of Johor, 
Selangor, Penang, Kedah and Kelantan. The main criterion of selection is the distance of 
every state from the central administration of Putrajaya, Malaysia. The locations were 
selected in that manner in order to avoid bias and to encourage accuracy. The actors were 
stratified based on their involvement in the National Disaster Management Mechanism. In 
order to justify the proper disaster response concurrent with its level, the Disaster 
Management and Relief Committee in Malaysia has to form the following:  
1. District Disaster Management and Relief Committee for Level I Disaster;  
2. State Disaster Management and Relief Committee for Level II Disaster;  
3. Central Disaster Management and Relief Committee for Level III Disaster. 
 
 Therefore, most of the departments were accessed based on Disaster Management 
Mechanism of Malaysia. As a result, 71 actors (as shown in Table 6.10 and 6.11) responded 
as the actors directly involved in providing emergency housing.  
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Table 6.10: Interview Respondents 
Professional 
Status 
National (N) State 
(S) 
District 
(D) 
Special Body 
Appointed by 
Government 
(SB) 
Total 
Direct 
Contact 
with 
Disaster 
Victims 
(N) 
Manager 1 - 1 1 1 4 
Clerical  6 9 8 10 5 38 
Technical  3              6          7 4 4 24 
Officer - - 5 - 5 
Total 25 16 20 10 71 
                                                                                                                     Source: Author 
 
 All of the enforcers from each of the departments in Disaster Management 
Mechanism in Malaysia were called actors. They were managers, clerical staff members, 
technical staff members and officers involved in disaster management, especially in 
providing emergency housing. These included the actors from the special body appointed 
by the government, such as the contractors, compliance officers (i.e. CIDB) and contract 
workers, responsible for providing emergency housing to the disaster victims. Disaster 
victims were the victims who were affected by disaster. Disaster victims’ group is the group 
consisting of disaster victims under the actors’ advocacy. 
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Table 6.11: Actors Interviewed (Qualitative)  
Department Actors n 
National Minister of Information (Datuk Ahmad Shabery Cheek) representative  1 
Minister of Finance representative  1 
Minister of National Unity and Community Development  1 
Chief Secretary of State representative  - 
Commander of the Armed Forces representative  1 
General Director of Police Department representative 1 
General Director of Health representative  1 
General Director of National Security Division representative  2 
General Director of Fire Brigade and Rescue Malaysia representative  2 
General Director of Atomic Energy Licensing Board representative  - 
General Director of Broadcasting representative  - 
General Director of Information representative  1 
General Director of Transportation Department representative  1 
General Director of Public Work Department representative  2 
General Director of Environmental Department representative  2 
General Director of Social Welfare Department representative  2 
General Director of Working and Health Security Department representative  2 
General Director of Meteorology Service Department representative  - 
General Director of Civil Aviation Department representative  - 
General Director of Geology Research Department representative  1 
General Director of Irrigation and Drainage representative  1 
General Director of RELA representative  1 
Secretary: Director of Crisis and Disaster Management Unit, representative  1 
National Security Division (NSD): Prime Minister’s Department representative  1 
Sub-total 25 
State State Secretary representative  1 
State Police Officer Chief representative  1 
Brigade Commander (ATM) representative  - 
Director of State Fire and Rescue Department representative  - 
Director of State Health Department representative  - 
Director of State Public Works Department representative  1 
Director of State Social Welfare Department representative  1 
Director of State Information Department representative  1 
Director of State Broadcasting Department representative  - 
Director of State Civil Defence Department representative  1 
Director of State Environment Department representative  1 
Director of State Workers Security and Health Department representative  2 
Director of State Meteorology Department representative  - 
Director of Civil Aviation Department representative  - 
Director of State Irrigation and Drainage Department representative  1 
Director of State Geological Survey Department representative  2 
Director of Transport Department representative  1 
Director of Malaysian People Voluntary Alliance (RELA) representative  - 
Manager of State STMB (Malaysia National Telecommunication Agency) 
representative  
1 
Manager of State TNB (Malaysia Electrical Power Agency) representative  1 
Secretary: Director of National Security Division (NSD), State representative  1 
Sub-total 16 
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Department Actors n 
District District Officer representative  1 
Chief of District Police Officer representative  1 
District Fire and Rescue Officer representative  2 
District Health Officer representative  2 
District Engineer, Public Works Department representative  3 
Representative from Malaysian Armed Forces (ATM) representative  1 
District Council Secretary representative  2 
District Social Welfare Officer representative  1 
Officer of District Civil Defence Corporation representative  - 
District Information Officer representative  1 
District Engineer, Irrigation and Drainage Department representative  2 
District RELA Officer representative  1 
District TNB Officer representative  1 
District STMB Officer representative  1 
Secretary: Assistant Director, National Security Division (NSD), District 
representative  
1 
Sub-total 20 
Special Body 
Appointed 
by the 
Government 
Manager 1 
Clerical  5 
Technical  4 
Officers - 
Sub-total 10 
TOTAL 71 
                                                                                                                          Source: Author 
 
6.5.3 Instrument for the Interview 
A semi-structured interview schedule was developed for this part of the study (as shown in 
Appendix 16, p.353). The questions for the interview schedule were formulated from the 
issues on compliance raised from literature reviews, by the quantitative questionnaire 
approach and from the findings of a pilot study. The following issues were used as 
references in the construction of the interview: 
 
A. Cognitive 
1. Actors’ concepts of compliance with the regulation;  
2. Actors’ perceived ability to comply such regulation. 
 
B. Affective 
1. Actors’ perceptions of the suitability of the use of such regulation in any scene of 
disaster management;  
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2. Actors’ perceptions of the effect of compliance on actors' workload and how 
compliance would affect disaster management;  
3. Actors’ perceptions of the suitability of the national disaster management in the 
scene of emergency at site. 
 
C. Conative 
1. Actors’ willingness to support regulatory compliance implementation and the 
conditions for this support;  
2. Actors’ willingness to acquire skills to maximise compliance with the regulations. 
 
D. Others 
1. Actors’ perceptions of the barriers to regulatory compliance; 
2. Changes suggested by actors at the district, state and national levels towards 
regulatory compliance;  
3. Actors views on how to promote the acceptance of maximum regulatory 
compliance. 
 
6.5.4 Themes for Qualitative Data Analysis 
At this point, it was very useful to list the main regulatory compliance themes investigated 
in terms of the three main attitudinal components (or categories) posited in the earlier 
methodological discussion. They are shown in Table 6.12 in tabular form. Each number 
given represents the related question number (as shown in Appendix 16, p.353) in the 
actors’ attitudes interview.  The rationale behind each question was developed from the 
issues in the literature (as shown in Appendix 17, p.356). 
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Table 6.12: Themes for Qualitative Data Analysis                          
Category of 
Attitude 
Component 
Themes for Qualitative Data Analysis 
Cognitive 1 a Actors perceived knowledge of the regulatory compliance under the 
Prime Minister’s Department MNSC Directive 20 
b Prime Minister’s Department intention towards regulatory compliance 
2 Actors’ understanding of regulatory compliance in Malaysia 
3 a Perceived knowledge of actors by the term emergency housing 
b Actors’ concepts of disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20 
4 a Department level’s discussions on regulatory compliance 
b Actors’ perceived knowledge on regulatory compliance towards disaster 
victims under the MNSC Directive 20 
5 Actors perceived rationale of the Prime Minister’s Department plan 
6 Perceived abilities of actors towards regulatory compliance under the 
MNSC Directive 20 
Affective 7 Perceived rights of disaster victims under the MNSC to regulatory 
compliance 
8 a Knowledge gained of disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20 
b Disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20, social development 
c The emotional development of disaster victims under the MNSC 
Directive 20 
9 Perceived suitability of regulations for actors and disaster victims under 
the MNSC Directive 20 
10 Perceived effect of regulatory compliance on actors’ workload 
11 Perceived effect of regulatory compliance on disaster victims 
12 a Perceived effect of regulatory compliance on department levels’ 
performance 
b Suggestions about alternative methods of evaluating department levels’ 
performance if they practice regulatory compliance 
13 Types of regulations favoured by actors for regulatory compliance 
Conative 14 Perceived actors support for regulatory compliance implementation 
15 Perceived ability of regulatory compliance on promoting a ‘caring 
feeling’ and acceptance of disaster victims under the MNSC by the 
actors 
16 Perceived willingness of actors to attend in-service training in 
emergency housing                                                                                                                 
17 Actor perceptions of the conditions to accept regulatory compliance 
18 Barriers towards the implementation of regulatory compliance 
19 Changes suggested by actors prior to regulatory compliance 
implementation in disaster department levels 
20 Strategies to encourage actors to accept regulatory compliance under the 
MNSC Directive 20 
                                                                                                                        Source: Author 
 
6.5.5 Interview 
In order for the conversation to flow, the interviewer must possess good interpersonal skills 
thus establish a rapport with their respondents. The interviewer should be interested, 
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receptive and non-judgmental in order to minimise bias (Waltz et al. 1991). All focus 
groups conducted for this study were in English. However, translation was available to 
assist if necessary by the interviewer. 
 Interviews were used to produce evidence to illuminate and articulate the findings 
established by the questionnaire. They were used to support reasonable explanations as to 
why actors responded to the questionnaire in the way they did, something that the 
questionnaire cannot yield on its own, leading to greater clarity and understanding of their 
attitudes. The interviews were able to generate data that are relevant to both actors and 
decision makers in the Prime Minister’s Department responsible for the implementation of 
better regulation and compliance. Interviewing as a method of information gathering is 
more flexible compared to questionnaire completion, thus resulting in a greater likelihood 
of gaining more relevant and reliable information about attitudes (Clough et al. 1991).  
 Qualitative research is likely not to use sampling statistically (Delamont, 1995), 
however it was considered conventional to identify a sample as part of methodology, 
providing that the reasons for sampling were made explicit and could be demonstrated to be 
necessary to fulfill the aims of the research. Interviews, to refine meaning, were also 
fundamental methods. Interviews with actors were predicated as ‘conversations’ to reflect a 
less formal approach. The following informal methods had been trailed by the researcher 
and were used in this research. The basis of these methods was to minimise the disruption 
of the presence of the researcher in the setting. During the interview the researcher tries to 
relax and create an atmosphere that interviewees feel comfortable and free to talk openly. 
The interview format included a schedule and a set of appropriate time to help guide the 
discussion. The interview began with a short set of non-conversational questions focused 
on participants’ experiences to establish a rapport with the interviewee (Paton, 1990). This 
allowed the researcher to gain valuable background information about the interviewee.  
 
6.5.5.1 Qualitative Interview 
In recent years, interview had become a contemporary means of story telling where persons 
reveal life accounts in response to interview inquiries (Fontana et al. 2000). For the purpose 
of the study this traditional way was implemented in order to get accurate accounts and 
replies. Focus groups were interviewed personally. The focus group interview was designed 
to gain insights into the dynamic relationship of attitudes, opinions, motivation, concerns 
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and problems related to current and projected human activity (McDaniel et al. 1994). A 
focus group may be defined as a researcher selected group assembled for the purpose of 
discussing a specific research topic (Barbour et al. 1999). In this qualitative phase actors 
who were directly involved with emergency housing were interviewed. This approach to 
qualitative data collection was based on the assumption that people are an important source 
of information about themselves and the issues that affected their lives and that they could 
articulate their thoughts and feelings (Winslow et al. 2002). The interview was open for 
changes and was an inter-personal interaction focusing on certain themes (Kvale, 1983).  
 
A. Semi Structured Interview 
A semi-structured interview technique was chosen because it is an essential data gathering 
method (Fontana et al. 2000). This technique facilitates a researcher’s ability to get a rich 
and in-depth real life experience from respondents. Semi-structured interviews present 
consistent information that ensures comparability of data. Individual or focus groups in 
semi-structured interviews were held with actors at different levels because they are likely 
to be more knowledgeable and informative about the research subject (McMillan et al. 
1993). 
 Interviewing involved a combination of in-depth interviews and totally structured 
quantitative interviews. This method is often used in business-to-business and industrial 
research. The interview guide was more structured than usual in qualitative research and 
interviewers were trained in qualitative questioning and prompting techniques but who 
were not necessarily qualitative researchers (McGivern, 2003). In this research, semi-
structured interviews were conducted in a practically open framework to allocate more 
focus and interactive communication.  
 Semi-structured interviewing normally begins with general questions (Sampson, 
1972). Relevant topics related to the study were initially identified (e.g. availability, clarity 
and effectiveness) in advance. The majority of questions were designed and phrased prior 
to the fieldwork visit. However, the interviewees were free to interrupt and be flexible 
towards the issues being discussed. Prescriptive interviews were used only as a guide, in 
order to make sure that the issues were within the themes of this research (Pole et al. 2002). 
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6.5.6 Data Collection Process 
Follow-up visits were made to all the focus groups, identified from their biographical 
background in the sample, to make arrangements for appropriate dates to begin interview 
sessions. An agreement was reached to allow several visits to each of the departments. 
Permission was given to access any of the actors’ workplace/premises but only under the 
following conditions: 
1. Only actors who volunteered or those who were readily persuaded to volunteer 
would be interviewed. The head of the department or first senior assistants would 
not send out circulars directing actors to participate;  
2. Actors could only be allowed to be interviewed during their free time. Interview 
sessions with individual actors would stop as soon as the actor concerned needed to 
continue their work commitments and would be continued later if the actor agreed 
to it.  
 
 Initially not all of the actors approached agreed to be interviewed. Many needed 
coaxing before interview. Work commitments and time constraints were reasons cited by 
those who declined. For the interview sessions, actors were interviewed either individually 
or in groups. Pairing or grouping of actors for interviews was unavoidable because:  
1. Several actors refused to be interviewed alone; 
2. Actors were often free at the same time.  
   
Working hours in Malaysian normally begin at 9.00 o’clock in the morning and 
finish after 5.00 o’clock. A one hour break is taken for lunch, and that was the best time for 
interview sessions. Thus it was not uncommon for several actors to be free at the same 
time. In some cases the actors would set their own interview session within their working 
period, or alternatively after working hours. 
All actors interviewed were tape recorded with their permission. The interview 
session lasted approximately one hour on average for one-to-one interviews and one and a 
half hours for paired interviews, and not more then 2 hours for group interviews. It was 
assumed for the purpose of the interviews that:  
1. Respondents did not withhold any information concerning their attitudes to 
regulatory compliance because their statements were tape-recorded; 
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2. For the interview sessions that involved two or more respondents simultaneously, 
their personal attitudes to regulatory compliance were not influenced by each 
other’s comments on issues raised during the discussions. But it has to be admitted 
that in some way, directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously, respondents 
could have been influenced. 
 
6.5.7 Qualitative Data Analysis 
Scholars have suggested that the data speak for itself, but must be well organised (Fontana 
et al. 2000). As mentioned by Patton (2002), the process of analysing qualitative data is 
known for taking out rich information and narrowing it down into actual size in order to 
determine useful patterns and build a framework vision from objectives set up earlier 
(Patton, 2002). However, there was no single correct method for analysing qualitative data; 
but clearly the course of action chosen must reflect the purposes of the study (Creswell, 
1994; Patton, 2002). Researchers in particular, should be neutral, unbiased and invisible 
due to the issue of non-reflexivity in qualitative methods. In reality, this circumstance is 
incredibly hard to achieve as the researcher becomes covered with a mounting sum of field 
notes, transcripts and audiotapes (Fontana et al. 2000).  
 For the purpose of the study, no computer software was involved in data analysis. 
Many Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis (CAQDAS) (e.g. Nudist and Atlas/ti) 
packages are designed to facilitate thematic coding (e.g. transcription analysis; coding and 
text interpretation; recursive abstraction; content analysis; and discourse analysis) 
(Wickham et al. 2005). Nudist is suitable for data analysis involving sequential structured 
style, project management and sophisticated searching (particularly for complex projects) 
while Atlas/ti is suitable for inter-connectedness and creative interface (simple projects 
where the software needs to be learned in a hurry). However, CAQDAS will distance 
people from their data, lead to qualitative data being analysed quantitatively and lead to 
increasing homogeneity in the methods of data analysis (Wickham et al. 2005). Therefore, 
it is not possible to analyse data without reading and being familiar with it first, because 
continuing analysis relies on the necessity of re-reading data both in complete 
transcripts/field notes. Qualitative data analysis in this research was done manually due to a 
small sample size, complexity, and the possibility of losing sight of meaningful data. 
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The qualitative data analysis incorporated an inductive approach to classify the data 
into groups (categories) and to identify patterns and relationships among these categories. 
The qualitative data itself determines the emerging categories and patterns of relationships. 
With quantitative data, in contrast, categories and patterns of relationships are known, and 
set intentionally, in advance (McMillan et al. 1997). To stress this point, categories should 
reflect the data itself, because categories of qualitative data are obtained from random 
choices (Dey, 1995). 
 At this stage, a thematic/constitute approach was used to analyse the qualitative data 
analysis rather than grounded theory (codes, concepts, categories and creation of a theory). 
Thematic Analysis is an approach to dealing with data that involves the creation and 
application of ‘codes’ to data. The ‘data’ being analysed might take any number of forms 
(in this research the forms include interview transcripts, field notes, policy documents and 
audiotapes). 
The coding system was used on the answers given by the actors, for the purpose of 
analysing open ended questionnaires from the interviews (as shown in Appendix 18, 
p.357). ‘Coding’ refers to the creation of categories in relation to data and grouping 
together of different instances of datum (singular form of data) under an umbrella term that 
can enable them to be regarded as ‘of the same type’. The first stage of the qualitative data 
analysis approach was to transcribe the tape recordings of the interview sessions with 
respondents. The actors’ comments on the issues of regulatory compliance in emergency 
housing in Malaysia were then coded into three categories:  
1. Affirmative about the issue of regulatory compliance being discussed;  
2. Undecided on the issue; 
3. Negative towards the issue.  
 
For every question, the reasons was discussed for actors’ having affirmative, 
undecided or negative views and coded according to their interpretive similarities. The 
codes used for analysing the interviews were arranged in sequence based on the interview 
schedule items in the interview’s questionnaire. The un-transcribed interview was analysed 
using the same coding system by just listening to the recorded tapes. This was undertaken 
after the transcripts of the respondents had been analysed.  
185 
 
 Types of actors were interviewed and divided into groups. The first group was the 
actors who were involved only in the administration stage. The second group consisted of 
those who were involved in the technical stage. The third was those who were dealing 
directly with the disaster victims, and the fourth included those who were involved in all 
stages. 
As suggested by Giorgi (1985) and Kerlinger (1986), the analysis in this research 
was carried out according to the following combination of methods: 
1. Review all the data (all transcribed material from focus group) first in a general 
manner to obtain a sense of the data and emerging themes. A more detailed review 
was followed with bracketing (placing preconceived ideas within brackets) and 
intuiting (focusing on actors views). This provided structure to the gathered data and 
allowed for triangulation between the various research instruments used. The 
materials consisted of all transcriptions, field notes and document analysis; 
2. The data was evaluated holistically and an attempt was made to identify the major 
categories represented in the material. These major categories were reflected within 
the different dimensions of the actors work environment, namely, physically, 
psychological, social, and patterns of interactions between those dimensions; 
3. Sub-categories (national, state and district level) within the major categories [(1) 
affirmative about the issue of regulatory compliance being discussed, (2) undecided 
on the issue and (3) negative towards the issue] were then identified; 
4. A literature control was conducted to identify this study’s similarities, differences 
and contributions to that of previous research; 
5. Consensus discussions about the analysis of the data were held with my supervisor.  
 
6.6 Research Strategies 
 
6.6.1 The Nature of Good Design 
A researcher is always to bear in mind that some criteria should be cleared before accepting 
a design strategy during research work. As suggested by Trochim (1982), a good research 
design in any research work is based on grounded theory, and is situational, feasible, 
flexible and efficient. An inconsistent design may lead to poor function and operation. A 
good design where the components work together harmoniously, promotes efficient and 
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successful functioning. Meanwhile, a flawed design leads to poor operation or failure 
(Maxwell, 2005). 
 
6.6.2 Pilot Study 
Cooper et al. (2001) suggested that pre-testing the questionnaires is highly recommended in 
order to identify potential problems before the actual data collection. A pilot study consists 
of efforts to determine respondent’s interest; ascertain that questions have meaning to the 
respondent; checking for the possibility of respondent’s modification; experimenting with 
the questions continuity and flow; examining patterns with question sequencing; gathering 
unnecessary data; and setting up questionnaires in proper length and timing (Cooper et al. 
2001). 
The survey questionnaires were piloted on Malaysian actors, and their 
accompanying spouses, studying in the United Kingdom, who were familiar with the 
authority and enforcement in Malaysia, and who were involved in Malaysian enforcement 
before their arrival in the UK. Six individuals temporarily living in Bristol, Coventry, 
Manchester, Sheffield and Glasgow, were identified prior to sending the finalised 
questionnaires. They also distributed the questionnaires to their friends who were also 
familiar with Malaysian enforcement. They were given a deadline to return the 
questionnaires and each of the respondents was provided with a stamped addressed 
envelope. It was considered that all actors receiving the questionnaire in Malaysia would be 
able to respond appropriately if none of the actors in the pilot study in England encountered 
problems answering it. 
 The total number of pilot study questionnaires distributed was 50. The number of 
questionnaires returned was 30. All respondents who returned the survey questionnaires 
indicated that they had no problems responding to any of the items. They all answered ‘no’ 
to the question, ‘Are there any items in the questionnaire you are unclear of’? As a 
consequence of data received from the pilot study, several modifications and additions were 
made to the final survey questionnaire. The main adjustments made were to the 
questionnaires format; the testing group had not been familiar with some of the terminology 
used in the questionnaires. 
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6.6.3 Data Collection Procedure 
Upon acquiring the relevant documents, I made visits to each of the relevant departments in 
the Malaysian Disaster Management Mechanism. All Heads of the department or first 
senior assistants (if the departments’ heads were not on the premises) were briefed on the 
purpose of the study during the first visit to the department. They were also given an 
explanation of the significance of the study and how the actors’ responses to the 
questionnaire could help shape the future developments of regulatory compliance with the 
MNSC Directive 20 in Malaysia generally and at every department specifically. They were 
also encouraged during the briefing to ask questions concerning the study if they felt it 
needed to be clarified further. 
 Once they were satisfied with the briefing, their cooperation was enlisted to help 
distribute the questionnaires to all actors in their department. ‘Self completion 
questionnaires’ (questionnaires that respondents complete by themselves) were used in 
order to reach as many actors as possible. This strategy of distribution was chosen because 
of the difficulty of meeting every individual actor personally within the department. The 
services of head of the department or first senior assistants were again enlisted to help 
collect the completed questionnaires from their colleagues. They requested a period of 
between seven to ten days to distribute and collect the completed questionnaires. On the 
agreed date, I visited the department to collect the questionnaires. Efforts were again made 
to brief heads of the department or first senior assistants who had been away during the first 
visit. Then personal interviews were conducted in order to get complete questionnaires. 
 A total of 500 questionnaires were distributed. The number of questionnaires 
returned and collected personally was 423. Three reasons given for unreturned 
questionnaires were:  
1. Several actors were not in the department or not available for long time during the 
period the survey was undertaken;  
2. A few of the actors who received the questionnaires went for outstation duties and 
did not return the questionnaire prior to leaving the department;  
3. Some actors were reluctant to fill in the questionnaires for personal reasons.  
 
Of the 423 questionnaires returned, 10 were incomplete in the attitudinal scale 
section and the actors were untraceable; therefore the questionnaires were discarded.  A 
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total of 413 (82.6 per cent) returned questionnaires were used in the data analysis and this 
was considered as high compared to the level of participation in other general emergency 
management research in Malaysia, with only 37 per cent in overall response rate (Fakru’l-
Razi, 2001). The reason for not returning the questionnaires were: attending in-service 
courses, recently transferred to other departments, and feeling they were not knowledgeable 
enough about the actors in their department to answer the questionnaires accurately.  
 
6.6.4 Ethical Issues 
Ethics issues appear from the possibility of conflict among professions in the field 
(Gillespie, 1995). These conflicts relate to individual rights and making sure that research 
work is harmless. Therefore, Punch (1998) suggested that the issues of consent, deception, 
privacy and confidentiality of information must be cleared (Punch, 1998). The ethical 
issues arising within the context of this research had been given extensive consideration 
from the outset. As mentioned by Cohen et al. (2000), the ethical issues may arise from the 
nature of actors’ ethnic differences in intelligence, procedure adopted, data collection 
methods, emotional concern, the sensitive nature of data collected and the necessity of not 
embarrassing participants. 
 The ethical issues involved in all social research are due to the participation of 
people (Punch, 1998). Thus, the researcher tried to minimise the risk of exposure to 
respondents, peers and societies without compromising the production of quality 
information. With regards to ethical issues, it was important that strict standards were 
maintained at all times throughout this research. Deep consideration was given in the 
qualitative phase because qualitative research breaks into peoples’ lives. Some qualitative 
research deals with sensitive, intimate and innermost matters in peoples’ lives and ethical 
issues inevitably accompany the collection of such information (Punch, 1998). There are 
several ethical considerations with which the questionnaires and interviews are concerned 
and have been accounted for. 
 The ethical issues were raised with the actors at the start so that ethical principles 
could be negotiated with all participants (McMillan et al. 1993). Strict confidentiality and 
the processes for the building of trust between the participants (including the researcher and 
a participant) were the issues that rose at the start. The ethical principles came from all the 
participants, and each participant was prepared to negotiate changes and develop these 
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principles throughout the research. It would be my role to initiate this process. However, I 
opened opportunities for all participants to take turns in chairing discussions about the 
ethical principles and issues, as the research progressed. This is important for participant 
ownership, particularly in light of the tensions surrounding the power for my role. 
Openness about the issues surrounding the research such as time commitment, relationship 
to the course structure, content of the research, potential gain and actors’ questions is vital.  
 Consent was required from all actors at the setting to clarify that they volunteered to 
get involved, with the information sheet explaining the research and the detail of the actor’s 
involvement, including talking to the researcher and being the subject of an audio taped 
conversation (as shown in Appendix 19, p.364). The letter indicated the time scales 
involved. Explanations were given to help the actors understand the research. Actors were 
able to refuse to give consent if they wanted to. Respondents did not have to talk or answer 
any particular question, to ensure that actors felt comfortable (McMillan et al. 1993). 
 ‘Ethics Codes’ insist on securing the identities of people and locations involved in 
research work (Christians, 2000). All names of people involved in the research were 
unspecified (safe). All participants were presented with the transcript of their interview and 
offered the chance to alter or withdraw parts of the transcript if they felt it misrepresented 
their comments or for other reasons. Any audio and video tapes were only used for research 
analysis purposes and kept in a secure/locked place. All of the answered materials 
(document, tapes) from the actors were destroyed after research work was completed. 
 
6.6.5 Field-Work and Gaining Access 
Three types of permission were required from the relevant authorities. The first was 
obtained from the Prime Minister’s Department. I attempted to seek approval and 
collaboration from the Prime Minister’s Department for conducting this study and access 
was granted conditionally (this research is only for academics purposes). This approval 
permitted me to obtain assistance from various departments in Malaysia Disaster 
Management Mechanism in order to initiate the process of sampling and data gathering. 
However the foremost consideration in this study was the ethical measures necessary for 
the use of human subjects. These were developed as part of the research methodology. The 
approval letter was forwarded to all state and district levels.  
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 Field work was the stage of collecting data from the actors individually or in 
groups. Field work was separated into two phases (Hutter, 1988). The first and primary 
methods of investigation were observation and informal discussions with officers. If 
possible, I tried to join officers for the 9.00 a.m. to 5 p.m. working day and accompanied 
field officers on their daily visit at the disaster site. They were asked to carry on working as 
normal when I was with them. However some made special arrangements for my visit, such 
as devoting part of the day to driving around the area to give me some idea of the types of 
problems and people they were dealing with.  
 The second phase of the field-work comprised more formal methodological 
techniques than the first, namely examination of the records of the department for the 
purpose of understanding the environment of the departments’ administration before semi-
structured interviews with the actors. If the head of department or Chief Officer was not 
available for discussion, then representations were made on their behalf by junior officers 
to encourage and stick to the number of respondents planned earlier.  
 The approach was to initiate cooperation from the respondents and motivate them to 
react positively to the questions through face-to-face interview and mailed communication. 
The respondents were given advanced notice through a personally addressed postcard or 
letter inviting their participation in the study. The letter also provided explanation of 
selection, the method of sampling used, confidentially, reminders and return of 
questionnaires, anonymity to hide the identity of respondents, appearance and quality of 
presentation of questionnaires and a return envelop with glued stamps. The information 
also included publicity by an informed head of department, small incentives like 
information on the research topics, future ventures and findings dissemination. Letters to 
inform about the overall purpose of the study were given before any session of interviews 
began (as shown in Appendix 20, p.365). 
 
6.6.6 Dealing with Non-Response 
The respondents were reminded and revisited to ensure that they were aware of the 
deadline. The real issue here was the possibility of bias rather than concern over the number 
of non-responses. Pilot work is able to minimise the possibility of bias. It follows from any 
non-response in a pilot study, the assumption that within each cell the non-respondents 
have the same attributes or experiences as the respondents; therefore the reasons for their 
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non-response were purely situational, or at any rate were unconnected with the topic of the 
survey. 
 
6.6.7 Bias in Data Collection 
Bias is a real problem when collecting research information especially when closed-ended 
questions are involved. When compared to open ended questions, bias is, most probably, 
more deeply hidden, but nevertheless still there (Kirakowski, 2000). Open-ended 
questionnaires were preferred in this study. There was always the possibility of obtaining 
imprecise information or inaccuracy in the data. The actions taken to reduce bias were:  
1. Survey questionnaire designed to have the same socio-demographic characteristic as 
its population (e.g. gender ratio as the grouping, biographical data and ethics); 
2. Designing questionnaires in the range of generous knowledge and understanding by 
the respondent to avoid serious misinterpretations; 
3. Making the respondent feel free to take part in the research work in order to create a 
sense of shared control of the interview; 
4. While doing group interviews, the researcher tried to make respondents take part in 
the interviews without domination by any individual; 
5. Tried to avoid random errors (e.g. carelessness, inaccuracies, misunderstandings) 
and systematic errors (e.g. habitual attempts to hurry less well-educated respondents 
rather than more time with intelligent-looking respondents); 
6. Avoid the scenario in which interviews take the form of investigative procedure 
rather than in a relaxed environment; 
7. The split-ballot technique in pilot work was employed while doing pilot test (divide 
sample into two groups) in order to avoid the risk of ordinal bias, occurring when 
people tend to choose a figure near the average; 
8. The proper pilot work had been done in order to avoid prestige bias that makes 
respondents prefer to answer in a way that makes them feel better;  
9. Survey questionnaires were design in a way to avoid social desirability bias, when 
some people claim they know more than they actually do. When designing 
questionnaires wording was selected more towards low prestige answers (e.g. 
working together and caring). 
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6.6.8 Rapport Building 
As an introduction, conversation between researcher and respondents was started with easy 
to answer questions and not necessarily according to the questionnaires. These questions 
were not aggressive and were then continued to shift to more specifics. In order to make an 
interactive conversation, the researcher tried to assesses the matter of who speaks readily 
and who needs a bit of encouragement; and who answers questions in detail and who may 
need to be stimulated for more detail especially while doing group interviews. Tutty et al. 
(1996) encourages researchers to set a direction when interviewing respondents by creating 
consistent feedback. It is also encouraged that interviews occur individually, when it comes 
to the subject of an organisations function (Kelly, 1992; McMillan et al. 1997).  
 
6.6.9 Sampling Error 
Sampling error might be an outcome of improper research work practice and size of 
samples. A much larger sample would be needed, in particular, with dependent variables in 
order to reduce error and to approach significance in statistics. For the purpose of the study, 
it was decided that sample sizes would not be larger than a few hundred, due to dependent 
variables as an interval scale, in order to reach statistical significance. Sampling error 
depends much on sampling size and the precision of the sampling procedure and 
comparisons of the number of the actors’ sub-groups.  
 
6.6.10 The Researcher as Instrument 
In order to obtain the data and establish social relationships, the researcher tried to develop 
close interactions with respondents. McMillan et al. (1993) noted that a researcher has to be 
sensitive as an observer and faithfully records phenomena around them. It is important to 
understand that researchers are actually an observer, interviewer, participant, observer-
participant and participant-observer (Fontana et al. 2000). For the purposes of the study the 
role of interviewer was chosen. I presented myself as a learner and approached the 
interviews. 
 
6.7 Approaches to Verification and Standards of Quality 
Verification is a process that occurs throughout the data collection, analysis and writing-up 
of a study, while standards are criteria imposed by a researcher and others after the study is 
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complete (Creswell, 1998). For the purpose of this research, a model of trustworthiness was 
chosen.  The Trustworthiness Model was chosen to make sure there was a tightness of 
verification and standard of quality in the overall phases of research design. This model is 
based on the identification of four aspects that consist of truth value, applicability, 
consistency and neutrality. Truth value considers whether the researcher has established 
confidence in the findings of subjects or informants (i.e. consent letter and respondents 
volunteered to get involve) (Lincoln et al. 1985). He also describes how applicability refers 
to the degree to which findings can be applied to other contexts and settings or with other 
groups (i.e. all of the public service actors in every department in the Disaster Management 
Mechanism in Malaysia). Sandelowski (1986) interpreted that consistency refers indirectly 
to the reproducibility (ability to produce the same outcome given a controlled set of 
variables) of the findings if the inquiry were replicated with the same subjects or in a 
similar context (i.e. methodology and findings presented directly without repetition) and 
neutrality, that is from bias in research procedures and results (i.e. non-bias). This model 
was used to develop strategies that would introduce standards of quality into this research. 
The strategies implemented were credibility, transferability, dependability and 
conformability (Krefting, 1991). 
 
6.8 Research Credibility 
Credibility refers to the establishment of truth value of the study with the findings (Barribal 
et al. 1996). Research works is considered as not credible if the output gathered from 
inappropriate views and opinions (Krefting, 1991). Thus, the researcher purposefully 
selected participants with firsthand experience in order to improve the credibility of this 
research (Rubin, 1995). The development of the rapport with the participant was made to 
improve credibility of this research as this provided the researcher with more sensitive in-
depth information (Barriball et al. 1996). The credibility of this research was set with clear 
objectives and aims. Being research minded means being able to assess whether a piece of 
research has been ethical in its design, delivery and reporting. Ethical research creates a 
mutually respectful relationship between all participants in the research process. This is a 
relationship in which all involved freely participate, the research retains the highest levels 
of integrity and the stakeholders or wider community can rely on the findings. 
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6.9 Reliability and Validity of the Qualitative and Quantitative Research 
Reliability and validity are constant concerns in all research. Therefore, in the context of 
this study the consideration by the terms rigor and trustworthiness had to be cleared. The 
call for the matter of rigor is actually a basis in qualitative research in order to make sure 
the research design is tight enough (Krefting, 1991). Potential threats to rigor include 
trouble in research setting, the chance of misrepresentation of findings and carefully put it 
right in the nature of the study. The ability to transfer data was also involved, applying to 
how rigorously the findings can be generalised and applied to other context settings. 
 There was considerable debate over what constitutes good interpretation in 
qualitative research (Denzin et al. 1994). Krefting (1991) introduced a model of 
trustworthiness in qualitative research to check and verify data collection methods are valid 
and reliable. Meanwhile, scholars are still debating the terms of validity and reliability 
(Hamersley, 1987). According to general understanding and usage, the term validity means 
to verify whether the instruments implemented in data collection do indeed measure or 
describe what they have been invented to measure or describe. On the other hand, reliability 
refers to the extent to which a test or measure yields the same results if re-administered 
under constant circumstances in all occasions (Bell, 1999). 
 
6.9.1 Instrument Reliability 
In this study, this issue was considered from the beginning of designing the instruments 
used to collect the data relevant to this study. Two stages of reliability testing were 
conducted. The first was for the questionnaires.  
 In order to have some degree of confidence in the findings from using survey 
questionnaire, the Cronbach alpha internal reliability test was used to give a measure of the 
reliability of the attitudinal scale generally for each Section A, B and C; and for the four 
sub-scales. The internal reliability coefficient of the survey general attitudinal scale (for all 
39 items) was calculated as +0.96. This relatively high reliability coefficient value seems to 
indicate that the survey attitudinal scale is reasonably reliable. The internal reliability of 
each component of the attitudinal scale was also calculated. The coefficient value for 
Section A (cognitive component) was +0.71, for Section B (affective component) was 
+0.95 and for Section C (behavioural component) was +0.67. A probable explanation for 
the modest reliability coefficient values for sections A and C was that respondents were 
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unable to gauge their true knowledge of regulatory compliance and ability to comply with 
the MNSC Directive 20 when answering items in Section A. They were also probably 
unable to state their actual behavioural reactions when answering items in Section C. This 
is due to the fact that the implementation of full regulatory compliance in any department 
has yet to be rectified.  
 The internal reliability coefficient for the four sub–scales containing three or more 
items was calculated and is as shown in Table 6.13. 
 
Table 6.13: Reliability Coefficient of Q1 to Q39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                            Source: Author 
 
 The preventive measures to sustain instrument reliability to the interview 
questionnaires are as follows: 
1. Researcher had to establish confidence in the truth of the findings. In qualitative 
research this is usually obtained from the discovery of human experiences as they 
are lived and perceived by participants. Researchers then need to focus on testing 
their findings against various groups from whom the data was drawn, or persons 
who are familiar with the phenomenon being studied; 
2. The second step was for the researcher to establish whether the findings can be 
generalised to other large populations. There are two perspectives related to 
applicability in qualitative research. The first suggests that in qualitative research 
each case is unique and not amendable to qualitative research. Applicability is then 
not seen as relevant to qualitative research as its purpose is to describe a particular 
phenomenon or experience not to generalise to others. The second perspective is 
referred to as fittingness or transferability. Research meets this criterion when the 
findings fit into contexts outside the study situation that are determined by the 
Scales Reliability Coefficient 
Q1 to Q39 
Section A 
Section B 
Section C 
Sub scales: 
• K1 
• K2 
• F1 
• F2 
+0.958 
+0.708 
+0.954 
+0.673 
 
+0.669 
+0.627 
+0.734 
+0.565 
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degree of similarity or goodness or fit between the two contexts (Krefting, 1991). 
As long as the original researcher presents sufficient descriptive data to allow 
comparison, she or he addressed the problem of applicability; 
3. It must also determine whether the findings would be the same if the research was 
repeated with the same participants or in a similar context. As qualitative research 
deals with the uniqueness of the human situation, variability is expected in 
qualitative research and consistency is defined in terms of dependability;  
4. The researcher improved the trustworthiness of the findings by extended contact 
with the subjects and lengthy periods of observation. Instead of looking at the 
neutrally of the researcher, the neutrally of the data is considered and Krefting 
(1991) suggested that conformability be the reason of neutrality. This is achieved 
when the truth-value in applicability is established. 
 
Then, the reliability of the questionnaires and interview questions were assured by 
using the pilot testing method. This procedure included the administration of the 
questionnaires and interviews to purposefully selected samples of respondents. However, 
high reliability is not necessarily a guarantee for good scientific results, but there cannot be 
any respectably scientific results without reliability. Reliable measurement is referring to 
consistent results. It is a necessity to ensure that reliable measurement is also high in 
validity; without high validity there is still sufficient reliability (Krefting, 1991). 
 
6.9.2 Instrument Validity 
Among the main issues taken care of during the questionnaire design to ensure its validity 
was that all the items will be based on the analysis of the literature; and role and 
responsibilities of the interviewees. Validity determines whether the measuring instrument 
or interview in fact measures that it is supposed to measure. It also refers to whether or not 
the experimental design answers the research question and is threatened when uncontrolled 
factors confusing the experiment process (Weimer et al. 1995). The following procedures 
were followed to support the fact that the instrument and themes constructed according to 
the international and national academics and questions asked correctly as follows: 
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1. A comprehensive literature study regarding organisation/institution behaviour, 
attitudes, regulatory compliance, disaster management and laws and regulation were 
conducted to ensure that relevant themes were included in the interviews; 
2. Each item was discussed by a team of experts/supervisor to ensure correct 
placement of the relevant categories;  
3. Pre-testing had been done to determine whether the questions are clearly worded 
and easily understood. The pre-test also ensured culture standardisation of 
respondents.  
 
In this research, two types of non-statistical validity were made before the 
commencement of the questionnaire’s implementation on site. The open-ended responses 
and interview data were used to validate the finding of the attitudinal scales. The 
questionnaire will only describe generally the actors’ attitudes to regulatory compliance and 
use to modify and generate items for the interview schedule. The open-ended item data and 
the interview data were considered adequate to validate the attitude scale findings.  
 Methods in analysing qualitative data as taking out rich information and narrow its 
actual size in order to decide beneficial patterns and to build a framework toward the 
purpose of the studies (Patton, 2002). McMillan et al. (1997), notes that there is no single 
approach in doing qualitative data analysis. Therefore, the researcher tried to find a suitable 
pattern for data analysis within the general framework of suggested approaches in research 
texts guided by the research aims and objectives (Miles et al. 1994; Cohen, 2000; Patton, 
2002). 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
Quantitative Analysis 
 
“Finally, we ought to recognise that there are limits to the improvements that can be made; 
there never will be a point where there will be perfect disaster concepts or statistics”. 
(Quarantelli, 1997: 325) 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter will express quantitative analysis (consisting of cognitive analysis in section 
7.2, affective in section 7.3 and conative in section 7.4: components of attitude) (see also 
section 6.4.8, p.166) for methods of analysis with an emphasis in the statistical analysis of 
responses to the survey questionnaires (from hypothesised domains: see section 5.13.1, 
p.145) and examines in depth the main emergent findings. In total, 413 respondents 
participated in this survey. They were from the convenient sample under the Disaster 
Management Mechanism in Malaysia.  
The sequences of analyses are presented according to category of components from 
cognitive, affective and conative and from the variables measured (i.e. sequence in the 
questionnaire). The results of data analysis for descriptive statistics on actors’ attitudes 
towards regulatory compliance are presented as tables. The tables were constructed for 
general attitudinal scores, individual sections A (cognitive), B (affective) and C (conative) 
and the four sub-scales (K1, K2, F1 and F2) of the attitudinal scales (Strongly 
Disagreed/Disagreed as Group 1, Undecided as Group 2 and Agreed/Strongly Agreed as 
Group 3). These tables consist of:  
1. Composite mean scores (CMS-e.g. 2.72) (see section 6.4.8, p.166);  
2. Standard deviations (e.g. ± 0.23);  
3. Groups divided from attitudinal scale of 1 to 5 (i.e. Group 1 is a mean score of 2.60 
and less as negative attitude, Group 2 is a mean score between 2.61 and 3.4 as 
neutral attitude and Group 3 is a mean score of 3.41 and above as positive attitude); 
4. Frequencies;  
5. Percentage scores.  
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Methods of analysis are as shown in section 6.4.9, p.169. Conclusion was made 
based on the following analyses and correlated at the end of this chapter (illustrated in 
details in Appendix 21, p.366). 
 
7.2 Actors’ Cognitive Component of Attitudes to Regulatory Compliance 
The cognitive element of actor attitudes would be influenced by actors’ perceived 
knowledge of regulations in the MNSC Directive 20. This knowledge could have been 
developed through actual experience of interacting among themselves and the disaster 
victims. If the experience had been positive (mean score of CMS 3.41 and above), it could 
be assumed that they might have developed a positive outlook about their colleagues and 
disaster victims and they would have a favourable view of the regulatory compliance 
process. But if their experience had been negative (mean score of CMS 2.60 and less), they 
might eventually view the concept of regulatory compliance with a negative perception. 
The key features are listed in the following analyses throughout this chapter. Further 
analyses that related to hyphothesised domain are as shown in Appendix 22, p.370. 
 
7.2.1 Influence of Actors’ Professional Status on the Dependent Variable of 
Knowledge (K1) and Perceived Ability (K2) 
Multivariate tests showed that there were no significant differences main effects for the 
independent variable of Professional Status {Wλ = 0.96, F (8, 814) = 1.84, p> 0.05} for the 
dependent variable (K1) and (K2).  
 Univariate F-tests showed that there were significant difference between knowledge 
(K1) mean refers to Professional Status {F (4, 408) = 3.63, p< 0.05}. But, there were no 
significant difference between knowledge (K2) mean refers to Professional Status {F (4, 
408) = 1.47, p> 0.05}. 
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Table 7.1: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Score for K1 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
K1 attitude 2.72 ± 0.27 107 25.9 217 52.5 89 21.5 413 
Chairman 2.87 ± 0.25 3 33.3 3 33.3 3 33.3 9 
Manager 2.69 ± 0.30 16 27.5 31 51.9 12 20.7 59 
Technical 2.72 ± 0.30 25 24.1 57 56.1 20 19.8 102 
Clerical 2.72 ± 0.28 27 24.8 60 54.9 22 20.4 109 
Officer 2.73 ± 0.24 36 27.0 67 49.6 31 23.4 134 
                                                                                                                    Source: Author 
 
CMS data (Table 7.1) shows that generally actors had mixed perceptions of their 
knowledge of regulatory compliance (K1). Percentage data indicates that 25.9 per cent of 
actors perceive themselves as having low (negative) knowledge of regulatory compliance, 
21.5 per cent perceived themselves as having high (positive) knowledge of regulatory 
compliance, while 52.5 per cent were uncertain. CMS also shows those chairmen were 
cited as break even (33.3 per cent) referred to the same percentage showed in the Table 7.1. 
Only chairmen considered themselves as having higher knowledge of regulatory 
compliance compared to other actors with 33.3 per cent positive in attitudes. Standard 
deviations show that there were few differences of perception regarding actors’ general K1 
component within groups of actors. The differences of opinion between actors’ knowledge 
of regulatory compliance were significant statistically. There were significant differences in 
perceptions between chairmen, technical staff members and clerical staff members about 
actors’ knowledge of regulatory compliance. 
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Table 7.2: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Scores for K2 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
K2 attitude 1.83 ± 0.25 340 82.3 60 14.5 13 3.2 413 
Chairman 2.50 ± 0.32 6 66.7 0 0.0 3 33.3 9 
Manager 1.85 ± 0.34 48 80.9 10 16.9 1 2.1 59 
Technical 1.79 ± 0.23 87 85.5 12 11.5 3 2.9 102 
Clerical 1.80 ± 0.21 92 84.0 14 13.3 3 2.5 109 
Officer 1.83 ± 0.23 107 80.0 23 17.5 4 2.4 134 
                                                                                                                     Source: Author 
 
CMS (Table 7.2) shows that actors had a very low perception of their ability to 
comply with regulations (K2). Only 3.2 per cent of actors consider themselves as being 
capable of handling these disaster victims, while 14.5 per cent were unsure. The percentage 
shows that there were mass differences amongst the attitudes because negative attitudes 
contributed 82.3 per cent of the whole attitudes. Standard deviations show that there were 
few differences of perception regarding actors’ general K2 component within groups of 
actors. There were no significant differences in perceptions between actors about actors’ 
ability to apply regulatory compliance. 
 
7.2.2 Relationship between Perceived Knowledge of Regulatory Compliance (K1) 
and Perceived Ability to Apply Regulatory Compliance (K2) 
Table 7.3: Inter-Relationship between K1 and K2 
 K2 
Pearson correlation 
K1 
 
0.53 
                                                           Source: Author 
 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test). The bivariate correlation 
statistical test shows that there was a significant positive relationship at 0.01 levels between 
actors’ perceived knowledge of regulatory compliance and their perceived ability to apply 
regulatory compliance. Both K1 and K2 had a strong relationship because the correlation 
value (0.53) is close to 1 as shown in Table 7.3. 
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7.3 Actors’ Affective Component of Attitudes to Regulatory Compliance 
The affective information consists of how an individual feels about the attitude towards 
regulatory compliance and involves the feelings, moods, emotions or sympathetic nervous 
system activity that is aroused in a person in relation to the attitude. Attitudes, therefore, are 
the positive (from mean score of CMS 3.41 and above), or negative (from mean score of 
CMS 2.60 and less), evaluations a person gives to an attitude towards regulatory 
compliance about their colleagues and disaster victims. Even if actors have negative 
feelings or are non-committal (from mean score of CMS 2.61-3.40) about the regulatory 
compliance process, repeated exposure to the emotional experiences of disaster victims 
might change their expectations and might gradually shift their feelings from negative to 
positive. The key features of analyses are listed below. Further analyses are as shown in 
Appendix 22, p.370. 
 
7.3.1 Influence of Actors’ Professional Status on the Dependent Variable F1 and F2 
Multivariate test showed that there were no statistically significant relationship between the 
background characteristics of Professional Status {Wλ = 0.98, F (8, 814) = 0.81, p> 0.05} 
for the dependent variable F1 {F (4, 408) = 0.25, p> 0.05} and F2 {F (4, 408) = 0.42, p> 
0.05}. 
 
Table 7.4: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Scores for F 1 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
F1 attitude 2.17 ± 0.35 222 53.7 153 37.1 38 9.2 413 
Chairman 2.52 ± 0.38 4 48.1 2 18.5 3 33.3 9 
Manager 2.15 ± 0.35 31 53.1 22 37.9 5 9.0 59 
Technical 2.14 ± 0.37 58 56.9 35 34.0 9 9.2 102 
Clerical 2.14 ± 0.32 58 53.5 43 39.8 7 6.7 109 
Officer 2.20 ± 0.31 70 52.0 51 38.0 13 9.7 134 
                                                                                                        Source: Author 
 
CMS (Table 7.4) shows that actors perceive themselves as having perception of 
negative reactions towards the benefit of regulatory compliance to actors and disaster 
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victims in regulatory compliance. Only 9.2 per cent of actors have a high (positive) 
perception of their reactions, with 37.1 per cent undecided. There were slightly positive 
attitudes from the chairmen that contributed 33.3 per cent from overall attitudes. Standard 
deviations show that there were few differences of perception regarding actors’ general F1 
within groups of actors. There was no statistically difference between actors’ perception of 
F1 attitude for the independent variable of Professional Status. 
 
Table 7.5: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Scores for F2 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
F2 attitude 2.36 ± 0.34 172 41.7 189 45.8 51 12.4 413 
Chairman 2.52 ± 0.35 5 51.9 1 14.8 3 33.3 9 
Manager 2.43 ± 0.36 23 38.4 29 49.2 7 12.4 59 
Technical 2.30 ± 0.38 43 42.5 48 46.7 11 10.8 102 
Clerical 2.31 ± 0.33 47 43.4 49 45.0 13 11.6 109 
Officer 2.39 ± 0.31 54 40.5 62 46.5 18 12.9 134 
                                                                                                       Source: Author 
 
CMS (Table 7.5) shows that actors perceive themselves as having perception of 
negative reactions towards the suitability of the regulations and guidelines to actors and 
disaster victims. Only 12.4 per cent of actors have a high (positive) perception of their 
reactions, with 45.8 per cent undecided. There were slightly positive attitudes from the 
chairmen that contributed 33.3 per cent from overall attitudes. Standard deviations show 
that there were few differences of perception regarding actors’ general F2 within groups of 
actors. There was no statistically significant difference between actors’ perception of F2 
attitude for the independent variable of Professional Status. 
 
7.3.2 Relationship between Actors’ Perceived Benefit of Disaster Victims’ 
Development When Included in the Decision Making (F1) and Actors’ Perceived 
Suitability of the Current MNSC Directive 20 (F2) 
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Table 7.6: Inter-Relationship between F1 and F2 
 F2 
Pearson correlation 
F1 
 
0.77 
                                                           Source: Author 
 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test). The bivariate correlation 
statistical test shows that there was a significant positive relationship at 0.01 levels between 
actors’ perceived benefit of disaster victims’ development when included in the decision 
making and their perceived suitability of the current MNSC Directive 20. Both F1 and F2 
had a strong relationship because the correlation value (0.77) is close to 1 as shown in 
Table 7.6. 
 
7.4 Actors’ Conative Component of Attitudes to Regulatory Compliance  
The conative component of attitudes is strongly shaped by the previous amount of personal 
involvement an actor has had in implementing the MNSC Directive 20. Actors assumed 
that an individual (about their colleagues and disaster victims) with positive attitude to an 
object should engage in behaviour that moves towards the attitude to comply with the 
MNSC Directive 20 if attitudes influence overt behaviour (from mean score of CMS 3.41 
and above). Those with negative attitude (from mean score of CMS 2.60 and less), should 
move away from it. The key features of analyses are listed below. Further analyses are as 
shown in Appendix 22, p.370. 
 
7.4.1 Influence of Item 31 and 32: Actors’ Support of the MNSC Directive 20 
towards the Emergency Housing Regulatory Compliance 
Multivariate tests showed that there was no statistically significant relationship between the 
background characteristics of Professional Status {Wλ = 0.98, F (8, 814) = 0.68, p> 0.05} 
for the dependent variable Q31 and Q32. Univariate F-tests showed that there was no 
statistically significant relationship between the background characteristics of Professional 
Status for the dependent variable Q31, {F (4, 408) = 0.63, p> 0.05} and Q32, {F (4, 408) = 
0.49, p> 0.05}. 
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Table 7.7: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Scores for Item 31 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
Q31 attitude 2.82 ± 0.30 100 24.2 266 64.4 47 11.4 413 
Chairman 3.11 ± 0.29 2 22.2 4 44.4 3 33.3 9 
Manager 2.76 ± 0.36 16 27.1 36 61.0 7 11.9 59 
Technical 2.76 ± 0.26 28 27.5 64 62.7 10 9.8 102 
Clerical 2.81 ± 0.31 26 23.9 73 66.9 10 9.2 109 
Officer 2.89 ± 0.27 28 20.9 89 66.4 17 12.7 134 
                                                                                                         Source: Author 
 
CMS (Table 7.7) shows that actors perceive themselves as having neutral attitudes 
towards the matter that actors were supportive of the idea of regulatory compliance. This 
was obvious since 64.4 per cent of actors were undecided about their willingness to support 
the idea of regulatory compliance. Standard deviations show that there were few 
differences of perception regarding actors’ general attitudes within groups of actors. There 
was no statistically difference between actors’ perception of actors admittance that actors 
were supportive of the idea of regulatory compliance for the independent variable of 
Professional Status.  
 
Table 7.8: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Scores for Item 32 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
Q32 attitude 2.60 ± 0.36 167 40.4 167 40.4 79 19.1 413 
Chairman 2.78 ± 0.29 5 55.6 1 11.1 3 33.3 9 
Manager 2.56 ± 0.33 24 40.7 24 40.7 11 18.6 59 
Technical 2.59 ± 0.30 39 38.2 47 46.1 16 15.7 102 
Clerical 2.54 ± 0.35 48 44.0 40 36.7 21 19.3 109 
Officer 2.63 ± 0.34 51 38.1 55 41.0 28 20.9 134 
                                                                                                         Source: Author 
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CMS (Table 7.8) shows that actors perceive themselves as having low (negative) 
acceptance that actors will accept the current regulations about to change. Only 12.6 per 
cent of actors have a high (positive) perception of acceptance. Even though undecided with 
attitudes contributed 40.4 per cent and considered almost even with the negative attitudes 
(40.4 per cent) it was still not affected by overall attitudes. Chairman was the only group 
that had high attitude to accept that actors will accept the current regulations about to 
change with 33.3 per cent positive contribution. Standard deviations show that there were 
few differences of perception regarding actors’ general attitudes within groups of actors. 
There was no statistically significant difference between actors’ perception of actors who 
admitted that actors will accept the current regulations about to change for the independent 
variable of Professional Status.  
 
7.4.2 Influence of Item no 33: The Willingness of Actors to Develop Skills towards 
the Regulatory Compliance 
There were no statistically (one way ANOVA) significant differences between the 
background characteristics of Professional Status F (4, 408) = 0.42, p> 0.05} for the 
dependent variable Q33. 
 
Table 7.9: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Scores for item 33 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
Q33 attitude 2.39 ± 0.34 199 48.2 135 32.7 79 19.1 413 
Chairman 2.89 ± 0.30 4 44.4 2 22.2 3 33.3 9 
Manager 2.47 ± 0.28 27 45.8 18 30.5 14 23.7 59 
Technical 2.35 ± 0.24 51 50.0 33 32.4 18 17.6 102 
Clerical 2.33 ± 0.36 57 52.3 34 31.2 18 16.5 109 
Officer 2.41 ± 0.32 60 44.8 48 35.8 26 19.4 134 
                                                                                                           Source: Author 
 
CMS (Table 7.9) shows that actors perceive themselves as having low (negative) 
acceptance that actors will volunteer to attend relevant in-service training on regulatory 
compliance. Only 19.1 per cent of actors have a high (positive) perception of acceptance, 
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with 32.7 per cent undecided. Chairman was the only group who had high attitude to accept 
that actors will volunteer to attend relevant in-service training on regulatory compliance 
with 33.3 per cent positive contribution. Standard deviations show that there were few 
differences of perception regarding actors’ general attitudes within groups of actors. There 
was no statistically significant difference between actors’ perception of actors who 
admitted that actors will volunteer to attend relevant in-service training on regulatory 
compliance for the independent variable of Professional Status.  
 
7.4.3 Conditions for Accepting Regulatory Compliance 
Table 7.10: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Scores for the 6 Conditions for 
Accepting Regulatory Compliance by Actors 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
General conditions 
attitudes 
2.75 ± 0.39 140 33.9 140 33.9 133 32.2 413 
Q34, If directed only 3.12 ± 0.32 105 25.4 105 25.4 203 49.2 413 
Q35, Disaster victims 
without  
disruptive behaviour 
2.93 ± 0.37 107 25.9 145 35.1 161 38.9 413 
Q36, If specialist  
support is available 
3.25 ± 0.37 81 19.6 84 20.3 248 60.0 413 
Q37, Voluntarily  
accept without changes 
2.69 ± 0.33 88 21.3 288 69.7 37 8.9 413 
Q38, If given incentives 2.38 ± 0.33 196 47.5 135 32.7 82 19.9 413 
Q39, accept even  
affects annual appraisal 
2.15 ± 0.31 262 63.4 83 20.1 68 16.5 413 
                                                                                                         Source: Author 
 
CMS (Table 7.10) shows that actors perceive themselves as being undecided in 
cited conditions towards the implementation of regulatory compliance. Even though 
negative perception of attitudes contributed only 33.9 per cent and considered almost equal 
to the undecided (33.9 per cent), it is still did not affect overall attitudes. CMS (Table 7.10) 
also shows that of the six conditions for accepting regulatory compliance by actors, the 
highest CMS was for ‘the availability of relevant specialist support’. This shows that 
generally actors would be willing to accept the implementation of regulatory compliance if 
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the relevant specialist support is available. Percentage scores show that 60.0 per cent of 
actors would accept regulatory compliance with specialist support. The second highest 
CMS for the acceptance of the implementation by actors was that if they were directed to 
do so by the relevant authorities. Percentage scores show that 49.2 per cent of actors were 
positive that they were willing to implement regulatory compliance only if directed. Actors 
did not have a problem accepting disaster victims only without disruptive behaviour as part 
of their condition in accepting the implementation of regulatory compliance. Percentage 
scores show that 38.9 per cent agreed that they will positively welcome disaster victims 
only without disruptive behaviour. Very few actors were willing voluntarily to accept 
regulatory compliance without changes in regulations or guidelines. Only 8.9 per cent 
voluntarily accept regulatory compliance with present regulations and guidelines. Most of 
them were undecided (69.7 per cent) to volunteer themselves towards the implementation 
of regulatory compliance. The least cited conditions were actors who will only accept 
regulatory compliance if given incentives and actors will accept regulatory compliance 
even though it will affect annual appraisal. Most of the actors expressed negative attitudes 
regarding both of these two conditions. 
  The chairmen most preferred to accept regulatory compliance if the specialist 
support is available, then followed by: (1) if they were directed only by the authorised 
parties, (2) disaster victims without disruptive behaviour only to be included under their 
supervision, (3) willingly accept without changes to regulations and guidelines, (4) 
incentives will be given and (5) their annual appraisal affected. 
 
7.5 General Attitudes of Actors towards Regulatory Compliance Implementation 
Multivariate tests showed that there were statistically significant differences between the 
background characteristics of Professional Status {Wλ = 0.95, F (12, 1074) = 1.83, p< 
0.05} for the dependent variable of three components of attitudes (cognitive, affective and 
conative). 
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Table 7.11: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Scores for Actors’ General Attitudes 
and Three Components of Attitude to Regulatory Compliance 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
General attitudes 2.45 ± 0.33 199 48.2 140 33.8 74 18.0 413 
General cognitive 
attitude 
2.32 ± 0.44 211 51.0 147 35.6 55 13.4 413 
General affective 
attitude 
2.42 ± 0.28 218 52.7 129 31.2 66 16.1 413 
General conative 
attitude 
2.70 ± 0.29 145 35.1 156 37.9 112 27.0 413 
                                                                                                        Source: Author 
 
Table 7.11 shows that generally actors involved in the survey have broadly negative 
(2.45 is in Group 1) attitudes towards the proposed implementation of regulatory 
compliance in the MNSC Directive 20 into Malaysian Emergency Management 
Department. The percentage of actors with negative general attitudes was 48.2 per cent. 
Followed by non-committal attitudes (33.8 per cent) and only 18.0 per cent of actor’s 
exhibit positive attitudes to regulatory compliance. Standard deviations show that there 
were few differences of perception regarding actors’ general attitudes within groups of 
actors. 
 
7.5.1 Influence of Actors' Background Characteristics (independent variable) on 
General Attitudes to Regulatory Compliance 
Statistically (independent t-test or one way ANOVA), there were significant differences in 
actors' general attitudes to regulatory compliance for the independent variables of: (1) 
Professional Status { F (4, 408) = 7.15, p< 0.05}, (2) Attended In-service Courses {F (1, 
411) = 7.00, p< 0.05}, (3) Availability of Trained Actors {F (1, 411) = 6.32, p< 0.05}, (4) 
Actors to look after Regulatory Compliance {F (1, 411) = 6.11, p< 0.05} and (5) 
Department Related to the Scene of Emergency Housing {F (1, 411) = 6.03, p< 0.05}. 
There were no significant differences on actors' general attitudes towards regulatory 
compliance for the independent variables of: (1) Gender {F (1, 411) = 1.79, p> 0.05}, (2) 
Years Services {F (4, 408) = 2.12, p> 0.05}, (3) Level Control F (2, 410) = 2.52, p> 0.05 
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and (4) Department has Specific Regulation towards Regulatory Compliance F (1, 411) = 
0.86, p> 0.05. 
 
Table 7.12: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Scores for Actors’ General Attitudes 
and Background Characteristic 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
a. Gender 
Male 2.49 ± 0.33 137 47.1 100 34.5 54 18.5 291 
Female 2.40 ± 0.33 62 51.0 39 32.1 21 16.9 122 
b. Number of Years Working 
Under 5 2.61 ± 0.32 47 58.5 30 36.8 18 21.7 81 
6 to 10 2.41 ± 0.34 52 49.5 36 33.5 18 17.0 106 
11 to 15 2.47 ± 0.32 29 48.0 21 33.6 11 18.4 61 
16 to 20 2.34 ± 0.32 44 53.9 25 31.4 12 14.7 81 
More than 20 2.47 ± 0.33 40 47.8 28 33.7 16 18.5 84 
c. Professional Status 
Chairman 2.50 ± 0.32 5 49.6 1 15.7 3 34.8 9 
Manager 2.46 ± 0.33 129 47.6 20 35.6 10 17.8 59 
Technical 2.42 ± 0.33 51 49.5 34 33.6 17 16.8 102 
Clerical 2.43 ± 0.34 54 49.3 37 34.0 18 16.8 109 
Officer 2.50 ± 0.33 62 46.6 46 34.6 25 18.8 134 
d. Level of Control 
National 2.53 ± 0.33 25 45.8 19 35.8 10 18.4 54 
State 2.51 ± 0.33 93 45.9 70 36.7 39 19.4 202 
District 2.37 ± 0.32 82 52.1 50 31.9 25 15.9 157 
e. Attended In-service Courses 
Yes 2.56 ± 0.32 74 43.9 60 35.3 35 20.8 169 
No 2.39 ± 0.34 125 51.2 80 32.7 39 16.0 244 
f. Availability of Trained Actors 
Yes 2.55 ± 0.33 77 44.3 61 34.8 36 20.9 174 
No 2.40 ± 0.33 122 51.1 79 33.0 38 15.8 239 
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Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
g. Actors to look after Regulatory Compliance 
Yes 2.55 ± 0.33 78 44.3 62 35.2 35 20.5 175 
No 2.40 ± 0.33 122 51.2 78 32.8 38 16.1 238 
h. Department Related to the Scene of Emergency Housing 
Yes 2.56 ± 0.32 76 44.3 59 34.4 37 21.2 172 
No 2.39 ± 0.34 123 51.0 80 33.3 38 15.6 241 
i. Department has Specific Regulation towards Regulatory Compliance 
Yes 2.44 ± 0.31 70 50.0 45 32.5 24 17.5 139 
No 2.47 ± 0.35 130 47.3 94 34.4 50 18.2 274 
                                                                                                        Source: Author 
 
Actors’ CMS showed (as shown in Table 7.12) that for groups of independent 
variables of: (1) Professional status, (2) Attended in-service courses, (3) Availability of 
Trained Actors, (4) Actors to look after Regulatory Compliance and (5) Department 
Related to the Scene of Emergency Housing had influenced negative general attitudes 
towards regulatory compliance. However, chairmen in Professional Status group had 
slightly positive attitudes to regulatory compliance because 34.8 per cent of them had 
positive attitudes.  
 
7.6 Relationship between Actors’ Three Components of Attitudes (cognitive, 
affective and conative) towards Regulatory Compliance 
Table 7.13: Inter-Relationship between Cognitive, Affective and Conative 
Components of Attitudes 
 Cognitive Affective 
Pearson correlation 
Cognitive 
Affective 
Conative 
 
 
0.87 
-0.35 
 
 
 
-0.38 
                                                                               Source: Author 
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Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test). The bivariate correlation 
statistical test shows that there was a significant positive relationship at 0.01 levels between 
cognitive and affective attitudes. But it was a significant negative relationship at 0.01 levels 
between both attitudes to conative attitudes. However the three attitudes had a strong 
relationship because the correlation value (0.87, -0.35 and -0.38) was close to 1 as shown in 
Table 7.13. 
 
7.7 Relationship between Actors’ Perceived Ability to Apply (K2) to the Affective 
Component of Attitudes (Section B) and Willingness to Support the Implementation 
of Regulatory Compliance (item 31) 
Table 7.14: Inter-Relationship between K2, Affective and Q31  
 K2 Affective 
Pearson correlation 
K2 
Affective 
Q31 
 
 
0.87 
-0.49 
 
 
 
-0.50 
                                                                                 Source: Author 
 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test). The bivariate correlation 
statistical test shows that there was a significant positive relationship at 0.01 levels between 
actors’ perceived ability to apply and affective attitudes to regulatory compliance. But it 
was a significant negative relationship at 0.01 levels between both K2 and affective attitude 
to willingness to support the implementation of regulatory compliance (Q31). However the 
three (K2, affective and Q31) had a strong relationship because the correlation value (0.87, 
-0.49 and -0.50) was close to 1 as shown in Table 7.14.  
 
7.8 Open-Ended Items  
Included in the survey questionnaire were two open-ended items. Actors were asked to 
express their view on Q40 (views on the MNSC Directive 20 towards Regulatory 
Compliance in Emergency Housing) and Q41 (changes need to be made at the department 
level before implementing regulatory compliance). 
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7.8.1 Item 40: Views on the MNSC Directive 20 towards Regulatory Compliance in 
Emergency Housing 
Table 7.15: Frequency for the Three Categories of Responses for Item 40 Based on 
Professional Statuses 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage 
 Disagreed Undecided Agreed 
Chairman 6 2 1 
Manager 43 10 67 
Technical 74 16 12 
Clerical 78 18 13 
Officer 96 22 16 
Total 297 68 48 
% 66.7 22.2 11.1 
                                                                                                        Source: Author 
 
Percentage of the actors (as shown in Table 7.15), 66.7 per cent (6) was disagreed 
with the regulatory compliance plan. 22.2 per cent (2) were undecided and 11.1 per cent (1) 
were agreed with the plan as shown in Table 7.15. The percentage of managers who 
disagreed with the plan was 72.9 per cent (43), while 16.9 per cent (10) managers were 
undecided and 10.2 per cent (6) were agreed with it. The percentage of technical staff 
members who disagreed with regulatory compliance implementation was 72.5 per cent 
(74). Of these technical staff members, 15.7 per cent (16) were undecided and only 11.8 per 
cent (12) were agreed about the implementation. The percentage of clerical staff members 
who disagreed with the regulatory compliance was 71.6 per cent (78), 16.5 per cent (18) of 
these actors were undecided and only 11.9 agreed. Meanwhile, 71.6 per cent (96) of 
officers were disagreed about the implementation, 16.4 per cent undecided and 11.9 per 
cent (16) were agreed about the implementation. 
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Table 7.16: Actors’ Reasons for Disagreeing with the Regulatory Compliance  
Reasons Number 
of 
Actors 
 
% 
1. Regulatory compliance would disrupt the current norms of the working 
process 
2. Regulatory compliance will increase actors’ workload 
3. Regulatory compliance will have negative effect on actors and other 
disaster victims’ adaptation 
4. Actors do not have the appropriate skills in emergency housing and to 
manage disaster victims 
5. Disaster victims need specialised actors in emergency management to 
handle them 
6. Disaster victims would not be able to cope with adaptation process 
7. Disaster victims’ group size is too large to support the adaptation 
process 
8. Disaster victims would be discriminated and victimised by other 
disaster victims 
9. Disaster victims would be demoralised if included in disaster victims’ 
group 
10. Regulatory compliance is difficult to implement because: 
a. Disruptive behaviours in disaster victims; 
b. Appraisal pressures; 
c. Negative acceptance of actors; 
d. Insufficient resources; 
e. Negative acceptance of disaster victims 
11. Regulation and guidelines are unsuitable for actors and disaster victims 
12. Disaster victims are not interested in being included in disaster victims’ 
group 
13. There are no working assistants to help actors involved in regulatory 
compliance 
 
 
70 
46 
 
41 
 
37 
 
35 
33 
 
25 
 
21 
 
19 
 
15 
5 
3 
2 
1 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
19.7 
12.9 
 
11.5 
 
10.4 
 
9.8 
9.3 
 
7.0 
 
5.9 
 
5.3 
7.3 
 
 
 
 
 
0.3 
 
0.3 
 
0.3 
                                                                                                       Source: Author 
 
Some of the actors gave reasons more than one as shown in Table 7.16. The most 
cited reason among actors who disagreed with the regulatory compliance was the 
perception that regulatory compliance would disrupt the normal routine of working process 
(19.7 per cent). This was followed by the perceptions that regulatory compliance would: (1) 
increase actors’ workloads (12.9 per cent) and (2) have a negative effect on actors and other 
victims’ adaptation (11.5 per cent). The fourth most cited reason was the view that actors 
do not have the required skills in emergency housing and to manage disaster victims (10.4 
per cent) and the fifth was the perception that disaster victims need specialised actors to 
look after them (9.8 per cent). This was followed by the reason of disaster victims who 
would not be able to cope with adaptation (9.3 per cent), disaster victims’ group size is too 
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large to support the adaptation process in a disaster victims’ group (7 per cent), disaster 
victims would be discriminated and victimised by other disaster victims (5.9 per cent), 
disaster victims would be demoralised if included in disaster victims’ group (5.3 per cent), 
regulatory compliance is difficult to implement (7.3 per cent), regulation and guidelines are 
unsuitable for actors and disaster victims (0.3 per cent), disaster victims are not interested 
in being included in disaster victims’ group (0.3 per cent) and there are no working 
assistants to help actors involved in regulatory compliance (0.3 per cent). 
 Actors who were undecided used ‘if’ and ‘but’ when expressing their views to item 
40. The ‘if’ cited by these actors are as in Table 7.17 and ‘but’ is as in Table 7.18. 
 
Table 7.17: Reasons Cited by Actors who Undecided with the Plan to Implement 
Regulatory Compliance 
                                                                                                           Source: Author 
 
Table 7.17 shows that there were categories of ‘if’, cited by actors who were 
undecided about the plan to implement regulatory compliance. The two most common ‘ifs’ 
were: (1) if the department is well informed about the process to implement regulatory 
compliance (15.5 per cent) and (2) if actors are given training in emergency management 
(15.5 per cent). This was followed by appropriate resourcing is made available on site (9 
per cent), disaster victims included in disaster victims’ group with certain criteria (33.3 per 
cent), regulatory compliance involves non-religious matters only (12 per cent), all actors in 
The ‘if’ cited by actors who were undecided with the plan to implement regulatory 
compliance 
Agree with the plan ‘if’: Number % 
1. Departments are given extensive information on regulatory 
compliance implementation process 
2. Actors are given training in emergency management 
3. Appropriate resourcing is made available on site 
4. Disaster victims included in disaster victims’ group: 
a. Do not have a behavioural problem; 
b. Have the prerequisite skills (are ready); 
c. Are psychologically able; 
d. Have moderate difficulties 
5. Regulatory compliance involves non-religious matters only 
6. All actors in the department are willing to co-operate in the 
regulatory compliance programme 
7. The implementation of regulatory compliance is properly 
planned 
 
5 
5 
3 
 
4 
3 
2 
2 
4 
 
3 
 
1 
 
 
15.5 
15.5 
9.0 
33.3 
 
 
 
 
12.0 
 
9.0 
 
3.0 
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the department are willing to co-operate in the regulatory compliance programme (9 per 
cent) and the implementation of regulatory compliance is properly planned (3 per cent). 
 
Table 7.18: Reasons Cited by Actors Who Undecided with the Plan to Implement 
Regulatory Compliance 
The ‘but’ cited by actors who undecided with the plan to implement regulatory 
compliance 
Agreed with the plan ‘but’: Number % 
1. Difficult to implement because: 
a. Disaster victims have behavioural problem; 
b. Disaster victims’ group is too large 
2. Regulatory compliance will increase actors’ workload 
3. Regulatory compliance implementation needs to be planned 
carefully 
4. Depends on the types of disaster victims difficulties 
5. Regulatory compliance will benefit only some actors and disaster 
victims 
6. Disaster victims: 
a. Have psychological problems; 
b. Will develop traumatic problems 
7. Department do not have the appropriate resources in emergency 
housing and to handle disaster victims 
8. Actors are not trained in emergency management and to manage 
disaster victims 
9. Regulatory compliance will take time to succeed 
 
 
6 
6 
6 
 
6 
4 
 
4 
 
3 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
3 
27.3 
 
 
13.6 
 
13.6 
9.0 
 
9.0 
 
6.8 
4.5 
 
4.5 
 
4.5 
6.8 
                                                                                                 Source: Author 
 
Table 7.18 shows that there were categories of ‘but’ cited by actors who were 
undecided about the plan to implement regulatory compliance. The first was difficulties to 
implement (27.3 per cent); regulatory compliance will increase actors’ workload (13.6 per 
cent); regulatory compliance implementation needs to be planned carefully (13.6 per cent); 
depends on the types of disaster victims difficulties (9 per cent); regulatory compliance will 
benefit only some actors and disaster victims (9 per cent); disaster victims have 
psychological problems (6.8 per cent) and will develop traumatic problems (4.5 per cent); 
department do not have the appropriate resources in emergency housing and to handle 
disaster victims (4.5 per cent); actors are not trained in emergency management and to 
manage disaster victims (4.5 per cent); and the last one was regulatory compliance will take 
time to succeed (6.8 per cent). 
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Table 7.19: Reasons Cited by Actors Who Agreed with the Plan to Implement 
Regulatory Compliance 
Reasons Number % 
1. Regulatory compliance would help in the realisation of the 
‘caring society’ 
2. Regulatory compliance would promote and develop self-esteem 
in actors and disaster victims 
3. Regulatory compliance is in line with the national philosophy of 
equal opportunities 
4. Regulatory compliance would make it easier for disaster victims 
to accommodate themselves in actors-disaster victims’ group 
5. A good idea (no reasons provided) 
6. Regulatory compliance would promote adaptation atmosphere in 
disaster victims 
 
 
16 
 
15 
 
8 
 
5 
4 
 
3 
 
31.4 
 
29.4 
 
15.7 
 
9.8 
7.8 
 
5.8 
                                                                                              Source: Author 
 
Tables 7.19 shows the reasons why actors agreed with the idea to implement 
regulatory compliance. Most frequently cited reasons by those who agreed were that 
regulatory compliance would help to create a more ‘caring society’ (31.4 per cent) and 
regulatory compliance would help to develop self-esteem of actors and disaster victims 
(29.4 per cent). This was followed by regulatory compliance, which is in line with the 
national philosophy of equal opportunities (15.7 per cent), regulatory compliance would 
make it easier for disaster victims to accommodate themselves in actors-disaster victims’ 
group (9.8 per cent), a good idea (no reasons provided) (7.8 per cent) and the last one was 
that regulatory compliance would promote adaptation atmosphere in disaster victims (5.8 
per cent). 
 
7.8.2 Item 41: Changes need to be made at the Department Level before Regulatory 
Compliance Implementation 
A total of 339 actors responded to item 41 of the questionnaires. 315 actors had made 
recommendations for change. Some of them gave more than one suggestion. However, 24 
actors had advocated that no changes were needed because they were totally against the 
plan towards the implementation. Frequency of actors who were interpreted as 
recommending changes is included in the Table 7.20. 
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Table 7.20: Frequency of Changes or Actions Recommended by Actors Prior to 
Regulatory Compliance Implementation 
          Source: Author 
 
Changes or actions recommended Frequency % 
1.   Actors should be given in-service training 
2.  The department should be articulate on the rationale of implementing 
regulatory compliance 
3 All department involved in the regulatory compliance programme should 
be provided with appropriate physical resources and working equipment 
4 The members in disaster victims’ group needs to be reduced to enable 
actors to attend to adaptation needed by the disaster victims appropriately 
5 All departments involved in the regulatory compliance programme should 
be provided with the service of relevant specialist to act as adviser or 
consultant to actors 
6 The post of actors’ assistant is created in the department involved in the 
MNSC Directive 20 to support actors toward regulatory compliance 
7 Incentives are given to actors involved in regulatory compliance 
programme 
8 Certain aspects of the current MNSC Directive 20 should be customised to 
ensure that disaster victims may have wider access to relevant information 
and other facilities 
9 Disaster victims should be ready (mentally and emotionally) before being 
included in actors and disaster victims’ group 
10 Actors’ workload need to be reduced 
11 Attainment of individual actors’ appraisal should not be the sole basis of 
department yearly appraisal or evaluation 
12 Credit should be given to the department in its yearly appraisal or 
evaluation for their good practice in regulatory compliance 
13 Everyone in the department involved must be participated in the 
programme 
14 Continuous evaluation and assistance to the programme at district, state 
and national levels 
15 Only actors interested in the programme should be involved in the 
regulatory compliance programme 
16 Acknowledge and promote the benefits of regulatory compliance to all 
communities and relatives 
17 Actors should be given easy access to the programme information and 
facilities 
18 Different types of actors’ evaluation 
19 Freedom for actors to work without interference from NGO’s 
20 Provide more opportunities to other related department to volunteer to get 
involved 
21 Increased financial support to department involved in regulatory 
compliance programme 
22 The number of disaster victims included in disaster victims’ group should 
be limited 
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151 
 
122 
 
38 
 
 
24 
 
22 
 
21 
 
 
21 
 
20 
11 
 
11 
 
8 
 
7 
 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
2 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
31.0 
 
21.6 
 
17.5 
 
5.4 
 
 
3.4 
 
3.1 
 
3.0 
 
 
3.0 
 
2.9 
1.6 
 
1.6 
 
1.1 
 
1.0 
 
0.6 
 
0.6 
 
0.6 
 
0.6 
0.3 
0.3 
 
0.3 
 
0.3 
 
0.3 
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 Actors suggested (as shown in Table 7.20) that actors should be given in-service 
training (31 per cent); the department should be articulate on the rationale of implementing 
regulatory compliance (21.6 per cent); and all departments involved in the regulatory 
compliance programme should be provided with the appropriate physical resources (e.g. 
access to information, site office and suitable dressings) and working equipment (e.g. tools, 
first aid kit and furniture) (17.5 per cent).  
 Besides those mentioned, actors also wanted to see the members in disaster victims’ 
group needs to be reduced to enable actors to attend to adaptation needed by the disaster 
victims appropriately (5.4 per cent). All departments involved in the regulatory compliance 
programme should be provided with the service of a relevant specialist to act as adviser or 
consultant to actors (3.4 per cent), the post of actors’ assistant is created in the department 
involved in the MNSC Directive 20 to support actors towards regulatory compliance (3.1 
per cent). Moreover, incentives are given to actors involved in regulatory compliance 
programme (3 per cent). Certain aspects of the current MNSC Directive 20 should also be 
customised to ensure that disaster victims may have wider access to information and other 
facilities (3 per cent). Actors suggested that disaster victims should be ready (mentally and 
emotionally) before being included in actors and disaster victims’ group (2.9 per cent). 
They also wanted to see that actors’ workload is reduced (1.6 per cent), attainment of 
individual actors’ appraisal should not be the sole basis of department yearly appraisal or 
evaluation (1.6 per cent), credit should be given to the department in its yearly appraisal or 
evaluation for their good practice in regulatory compliance (1.1 per cent) and everyone in 
the department involved must be participated in the programme (1 per cent).  
 Actors also suggested that continuous evaluation and assistance to the programme at 
district, state and national levels (0.6 per cent), only actors interested in the programme 
should be involved in the regulatory compliance programme (0.6 per cent), acknowledge 
and promote the benefits of regulatory compliance to all communities and relatives in 
regulatory compliance (0.6 per cent), actors should be given easy access to the programme 
information and facilities (0.6 per cent), different types of actors’ evaluation (i.e. not for 
appraisal only rather to other personal achievement) (0.3 per cent). Actors also wanted to 
see freedom for actors to work without interference from NGO’s (0.3 per cent), provide 
more opportunities to other related departments in which to volunteer and get involved (0.3 
per cent), increased financial support to department involved in regulatory compliance 
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programme (0.3 per cent) and the number of disaster victims included in disaster victims’ 
group should be limited (0.3 per cent). 
 
7.9  Conclusion 
The findings from the questionnaires showed that actors had broadly negative attitudes 
towards regulatory implementation. These negative general attitudes reflect negative 
cognitive and affective components of attitudes to regulatory compliance, although the 
conative component of attitudes is neutral. They were unsure about their reactions towards 
the implementation of regulatory compliance but negatively thought about their level of 
knowledge and also their internal feelings (reasons are revealed in qualitative analysis 
section 8.2.1, p.228; 8.2.2, p.231; 8.2.3, p.231; 8.2.4, p.232 and 8.2.5, p.238: they know 
very little about the regulatory compliance implementation proposed by the Prime 
Minister’s Department, information restricted to specific actors only and rarely discussed).  
 However the tests did show that there were strong significant positive relationships 
between the three components of attitudes. The three components influenced the way actors 
react to their perception towards the implementation of regulatory compliance. Statistically, 
the background characteristic that seems to have significant influence on actors’ attitudes to 
regulatory compliance were the Professional Status, Actors Attended In-service Courses, 
Department that had Trained Actors, Willingness to Attend Trainings, Official Care in 
Regulatory Compliance and Experience in Emergency Housing. There were no significant 
differences in actors’ general attitudes to regulatory compliance based on their background 
characteristics of: (1) Gender, (2) Number of Years Working, (3) Level of Control and (4) 
Department has Specific Regulation towards Regulatory Compliance. Different Gender, 
Experience, Mechanism and Availability of Specific Regulation had no influence on the 
implementation of regulatory compliance. Hence, they provided thirteen reasons for 
opposing regulatory compliance implementation in their department. 
 Knowledge and abilities instrument is working in parallel (reasons are revealed in 
qualitative analysis section 8.2.4, p.232; 8.2.5, p.238; and 8.2.6, p.239: lack of knowledge, 
inexperienced and lack of training). The tests show that there were strong significant 
positive relationships between both elements. They will show high ability to comply if they 
had knowledge regarding the MNSC Directive 20. Statistically, background characteristics 
(e.g. Gender, Professional Statuses and Level of Control) have influenced actors’ abilities 
221 
 
to comply but the knowledge of actors not influenced by these background characteristics. 
Generally, actors perceived themselves as unsure about their level of knowledge in 
regulatory compliance in the MNSC Directive 20 and had low confidence of their own 
ability to comply with regulations and guidelines. Only chairmen had high confidence in 
their own skills to apply regulatory compliance.  
 Specifically, actors at the national and state level considered themselves as positive 
but unsure about their knowledge in emergency management. Actors at the national and 
state level however perceived themselves as negative and undecided about their abilities to 
implement regulatory compliance (findings in quantitative and qualitative are differ as 
shown in Table 7.1, p.200 and 7.2, p.201 due to actors’ involvement are more in 
administration work in the quantitative samples compared to disaster victims engagement 
in the qualitative samples. 35 per cent of actors in qualitative phase were more positive 
about their own abilities as shown in Table 8.9, p.428 and discussed in section 8.2.4, p.232: 
they never expected to do so and not ready). Actors clearly admitted a lack of knowledge 
and confidence towards their own abilities in emergency management. Knowledge and 
abilities of actors contributed to the positive development of the department of:  
1. Department Related to the Scene of Emergency Housing; 
2. Department has Specific Regulation towards Regulatory Compliance.  
 
 The knowledge and abilities of actors had no influence, whether the department was 
related to emergency housing or not, or if the department has specific responsibility for 
regulatory compliance or not.  
 The tests show that strong significant positive relationships of both benefit (F1) and 
suitability (F2) of regulations and guidelines in the MNSC Directive 20. They perceived 
that the programme is suitable if it is benefiting both actors and disaster victims. Actors 
perceived themselves as against the fact that regulatory compliance would benefit them and 
the disaster victims. They were not agreed that present MNSC Directive 20 is suitable for 
them and disaster victims (reasons are shown in qualitative analysis section 8.3.3, p.251; 
8.3.4, p.252; 8.3.5, p.254 and 8.3.6, p.256: the programme only benefiting the department 
level and the actors felt that their daily workload still increased from time to time). 
Different levels in Malaysian emergency mechanism benefited from regulatory compliance 
but the MNSC Directive 20 is not suitable to implement at every level. The statement of 
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suitability of regulatory compliance implementation was confirmed by the actors from 
national, state and districts respectively. Statistically, background characteristics of actors 
have no influence on the benefit and suitability of regulations and guidelines.  
 Statistically, background characteristics of actors did not influence actor’s support 
to the MNSC Directive 20. However, the tests did show that there were strong significant 
positive relationships amongst the actors:  
1. Ability to apply (K2);  
2. Their feeling, moods, emotions and sympathetic nervous system (Section B);  
3. Willingness to support the implementation of regulatory compliance.  
 
 However, the significant relationship is negative between both K2 and affective 
attitude towards their willingness to support the implementation of regulatory compliance 
(Q31). Even if actors’ internal feeling were positive and were in high ability to implement 
regulatory compliance, they would prefer not to support the implementation of regulatory 
compliance because there was a negative correlation between actors’ ability-affective 
component and willingness to support the implementation of regulatory compliance. 
However, they showed that actors were generally not supportive of the idea of regulatory 
compliance. Actors would prefer not to attend in service training even if their:  
1. Department had Actors to look after Regulatory Compliance;  
2. Department Related to the Scene of Emergency Housing;  
3. Department has Specific Regulation towards Regulatory Compliance because (the 
support and willingness to develop skills towards the regulatory compliance had no 
influence by these background characteristics).  
  
 They also reasoned that most of the actors were unsure whether to support the 
implementation of regulatory compliance, but clearly object towards training. Thus, most of 
department levels had a lack of actors trained in the field of emergency housing. However 
the chairmen were positive that actors were willing to support and attend training 
themselves to develop knowledge and skills in emergency management, but not all of them. 
 Actor’s knowledge (K1), feelings (affective component) and willingness to attend 
in-service training (Q31) had a strong relationship. The significant relationship is negative 
between both K1 and affective attitude towards their willingness to support the 
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implementation of regulatory compliance (Q31). If actors’ internal feelings were positive 
that they had a high ability to implement regulatory compliance, they would prefer not to 
attend relevant in-service training because there was a negative correlation in actors’ 
willingness to attend relevant in-service training. 
 The findings from Q10 and Q13 of the questionnaires showed that there was a 
conflict between actors' perceptions of the 'rights of disaster victims in regulatory 
compliance' and the 'benefit of rights, disaster victims might get from the MNSC Directive 
20’. The actors perceived themselves as understanding the concept of regulatory 
compliance (Q1) and the implementation (Q2) with the positive perceptions (CMS 3.73) 
and (CMS 3.73) respectively. However, they perceived themselves as having negative 
perceptions toward the matter of 'rights of the disaster victims in regulatory compliance'. 
They were slightly neutral on the 'benefit of rights that disaster victims might get from the 
MNSC Directive 20’. They also denied that regulatory compliance might increase the 
relationship between actors and disaster victims. Actors agreed that the disaster victims do 
extend to the rights of equal opportunities in regulatory compliance with the MNSC 
Directive 20.  
 Statistically, disaster victims’ participations did increase actors working workloads 
and actors’ background characteristics did influenced working responsibility if regulatory 
compliance was implemented. Different Professional Status’ had different loads of 
responsibilities. However background characteristics did not influenced actors’ perceptions 
of disaster victims’ suitability to be included into the process of regulatory compliance. 
Most actors were not sure whether it is suitable to get the disaster victims to participate in 
the process of regulatory compliance. They highlighted that it was not appropriate to 
involve disaster victims with disruptive behaviour but might tolerate the participation if the 
disaster victims had knowledge, with or without experience, worked as a group and the 
interaction will not create complications. Actors admitted that disaster victims should not 
be isolated but were unsure whether to let the responsibility for handling disaster victims 
for the specialist only. Actors have a responsibility for the education of victims in the 
process of regulatory compliance but were unwilling to carry responsibility for educating 
the disaster victims due to the present conditions (unqualified). 
 The findings for conditions for accepting regulatory compliance showed that actors 
may be persuaded to accept regulatory implementation, if certain conditions are met by the 
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Prime Minister’s Department. The most dominant condition was the need for specialists 
support to be provided who are trained in emergency housing and emergency management. 
This was also confirmed by chairmen; managers and technical staff members; and clerical 
staff members and officers who agreed that actors would be willing to give regulatory 
compliance a chance if actors were given specialist support. Actors would also positively 
accept regulatory compliance if they are given direct orders from their superiors and 
accepted only disaster victims without disruptive behaviour. The findings also showed that 
actors would not accept regulatory compliance voluntarily unless there are some changes in 
working with incentives and their contribution will be assessed in annual appraisal (reasons 
are revealed in qualitative analysis section 8.4.4, p.267; 8.4.5, p.268; 8.4.6, p.269 and 8.4.7, 
p.271). 
 Actors perceived themselves as having negative capability towards their own 
understanding and knowledge (cognitive) in regulatory compliance. Variables that 
contributed to their own attitudes were different gender, how many with experience worked 
in the department, which level do they serve, whether they attended the training or not, 
whether the department has trained actors, whether the department has actors handling 
regulatory compliance or whether the department related to the scene of emergency housing 
or not. The state and district level were the mechanism level that influenced most of the 
attitudes towards their understanding and knowledge in regulatory compliance 
implementation. Actors’ Professional Status and the Department with Specific Regulation 
towards Regulatory Compliance did not influenced actors’ attitudes (understanding and 
knowledge) in regulatory compliance. 
 Actors perceived themselves as having a perception of negative reactions towards 
their own feeling, moods, emotions and sympathetic nervous system (affective) in 
regulatory compliance. Different Level of Control, Attendance to In-service Courses, 
Availability of Trained Actors in the Department, Availability of Actors to look after 
Regulatory Compliance and Department Involvement to the Scene of Emergency Housing 
contributed to the ways actors react in regulatory compliance implementation.  
 Actors perceive themselves as having a perception of a neutral behavioural response 
(conative) of attitudes in regulatory compliance. Actors’ perception of affective attitude 
resulted from their differences in Gender, Professional Status and Status of Attended In-
service Courses, but not the issue of How Long they had been Working, which Level they 
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Work, Availability of Trained Actors in Department, Availability of Actors to look after 
Regulatory Compliance, Department Related to the Scene of Emergency Housing and 
Availability of Specific Regulation in Department towards Regulatory Compliance.  
 Most of actors were disagreed over the regulatory compliance plan. The most cited 
reason among actors who disagreed with the regulatory compliance was the perception that 
regulatory compliance would disrupt the normal routine of the working process, besides 
other reasons such as workload increment, effect on actors and other disaster victims’ 
adaptation and actors working without appropriate skills. Actors who were undecided used 
‘if’ (more toward supporting the implementation) and ‘but’ (more toward against the 
implementation) for the reasons. Actors with the ‘if’, reasons were cited that they wanted to 
get more support, such as information, training and resources. Meanwhile, actors with the 
‘but’ reasons were cited that it is difficult to implement regulatory compliance due to 
disaster victims having behavioural problem, disaster victims’ group is too large, regulatory 
compliance will increase actors’ workload and needs to be planned carefully.  
Only a few actors (11.1 per cent) agreed with the idea to implement regulatory 
compliance. They cited that the MNSC Directive 20 is formulated for good reasons such as 
to help in the realisation of the ‘caring society’; would promote and develop self-esteem in 
actors and disaster victims; and is in line with the national philosophy of equal 
opportunities (National Constitution: see section 4.1, p.92). However, most of actors (82 
per cent) still wanted to see changes at the department level before regulatory compliance 
implementation even though some of them were against the implementation. The most 
cited suggestion was that actors should be given in-service training, the department should 
be articulate on the rationale of implementing regulatory compliance and all department 
involved in the regulatory compliance programme should be provided with appropriate 
physical resources and working equipments. 
 At the present stage in the MNSC Directive 20 implementation, the main issues 
were: actors not receiving enough information about the programme; the introduction of 
implementation will increase their workload due to misunderstanding; not enough 
resources; disaster victims involvement; and actors themselves are not ready due to lack of 
training. Actors suggested that actors should be given in-service training and explain more 
about rationale (see qualitative analysis section 8.2.5, p.238) of the MNSC Directive 20 
implementation and including victims in disaster victims group towards promoting ‘caring 
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feeling’ (see qualitative analysis section 8.4.2, p.264). Information about this programme 
should be done more specifically and not simply in general. 
 As a conclusion, the result indicates that if actors were knowledgeable about 
regulatory compliance and perceived themselves as having the appropriate and necessary 
skills in line of duties, they would be likely to exhibit positive feelings towards regulatory 
compliance and may then be the more willing to accept its implementation. The real fact 
was that actors were unwilling to accept regulatory compliance in the present climate. 
Actors do wish to see changes at the department level before regulatory compliance is 
implemented. Yet actors in general are also of the opinion that actors would accept 
regulatory compliance if directed by the Prime Minister’s Department. As civil servants 
actors are of course required to observe and implement the Prime Minister’s Department 
directives. Nevertheless in the light of the present research evidence there may be a need 
for careful preparation at several levels before regulatory compliance implementation. 
Careful preparation might be vital to secure maximum co-operation from the working force 
and to prevent alienation and consequent failure. As a result, the questionnaire findings 
showed that generally actors have negative attitudes to regulatory compliance. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
Qualitative Analysis 
 
“Planners need to become good ethnographers of previous local responses to disaster 
events. They need to know the history of community responses to disasters, the successes 
of previous plans, warnings, evacuations, and search and rescue efforts; and the political 
dynamics existing among the significant local institutions, neighborhoods, ethnic groups, 
social classes and leaders”. 
(Aguirre, 1995: 21-22) 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter will express qualitative analysis (consists of components of attitude: cognitive 
analysis in section 8.2, affective in section 8.3 and conative in section 8.4) with an 
emphasis in the discussion of the themes (see section 6.5.4, p.178) that emerged from the 
actors’ different level of control and profession leading to a statement of general 
conclusions. The frequencies of actors’ attitudes to the variables investigated in quantitative 
analysis were exemplified and clarified by the use of direct quotations from the essentially 
qualitative material obtained (see section 6.5.7, p.187).  
The sequences of analyses are presented according to category of components from 
cognitive, affective and conative and from the variables measured (sequence in the 
questionnaire). Actors’ perceptions were administered in sequence from positive towards 
the issue pertaining, undecided to negative [(1) affirmative about the issues being discussed 
(2) undecided on the issue and (3) negative towards the issue] in most designated level 
(national, state, district and under special body appointed by the government). For every 
question discussed, the individual actor’s reasons for having affirmative, undecided or 
negative views were coded (see Appendix 18, p.357) according to its interpretative 
similarities.  
The results of data analysis were summerised and presented as tables as shown in 
Appendix 24, p.426. These tables consist of:  
1. Professional Status; 
2. The Subject Matter; 
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3. Level Control (N: National, S: State, D: District and SB: Special Body);  
4. Frequencies; 
5. Percentages.  
 
Those who were positive about the issues in the biographical data section in the 
survey questionnaires were selected for the interviews (see section 6.5.1, p.173). The 
numbers of actors interviewed (71 respondents) are considered as significant due to their 
direct involvement in providing emergency housing in Malaysia. Conclusions were made at 
the end of this chapter that highlights the analysis.  They are correlated and presented in 
three paragraphs consisting of cognitive, affective and conative components. 
 
8.2 Cognitive Component of Attitudes to Regulatory Compliance 
The cognitive element of actor attitudes would be influenced by actors’ perceived 
knowledge of regulations in the MNSC Directive 20. This knowledge could have been 
developed through actual experience of interacting among themselves and the disaster 
victims. If the experience had been positive (affirmative about the issues being discussed), 
it could be assumed that they might have developed a positive outlook about their 
colleagues and disaster victims and they would have a favourable view of the regulatory 
compliance process. But if their experience had been negative (negative towards the issue), 
they might eventually view the concept of regulatory compliance with a negative 
perception. 
 
8.2.1 Actors Perceived Knowledge of the Regulatory Compliance under the MNSC 
Directive 20 
35 per cent of actors admitted that they received related information about the MNSC 
Directive 20. However, the biggest contribution (88 per cent) was from technical staff 
members those who claimed that their department level received some circulars from the 
Prime Minister’s Department regarding the MNSC Directive 20 (as shown in Table 8.1 in 
Appendix 24, p.426). Most of the actors (65 per cent) admitted that they never receive any 
information regarding the MNSC Directive 20. Only one out of four managers (under state 
level) reported having received such circulars. One clerical staff (under national level) and 
three clerical staff (under state level) claimed that they had read the circulars. One clerical 
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staff (under national level) who had seen these documents admitted that she could not 
remember the contents. 
 The rest of the actors interviewed claimed that they had never seen any related 
documents. Non-involvement in their department levels’ towards the MNSC Directive 20 
was the reason cited by these actors. Moreover, they revealed that administrators at 
department level had not distributed these documents to them. One manager (under national 
level) claimed that since being posted there she had never received any such documents. To 
cite her response as argued, in translated quotation in Appendix 23 (1.1), p.392 that: 
 
“When I was posted to this department level, its regulatory compliance practice was already 
established. Ever since I arrived I have never received any circulars from the Prime Minister’s 
Department or other relevant authorities concerning regulatory compliance towards disaster 
victims under resilience difficulties”. 
 
This reason was supported by the manager (under district level) who said that all 
circulars regarding emergency housing that she had received were meant for the technical 
staff members and not open to others. But the technical staff (under national level) argued 
that the documents are available in the files of department level. The clerical staff in the 
department level was reportedly not interested in reading them since the contents do not 
concern them. Technical knowledge in emergency housing is not part of their 
responsibility. 
 Therefore, even though this department level had been sent official documents on 
emergency housing, majority of the clerical staff had not read them, thus limiting the 
knowledge regarding the MNSC Directive 20. As for other actors, the knowledge of the 
MNSC Directive 20 documents in the department level might be inferred in Table 8.1 in 
Appendix 24, p.426. Almost 63 per cent had no sight of available circulars. Table 8.1 in 
Appendix 24 summarises response to the question of documents being circulate to the 
department in Disaster Management Mechanism in Malaysia. To quote from one clerical 
staff (under national level) as argued, in translated quotation in Appendix 23 (1.1), p.392 
that: 
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“I am not sure the department level has any circulars concerning the department level towards the 
MNSC Directive 20. It was never discussed before. Maybe because of I am not an emergency 
housing actor”. 
 
8.2.1.1 The Intention of Prime Minister’s Department towards Regulatory 
Compliance  
Actors were asked about the intention of the Prime Minister’s Department towards 
regulatory compliance. Actors interviewed claimed that all departments are already 
applying rules and regulation according to the circular. A total of 38 actors (54 per cent) 
replied that they accepted this implementation as a good step in providing emergency 
housing. To quote from one manager (under national level) as argued, in translated 
quotation in Appendix 23 (1.1.1), p.392 that: 
 
“After the Highland Tower tragedy in the 90s the department level decided after consultation with 
our technical staff to straighten the regulations in developing new development even in providing 
emergency housing. Main regulation to be applied are Land Conservation Act, Environmental 
Quality Act 1974, Local Government Act 1976, Road, Drainage and Building Act and Occupational 
Safety and Health Act will definitely become the main reference”. 
 
10 of the actors (14 per cent) expressed mixed feeling about the implementation. 
One technical staff (under national level) said that, even though the purpose was good, it 
was not properly implemented after disaster occurred. Translated quotation as argued, is as 
shown in Appendix 23 (1.1.1), p.392 that: 
 
“What we did was to place selected regulation according to the resources available because on the 
scene of disaster everything has to be done fast and unfortunately we have to put the regulation 
aside. For example we have to put many disaster victims in one hall and it is cramped. We have to 
wait for quite sometime until other resources arrived”.  
 
23 actors (32 per cent) did not think it was a good idea as shown in the summaries 
Table 8.2 as shown in Appendix 24, p.426. One of the clerical staff (under national level) 
did not think the implementation could happen because practically it is impossible. He 
argued, as shown in translated quotation in Appendix 23 (1.1.1), p.393 that: 
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“The intension is good but the implementation for totally complied towards regulatory and 
guidelines is impossible”. 
 
8.2.2 Actors’ Understanding of Regulatory Compliance in Malaysia 
Actors were asked to express their understanding of the term regulatory compliance. 62 per 
cent of actors familiar about the concept of regulatory compliance as listed in Table 8.3 in 
Appendix 24, p.426. They were all exposed to the practice of regulatory compliance in 
training before being appointed as government officers. There are four groups of 
interpretations and all of them are consistent with the directions of the national civil service 
purposes. Most of the actors described regulatory compliance as the efforts of personnel in 
department of agencies to comply with relevant regulations. The rest of them described 
how regulatory compliance is the responsibility of their agencies that should ensure that 
their activities are in compliance with all applicable federal, state and local laws and 
regulations; agencies should also ensure that all staff members are appropriately credited 
for the functions they will be performing; and agencies should be aware of and comply 
with, any state or local requirements related to the provisions or regulations. However, a 
total of 27 actors (38 per cent) replied that they either had not heard of regulatory 
compliance or had no understanding of the types of compliance it refers to under the 
MNSC Directive 20. 
 
8.2.3 Perceived Knowledge of Actors by the Term Emergency Housing 
All actors understood the term emergency housing as shown in Table 8.4 in Appendix 24, 
p.427. Even though there is no specific definition in the MNSC Directive 20 regarding the 
term emergency housing, actors were able to interpret according to their experience and 
exposure in trainings. There were five types of interpretation given by the actors. 55 per 
cent of actors interpreted emergency housing as a place where the fast build process after 
an emergency occurs, before disaster victims move to permanent housing. The rest of them 
understood the meaning of emergency housing as any rigid or mobile structures, without 
permanent attachment to the ground, for use as human shelter within 30 consecutive days; a 
closed partition or group of rooms built within an existing dwelling to form a single 
habitable unit; an enclosed floor space to make a room or habitable area so that disaster 
victims can continue livelihood; and a wholly or partly enclosed space intended to be used 
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by disaster victims. One technical staff (under national level) argued, as shown in translated 
quotation in Appendix 23 (1.3), p.393 that: 
 
“As far as I am concerned, when the life of a person is at risk by a natural or non ordinary 
situation, emergency housing is the fast build process when an emergency occurs”. 
 
8.2.3.1 Actors’ Concepts of Disaster Victims under the MNSC Directive 20 
The majority of actors (76 per cent) interviewed described the term disaster victims as 
referring to disaster victims with resilience difficulties. This is the official Prime Minister’s 
Department definition of disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20. Meanwhile, 14 per 
cent of actors describe victims as the disaster victims with physical effects under resilience 
difficulties, 3 per cent of them describe victims as the disaster victims under adaptation 
problems, 7 per cent of actors understood that victims are disaster victims with resilience 
difficulties under an authorities’ responsibility. The definitions of disaster victims under the 
MNSC Directive 20 are summarised in Table 8.5 in Appendix 24, p.427.                                                                                            
 
8.2.4 Department Level’s Discussions on Regulatory Compliance 
Only 8 per cent of actors had frequently discussed regulatory compliance at department 
level. 14 per cent of them had discussions with only selected actors related to their daily 
routines. Obviously, 69 of actors interviewed never had discussion with peers at department 
level. Actors’ contribution of views was illustrated in details below. Table 8.6 in Appendix 
24, p.427 summarises response to the question of actors’ perception regarding discussion of 
regulatory compliance. 
 
A. Department (under national level) that had tried Direct Contact with Disaster 
Victims 
Four clerical staff members admitted that they had discussed this topic with other actors. 
They argued that there were several discussions between them, technical staff and the 
manager, formally and informally. One clerical staff argued, as shown in translated 
quotation in Appendix 23 (1.4), p.394 who said that: 
 
“When we planned to place disaster victims into disaster victims’ group, the manager and I invited 
other actors who agreed to have these disaster victims in their groups for discussions on how the 
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programme should be implemented. Actors who were not involved in the MNSC Directive 20 did 
not take part in the discussions”. 
 
Three technical staff members admitted that they had discussed only some aspects 
of regulatory compliance with other actors involved in the department level related to the 
MNSC Directive 20.  
 The manager had never discussed regulatory compliance with other actors formally 
or informally. 
 
B. Department (under national level) 
Only three clerical staff members reported talked to technical staff regarding the possibility 
of disaster victims being included in their groups in implementing regulatory compliance. 
 One technical staff at this department level reported that he had informal talks to 
several of colleagues regarding regulatory compliance. He argued, as shown in translated 
quotation in Appendix 23 (1.4), p.394 that: 
 
“I had a policy of open-group. I invited actors to come over to my group whenever they feel like 
dropping in. When they come over (even not all of them) I try to tell them about the disaster victims 
in my group. I find this more effective because if they can see the disaster victims for them if we 
make site visit, and when they see these disaster victims they tend to ask questions about them”. 
 
The other eleven clerical staff members had never discussed regulatory compliance 
with other actors formally or informally. Five technical staff members also never talked 
about this matter to others. 
 
C. Department (under state level) 
The manager said that the coordinator had discussed about the intention of regulatory 
compliance with other actors. To quote as argued in translated quotation in Appendix 23 
(1.4), p.395 that: 
 
“The discussions were done informally between me, technical staff and clerical staff involved in the 
handling of these disaster victims included in disaster victims’ group. There were no such 
discussions with other actors who were not involved in the programme of these disaster victims”. 
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Three technical staff members claimed that they had tried informally to discuss with 
several other clerical staff regarding the possibility of disaster victims being included in 
disaster victims’ group. One of the technical staff members admitted that there is no point 
talking about this if other actors not interested. 
 The other four technical and eight clerical staff members said that they had never 
discussed regulatory compliance in this department level.  
 
D. Department (under district level) 
The manager, one clerical staff and one officer from district level never discussed this issue 
with other actors.  
 Nine clerical staff members at this department level admitted that they had never 
discussed regulatory compliance with either the manager or other officers. This was 
confirmed by another four technical staff members and four officers. The reason was that 
the department level did not receive circulars regarding compliance and the MNSC 
Directive 20. In fact, the discussions according to the manager were more about to back the 
regulations in the MNSC Directive 20. He argued, as shown in translated quotation in 
Appendix 23 (1.4), p.395 that: 
 
“We had never discussed the possible direct contact with disaster victims under resilience 
difficulties in this department level. But we did discuss on few occasions about a regulatory 
compliance for disaster victims established recently in one disaster department level nearby. Our 
discussions were on how to provide things that are not in regulations or guidelines that are 
sometimes requested by the disaster victims. This is the opposite of what we are discussing now”. 
 
E. Department (under special body appointed by the government) 
The manager had briefly mentioned about regulatory compliance once during her 
department level’s formal staff meetings. Three clerical staff members had also discussed 
about regulatory compliance with other actors.  
 Three technical staff members had mixed reasons and only discussed about it with 
selected actors. It is possible that their work will be misjudged by other actors for not doing 
their job accordingly. Consequently they will just keep silent on the things they discussed, 
as argued in translated quotation in Appendix 23 (1.4), p.395 that:  
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“Maybe the department levels’ were concerned about bureaucracy and handed over this matter to 
other relevant authorities. For me I better keep it quiet because of what you did, didn’t meant all 
were rights. We were not interested to talk about this”. 
 
One technical staff and two clerical staff members admitted that they were not 
having any discussions with other actors on the possibility of disaster victims being 
included in disaster victims’ group.  
 
8.2.4.1 Actors’ Perceived Knowledge on Regulatory Compliance towards Disaster 
Victims under the MNSC Directive 20 
Only 10 per cent of actors had knowledge about disaster victims’ involvement towards the 
regulatory compliance process. Meanwhile, 20 per cent perceived themselves as unsure, 
moderately know about it, or some do and some do not know about disaster victims’ 
involvement. Most of the actors (65 per cent) did not know about actors’ involvement in the 
regulatory compliance and decision making process. Actors’ contributions of views are 
illustrated in details below. Table 8.7 in Appendix 24, p.428 summarises response to the 
question of actors’ perceived knowledge on disaster victims’ involvement in regulatory 
compliance. 
 
A. Department (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster 
Victims 
Three technical staff members said that actors who regularly visit the disaster site during 
their work were usually sensitive to the general welfare of disaster victims and would make 
an effort to help them in whatever way possible. To quote one such technical staff member, 
as argued in translated quotation in Appendix 23 (1.4.1), p.396 that: 
 
“There are actors who know my group of disaster victims and there are also those who don't. Those 
who regularly visit our group during their working time are aware of the existence of our disaster 
victims, and usually are sensitive towards these disaster victims’ welfare. If anything happens to 
our disaster victims they will either help them or inform us about it. Actors who are not interested 
only know these disaster victims from a far”. 
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The manager claimed that only small minorities of actors from this department level 
were regularly discussing the disaster victims’ welfare and these actors were the technical 
or clerical staff involved at the disaster site programme.  
 Three technical staff members and six other clerical staff members perceived that 
actors in this department level did not personally know about regulatory compliance and 
disaster victims’ involvement.  
 
B. Department (under national level) 
Three clerical staff members and two technical staff members claimed that they had good 
knowledge about the department level’s involvement towards regulatory compliance 
because they regularly interact with disaster victims by making frequent visits to the 
disaster site. 
 Three clerical staff members who had experienced interacting with the disaster 
victims in disaster victims’ group admitted that they knew only those who were sent to their 
group, not every single victim at the disaster site. The rest of the actors in this department 
level admitted that they did not know disaster victims personally. To illustrate, as argued in 
translated quotation in Appendix 23 (1.4.1), p.396 that: 
 
“I regularly visit the disaster site, just to talk to the technical staff, and say hello to the disaster 
victims. I don't know personally their adaptation problems, but I do know that some of them are 
having problems to recover compared to other disaster victims. Some of these disaster victims 
experienced some kind of behaviour problems as well”. 
 
One technical staff and three clerical staff members felt generally that actors in this 
department level do not personally know about the department level’s involvement of 
disaster victims towards regulatory compliance.  
 
C. Department (under state level) 
One clerical staff interviewed reported that he knows the disaster victims well, because he 
was responsible for overseeing them everyday during the programme. To quote as argued 
in translated quotation in Appendix 23 (1.4.1), p.396 that: 
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“I know these disaster victims quite well even though I had been posted to this department level for 
a month. This is because of I am given the responsibilities to oversee their everyday resilience 
difficulties and welfare”. 
 
The manager and two technical staff members felt that actors only knew the disaster 
victims who were placed in their disaster victims’ group, but not entire disaster victims. 
Technical staff claimed that actors hardly visit the disaster site.  
 Five technical staff members interviewed considered that the actors in the 
department level did not personally know the disaster victims, due to lack of interest. Seven 
clerical staff members admitted that they knew very little about these disaster victims 
because they rarely or never go to the disaster site.  
 
D. Department (under district level) 
One clerical staff claimed that she knew the disaster victims because she regularly visited 
the disaster site. To quote as argued in translated quotation in Appendix 23 (1.4.1), p.396 
that: 
 
“We visited the disaster site regularly until both side of actors and disaster victims are satisfied 
with the work. Of course we know disaster victims very well especially their leaders in my group 
that I looked after”. 
 
Two clerical staff members and three technical staff members who had experienced 
having disaster victims in their groups admitted knowing only those who were in their 
groups. To quote from one technical staff as argued in translated quotation in Appendix 23 
(1.4.1), p.396 that: 
 
“Our contact with the disaster victims is very limited because we had to limit our relationship as 
actors and disaster victims. Not more than that. That was why our knowledge about them is very 
little”. 
 
The interviews show that the majority of actors in this department level knew very 
little about their department level’s involvement with disaster victims under the MNSC 
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Directive 20 and this was supported by one of the department levels’ technical staff and a 
manager. 
 
E. Department (under special body appointed by the government) 
One clerical staff recognised some of the disaster victims in his group. Four technical staff 
members, a manager and four clerical staff members in this department level believed that 
actors knew very little about the disaster victims. They assumed that actors were not 
interested and the department levels’ are not officially under the government agencies 
because they are appointed subject to certain project developments only. Table 8.7 in 
Appendix 24, p.428 summarises response to the actors’ perception regarding knowledge of 
their department level. 
 
8.2.5 Actors Perceived Rationale of the Prime Minister’s Department Plan 
More than half of actors interviewed (55 per cent) understand the rationale of regulatory 
compliance implementation. Other actors interviewed stated that very few actors really 
understand the reason why the Prime Minister’s Department wants to implement full 
regulatory compliance under the MNSC Directive 20. Lack of information and lack of 
interest were cited as the reasons. One technical staff (under national level) argued, as 
shown in translated quotation in Appendix 23 (1.5), p.397 that: 
 
“Regulatory compliance if properly implemented could have a positive effect to disaster victims 
under resilience difficulties. Sadly as far as I can remember no one on behalf of the Prime 
Minister’s Department has come to this department level to explain to all our actors the rationale 
and the importance of its implementation and so on. You can't expect actors to simply accept 
something that they don't understand or implement a new concept of compliance that they know 
very little about. Presently regulatory compliance is being planned by the top administration of the 
Prime Minister’s Department, but we, the actors in the department level have no clue to what it is 
all about or what is expected of us with reference to the programme”. 
 
These opinions were supported by other officers, who felt generally that actors do 
not know why the Prime Minister’s Department wants to implement regulatory compliance. 
He felt actors had a very low interest due to no connection to these disaster victims. 
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The actors were asked to suggest possible reasons for the Prime Minister’s 
Department plan to implement full regulatory compliance. Thirty two clerical staff 
members either replied that they did not know or would not give any comment. Several 
reasons were suggested as detailed in Table 8.8 in Appendix 24, p.428. 
 
8.2.6 Perceived Abilities of Actors towards Regulatory Compliance under the MNSC 
Directive 20 
35 per cent of actors were positive about their own ability to comply with the MNSC 
Directive 20. Meanwhile, 13 per cent perceived themselves as unsure, besides of other 52 
per cent were negative about their own ability to comply with the MNSC Directive 20. 
Actors’ contribution of views was illustrated in details below. Table 8.9 in Appendix 24, 
p.428 summarises response to the question of actors’ perceived abilities of actors towards 
regulatory compliance under the MNSC Directive 20. 
 
A. Department (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster 
Victims 
The manager in this department level was confident that the department ability towards 
regulatory compliance under the MNSC Directive 20. She cited based on her experience of 
carrying out a few projects to provide accommodation to the disaster victims. She argued 
that actors could comply with these regulations. To quote, as shown in translated quotation 
in Appendix 23 (1.6), p.398, that: 
 
“I think actors are able to comply with any regulations in order for them to deliver any housing to 
the disaster victims. Even though it is hard to comply totally, at least it can please the disaster 
victims. Therefore I don’t have any hesitation in my colleagues”. 
 
Two technical staff members at the department level had a positive perception of 
actors’ ability towards regulatory compliance. They argued that they had managed to 
comply with all regulations and guidelines without going to the in-service training in 
emergency management or relevant training. They acknowledged it would be better if they 
had been trained in emergency housing.  
 Three clerical staff members had mixed views arguing that they might not have the 
patience to comply with all regulations under the MNSC Directive 20.   
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 Five clerical staff members had negative perceptions of their working capacity 
because they had a lack of experience and training. One clerical staff declared, as argued in 
translated quotation in Appendix 23 (1.6), p.398 that: 
 
“I don't think I have the capability to comply totally to the regulations because we just following 
orders given from two sides. One from our bosses and the other side is from the disaster victims. 
Nothing is perfect”. 
 
B. Department (under national level) 
Clerical staff felt that they were able to comply with all regulations because they just felt 
they could and they were used to work in disaster victims’ group. One actor said that she 
could comply with regulations because she had attended in-service training in emergency 
housing. Three technical staff members at this department level felt that actors could 
comply with all regulations under the MNSC Directive 20. One Technical staff argued as 
shown in translated quotation in Appendix 23 (1.6), p.398 that: 
 
“There are actors working in regulatory compliance who never had any training in emergency 
housing. With a right guidance they have managed to learn to handle these disaster victims and 
regulations quite well. If we have enough training in emergency housing, then we don’t need many 
actors to look after our level of compliance. I guess any actors can comply with regulations related 
to emergency housing. The requirements are interest, commitment and a little help from 
experienced technical staff”. 
 
Four technical staff members felt that actors were ineffective in regulatory 
compliance because they had never been specially trained in the field of emergency 
management or inappropriately experienced. To quote as argued in translated quotation in 
Appendix 23 (1.6), p.398 that: 
 
“Every actor can comply because that’s what actors do. But how effective is the compliance? 
Handling disaster victims under MNSC Directive 20 are not easy. I am not convinced that actors 
can comply totally because of their inexperience with these disaster victims and regulations at the 
same time. New housing development is a different thing”. 
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Five clerical staff members had negative perceptions of their ability because they 
had not been trained in emergency housing and had no experience of handling these 
disaster victims. 
 
C. Department (under state level) 
Six technical staff members felt that actors could comply with relevant regulations because 
several of them had been officially trained in emergency housing. But they admitted that it 
takes time and determination to develop new knowledge and responsibilities if necessary 
such as in medical response. One technical staff argued, as in translated quotation in 
Appendix 23 (1.6), p.399 that: 
 
“There are only two officially trained technical staff in disaster management in this department 
level. The rest of us had never attended in-service training. If we can do it, why shouldn't other 
actors be able to it as well because it is part of our duties as government servant?” 
 
One clerical staff claimed that he is able to comply with regulations because by 
working together with technical staff members those were familiar with regulations and 
guidelines in emergency housing. He argued, as shown in translated quotation in Appendix 
23 (1.6), p.399 that: 
 
“I think I can if given a little bit of training in emergency housing. Fortunately many of the actors’ 
especially technical staff were on site. Even though they had never attended in-service in emergency 
housing they were familiar with regulation and guidelines”. 
 
The manager felt that the actors would have difficulties in regulatory compliance 
because they were not trained in emergency housing. Even one technical staff with in-
service training in emergency housing had a negative perception of the actors’ ability to 
comply with regulations, because actors can not make their own decision. All decisions are 
made unanimously at the department level. Seven clerical staff members felt that they were 
unable to comply with regulations because they do not have the knowledge in MNSC 
Directive 20. 
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D. Department (under district level) 
The manager felt that his staff could comply with the regulations under the MNSC 
Directive 20, but not to fully comply with the request from disaster victims. This was also 
the perception of four clerical staff members and one officer.  
 Three technical staff members had positive perceptions of their ability to comply, 
but not to respond to the disaster victims’ demands. Two clerical staff members were 
unsure about the abilities of other colleagues to comply with regulations and guidelines.   
 Four officers had negative perceptions about the actors’ ability to comply with 
regulations under the MNSC Directive 20 because they were not trained in emergency 
housing. Four clerical staff members cited as not being trained in emergency housing 
and/or having no experience in working with the disaster victims under the MNSC 
Directive 20 as the reasons for their perceived inability to comply with regulations. 
Sometimes it depends on the public pressure or demands whether actors should stick to the 
regulations or not. One of them argued, as shown in translated quotation in Appendix 23 
(1.6), p.399 that: 
 
“We had disaster victims in this department level who actors classified as having resilience 
difficulties. We tried to handle them as best we can until now but they still cannot understand what 
regulations and guidelines are all about. All they know is their own needs and that we can’t make it 
happened because it was out of the orders given by our superiors. But that demands came from 
communities that we can not simply put aside. It is out of our control”. 
 
E. Emergency Housing Department Level (special body appointed by the 
government) 
Four technical staff members felt that actors could comply with regulations even though 
they had not been officially trained in emergency housing. They admitted that it took a lot 
of hard work and determination before they could learn about disaster victims’ behaviour 
and knowledge of regulatory compliance. As one technical staff argued, as shown in 
translated quotation in Appendix 23 (1.6), p.399 that: 
 
“I was requested to manage this department level because of the department was short of staff. I 
agreed voluntarily to work here. When I first arrived I just didn’t know how to start to comply with 
regulations, because of my work experience had always been more with disaster victims but not 
243 
 
guidelines or regulations. For days I had sleepless nights. With the manager’s encouragement and 
the help of other technical staff, 1 slowly began to communicate with the disaster victims using 
psychology and translate it accordingly with the requirement in rules and regulations. Now I feel 
confident in my work. Thus if I can do it, I am sure other actors can do it too”. 
 
One manager was unsure without cited any reason. He argued, as shown in 
translated quotation in Appendix 23 (1.6), p.399 that: 
 
“I am not sure about this because compliance is subjective and we have no instrument yet to 
measure it. Till now the only way to know about it if there is any complaint about the project 
carried out”. 
 
One clerical staff and four technical staff members in this department level assumed 
that actors were not able to comply with regulations under the MNSC Directive 20 because 
they were not trained in emergency management and housing. Table 8.9 in Appendix 24, 
p.428 summarises the response with over 50 per cent showing that they are uncertain. 
 
8.3 Affective Component of Attitudes 
The affective information consists of how an individual feels about the attitude towards 
regulatory compliance and involves the feelings, moods, emotions or sympathetic nervous 
system activity that is aroused in a person in relation to the attitude. Attitudes therefore are 
the positive or negative evaluations a person gives to an attitude towards regulatory 
compliance about their colleagues and disaster victims. Even if actors have negative 
feelings (negative towards the issue) or are non-committal (undecided) about the regulatory 
compliance process, repeated exposure to the emotional experiences of disaster victims 
might change their expectations and might gradually shift their feelings from negative to 
positive. A thorough analysis had been made to find out patterns of relationship between 
levels of action from national to local (district). As a result, there were typical answers at 
the national and state levels. Therefore analyses of perception at the national and state level 
by the actors are as shown in the cognitive component of attitudes at the beginning of this 
chapter. Only answers at the district level and the department appointed by the government 
are highlighted in this section and forward in this chapter. However, the detail analyses in 
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actors’ affective components of attitudes at national and state level are as shown in 
Appendix 25, p.429. 
 
8.3.1 Perceived Rights of Disaster Victims under the MNSC Directive 20 to 
Regulatory Compliance 
Most of actors whether unsure (47 per cent) or agreed (41 per cent) to the government 
intentions. A few of the actors (12 per cent) still disagreed to the rights of disaster victims 
to be included under the MNSC Directive 20. The fact was that they received very little 
information about the MNSC Directive 20 that allocates the rights of disaster victims. 
Actors’ contribution of views was illustrated in details below. Table 8.10 in Appendix 24, 
p.429 summarises response to the question of actors’ perceived rights of disaster victims 
under the MNSC Directive 20. 
 
D. Department (under district level) 
Two officers and seven clerical staff members declared that disaster victims have the rights 
to regulatory compliance due to equal human rights opportunities under the MNSC 
Directive 20. One officer argued, as shown in translated quotation in Appendix 23 (2.1), 
p.401 that: 
 
“They have the rights especially disaster victims under resilience difficulties because I heard for the 
time being only the government is capable of fulfilling their needs”. 
 
One manager, two officers, four technical staff members and one clerical staff had 
mixed views. They argued that these disaster victims have rights, if ways can be found to 
handle them effectively in disaster victims’ group, but not otherwise. They also felt that 
disaster victims may have the rights to be included in the process of decision making since 
they are being handled under the same programme with the actors. The rights should only 
be extended to disaster victims who might be able to cope with the rigors of disaster 
adaptation, both psychologically and socially. As one officer argued, as shown in translated 
quotation in Appendix 23 (2.1), p.401 that: 
 
“It is not just the question of rights; it is whether these disaster victims can cope with disaster 
adaptation. What's the point of granting them their rights to regulatory compliance when the 
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objectives to assist them are unreachable? They are in trouble and no where to turn to. Anyway it is 
the government responsibilities to look after them”. 
 
One officer and two clerical staff members said that disaster victims under the 
MNSC Directive 20 should be handled by the specialised actors in emergency housing and 
regulatory compliance because the disaster victims are vulnerable and need guidance.  
 
E. Department (special body appointed by the government) 
The manager and one technical staff agreed that disaster victims have the rights to 
regulatory compliance because disaster victims should be part of other communities and for 
humanitarian reasons. A manager argued, as shown in translated quotation in Appendix 23 
(2.1), p.401 that: 
 
“If there are ways that disaster victims under resilience difficulties can be helped, then they should 
be included in order for them to become part of other communities, and for humanitarian reasons”. 
 
Three technical staff members and one clerical staff in this department level had 
mixed views on the disaster victims’ regulatory compliance rights. They agreed that these 
disaster victims have the rights to be placed for non-religious demands so that they can 
learn to accommodate in disaster victims’ group without any hesitation. One technical staff 
argued, as shown in translated quotation in Appendix 23 (2.1), p.401 that: 
 
“They have the right but would only be suitable for non-religious demands. Regulatory compliance 
in non-religious demands would permit disaster victims to actively interact with actors and thus 
learn how to accommodate themselves to disaster society without hesitation”. 
 
Four clerical staff members declined to make any comment. Table 8.10 in Appendix 
24, p.429 shows the group of actors’ perception regarding the rights of disaster victims 
under the MNSC Directive 20 to regulatory compliance. 
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8.3.2 Perceived Benefit of Regulatory Compliance to Disaster Victims under the 
MNSC Directive 20 
Actors were asked about the benefit of regulatory compliance to disaster victims under the 
MNSC Directive 20. All the actors mentioned about the knowledge and social benefit that 
the disaster victims might get from the implementation of regulatory compliance. However 
some actors interviewed expressed their opinion that some disaster victims with adaptation 
difficulties might experience a degree of personal support and emotional satisfaction if 
other disaster victims were to socialise with them for a longer term.    
 
8.3.2.1 Knowledge Gained of Disaster Victims under the MNSC Directive 20 
Only 19 per cent of actors agreed that regulatory compliance will benefit the disaster 
victims in terms of knowledge development. Meanwhile, most of them (54 per cent) were 
unsure and 27 per cent perceived themselves as against the idea that regulatory compliance 
will benefit the disaster victims. Actors’ contribution of views was illustrated in details 
below. Table 8.11 in Appendix 24, p.429 summarises response to the question of actors’ 
perceived benefit of knowledge gained of disaster victims if included in the disaster 
victims’ groups. 
 
D. Department (under district level) 
Two officers, one manager and one clerical staff were of the opinion that regulatory 
compliance will increase the knowledge of disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20 
because they could learn from the actors, for example as argued by one clerical staff, as 
shown in translated quotation in Appendix 23 (2.2.1), p.403 that: 
 
“When mixed together with actors their thinking could be further developed compared to when they 
are mixing only with their own society. They can always learn from actors”. 
 
Six clerical staff members were unsure because they had never handled disaster 
victims under the MNSC Directive 20. The rest said that the knowledge gained of disaster 
victims under the MNSC Directive 20 in disaster victims’ group would depend on the 
nature of persistent difficulties. They reasoned that disaster victims who gave cooperation 
and were willing to know about the programme might improve, though this might be 
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difficult for disaster victims suffering depression and without formal education. They also 
argued that if the disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20 are placed in disaster 
victims’ group, they could be convinced to do their best and not feel concerned by other 
disaster victims’ knowledge in the group. Four technical staff members were unsure 
because disaster victims could learn from each other but discouraged them in terms of 
competition. This was expressed by one technical staff, as shown in translated quotation in 
Appendix 23 (2.2.1), p.402 that: 
 
“Among themselves, they may feel they are lagging behind compared to other disaster victims in 
their communities. Thus they may be encouraged to try harder to catch up with each other. In 
disaster victims’ group they could simply give up because they could not keep up with other disaster 
victims’ progress. But if these disaster victims under resilience difficulties can be persuaded to do 
their best irrespective of other disaster victims’ achievements, and they can comfortably learn side 
by side with other disaster victims and actors, then their knowledge could better improve in disaster 
victims’ group compared to what they know before disaster strike”. 
 
Three officers and three clerical staff members disagreed that regulatory compliance 
would improve these disaster victims’ knowledge because in regulatory compliance they 
were not interested in knowing guidelines or regulations. For the disaster victims they were 
just concerned with their demands. Also they reasoned that technical staff members are 
better equipped rather than clerical staff to manage these disaster victims’ resilience 
difficulties as argued by one clerical staff, as shown in translated quotation in Appendix 23 
(2.2.1), p.403 that: 
 
“Technical staff members are better trained to handle these disaster victims particularly in building 
regulations. They know what is required because they have been specially trained for the task. We 
clerical staff will handle them like other disaster victims that might not be suitable. Maybe it is 
better practically if the victim with resilience difficulties in the department level is handled by 
specialist actors in emergency housing”. 
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E. Department (special body appointed by the government) 
Only one technical staff agreed that regulatory compliance might improve disaster victims’ 
knowledge slowly by mixing them with the actors. The technical staff argued, as shown in 
translated quotation in Appendix 23 (2.2.1), p.403 that: 
 
“This is a slow process but the disaster victims might do it if they want it to”. 
 
Three technical staff members and five clerical staff members in this department 
level were unsure of the ability of regulatory compliance to improve the knowledge of 
disaster victims. They claimed that the knowledge gained would not progress rapidly 
because actors would have difficulty in conveying instruction to them. They also said that 
clerical staff would always give preference to overall aspects of disaster victims’ 
adaptation, thus neglecting specific needs from the disaster victims. In regulatory 
compliance technical staff could give the disaster victims the individual attention because 
they understand buildings and can answer the demands from disaster victims. These views 
are seen in the statement of one technical staff as argued, in translated quotation in 
Appendix 23 (2.2.1), p.403 that: 
 
“Their knowledge would not progress rapidly because clerical staff would have difficulties in trying 
to make disaster victims understand the essence of regulations. Clerical staff have to go back to 
technical staff for certain information about buildings and regulations. Most of technical staff can 
make direct contact and explain the real scenario in emergency housing and what to provide the 
victim”. 
 
Table 8.11 in Appendix 24, p.429 shows how the group of actors’ perception of 
disaster victims’ gained knowledge, resulted from regulatory compliance. 
 
8.3.2.2 Disaster Victims under the MNSC Directive 20, Social Development 
All actors interviewed either agreed (66 per cent) or had mixed views (34 per cent) on the 
benefits of regulatory compliance to the social development of disaster victims under the 
MNSC Directive 20 as shown in Table 8.12, Appendix 24, p.429. This was also considered 
as acceptance of disaster victims by actors in disaster victims’ group. Actors’ contribution 
of views was illustrated in details below. 
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D. Department (under district level) 
The manager, four officers and four clerical staff members had a positive view of the ability 
of regulatory compliance to develop the social skills of disaster victims under the MNSC 
Directive 20 because regular interaction with actors should facilitate socially acceptable 
behaviour. As one manager and one clerical staff stressed, as shown in translated quotation 
in Appendix 23 (2.2.2), p.404 that: 
 
“The main way we can help our victim who we think has resilience difficulties is to improve his 
social skills. We can try to make him independent in handling himself, conscious of the groups 
around him, and know how to behave when interacting with other communities even outside 
disaster victims’ group”. 
 
“The victim regarded as having mental resilience difficulties gets along superbly in communities. 
Socially, he is just like any other victim that needs to be part of communities”. 
 
However one officer, six clerical staff members and four technical staff members 
had mixed opinions because they had never handled disaster victims under the MNSC 
Directive 20. The other actors argued that social skills might improve if the recovered 
disaster victims could be encouraged to act as ‘role-models’ to other disaster victim under 
the MNSC Directive 20 and if actors were willing to assist in their development. 
 
E. Department (special body appointed by the government) 
The manager and five clerical staff members were agreed that regulatory compliance will 
improve the social skills of disaster victims. All four technical staff members in the 
department level believed that regulatory compliance would help disaster victims to 
improve their social skills if they tried to respond (e.g. attending, observing and attempting) 
to the authorities’ programmes and development offered to them. These are detailed in 
Table 8.12 in Appendix 24, p.429. They also hoped that such responsibility might be 
extended to social contacts with other disaster victim in the wider society, as suggested by 
the technical staff, who argued, as shown in translated quotation in Appendix 23 (2.2.2), 
p.404 that: 
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“They will be able to develop their social skills. Recently we had a meeting in disaster victims’ 
group explaining our plan of recoveries. They (disaster victim) seem to get along fine with actors 
even though they have lots of difficulty understanding each other especially when it is the part of 
rules and regulations”. 
 
8.3.2.3 The Emotional Development of Disaster Victim under the MNSC Directive 20 
During discussion with actors on the issue of the probable developmental benefit of disaster 
victim under the MNSC Directive 20 of regulatory compliance, only 25 actors interviewed 
were adjudged to have included emotional development in their discussions as shown in 
Table 8.13 in Appendix 24, p.429. 32 per cent of them were positive about the benefit of 
disaster victims’ emotional development under their supervision besides of other 28 per 
cent were unsure. 40 per cent of them disagreed about the benefit of emotional 
development will increase just to be included in the disaster victims’ group. They admitted 
that they do not have the skill to handle disaster victims’ emotional development. Actors’ 
contribution of views was illustrated in details below.  
 
D. Department (under district level) 
Two officers and two clerical staff members in the department level agreed that disaster 
victim under the MNSC Directive 20 would be more emotionally secure if they were placed 
in disaster victims’ group. Being able to adapt and mix with other disaster victims would 
increase their self-esteem. This is expressed by one officer, as shown in translated quotation 
in Appendix 23 (2.2.3), p.405 that: 
 
“Maybe initially disaster victims under resilience difficulties would feel humble, embarrassed and 
at times isolated when included in disaster victim’ groups. Once they feel they are being accepted 
by both other disaster victims  and actors they will have confidence in themselves and will like 
disaster victim’ groups better”. 
 
The manager had reservations. He felt that at an earlier stage of recovery, these 
disaster victims would be less aware of their resilience difficulties, but at later stage of 
recovery they would be more conscious of it and keep requesting more. If the request 
sometimes did not meet on time it may cause emotional depression especially to the elder 
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age disaster victim. This might make regulatory compliance with the MNSC Directive 20 
more difficult to achieve.  
 One officer and one technical staff disagreed about the idea that regulatory 
compliance would enhance emotional development of disaster victims. Two clerical staff 
members argued that disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20 would be demoralised 
emotionally if placed in disaster victims’ group due to their inability to emulate with other 
disaster peers, as shown in translated quotation in Appendix 23 (2.2.3), p.405 that: 
 
“When other disaster victims can, and they can’t because of age factors, they would be 
demoralised”. 
 
E. Department (special body appointed by the government) 
None of this department level of actors was adjudged to have mentioned the emotional 
development of disaster victims in their discussions. Table 8.13 in Appendix 24, p.429 
summarises response to the question of emotional benefit to the disaster victims. 
 
8.3.3 Perceived Suitability of Regulations for Actors and Disaster Victims under the 
MNSC Directive 20 
During the time of this study, disaster victims were handled by different departmental 
levels based on the MNSC Directive 20 (see section 4.5.1, p.107, p.6) alongside other 
national legal framework in development processes and other international requirements. 
Preference of practical ability was discussed in section 8.4.7, p.264. Only 19 per cent of 
actors agreed that the programme introduced was suitable for actors and the disaster 
victims. Most of them, (75 per cent) however, perceived as unsure about the programme 
suitability. 6 per cent of them were disagreed about the programme suitability. Actors’ 
contributions of views are illustrated in details below. Table 8.14 in Appendix 24, p.430 
summarises response to the question of actors’ perceived suitability of regulations for 
actors and disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20. 
 
D. Department (under district level) 
Every actor in this department level expressed mixed opinions on the suitability of 
regulations for actors and disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20. They believed 
some regulations are suitable, whilst others are not. Suitability of the regulations is also 
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conditional upon the types of resilience difficulties these disaster victims have. All actors 
perceived that regulations might be tougher in terms of decision making for actors at higher 
levels like managers because they have to make decisions but should be manageable for 
actors at lower level. But they agreed that most regulations related to non-religious 
demands could be suitable for actors. 
 
E. Department (special body appointed by the government) 
All technical staff members in the department level conceded that the standards of religious 
demands, that have to be handled by actors, may be too high for them. But regulations 
related to non-religious demand should be suitable for these disaster victims. One technical 
staff argued, as shown in translated quotation in Appendix 23 (2.3), p.407 that: 
 
“We feel that the religious section of regulation or programme is too demanding for our colleagues, 
but we have no choice because we must subscribe to the directives of the Prime Minister’s 
Department to handle according to these guidelines”. 
 
Table 8.14 in Appendix 24, p.430 summarises the response with over 50 per cent 
showing that they are uncertain about suitability of regulations for actors and disaster 
victims under the MNSC Directive 20. 
 
8.3.4 Perceived Effect of Regulatory Compliance on Actors’ Workload 
Actors interviewed were unanimous that regulatory compliance would increase their 
workload. For example one manager (under national level) observed, as shown in translated 
quotation in Appendix 23 (2.4), p.407 that: 
 
“If actors were to handle disaster victims, there would not be much increase in their everyday 
workload. But the official requirement is that the regulatory compliance progress of disaster victims 
needs to be accommodated under resilience difficulties, and this would definitely increase actors’ 
present workload. Actors also have to put in extra effort to control and handle disaster victims. 
They also have to give special attention to these disaster victims according to MNSC Directive 20 
that might necessitate using different strategies to those usually employed”. 
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The clerical staff reasoned that they would have to prepare extra work and 
compliance materials even if only one of these disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 
20 is placed in their group. This would definitely mean extra work for them. One clerical 
staff (under national level) argued, as shown in translated quotation in Appendix 23 (2.4), 
p.407 that: 
 
“Presently, actors are required to go to the site and make presentation to the disaster victims and 
get their feedback. Then go back and amend and present again. It takes time and effort”. 
 
And there are also new practical concerns for different groups, as from one clerical 
staff (under national level) argued, as shown in translated quotation in Appendix 23 (2.4), 
p.407 that: 
 
“These disaster victims under resilience difficulties need special attention from group of actors. For 
example, if they got 8 kids, demand for an extra rooms or space. But in the MNSC Directive 20 
guidelines stated that only 1 unit for a family, and then we have to back to the central and amend 
those things and definitely increase our workload”. 
 
One technical staff (under state level) said that regulatory compliance only gave him 
a slightly increased workload from his usual workload. He argued, as in Appendix 23 (2.4), 
p.407 that: 
 
“Actors handle as usual. When disaster victims are included in their groups, all these disaster 
victims’ needs would be sent to the technical staff for transcribing. Actors only have to mark the 
transcripts and try to fulfill their needs. Then compare with guidelines in the MNSC Directive 20 or 
other guidelines provided specific to that project. There will only be a slight increase because of 
our duties”. 
 
And one clerical staff (under district level) raised the point, as shown in translated 
quotation in Appendix 23 (2.4), p.408 that: 
 
“Actors have to give extra attention to the only victim with mental depression in the department 
level. Often with this victim, actors have to prepare adaptation materials that are totally different to 
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those we give the other disaster victims in the group. If we really want to stick to the regulations 
just imagine how much time and effort it might take”. 
 
Besides duties and responsibilities in the department level, clerical staff said that 
they would have to lavish extra attention on disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20 
to make up to disaster victims’ adaptation on the right track. This extra consideration would 
distract actors’ attention on the regulatory compliance because of human feelings and 
sympathy that might drag allotted time in providing emergency housing. Virtually, all 
actors had their own concerns to express. One technical staff (special body appointed by the 
government) argued, as shown in translated quotation in Appendix 23 (2.4), p.408 that: 
 
“As it is actors who are not only expected to handle regulations. They are also required to be 
involved in community’s activities, clerical work concerning the disaster victims in the group, and 
other appraisal activities at the district, state and sometimes at the national level. If disaster victims 
under resilience difficulties are also included in their groups, and the latest requirement is that 
every victim under resilience difficulties must have an individualised plan, then the actors would 
have a heart attack”. 
 
8.3.5 Perceived Effect of Regulatory Compliance on Victim 
Most of the actors (61 per cent) agreed that the MNSC Directive 20 will leave a positive 
effect on the disaster victims’ adaptation. Meanwhile, 15 per cent were unsure and 24 per 
cent perceived that regulatory compliance will leave a negative effect the adaptation of 
disaster victims. Actors’ contribution of views was illustrated in details below. Table 8.15 
in Appendix 24, p.430 summarises response to the question of actors’ perceived effect of 
regulatory compliance on the disaster victims’ adaptation.  
 
D. Department (under district level) 
Two officers and three clerical staff members argued that regulatory compliance will have a 
negative effect on the resilience progress of disaster victims because actors would have to 
spend more time with every victim personally. One clerical staff acknowledged, as shown 
in translated quotation in Appendix 23 (2.5), p.409 that: 
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“If these specific disaster victims have abnormal behaviour and like to disturb other disaster 
victims, then these disaster victims would keep their distance from them. If they don’t have such 
awkward behaviours, maybe they could accept them in their group”. 
 
Two clerical staff members had mixed views. They said that it might not have a 
negative effect if disaster victims included in disaster victims’ group were free from 
behavioural problems that would not distract other disaster victims’ adaptation. The clerical 
staff argued, as shown in translated quotation in Appendix 23 (2.5), p.409 that: 
 
“I am not sure because regulations and guidelines exist for a good reason and from the previous 
experience. In the scene of disaster it depends on the disaster victims behaviours whether they can 
adapt with other disaster victims or not and whether their demands are rational or not”. 
 
The manager, four technical staff members, three officers and five clerical staff 
members disagreed that regulatory compliance would have negative effects on disaster 
victims’ resilience progress because to them disaster victims are psychologically ‘normal’. 
In fact, they argued that by assisting other disaster victims in their adaptation, disaster 
victims’ knowledge in regulations could be further reinforced. They added that probable 
disturbances in the groups, because of the engagement of other disaster victims in disaster 
victims’ group, would not unduly affect disaster victims’ adaptation. One officer argued, as 
shown in translated quotation in Appendix 23 (2.5), p.409 that: 
 
“When disaster victims help other disaster victims under resilience difficulties, they increase their 
understanding of the regulation matter or concepts. This would enhance resilience progress rather 
than diminishing it”. 
 
E. Department (special body appointed by the government) 
Two technical staff members agreed that regulatory compliance would have negative 
effects on disaster victims’ resilience progress because actors have to deal with special 
attention to other disaster victims and thus have to shorten their time spent with disaster 
victims in resilience difficulties. One technical staff argued, as shown in translated 
quotation in Appendix 23 (2.5), p.409 that: 
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“This regulatory compliance concept will keep actors focus on their duties more towards providing 
accommodation that is already planned. At the same time they are responsible to hear from the 
disaster victims’ side too of what they need and what they don’t. Foremost, some of the actors may 
only cater for specific disaster victims needs rather then overall disaster victims”. 
 
On manager was undecided whether regulatory compliance might have an effect on 
disaster victims or not without any reason. 
 Five clerical staff members and three technical staff members in the department 
level disagreed that regulatory compliance of disaster victims would negatively affect 
disaster victims’ resilience progress because normal work would continue as usual. They 
also argued the desire of disaster victims not to be upstaged by other disaster victims would 
make them work harder, thus increasing their attainments. These are detailed in Table 8.15 
in Appendix 24, p.430. 
 
8.3.6 Perceived Effect of Regulatory Compliance on Department Levels’ 
Performance 
Most of the actors at department level are required to attend the training programme many 
times a year related to disaster management and many others not only in disaster 
management. Then, all of these trainings, seminars and anything related to attendance 
towards knowledge attainment will be counted in order to get promoted and department 
level appraisal. Thus, half of actors (51 per cent) perceived themselves as agreed to the fact 
that regulatory compliance will negatively effects on department level’s performance due to 
increase of workload. 10 per cent were unsure besides of other actors 39 per cent) accepted 
regulatory compliance as not a problem to influence department level’s performance. Table 
8.16 in Appendix 24, p.430 summarises response to the question of actors’ perception of 
the effect of regulatory compliance on department levels’ performance. 
 
D. Department (under district level) 
Five officers, four technical staff members and three clerical staff members said that 
regulatory compliance would affect the department levels’ performance because there are 
actors who were trained in emergency housing and disaster management but purposely had 
to ignore the fact that they had other responsibilities and commitments. One officer argued, 
as shown in translated quotation in Appendix 23 (2.6), p.411 that: 
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“They know what to do with the regulations but ignore most of it in the name of other 
responsibilities and commitments”. 
 
The manager and three clerical staff members had reservations. They argued that it 
depends on the actors’ willingness to comply with regulations or ignore the regulations they 
are familiar with. The reason they gave was that they have other responsibilities and 
commitments. They are just the enforcers that follow orders from their superiors.  
 Four clerical staff members believed that regulatory compliance would not have any 
effect on their performance because regulatory compliance would make no difference to the 
department level’s performance. 
 
E. Department (special body appointed by the government) 
The manager, three technical staff members and four clerical staff members in the 
department level agreed that sticking to the regulation totally in emergency housing would 
lower the department levels’ performance because they had to deliver the project on time. 
Their main consideration was time. Sticking to the regulations required them to give extra 
attention to the disaster victims that may result in project delays. 
 One clerical staff undecided and one technical staff disagreed that regulatory 
compliance would have any effect on their performance because distraction of work 
responsibilities was part of their work. He quoted, as shown in translated quotation in 
Appendix 23 (2.6), p.411 that: 
 
“Regulatory compliance will definitely give us pressure and distract our concentration in disaster 
relief. But that is what we do. I don’t see any problem there”. 
 
Table 8.16 in Appendix 24, p.430 shows the group of actors’ perception regarding 
effects on department levels’ performance. 
 
8.3.6.1 Suggestions about Alternative Methods of Evaluating Department Levels’ 
Performance if they Practice Regulatory Compliance 
Actors were requested to suggest alternative methods for evaluating performance of 
department level if they were to practice regulatory compliance. Of the actors 22 were 
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unable or reluctant to make any suggestion. Those who did so offered the following 
recommendations: 
1. Valuation in training programme should also be part of overall individual appraisal 
(41 per cent of actors). 
2. It was suggested that the valuation on behalf of the department should be done by 
the right person who is really specialised in emergency housing (35 per cent of 
actors). They are the key indicator of the success of regulatory compliance. One 
actor suggested, as shown in translated quotation in Appendix 23 (2.6.1), p.411 that: 
 
“Evaluating the regulatory compliance progress of actors is not the whole picture of what we have 
done. If the government wants to make valuations they should start with appointing an officer or put 
more specialist staff in emergency housing. Valuation can be started with calculating their 
performance. Some of us are involved in this department on behalf of the department and don’t 
really understand what emergency housing is all about”.  
 
3. Actors recommended that credits be given to the department level with good 
regulatory compliance practice (24 per cent of actors). For example does the 
department level have a committee to determine the regulatory compliance plan for 
each project? Does the committee represent all interested parties in the regulatory 
compliance of each project? Have these actors been involved in social and extra-
curricular activities organised by the department level and what is the extent of their 
involvement? If the answers are affirmative, then the department level should be 
recognised for these actions. Such proposals were made by one technical staff 
member (under state level), as shown in translated quotation in Appendix 23 (2.6.1), 
p.411 that:  
 
“The success of actors towards regulatory compliance should not be based solely on their 
regulatory compliances application in the line of duty. It should also take into account these actors 
achievements in other fields. For example, their involvement in representing the department level in 
cultural and sport activities at district, state and national level. Actors in this department level are 
heavily involved in these activities. This should also be referred to when assessing the regulatory 
compliance success of these actors, and credit is given to the department level for this 
achievement”. 
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8.3.7 Types of Regulations Favoured by Actors for Regulatory Compliance 
Actors were asked to nominate types of regulations that they perceived as suitable for 
regulatory compliance in the process of providing emergency housing. However, only three 
types of regulations (commercial planning and building codes; MNSC Directive 20; and the 
international standards) were selected. These three regulations are the most prominent 
sources in disaster situations in Malaysia. Most of the actors (53 per cent) favoured the 
MNSC Directive 20 being used in disaster situations in Malaysia. 39 per cent suggested 
that the commercial planning and building codes are the most suitable even in disaster 
situations. However, only 8 per cent prefer to use international standards as guidance in 
disaster situations. There were two reasons given by actors for their nominations in every 
type of regulation: 
1. Actors, who favoured the present planning and building codes that applied to all 
authorities in Malaysia in developing commercial housing schemes because they 
were familiar with it. The second reason was that they assumed that actors have the 
required skills and technique to handle these regulations; 
2. Actors, who nominated the regulations that, are flexible enough to suit a disaster 
situation at site under the MNSC Directive 20. At the scene of a disaster there were 
unpredictable scenarios and disaster victims should be provided with available 
resources; 
3. Actors, who favoured the international standards provided by international bodies, 
like the SPHERE, UNHCR and OXFAM in disaster actions, because they are 
practically proven and internationally recognised. 
 
Actors’ contribution of views was illustrated in details below. Table 8.17 in 
Appendix 24, p.430 summarises response to the question of actors’ perceived types of 
regulations favoured by actors for regulatory compliance implementation. 
 
A. Department (under national level) that had tried direct contact with disaster 
victims 
The manager, two technical staff members and three clerical staff members were most 
favoured with the present planning and building codes. One clerical staff and one technical 
staff nominated the regulations under the MNSC Directive 20. Meanwhile two clerical staff 
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members said that the international standards were the most suitable for regulatory 
compliance. Actors who were favoured the regulations under the MNSC Directive 20 and 
the international standards rated regulations in the present national planning and building 
codes as being the least suitable for regulatory compliance implementation.  
 
B. Department (under national level) 
Three technical staff members and seven clerical staff members rated regulations in the 
present national planning and building codes as being suitable for regulatory compliance 
despite rated regulations under the MNSC Directive 20 and the international standards as 
being equally unsuitable. For example one clerical staff argued, as shown in translated 
quotation in Appendix 23 (2.7), p.411 that: 
 
“I prefer the regulations in the present national planning and building codes because I’m already 
familiar with it. They assumed that actors have the required skills and technique to handle these 
regulations. As for regulations under the MNSC Directive 20 and the international standard, they 
are not my concern because I never work with that”. 
 
Three technical staff members and two clerical staff members rated regulations 
under the MNSC Directive 20 as being most suitable, followed by the international 
standards. Regulations in the present national planning and building codes were rated third, 
by these actors in terms of suitability.  
 
C. Department (under state level) 
One technical staff member chose regulations in the present national planning and building 
codes as being most suitable for regulatory compliance.  
 The manager, six technical staff members and five clerical staff members nominated 
regulations under the MNSC Directive 20 as their favourite for regulatory compliance. 
They argued that regulations in the present national planning and building codes were 
deemed to be the most unsuitable.  
 Three clerical staff members chose the international standards as being the most 
suitable because they were practically proven and internationally recognised. These actors 
also rated regulations in the present national planning and building codes as unsuitable in 
providing emergency housing.  
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D. Department (under district level) 
Five clerical staff members nominated regulations in the present national planning and 
building codes as being suitable for regulatory compliance in this department level because 
they were familiar with them and with the availability of those facilities. Unfortunately they 
did not have the facilities for regulations under the MNSC Directive 20 and the 
international standards. These actors also rated equally the unsuitability of both regulations 
for regulatory compliance.  
 The manager, three officers and four clerical staff members chose regulations under 
the MNSC Directive 20 as being the most suitable and regulations in the present national 
planning and building codes as the least suitable. One clerical staff offered the comment, as 
shown in translated quotation in Appendix 23 (2.7), p.412 that: 
 
“Currently there are regulations under the MNSC Directive 20 that had succeeded in this 
regulatory compliance and projects delivered with fewer complaints. I haven't heard of 
international standards, but there are efforts towards the implementations. As for regulations in 
present planning and building codes, it will be a great achievement if it is accomplished towards 
regulatory compliance”. 
 
Two clerical staff members and two technical staff members claimed that all three 
types of regulations are suitable for regulatory compliance in emergency housing. One 
clerical staff declined to nominate. Two technical staff members said that all three types are 
unsuitable for regulatory compliance. 
 
E. Department (special body appointed by the government) 
The manager in this department level favoured the present planning and building codes 
because he was familiar with it. The manager argued, as shown in translated quotation in 
Appendix 23 (2.7), p.412 that: 
 
“I’m in this line for quite sometime and my main reference is planning and building codes. But 
there’s no problem for me to follow any instruction from above”. 
 
Four technical staff members in this department level nominated regulations under 
the MNSC Directive 20 as being the most suitable followed by the international standard. 
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Third were regulations in the present national planning and building codes. One technical 
staff was proud to report, as shown in translated quotation in Appendix 23 (2.7), p.412 that: 
 
“We have proof that regulations under the MNSC Directive 20 could be achieved. No major 
complaints from the disaster victims”.  
 
Four clerical staff members said that all the three types are unsuitable for regulatory 
compliance because it all depends on the time scale and resources available at a disaster site 
or emergency housing site. One clerical staff was unsure. Table 8.17 in Appendix 24, p.430 
summarises responses to the question about the most favoured regulation in providing 
emergency housing. 
 
8.4 Conative Component of Attitude  
The conative component of attitudes is again strongly shaped by the previous amount of 
personal involvement an actor has had in implementing the MNSC Directive 20. Actors are 
undoubtedly assumed (about their colleagues and disaster victims) that an individual with a 
positive attitude to an object, should engage behaviour that ultimately complies with the 
MNSC Directive 20. Those with negative attitudes (negative towards the issue) should 
move away from it. A thorough analysis had been made to find out patterns of relationships 
between levels of action from national to local (district). As a result, there were typical 
answers at the national and state levels. Therefore analyses of perception at the national and 
state level by the actors are shown in the cognitive component of attitudes at the beginning 
of this chapter. Only answers at the district level and the department appointed by the 
government are highlighted in this section and discussed in this chapter. However the 
detailed analyses in actors’ conative components of attitudes at national and state level are 
shown in Appendix 25, p.429. 
 
8.4.1 Perceived Actors Support for Regulatory Compliance Implementation  
Only 24 per cent of actors agreed to support regulatory compliance implementation. 
Meanwhile, 30 per cent were unsure but almost half of them (46 per cent) were against the 
introduction of regulatory compliance implementation. Table 8.18 in Appendix 24, p.431 
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summarises response to the question of actors’ perceived support for regulatory compliance 
implementation. 
 
D. Department (under district level) 
Three clerical staff members were willing to support regulatory compliance implementation 
on humanitarian grounds. They argued that regulatory compliance should be put on trial 
first in order to determine its success or failure. One general comment from one clerical 
staff, as shown in translated quotation in Appendix 23 (3.1), p.414 that: 
 
“Based on the department level’s current conditions, maybe at the earlier stage actors will support 
this MNSC Directive 20 for these disaster victims under resilience difficulties because most of the 
work can be monitored. As for later phase of recovery, I don't think they will support it because the 
work is geared toward accommodating facilities with a lot of pressure from surroundings”. 
 
All five officers had mixed views on actors’ willingness to support regulatory 
compliance. Actors might be willing to support regulatory compliance if: (1) the managers 
in this department level totally support the programme and (2) it involves in recovery plan 
earlier phase only, thus the work can be monitored. Actors at a later recovery phase at site 
would be so preoccupied with the job to accommodate facilities for the disaster victims.  
 The manager believed that actors in his department level would be opposed to 
regulatory compliance because it would be too demanding on their working responsibilities. 
He argued that actors are faced with enough troubles concerning disaster victims’ 
adaptation, thus they are not ready for any additional responsibilities. Four technical staff 
members and six clerical staff members opposed the programme implementation because it 
would interfere with the normal adaptation and working process. They were not trained to 
handle disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20 and this department level was 
inappropriately equipped. Regulatory compliance would put too much pressure on actors. 
One clerical staff declined to comment.    
 
E. Department (special body appointed by the government) 
One technical staff was willing to support regulatory compliance implementation without 
any reason. 
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 The manager, one clerical and three technical staff members believed that actors in 
this department level would be reluctant to support regulatory compliance because of their 
inability to communicate with the disaster victims. They have to be prepared for the risk of 
dragging out the time frame for providing accommodation to the disaster victims. These are 
detailed in Table 8.18 in Appendix 24, p.431. One technical staff member commented, as 
shown in translated quotation in Appendix 23 (3.1), p.414 that: 
 
“Very few will support regulatory compliance because of their inability to communicate with 
disaster victims, and also it will increase the actors’ burden”. 
 
Four clerical staff members refused to comment.  
 
8.4.2 Perceived Ability of Regulatory Compliance on Promoting a ‘Caring Feeling’ 
and Acceptance of Disaster Victims under the MNSC Directive 20 by the Actors 
Actors either had mixed opinions (53 per cent) or agreed (47 per cent) that regulatory 
compliance would promote a ‘caring feeling’ and acceptance of disaster victims under the 
MNSC Directive 20 as shown in Table 8.19 in Appendix 24, p.431. Actors’ contribution of 
views was illustrated in details below. Three actors argued that ‘caring feeling’ and 
acceptance could be encouraged even without regulatory compliance. 
 
D. Department (under district level) 
Three officers, two technical staff members and five clerical staff members in the 
department level were confident that regulatory compliance would help to promote 
acceptance and a ‘caring feeling’ in actors. They reasoned that actual experience of 
interacting with disaster victims would make actors more aware of disaster victims’ 
difficulties, thus making them more sympathetic.   
 The manager, one technical staff, two officers and five clerical staff members who 
had mixed views claimed that for some actors regulatory compliance might make them 
more accepting and caring of victims, but some will be tempted to ignore these disaster 
victims. This ‘caring feeling’ and acceptance of disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 
20 would also depend on actors’ acceptance of disaster victims in their groups. If actors 
were positive towards regulatory compliance, then their colleagues would probably reflect 
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that attitude too. If actors are negative then the chances were that their colleagues would 
reject disaster victims in the group. The manager argued, as shown in translated quotation 
in Appendix 23 (3.2), p.415 that: 
 
“There would be mixed acceptance by actors towards disaster victims under resilience difficulties. 
There would be one section of actors who could accept disaster victims under resilience difficulties, 
make friends with them, help them, and realise how lucky they are. But there is also a section of 
actors who would discriminate and ignore them”. 
 
One technical staff argued that ‘caring feeling’ and acceptance could be encouraged 
even under out regulatory compliance. 
 
E. Department (special body appointed by the government) 
Three clerical staff members and two technical staff members in the department level 
agreed that regulatory compliance would promote acceptance and ‘caring feeling’ in actors 
towards disaster victims, due to better understanding of these disaster victims’ difficulties. 
One technical staff member argued, as shown in translated quotation in Appendix 23 (3.2), 
p.416 that: 
 
“Of course government will propose the good things to the public. This concept of regulatory 
compliance is actually to protect disaster victims’ rights and get back what they had lost. I support 
this caring feeling and acceptance between actors and disaster victims”. 
 
One clerical staff and two technical staff members had reservations. They argued in 
one aspect that it might make actors more caring and accepting due to a better 
understanding of these disaster victims’ problems. But they were also worried that disaster 
victims would be more isolated and segregated because of their inability to articulate their 
thoughts to actors. Table 8.19 in Appendix 24, p 431 summarises the response with 50 per 
cent showing that they are uncertain. 
 One manager and one clerical staff argued that ‘caring feeling’ and acceptance 
could be encouraged even without regulatory compliance. 
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8.4.3 Perceived Willingness of Actors to Attend In-Service Training in Emergency 
Housing                                
Only 30 per cent of actors were willing to attend in-service training in disaster management 
and emergency housing. 25 per cent of them were undecided. Obviously, almost half (45 
per cent) of actors interviewed were unwilling to attend in-service training in disaster 
management and emergency housing. Actors’ contribution of views was illustrated in 
details below. Table 8.20 in Appendix 24, p.431 summarises response to the question of 
actors’ perception regarding willingness of actors to attend in-service training in disaster 
management and emergency housing. 
                                                                                      
D. Department (under district level) 
Two officers and seven clerical staff members said that they were willing to attend in-
service training to learn new working skills. One officer expressed the likelihood of 
acceptance of further training by actors, as shown in translated quotation in Appendix 23 
(3.3), p.417 that: 
 
“There are actors who would be interested to attend such courses. First thing to do is give them 
some information on what regulatory is all about. For example when I discussed about this MNSC 
Directive 20, there were many actors who came over to see what regulatory compliance is all 
about, and they asked a lot of questions. That shows that clerical staff are interested in regulatory 
compliance too”. 
 
One officer and four technical staff members expressed mixed opinions. They 
argued that actors might be willing to attend the in-service training if the length of the 
course were shortened and if appropriate information on regulatory compliance were given 
to all of the actors. They also felt that very few actors were interested in handling disaster 
victims without formal education.   
The manager and two officers claimed that actors in his department level were 
unwilling to attend in-service training because in the past they were not receptive to 
attending such training. Three clerical staff members were reluctant to attend in-service 
training because they had been handling disaster victims for too long and were not 
interested in changing their ways. Family commitments were also cited as reasons for not 
wanting to attend in-service training.   
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E. Department (special body appointed by the government) 
Three clerical staff members were willing to attend training in emergency housing in order 
to diversify their working abilities. One clerical staff argued, as shown in translated 
quotation in Appendix 23 (3.3), p.417 that: 
 
“Not a problem for me, because that is the way to get more information about this programme”. 
 
Two technical staff members who were unsure agreed that actors might be willing 
to attend in-service training if the Prime Minister’s Department directed them. Actors might 
also be interested in emergency housing training if they were bored with the routine of 
handling disaster victims and might want to try something completely different.   
 The manager, two clerical staff members and two technical staff members in the 
department level had the perception that actors would be reluctant to attend in-service 
training in emergency housing. One of these technical staff believed that unless actors have 
family relations with the disaster victims, they would not be interested in this programme. 
Actors’ unwillingness, according to these technical staff members, was also due to family 
commitments. Worthy of note is the comment from the technical staff that working at this 
department may be chosen for personal or family reasons. Table 8.20 in Appendix 24, 
p.431 summarises response to the question of actor’s willingness to attend in-service 
training. One technical staff argued, as shown in translated quotation in Appendix 23 (3.3), 
p.417 that: 
 
“I volunteered to handle this department level because of I have relatives involved in the MNSC 
Directive 20. Hopefully by working in this department level, I could help them”. 
 
8.4.4 Actor Perceptions of the Conditions to Accept Regulatory Compliance  
Actors were asked to express their views towards the issue above. Actor responses were 
gathered generally into three broad categories based on assumed interpretative similarities 
during data analysis. Wherever appropriate, these categories were sub-divided further into 
sections. Table 8.21 in Appendix 24, p.431 shows the range of conditions for accepting 
regulatory compliance as proposed by the 71 actors interviewed, 5 actors’ from national 
level declined to comment, some of them gave more than one answer (in the text below 
their responses are expressed in percentage form).  
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 Actors interviewed said that they would accept regulatory compliance under the 
MNSC Directive 20 in their groups if they were directed to do so by the Prime Minister’s 
Department (46 per cent), but there were exceptions. The manager (under national level) 
said that actors involved in the department had agreed to accept the selected disaster 
victims under any directives or the Prime Minister’s Department because they wanted to 
try. This view was shared by the technical staff (under state level). The clerical staff (under 
national level) had also accepted it. The clerical staff (under district level) claimed that 
actors involved in handling these victims would actually readily accept their presence in the 
disaster site or groups. The second condition was that disaster victims under the MNSC 
Directive 20, placed in disaster victims’ group, should have certain abilities. These disaster 
victims must have acquired certain prerequisite skills (15 per cent), for example, the ability 
to handle themselves, mastery of the use of at least medical responses and fluency in 
communication. Disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20 must be able to behave 
themselves in disaster victims’ group (25 per cent). This condition was put forward mainly 
by actors under national level and under district level. But there were also actors who had 
the perception that clerical staff would not accept disaster victims if they did not have 
behavioural problems due to poor knowledge of regulations (6.6 per cent). The third 
condition made was that only non-religious regulations are accepted (9.2 per cent). One 
technical staff (under national level) argued, as shown in translated quotation in Appendix 
23 (3.4), p.418 that: 
 
“There are actors who visit our group regularly, who would accept the disaster victims into their 
groups if these disaster victims can self-handle, especially groups involving non-religious 
regulations. Actors not only interested in religious matter but also races and cultures that are very 
sensitive”. 
 
8.4.5 Barriers towards the Implementation of Regulatory Compliance 
Actors were asked to state the barriers that existed in disaster department levels that could 
hinder regulatory compliance implementation. The barriers identified are listed in Table 
8.22 in Appendix 24, p.432 and consists of nine general categories. 
 The highest percentage (19 per cent) for a specific barrier was actors not being 
trained to handle disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20. However, several actors 
under national level and district level considered that actors only know their specific 
269 
 
knowledge and were not skilled in many different areas. Thus, they can only do their work 
(4.1 per cent). The second highest barrier cited was related to the high capacity of 
emergency housing population (16.2 per cent). A third barrier was the lack of working 
resource and materials (10.7 per cent) and fourthly, was the unwillingness of actors to 
accept disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20 in their groups (8.3 per cent). A Fifth 
barrier was the inadequate number of technical staff available on site (7.2 per cent). 
 A lack in provision of emergency housing (6.2 per cent) was closely related to the 
high capacity of the population that was also blamed for the failure in the internal 
Mechanism of Disaster Management in Malaysia. This internal system was also perceived 
as a barrier by actors interviewed (2.1 per cent). The situation was even worse with the 
involvement of international communities (2.1 per cent). Lack of information on regulatory 
compliance made actors wary of its implementation (4.8 per cent). Actors were also wary 
of regulatory compliance due to training programme appraisal (2.1 per cent). 
 Besides actors’ negative attitudes to regulatory compliance, negative attitudes of the 
department levels’ managers (3.4 per cent), disaster victims (2.4 per cent) and disaster 
victims’ relatives (3.8 per cent) were also cited as barriers to its implementation. Disaster 
victims’ behaviour (1.7 per cent) and disaster victims without formal education (3.8 per 
cent) were perceived as barriers by actors under national level and under district level. 
 Other barriers cited by the actors interviewed were the unwillingness of actors to 
relinquish their responsibilities due to professional interest (0.3 per cent), other 
responsibilities not related to working (0.5 per cent) and unwillingness of disaster victims 
under the MNSC Directive 20 themselves to be included in disaster victims’ group (1.3 per 
cent). 
 
8.4.6 Changes Suggested by Actors Prior to Regulatory Compliance Implementation 
in Disaster Department Levels 
Actors were asked to propose changes they would like to see at the department level prior 
to regulatory compliance implementation. Changes suggested were closely related to the 
barriers given in Table 8.22 in Appendix 24, p.432. Changes suggested are listed in Table 
8.23 in Appendix 24, p.433 and grouped into five general categories. 
 The main change advocated by actors interviewed was the retraining and training of 
actors (35.6 per cent). The manager (district) argued that if actors have the confidence to 
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handle disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20 in disaster victims’ group, then they 
will adapt well to regulatory compliance implementation. Retraining in the emergency 
housing programme would help them gain this confidence. Actors recommended that 
actors, especially technical staff involved in emergency housing, should be given 
continuous training at national, district or state level. By establishing training centers at 
these levels, actors could be called for training several times in a year. This would address 
some of the issues regarding actors’ family commitments that were quoted by many actors 
as reasons for their reluctance to attend retraining. Besides retraining, actors also 
recommended that inclusion of disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20 be made part 
of basic actor training programmes (4.1 per cent). This would prepare future actors 
mentally to accept disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20 in their groups. 
 Actors also suggested that department levels should be informed about the Prime 
Minister’s Department intention to introduce regulatory compliance in providing 
emergency housing (28.1 per cent). This would be more effective if the Prime Minister’s 
Department, through the state department, was willing to allocate officers well versed in the 
programme and its implementation, to disseminate regulatory compliance information to all 
department levels.  
 More emergency housing units are required to be built because regulatory 
compliance requires the reduction of present number of disaster victims per unit according 
to MNSC Directive 20 (11 per cent). Building more emergency housing requires a system 
of administration that is clear and focused towards regulatory compliance (4.8 per cent). 
Actors also suggested that the creation of working assistant posts in department levels that 
are practicing regulatory compliance (11 per cent). This would help to reduce actors’ 
workloads. 
 Other than suggesting a better system of administration, two actors (under national 
level) recommended that actors should spend more time with the disaster victims (1.4 per 
cent). This would give actors more time to concentrate on disaster victims’ adaptation 
difficulties under the MNSC Directive 20. Two actors from this department level suggested 
that the disaster victims who are interested to participate must volunteer themselves (0.7 per 
cent).   
 One technical staff (under national level) suggested that every district office in the 
state level should have one officer in charge of its emergency housing programme (1.4 per 
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cent). This officer could act as ‘trouble-shooter’ for actors with problems in their regulatory 
compliance programme. Two clerical staff members (under district level) suggested that the 
formation of a special committee at the state level in order to continuously monitor the 
regulatory compliance programme in disaster department levels (0.7 per cent). This 
committee would consist of experts in various fields and provide advice on regulatory 
compliance implementation if required. One technical staff (special body appointed by the 
government) said that the officer in charge of the emergency housing programme should be 
someone with an emergency housing background (1.4 per cent). This would make him/her 
more considerate and committed. 
 
8.4.7 Strategies to Encourage Actors to Accept Regulatory Compliance under the 
MNSC Directive 20  
The strategies listed in Table 8.24 in Appendix 24, p.434 were recommended by actors to 
encourage them to accept regulatory compliance. These strategies were gathered into six 
general categories. 
 Actors suggested that they should be given more encouragement for their efforts 
working in disaster management and emergency housing. There were generally four types 
of encouragement recommended. The first was the personal incentives, particularly 
financial reward (17 per cent), and actors who were involved in regulatory compliance 
should be made part of their yearly appraisal of working performance (5.2 per cent). It was 
also recommended that actors nominated for the regulatory compliance programme should 
be sent for overseas training to a country that has practised regulatory compliance 
successfully (1.7 per cent). Another recommendation was that actors involved in the 
regulatory compliance programme should be given the chance to upgrade their academic 
qualifications (1.3 per cent). 
 The second form of encouragement mentioned was that actors should be provided 
with all appropriate working materials required, depending on the types of working 
condition (15 per cent). These actors argued that this would save actors time and effort in 
providing emergency housing/site administration for disaster victims under the MNSC 
Directive 20. 
 The third type of encouragement suggested was the availability of professional 
working support. Three forms were mentioned. The first was the support from technical 
272 
 
staff (16 per cent). Actors argued that they should be given free access to consult and seek 
advice from technical staff and professional whenever they faced difficulties over the 
compliance matters. Moral support by managers was also mentioned by the actors 
interviewed (5.1 per cent). Managers should make every effort to help actors to resolve 
their difficulties in regulatory compliance. Actors (under district level) and (special body 
appointed by the government) also felt that it was also essential to get support from other 
actors involved in emergency housing (1.3 per cent). 
 The fourth form of encouragement recommended was the reduction of actors’ 
workloads. Actors advocated that disaster victims’ group responsibilities should be 
reduced. This would give actors more time to address disaster victims’ resilience 
difficulties under the MNSC Directive 20 and reduce other actors’ duties, for example, 
entertaining disaster victims’. In order to limit actors’ workloads, actors’ suggestions are: 
1. Reduce the group population so that fewer disaster victims sharing the same 
facilities at the same time (20.4 per cent);  
2. Restriction of regulations (2.9 per cent); 
3. Include disaster victims with resilience difficulties under the MNSC Directive 20 in 
low income group and get benefit from other national programme (2.1 per cent); 
4. Reduce actors working periods and non-working responsibilities (6 per cent);  
5. Involve different community, place in a different group (0.4 per cent). 
 
Besides encouragement, actors interviewed said that actors could be encouraged to 
try full regulatory compliance if the Prime Minister’s Department, through the State and 
District Department, could show examples of a regulatory compliance programme that 
actually works (4.2 per cent). They stressed that apart from knowing very little about 
regulatory compliance in theory, the majority of actors had never seen full regulatory 
compliance working in action. 
 Three actors (under national level) and (special body appointed by the government) 
also recommended that actors who had been recognised by the Prime Minister’s 
Department as ‘excellent’ actors should be involved in emergency housing programme (0.9 
per cent). As officially recognised excellent practitioners, they would be likely to posses the 
right credentials to make regulatory compliance work. 
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8.5 Conclusion  
The actors interviewed generally admitted that they know very little about the regulatory 
compliance implementation to the MNSC Directive 20 proposed by the Prime Minister’s 
Department. This lack of knowledge about regulatory compliance is due to lack of 
information about regulatory compliance given to departments at the national, state or 
district level.  
 
A. Cognitive 
Only actors who were involved in the disaster site activities and were familiar with the 
information sent it onto their departments. Regulatory compliance with the programme is 
rarely discussed within the departments either formally or informally especially among 
technical staff and managers. The managers who were directly involved with the disaster 
victims had positive attitudes towards the implementation of regulatory compliance, 
compared to the managers who were doing more administration work. Only halve of the 
overall actors involved in the interviews understood with rationale of regulatory 
compliance implementation by the Prime Minister’s Department.  
However, actors claimed that all departments were already applying rules and 
regulations (other than the MNSC Directive 20) related to their scope of works. The 
majority of actors interviewed said they had never been trained to handle disaster victims 
and to understand regulatory compliance during their pre-service training. Some of them 
were familiar with regulatory compliance as they attended formal training. They also 
admitted that they never expected to be involved in any way at all in these disaster victims’ 
adaptations. There was no doubt that the actors interviewed were anxious about regulatory 
compliance. Actors were interested to know about their working environments, as most of 
them were familiar with the term used in the disaster scene (i.e. disaster victims, emergency 
housing and regulatory compliance) and discussed it with their colleagues.  
Generally, actors felt they did not have the required skills to handle disaster victims 
if included in their group and this limited their ability to implement full regulatory 
compliance. Thus, they had the perception that handling disaster victims and complying 
with the programme required different skills. 
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B. Affective 
The majority of actors interviewed agreed that disaster victims have the rights to regulatory 
compliance due to equal rights and socialisation opportunities, but they also expressed their 
reservations about the benefit of regulatory compliance for these disaster victims. They 
accepted disaster victims in their groups, but they had reservation about the issue. They felt 
that disaster victims who are capable (mentally, socially and emotionally) and can behave 
themselves in disaster victims’ group, and can cope with the rigors of resilient difficulties 
may get involved in the process of decisions making.  
However, they felt if these conditions were not fulfilled, disaster victims would not 
be able to get benefit from regulatory compliance. Actors agreed that the involvement of 
disaster victims in disaster victims’ groups would increase their knowledge.  They were not 
sure about this with regard to social development, nor agreed that their emotional 
development would recover unless handed over to specialists. At the same time this action 
will promote human resource training to strengthen disaster preparedness for effective 
response (HFA Priorities) from within the community itself and not only from the 
authorities. Even so, the current MNSC Directive 20 is not perfect, and the actors were 
unsure about the suitability of the programmes, because they felt that their daily workload 
still increased from time to time. And while the programme was suitable and practical for 
their departments, it was less so to the actors and disaster victims themselves. Regulatory 
compliance would give a benefit to the department related to the scene of emergency 
housing and was suitable to be implemented.  
However the implementation is not effective at all levels of the National Disaster 
Management Mechanism and is not tailored for them and the disaster victims individually. 
In addition, their workload will definitely increase if the disaster victims become involved 
in the process of decision making. They suggested that it is fair if their contribution should 
also be part of an overall individual appraisal (in their department), and any valuation of 
regulatory compliance accomplishments should be done by the right people who are really 
specialised in emergency housing; their contribution should get attention or recognition. 
For them this MNSC Directive 20 did not contribute towards the benefit of the disaster 
victims or them individually. However this programme did give them proper guidelines and 
increased their department performance.  
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They favoured working with the MNSC Directive 20 compared to other rules and 
regulations (national building codes and international standards) at the scene of a disaster 
because the programme is a combination of both international and local requirements in 
providing emergency housing.  
 
C. Conative 
Actors also expressed the views that even though regulatory compliance could become a 
risk when getting the disaster victims involved, it does have the potential to make actors 
more ‘caring’ towards them. Regulatory compliance would make actors more aware of the 
difficulties that disaster victims encounter in everyday activities as the result of their 
resilience difficulties. This would shorten, considerably, the social distance between actors 
and disaster victims. But they also felt this could only be achieved if actors are active in 
promoting the ‘caring’ attitudes of disaster victims.  
At the present stage, actors admitted that they are unable to fully support the MNSC 
Directive 20 implementation. The actors interviewed put forward the viewpoint that there 
are currently too many barriers present at department levels to make regulatory compliance 
implementation straightforward. They listed nine categories of barrier or obstacle (see 
section 8.4.5, p.268) that need to be overcome if regulatory compliance is to be given a 
chance to succeed in Malaysia. The main obstacle being actors are not trained in disaster 
management. They suggested the main changes (see section 8.4.6, p.269) (see also section 
10.2.1, p.300) that the actors hope to see is further training provided for them.  
However at the present stage, they are unwilling to attend in service training. The 
findings showed that actors would not accept regulatory compliance voluntarily and attend 
in service training unless there are some changes in working with incentives, while hoping 
that their contribution will affect their individual annual appraisal. During the interviews 
the actors also expressed their ideas on what actions the Prime Minister’s Department (due 
to regulatory compliance with the MNSC Directive 20 will be accepted by the actors 
mainly if directed by the Prime Minister’s Department-see section 8.4.4, p.267) might take 
to encourage actors to accept regulatory compliance (see section 8.4.7, p.271). Not only 
that, in order to make sure the programme was successful, a proportion of manpower 
working at disaster scenes, and resources provided, should be equal to the amount of time 
dedicated to disaster victims.  
276 
 
CHAPTER 9 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
“Universities play a major role in the planning and implementation efforts since all 
these efforts require a major scientific base whereby the proper information and the 
uncertainties associated with disaster impact need to be fully understood before the 
preparedness plan can be translated into policy and regulatory measures”. 
(Ahmad, 2007: 2) 
 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the findings of this thesis guided by the answers to the broad 
questions about the concept of regulatory compliance as currently held in Malaysia in order 
to achieve the aims as discussed in the Chapter 5 and as listed below:   
1. What are Malaysian actors’ attitudes towards regulatory compliance 
implementation? 
2. What are Malaysian actors’ understandings of regulatory compliance?  
3. What are the actors’ perceived rationales of regulatory compliance implementation? 
 
The discussion also highlights variables influencing actors’ general attitudes as a 
result of broadly centred thematic areas as discussed in section 6.5.4, p.178. 
 
9.1.1 Actors’ Attitudes to Regulatory Compliance 
Research outside the Malaysian context shows that crisis in public sectors, failure in policy 
implementation and crisis management, (Gray et al. 1998) the compliance to which is 
usually far from complete, massively jeopardises the effectiveness of management (Sutinen 
et al. 1990).  The attitude dilemma is affected by the environment (Allport, 1971) and 
easily influenced by the current failure of the social system (Dynes, 1993). This research 
shows that actors have a high level of negativity towards government intention to 
implement full regulatory compliance. This particular finding is consistent with the results 
of research undertaken by Shaluf et al. (2003b) which showed that actors had negative 
attitudes towards the MNSC Directive 20. However this research was done with the actors 
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in the private service sectors as its subjects. Meanwhile, in the public service sectors, the 
research showed that the actors generally possessed a good basic knowledge in their own 
field and a positive attitude towards their daily routine (Aini et al. 2006).  
 In conclusion, the actors in public service sectors involved in disaster management 
are knowledgeable in their area but not about the MNSC Directive 20, hence they had a 
negative attitude towards its implementation because they are usually not familiar with the 
MNSC Directive 20. If this is a rather disappointing finding for the advocacy of regulatory 
compliance, it is, nevertheless, a position that administrative planners will have to look into 
with great consideration. This finding recalled the statement by scholars concerning 
improper standards and guidelines utilisation that may affect the overall support from 
regulators (Corsellis et al. 2005); negative perceptions from actors towards planning and 
acting on rehabilitation/reconstruction programmes due to difficulties in agencies 
coordination (Barakat, 2003); and no guarantee that comprehensive planning will be 
followed by good managing translation, if information regarding the programme be kept 
only as a plan for implementation (Qurantelli et al. 1977; Quarantelli, 1993).  
  Actors’ perspectives on the implementation of regulatory compliance reveal their 
actual commitment, and explain the failures of regulatory compliance. This research shows 
that actors have a range of beliefs, opinions and hopes for regulatory compliance 
irrespective of their Professional Status. It also indicates that there exists amongst actors 
every kind of attitude to regulatory compliance imaginable. The interviews showed that 
actors were, to their credit, genuinely concerned about the effect of regulatory compliance 
both to the disaster victims and their colleagues. They argue that there are currently too 
many barriers present in department levels to make regulatory compliance implementation 
straightforward. There are nine barriers that have been identified that could have 
contributed to actors having negative general attitudes towards regulatory compliance. The 
office of the Prime Minister’s Department together with the support of disaster community 
should look into this matter as a challenge and not simply as a barrier, as discussed below. 
 
A. Lack of Information 
Lack of knowledge in relation to regulatory compliance among the actors is due to lack of 
information about regulatory compliance given to departments at the national, state or 
district levels. The small number and uneven circulation of information about the MNSC 
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Directive 20 and regulatory compliance was among one of the reasons that contributed to 
lack of understanding among the actors. The national housing policy section has a strong 
normative function bringing knowledge and expertise in the housing sector development 
and policy responses in various thematic areas as mentioned by the UN-HABITAT (1999) 
although in this research, the findings show that the distribution of information regarding 
the MNSC Directive 20 in respect to housing provided was not adequately addressed. One 
consequence is that those involved in disaster response receive very little information about 
implementation because no one really knows what they are meant to do. 
 This lack of information was also cited as the reason why actors in general are 
unwilling to support regulatory compliance and also why they are unwilling to attend in-
service training. This finding is consistent with Parr (1970), Paton (1999) and Johnston et 
al. (2001) who agreed that it is important to provide sufficient information and resources in 
order to formulate and adopt comprehensive mitigation strategies. A number of actors were 
willing to support regulatory compliance if they knew more about it. Concerns about 
actors’ lack of knowledge was highlighted in this research as several actors interviewed 
claimed that the only document that they had come across concerning regulatory 
compliance was the questionnaire from the present research. However, as far as Malaysia is 
concerned, there is no real problem surrounding early warning and disaster information due 
to the fact that the Malaysian Centre of Remote Sensing (MACRES) has established a 
National Disaster and Information Management (NADDI). This action is consistent with 
the recommendation made by O’Keefe et al. (2006) that relevant agencies supposedly are 
active in sharing and expanding knowledge and information. 
 
B. Actors not trained to handle Disaster Victims 
Malaysia is still on its way in investing more capital in human resources. Studies indicate 
that developed countries observe lower casualty levels compared to others that lack capital 
to invest in emergency response management (Dynes et al. 1977; Burton, 1993). As a 
result, actors have negative perceptions about their own ability to handle disaster victims 
because they never expected to do so. Generally, actors feel that they do not have the 
required skills to handle disaster victims if included in their group. Even with the 
knowledge about departmental disaster management strategies they are still lacking the 
information regarding the MNSC Directive 20. This finding is consistent with the studies of 
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Fakhru'l-Razi et al. (2001) that the emergency management system in Malaysia focuses 
more on action plan in every level from national, state to district rather than local 
encounter. Thus, they have the perception that handling disaster victims and implementing 
regulatory compliance requires different skills. Disaster victims’ process of adaptation has 
always been and still is the sole responsibility of disaster workers, especially the actors in 
disasters.  
 Meanwhile, there are always pressures from the press, public and NGOs about the 
quality provided by the actors (Wisner et al. 2004). Pressure generates a positive obligatory 
action by government to provide actors with training. Actors will act better if they are well 
trained and understand what they are doing (Meidinger, 1987; Heide, 1989). Therefore, it is 
understandable that actors are anxious about the MNSC Directive 20 because they never 
exposed to it. It is also a conspicuous criticism of the actors training programme that actors 
have little appreciation of the scope of work that they could profitably contribute to. These 
findings are consistent with the studies of Paton et al. (1999) that ineffective team 
enhancement and administration, clarification of roles and capabilities, professional 
development and training and cooperation will disable the policies. Furthermore, lack of 
expertise and training, poorly integrated experience in its organisational culture and 
learning cycle contributed to the end result being significant delays in housing delivery for 
the disaster survivors (Berman et al. 2007). 
 
C. Regulatory Compliance would not benefit the Actors and the Disaster Victims 
Actors hardly accept the fact that regulatory compliance will give them and the disaster 
victims’ benefit from the MNSC Directive 20. It was consistent with the notion by 
Godschalk (1985) and Wolensky (1990) that a disaster community often has difficulty in 
seeing the potential benefits of mitigation. In fact the implementation of this programme 
gave them more responsibilities, forced them to attend in-service training, work overtime, 
possibilities to be blamed if the programme was not successful implemented and this will 
effect their yearly appraisal and department performance. Therefore they suggested that 
changes should be made in order to make the implementation successful.  
 The disaster victims are being ignored but they have rights (UNHCR, 2004) and the 
best protection against infringement of rights is to ensure that regulatory measures are 
implemented and enforced fairly and systematically (Anderson et al. 1991a). The majority 
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of actors interviewed agreed that disaster victims have the rights to regulatory compliance 
due to the fact of equal rights and socialisation opportunities. The actors are uncertain about 
the issue whether the knowledge of disaster victims will be improved or not if they 
participated in the decision making process. However, actors can ensure that the disaster 
victims’ social skills (communication) might develop even though they might not be able to 
easily recover emotionally (most of the victims were in a traumatic case). Furthermore, the 
current contents of the MNSC Directive 20 are not suitable for the actors and the victims 
that require revision especially in giving more authority to operational level (decentralise), 
although the programme shows some improvement (i.e. caring feeling) in the adaptation of 
disaster victims after a disaster strike. This finding corresponds to Berman et al. (2007), 
that community-based reconstruction and decentralisation are realistic. They have indeed 
been proven to be faster, resulting in the highest quality and satisfaction to stakeholders. 
Thus the actors wanted to see more changes in the MNSC Directive 20. 
 
D. Department Organisation 
Key variables affecting compliance are commonly based on the perceptions of individuals 
concerning fairness and appropriateness of the law and its institutions (Tyler, 1990). The 
success depends on the level of satisfaction by the stakeholders (regulators and regulatees). 
One principal tool available to the public service sector in any attempt to gain control over 
policy is its performance as mentioned by Peter (2001). However, actors perceived 
themselves as having partial commitments towards the MNSC Directive 20 that 
consequently results in non-compliance. This negative perception by the public service 
gives a bad impression regarding government policy. One of the reasons is that it was 
difficult for the actors to entertain specific demands from the disaster victims especially 
when it came to the matter of culture and religious interest (e.g. worship space, prohibited 
objects, daily routine). Apparently, actors are the ones to be accused of regarding the 
unsuccessful nature of any disaster management programme especially the actors from the 
‘special body appointed by the government’ because most of the assistance in providing 
accommodation to the disaster victims was handled by them. Consequently these daunting 
complaints will then affect the organisations performance or company portfolio.  
 Additionally, compliance must become institutionalised (Makkai et al. 1993; 
Parker, 1999; Luttig, 2000) with unanimous support from stakeholders to the planned 
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development project. According to any standard operation procedure in public service, 
most of the decisions are made internally. This finding has been shown by Amirahmadi 
(1990) to be an important method to centralise authorities in the process of 
rehabilitation/reconstruction. The apprehension is that the involvement of the disaster 
victims in the process of decision making possibly contributed to a distraction from 
department objectives, lengthen the process and revealed lack of commitment of the 
administration. The study findings show that the outcome of the regulatory compliance 
process produced negative effects on the performance of department levels, especially to 
the national level. Most of them work at administration level. On the other hand, most of 
the disaster effort has been done by others at disaster settings. Miscommunication within 
departments, due to ineffective distribution of information (needs from victims), contributes 
to programme failures and effects a departments’ reputation. 
 
E. The Actors’ Workload 
Actors interviewed were unanimous in believing that regulatory compliance would increase 
their workload. This result supports studies by Ramayah (2001), which show that the 
demands of meaningful work are increasing for the employees in Malaysia. Besides duties 
and responsibilities in the department level, clerical staff members said that they would 
have to lavish extra attention on disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20 to make up 
for their adaptation to the programme guidelines. This extra attention would distract actors’ 
attention from the regulatory compliance because human feelings and differences are 
demanding and might drag out the allotted time for providing emergency housing. Actors 
not only have to perform at the department level, they also have to perform at the disaster 
settings and attend programmes or training that are sometimes out of their scope of work. 
However, the commitment in responsibilities from the actors is considered to be high. 
Work was ranked as the most important followed by supervision and promotion. This 
supports the findings of Hackman et al. (1971); Seybolt (1976) and Ramayah (2001). 
 
F. Appraisal and Relief Works Pressure 
The main issue mentioned by the actors is that they were not provided enough information 
and skills to work at disaster setting apart from office routines. At the same time they were 
required to get involved in disaster management. Studies by Morago, for example (2005), 
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show that often the pressures of time and people’s needs counteract the demands of quality 
and suitability. They are basically judged on how well they can handle these matters and 
keep in touch with disaster victims. Without proper knowledge about the programme and 
skills, they are not prepared enough to get involved in disaster management but they still 
have to as it forms part of their responsibilities. This finding highlights the research that has 
been done by Dynes et al. (1980) that most disaster organisations will operate as usual 
based on their daily routine even in disaster situations. If the case turns out badly they will 
be blamed for not carrying out their job properly. As a result of the conflict in regulatory 
enforcement, assistance in disasters is not quite what the disaster victims expect (Crawford, 
2002).  
 Gunningham et al. (1999a) highlighted how compliance definitions are preferred by 
way of outcome (e.g. a safe workplace), rather than defining compliance according to 
prescriptive criteria, or adherence to a specified process. Unaddressed requests from 
disaster victims lead to unsuccessful outcomes in disaster response. These issues put a lot 
of pressure on the actors, especially when it affects their appraisal, promotion and 
increment of incentives. The actors suggested that the evaluation of appraisal at the 
department level should be more practical and expended. They requested that their 
appraisal must consist of training service attendance and should been done with the actors 
directly involved in disaster management. Furthermore, their contribution should be 
recognised and appreciated. 
 
G. Negative Acceptance of Disaster Victims by Actors and Communities 
Behaviour of officials was found to be a central constituent of any enforcement regime at 
operational level (May, 2003). In this research, most of the actors rarely visited disaster 
sites for a fair while after the disaster occurrence. Consequently, they are virtually unknown 
to the disaster victims in disaster victims’ group. They reasoned that involvement of the 
disaster victims would complicate the situation and make the development and 
reconstruction process difficult. They also admitted that they never expected to make 
contact and get involved in these disaster victims’ adaptations. The actors expected to see 
the outputs of the projects prescriptively the same as written on the papers (development 
plan). This finding is consistent with the studies of Bennett et al. (2006) that show how 
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results have too great an emphasis on outputs without appropriately tracking the outcomes 
on lives and livelihoods.  
 Actors would accept the disaster victims on the grounds of humanity and empathy 
but not in terms of responsibilities because they are bound to working ethics and there must 
be a gap between them and disaster victims. Although in the theory of social learning as 
argued by Aronfreed (1969); Bandura (1969), Mischel et al. (1976), Akers et al. (1979) and 
Akers (1985), the main variables concerning the compliance issue supposedly include 
opinions from peers that are affected by having individual encounters. The managers’ 
negative perceptions of the extra workload would result from the obligation to handle 
disaster victims. Disaster victims’ involvement in the process of decision making will just 
give them more concern over the disaster victims rather than departmental performance. 
This is especially true if managers are primarily concerned with their department 
performance in their departmental report. The managers concerned should reflect on Article 
25 of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights cited by the International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) that “every world citizen has 
the rights to health and well being and the rights to security in the event of circumstances 
beyond [his or her] control” (McEntire, 1997: 222). 
 The group of actors who made frequent visits to the disaster site was the technical 
staff members who work at the district level. They express their impression mostly about 
accepting the disaster victims in their group because they had made direct contact with the 
disaster victims. Research in the case of Malaysia is unique and mostly represented from 
Malaysia’s perspective. This is the reason why the actors might ascertain a higher level of 
tolerance and acceptance on cultural differences as mentioned by Kennedy et al. (2000); 
Jaouadi (2000) and Ramayah (2003). However, the actors prefer to accept the disaster 
victims if they are ready (rationally). The best scenario would be if the disaster victims had 
experience and knowledge about the MNSC Directive 20. Thus, the disaster victims might 
adapt to disaster victims’ group easily.  
 Additionally, the actors were concerned that the disaster victims might not get what 
they expected. They might be under-treated by the actors due to the large number of 
members in disaster victims’ group. The disaster victims would feel that they had not been 
treated accordingly due to discrimination or bias. Some of the community also does not 
offer assistance to the disaster victims, especially in terms of providing accommodation (as 
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host). Studies by O’Keefe et al. (2006) show that the urgent needs for hazard, precautionary 
and mitigation effort to lessen government responsibilities at community level are obvious 
but still not addressed. The community as a whole should be more supportive of the 
disaster victims. Actors assumed that communities will be accepting of the disaster victims 
if they are their relatives. Ironically, some of the communities rejected the assistance from 
the authorities because of transparency issues concerning the disaster victims.  
 
H. Lack of Resources 
Unavailability or inadequate supply of appropriate resources would make the 
implementation of regulatory compliance difficult (e.g. information, safety materials, office 
materials, information). Actors have also to consider providing them with adequate human 
resources: most departments lack actors who are adequately trained in emergency housing. 
This finding is consistent with Mitchell (1996); McEntire (1997) and Godchalk et al. 
(1999) who argue that states widely disagree over the disaster-related policies they adopt, 
largely as a result of the inadequacy of political experience and economic readiness. In the 
case of disaster victims’ psychological and medical treatments, for example, they prefer to 
hand it over to the specialists. The majority of actors are not trained in the MNSC Directive 
20. A majority of the actors interviewed would need frequent consultation and explanation 
about the MNSC Directive 20. Most of the actors did not familiarise themselves with the 
international standards in disaster management. Only five per cent prefer to use it.  
Actors also suggest that the implementation of regulatory compliance might be 
totally achieved if they are provided with the right working assistance (e.g. specialist 
availability and working instruments) to diminish their workload. These findings are 
consistent with the studies of Shaluf et al. (2003b) that enforcement authorities in disaster 
response should also be responsive to the international standards development that suits the 
Malaysia safety culture with the support of knowledge and physical assistance. Aini (2007) 
suggested that public administration in Malaysia requires more focus and determination in 
development projects in order to meet international standards (Aini, 2007). 
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I. Negative Acceptance of Regulatory Compliance by Disaster Victims and 
Actors 
Actors assumed that disaster victims, and actors themselves, perceived a negativity towards 
accepting regulatory compliance. Actors listed thirteen reasons (see section 7.8.1, p.213, 
Table 7.16, p.214) for opposing regulatory compliance implementation in their department. 
Most of the actors at administration level were against the intended implementation of 
compliance. Actors assumed that some of the disaster victims who were also against the 
implementation were hesitant about the authority’s capability to provide them 
accommodation and act accordingly at the scene of disasters. These findings highlight what 
has been mentioned by Sieber (1981) and Hogwood et al. (1985) about the possibility of 
policy failures, specifically if a program may or may not achieve its goals, rather creating 
more negative side effects. As a result, the stakeholders’ main objectives in disasters are 
preoccupied by other definitions of a disaster program (e.g. discrimination and 
bureaucracy) despite planning the disaster response as a priority.  
As stated by Barakat (2003), authorities failed to react accordingly and this resulted 
in unsustainable reconstruction projects. Consequently, houses are remodeled by their 
occupants, rejected or might even be abandoned. Disaster management and emergency 
housing in Malaysia prioritises material provisions rather than social development held to 
underpin the very concept of a ‘caring’ society. At worst, the disaster victims may begin to 
feel that they are the problem rather than the disasters. These findings are consistent with 
the studies of Barakat (2003) and O’Keefe et al. (2006) that projects that are impractical 
and don’t consider the appropriate needs of beneficiaries result in unsustainable 
rehabilitation/reconstruction projects.  
 Efforts in impact reduction should be given a priority in order to realise a 
sustainable culture which is moving towards the implementation of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) (Middleton et al. 2001). If the concept of ‘disaster works’ in 
the public service sectors was revised, the culture of the regulatory compliance could be 
implemented automatically.  Actors should consider humanitarian grounds more than 
responsibilities. That is the ultimate challenge for change (see section 10.2, p.299) that 
Malaysia seeks to achieve in its 2020 vision. Consequently, nine categories of barriers or 
obstacles are listed that need to be overcome if regulatory compliance is to be given a 
chance to succeed in Malaysia. 
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9.1.2 Actors’ Understanding of Regulatory Compliance 
These study findings lead to the conclusion that actors see the process of regulatory 
compliance as ‘assimilation’ and not ‘accommodation.’ Unchanging internal institutional 
structures can potentially create a cost of ‘squeezing’ external perceptions to fit (i.e. the 
actors adapting to the regulatory compliance environment, not the regulatory compliance 
environment to the actors) (Piaget, 2001). In ‘accommodation’, the internal institution has 
to accommodate itself to the evidence with which it is confronted, and thus adaption can be 
a more difficult and painful process (Piaget, 2001). Institutional goals or ambitions are 
adjusted to what, under given circumstances, appears feasible or possible (see section 
10.2.1, p.300). 
 The actors did not look at the concept of regulatory compliance as a culture but as 
their job responsibility. Studies were emphasised in work culture for example by Hawkins 
(1984); Bell (1985); McGarity (1985); Meidinger (1985) and Jasanof (1986); that culture 
has become a central construction in administrative regulation. But the meaning and 
importance of this development remains quite unclear because of the complexity of culture 
in organisations that need better understanding in terms of attitude, perception, value and 
belief (Harvey et al. 2002). As argued by Johnston et al. (2001), emergency management 
should be looked as more than just coordination and assimilation on the regulators’ side. 
Communities should also be given an opportunity to participate in disaster response to 
sustain empowerment, self-help and resilience. Therefore an emergency management 
agency is also capable of acting as a consultant for disaster communities rather than 
dictating the process of change.  
 Even though actors are knowledgeable and understand the concepts of regulatory 
compliance, emergency housing and disaster victims, they still consider themselves as 
having negative attitudes and demonstrate low confidence levels towards the 
implementation process. Actors perceive themselves as having a perception of negative 
capability towards their own understanding and knowledge in regulatory compliance, 
especially those within the state and district levels. This finding is consistent with the 
studies of Shaluf et al. (2003b) that actors are unaware of the MNSC Directive 20 disaster 
management guidelines, although the majority of them believe that the MNSC Directive 20 
is essential.  
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 Practically, regulatory compliance is rarely discussed within the department either 
formally or informally. Some technical staff members had mixed reasons and only 
discussed regulatory compliance with selected actors. There were possibilities that their 
work would be misjudged by other actors for not doing their job accordingly. According to 
them, the element of knowledge and abilities did influence actors’ attitudes when doing 
their routine jobs. This finding is supported by the statement by Wolensky (1990) that the 
limited discourse on local disaster management indicates that this is a particularly 
problematic area for local policy makers. Furthermore, Drabek (2000)   mentioned that both 
decision makers and operation personnel need to increase their understanding of the 
potential liability associated with emergency actions.  
 Actors (i.e. chairmen, technical staff members and clerical staff members) 
considered themselves as knowledgeable about the MNSC Directive 20. However, only the 
chairmen were confident about the ability of their working skills to implement full 
regulatory compliance. All departments in Disaster Management Mechanism in Malaysia 
perform at the same level of knowledge and ability; however levels of compliance are 
different according to the department due to different levels of control. Level of compliance 
was higher in the department that appointed officers to look after regulatory compliance. 
Nonetheless, most of the actors’ biographical data (e.g. Gender, Level of Control, and 
Experience) had no influence on the implementation of regulatory compliance. 
 
9.1.3 Actors’ Perceived Rationale of Full Regulatory Compliance 
Actors may be persuaded to accept regulatory implementation, if certain conditions are met 
by the Prime Minister’s Department. Actors would be willing to give regulatory 
compliance a chance if actors are given specialist support and enough exposure. Actors 
would also positively accept regulatory compliance if they are given the direct orders from 
their superiors, accept disaster victims without disruptive behaviour and even volunteer 
themselves to implement regulatory compliance. This finding is factual as mentioned by 
Aini et al. (2005) and Foong et al. (2006) that the Malaysian direction in providing 
accommodation in post-disaster is clear and on the right track. As a result, the actors 
recommend changes to the department structures, systems and practices prior to compliance 
with the MNSC Directive 20. Actors describe barriers as being obstacles toward the 
implementation. The main obstacle however is the inadequate training of the actors. It has 
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been suggested that the main change is to see further training provided to the actors in 
disaster response (Moin, 2006). The findings also showed that actors would not accept 
regulatory compliance voluntarily unless changes are made in working with incentives and 
aligned with their hopes that their contribution will be counted in their individual annual 
appraisal. Moreover, the proportion of manpower working in the disaster scene and 
resources provided should be in balance with the amount of the disaster victims and time. 
 Most of the actors were uncertain in supporting the implementation and they were 
also reluctant to attend the in-service training. They perceived this lack of  support when 
not able to implement, and consequently not willing to attend in-service training, and vice 
versa. The actors also said that the MNSC Directive 20 was suitable and practical for their 
department but not for the actors and disaster victims. Regulatory compliance would give 
benefit to the department related to the scene of emergency housing and was suitable to be 
implemented. However the implementation is not effective at all levels of the National 
Disaster Management Mechanism and is not tailored for them and the disaster victims 
individually. These findings were consistent to the findings by Hunt (2005) concerning the 
statement that efforts and approaches towards regulatory compliance will, at the end, 
acknowledge different needs from individuals within different authorities.  
 Changes usually take a long while to take place (Knoster, 1991) even if a 
department wishes to introduce specific regulations in order to make present regulatory 
compliance work better because compliance depends on actors’ attitudes and other relevant 
factors. This finding return to the notion by Fairman (2005) regarding the definition of 
compliance per se differs from a perspective that considers the scope and degree of 
compliance as the outcome of a negotiated process between a social actor and an 
enforcement officer. Thus, the reaction from the actors in regulatory compliance is also 
based on flexibility of surroundings.  
 Regulatory compliance is not a law as described by Conway (2002) and Corsellis et 
al. (2005). However, actors in the public service who are non-committal regarding 
compliance with any public service regulations will only put themselves at the stage of 
internal departmental ruling (e.g. promotion and appraisal) as reported by Sarji (1996). 
Commonly, workloads and different roles and responsibilities in department level were the 
main excuses by the actors for not implementing full regulatory compliance. They reasoned 
that their responsibilities are actually more than just to work in disaster management and 
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more to their departmental level legitimacy. They have to prioritise which one is more 
important. At some stage they are unaware that non-compliance occurred due to work 
commitments. Thus, this was the dilemma they ought to face that proved the findings by 
Aini (2007) that regulatory and organisational malfunctions were the main contributions to 
hidden errors in relation to the disasters response with 53.6 and 37 per cent respectively in 
Malaysia. These findings were true as mentioned by Meidinger (1985) and Hutter (1997) 
that ‘enforcement’ is not only about prosecutions because enforcement requires 
determination in organisational ability to comply with decided directions.  
 The findings from rationale of implementation, however, left further inquiries: 
should the department of the Prime Minister’s Department be willing to restructure the 
whole system to accommodate actors in every department, or to assimilate new better 
practices especially in providing relief working skills up to the level of international 
standards. Even if the government of Malaysia does address any positive responses from 
international communities (e.g. HFA and Agenda 21) in upgrading the public sector from 
time to time, the actors will not be willing to accept this restructuring or add value into the 
system. If regulatory compliance is viewed merely as a method of disaster actions for 
providing accommodation, then it would be of benefit only to a very small minority of the 
disaster population. Actors reasoned that efforts to implement full regulatory compliance 
will only please the disaster victims and increase actors’ workload at the same time. Hence 
the actors suggest that the implementation of regulatory compliance might proceed in a 
convenient way and be more welcoming if the disaster communities as a whole were to 
perceive two way socio-cultural benefits. Actors should also be provided with what they 
deserved (e.g. resources and incentives). From these findings, actors also expressed 
thoughts about the potential of regulatory compliance implementation to develop positive 
working ethics in the public service sectors and make actors more ‘caring’ towards the 
disaster victims. This development might be a good sign of moving towards achieving the 
national Vision 2020. 
 
9.2 Variables Influencing Actors’ General Attitudes to Regulatory Compliance 
Deily et al. (1991); Hutter (1997) and Macpherson (2004) rightly mentioned factors that 
most influenced organisations at micro level, and that depend much on the people aspects 
of categories consisting of employers and employees; specialists and generalist; skilled and 
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unskilled; roles and responsibilities; and the experienced and inexperienced. However, it is 
different in the case of multicultural and multi-religious in Malaysia. Different Gender, 
Experiences, Roles and Responsibilities do not affect the way the actors respond to the 
MNSC Directive 20. This finding was consistent with research by Norhasmah (2004) and 
Aini (2006) who found that overall in Malaysian public services’ gender, age, ethnicity and 
department job category, had nothing to do in influencing actors’ attitudes towards doing 
their daily job. The only biographical data with international parallels as mentioned by 
Baldwin et al. (2001) and locally as mentioned by Shaluf et al. (2006) was the Professional 
Status that influenced the attitudes of actors in disaster management. Different posts in the 
organisation will act differently on the scene of disaster because different Professional 
Statuses have different portfolios.  
 Malaysian actors had a perception of negative capability towards their own 
knowledge and understanding about the MNSC Directive 20. These findings are supported 
by the Stahlberg et al. (1992), research which showed that individuals are likely to hold 
positive attitudes towards objects they think may have good attributes but negative attitudes 
towards objects they think may have bad attributes. Variables that contributed to their 
cognitive attitudes were different gender, level of experience within the department, level 
served at, whether they were a part of the training, whether the department has trained 
actors, whether the department has actors handling regulatory compliance or whether the 
department is related to the scene of emergency housing or not. The significant influences 
are from the lesser experienced actors, those between 16 to 20 years, who work at the state 
and district levels. 
 As mentioned by Franzoi (1996), the emotion attached to the attitude object may not 
necessarily be closely related to cognitive understanding. Therefore, even though the actors 
were found to be knowledgeable about the MNSC Directive 20, they still perceived 
themselves as having negative reactions towards their own affective component (feeling, 
moods, emotions and sympathetic nervous system) in regulatory compliance. Different 
Levels of Control, In-service Courses Attendance, Availability of Trained Actors in the 
Department, Availability of Actors to look after Regulatory Compliance and Department 
Involvement to the Scene of Emergency Housing contributed to the ways actors react in 
regulatory compliance implementation. 
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 Actors perceive themselves as having a neutral conative component (behavioural 
response) of attitudes in regulatory compliance. This finding is complimentary to research 
by Jonas et al. (1995), as they said that intentions of behaviour are not necessarily 
expressed in action. Actors’ perception of affective attitude resulted from their differences 
in Gender, Professional Status and status in Attending In-service Courses. 
 The three components influenced the way actors react to their perception towards 
the implementation of regulatory compliance and these three components had a strong 
relationship. These findings were consistent with Triandis et al. (1986), Stahlberg et al. 
(1992), Smith et al. (1995), Jonas et al. (1995) and. Franzoi (1996). They said that attitudes 
must consist of these three components. Actors perceived negative general attitudes 
because their negative knowledge (cognitive component) and feelings (affective 
components) of attitudes towards regulatory compliance, although the (behavioural) 
conative components of attitudes were slightly neutral. They were unsure about their 
reactions towards the implementation of regulatory compliance but thought negatively 
about the level of knowledge and understanding required and also negatively accepting of 
the concept in their internal feelings. This finding recalled the mention by and McGuire 
(1969, 1985) and Gibbons (1979) that studies on the relationship between the three 
components of attitudes had not necessarily produced the expected results. 
 There was a significant positive relationship between actors’ perceived knowledge 
(K1) of regulatory compliance and their perceived ability (K2) to apply regulatory 
compliance. These findings are consistent with the studies of Stahlberg et al. (1992), that 
the cognitive aspect of attitude formation assumes that it is largely our knowledge and 
understanding that shape our attitudes. The actors had more confidence in doing their job if 
they were knowledgeable. Meanwhile, there were strong significant positive relationships 
between the both benefiting (F1) and suitability (F2) of regulations and guidelines in the 
MNSC Directive 20. The appropriate contents in the MNSC Directive 20 might benefit the 
actors and disaster victims. However, they perceived that the programme is only suitable if 
it is benefiting them, and vice versa. 
 Actor’s knowledge (K1), feelings (affective component) and willingness to attend 
in-service training (Q31) had a strong relationship. A person’s attitude will determine what 
the person will hear, think and do about the compliance issue (Allport, 1971). Beliefs about 
the object’s positive or negative characteristics, feelings and emotions towards it and past 
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and current behaviours towards it were found as three main factors that develop a person’s 
attitude towards an issue (Smith et al. 1995, Jonas et al. 1995; Franzoi, 1996). This 
research found that the significant relationship is negative between both K1 and affective 
attitude towards their willingness to support the implementation of regulatory compliance 
(Q31). If actors’ internal feeling were positive about their (high) ability to implement 
regulatory compliance, they would prefer not to attend relevant in-service training because 
there was a negative correlation in actors’ willingness to attend relevant in-service training. 
This finding is consistent with the research findings by Smith et al. (1995), that attitudes 
enable an individual to make sense of the social environment and forge connections with 
other persons. Attitudes assist a person to master the environment through the function of 
object (knowledge) appraisal (Smith et al. 1995). This function of attitudes enables a 
person to focus on the attitude object characteristics so that it can be dealt with 
meaningfully. Attitudes allow a person to classify new information and accommodate it 
along with established, existing information so that the complex world can be simplified 
(Stahlberg et al. 1992). 
 There are five sources of regulatory culture that are given as significant influences 
in this research. These are general culture, social structure, law, regulatory tradition and 
regulatory work (Meidinger, 1987). The related variable of resource support in regulatory 
culture has been shown by several studies (e.g. Becker, 1982; Barley, 1985; McCarty, 
1985) to be an important factor in influencing attitudes to regulatory compliance. The 
findings of this research also reflect upon this subject. This research has shown that actors 
might be willing to consider regulatory compliance if support came from within and outside 
their organisation to set directions (objective) in implementing the MNSC Directive 20 
especially if: (1) specialist support is provided to assist them, (2) managers are supportive 
of the programme and (3) appropriate information about the MNSC Directive 20 is 
provided by the relevant authorities. As mentioned by Becker (1982) and Barley (1985), a 
set of understandings about the objective that make it possible for the actors to act 
accordingly and the same result was found in this research. Thus, actors’ knowledge (K1) 
about the MNSC Directive 20 plays an important role in influencing their attitudes towards 
the objective of the MNSC Directive 20. 
 Actors also claimed that the involvement of disaster victims in decision making, 
especially in terms of workload increment, will be reflected in their attitudes. This 
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statement was consistent with the earlier literature which stated  attempts to ‘harmonise’ 
competing demands and forcing choices from outsider will create more burdens to the 
actors (Haines et al. 2003) and the regulatory burden faced by regulated entities from 
external forces is going to become increasingly difficult (Meidinger, 1987).  
 Meanwhile, actor’s attitudes might change if they are responsible enough to get 
involved in the education of the disaster victims. The finding was consistent with the result 
by Haines et al. (2003) that the actors bear the burden of potential liability by getting 
involve with the disaster victims without knowing that they are also educating others (i.e. 
disaster victims). However, in this research the actors insisted on specialists handling the 
disaster victims in terms of education and training. Actors also reconsidered their 
responsibilities regarding working together with the disaster victims as part of humanitarian 
works and the rights of disaster victims in the MNSC Directive 20. However, ‘public 
welfare’ concerns may not be met by a free operation that leads to failure (Shearing, 1993; 
Baldwin, 1999) because the influence from other social, economic and political forces 
(Gray et al. 1993). 
 
9.3 Final Conclusion 
Malaysia is unique and different from other developing countries because Malaysians have 
to consider cultural and religious affairs besides those of ordinary international issues like 
gender and natural resources. Some of the regulations in the MNSC Directive 20 are even 
higher in standard compared to the international standard, especially considering cultural 
and religious matters (e.g. minimum 3 rooms when providing shelter and separate worship 
space). In the case of Malaysia, it is right to ask: Should any country not be given the 
freedom to operationalise its own definition of regulatory compliance so as to meet its own 
needs within its own historical context? As a result, the challenges of involving disaster 
communities in disaster scenarios are more than just dealing with the nature, people, rules 
and regulations. The pressures also come from religious and cultural elements.  
 The quantitative data itself revealed that the actors are not knowledgeable because 
most of the actors who answered the questionnaires are working at the administration and 
clerical level in Malaysian Disaster Management Mechanism. Only chairmen had high 
confidence in their own skills to apply regulatory compliance. Statistically, the background 
characteristic that seems to have significant influence on actors’ attitudes to regulatory 
294 
 
compliance were the Professional Status, Actors Attended In-service Courses, Department 
that had Trained Actors, Willingness to Attend Trainings, Official Care in Regulatory 
Compliance and Experience in Emergency Housing. Actors also denied that regulatory 
compliance might enhance the relationship between them and disaster victims. Most of the 
actors had hardly visited the disaster scene, or interacted with the disaster victims and they 
were hardly making direct contact with the disaster victims. They would be able to 
implement regulatory compliance if they thought they were high enough in ability to 
comply, and knowledgeable enough as a result of attending in-service training. If actors’ 
were internally confident about their high ability to implement regulatory compliance, they 
would prefer not to attend relevant in-service training. Most of the department levels lack 
actors trained in the field of emergency housing because actors would prefer not to attend 
in service training even if their Department was related to the Scene of Emergency 
Housing; Department had Actors to look after Regulatory Compliance; and Department has 
Specific Regulation towards Regulatory Compliance. Actors admitted that disaster victims 
should not be isolated, but prefer to see that education/adaptation recovery (mentally) is 
handled by specialist because actors are not ready in terms of skills. Careful preparation 
might be vital to secure maximum co-operation from the work force and to prevent 
alienation and consequent failure. As a result, the questionnaire findings showed that 
generally actors have negative attitudes to regulatory compliance. Only a few actors (11 to 
18 per cent) agreed with the idea of implementing regulatory compliance. They cited that 
the MNSC Directive 20 is formulated for good reasons, such as helping in the realisation of 
the ‘caring society’; promoting and developing self-esteem in actors and disaster victims; 
and is in line with the national philosophy of equal opportunities (National Constitution: 
see section 4.1, p.92).  
 Meanwhile, the qualitative data itself revealed that actors were knowledgeable 
about the concept of regulatory compliance, emergency housing and disaster victims, 
because actors were directly involved in the development of emergency housing. 
Knowledge and awareness in emergency housing is a necessity. Halve of the overall actors 
involved in the interviews understood the rationale of regulatory compliance 
implementation by the Prime Minister’s Department. Some technical staff members had 
mixed reasons and only discussed regulatory compliance with selected actors. It was 
possible that their work would be misjudged by other actors for not doing their job 
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accordingly. The actors other than technical staff members and actors with direct contact 
with the disaster victims received very little information regarding the MNSC Directive 20. 
Thus, they were anxious about regulatory compliance. However, actors claimed that all 
departments were already applying rules and regulations (other than the MNSC Directive 
20) related to the scope of their work. For them this MNSC Directive 20 did not contribute 
to the benefit of the disaster victims, or for them individually. However this programme did 
give them proper guidelines and increased their department performance. They favoured 
work with the MNSC Directive 20 compared with other rules and regulations (national 
building codes and international standards) at the scene of a disaster, because the 
programme is the combination of both international and local requirements for providing 
emergency housing. Meanwhile, the majority of actors interviewed agreed that disaster 
victims have the rights to regulatory compliance due to equal rights and socialisation 
opportunities. However, they had expressed their reservations concerning the benefit of 
regulatory compliance for these disaster victims. Disaster victims who are capable 
(mentally, socially and emotionally) have the rights to get involved in the process of 
decision making in disaster victims’ groups. Above all, regulatory compliance with the 
MNSC Directive 20 will be accepted by the actors, if directed by the Prime Minister’s 
Department (see section 8.4.4, p.267). Furthermore, they also wanted to see changes to 
barriers towards implementing full regulatory compliance. 
 The quantitative and qualitative data showed an acknowledgement of the 
importance of ongoing regulation. Both methods proposed that more effort should be done 
to promote the importance of actors’ knowledge of the MNSC Directive 20, due to the fact 
that actors lacked of information. They were also willing to work together with the disaster 
victims if the disaster victims are ready and the content of the program is suitable, even if 
their workload is increasing. The actors said that the MNSC Directive 20 was suitable and 
practical for their department only, but not for the actors and disaster victims. The current 
contents of the MNSC Directive 20 are not suitable for the actors and the victims and 
require revision, especially toward giving more authority to operational level (decentralise), 
although the programme shows some improvement (i.e. caring feeling) in the adaptation of 
disaster victims after a disaster strike. Regulatory compliance would give the benefit to the 
department related to the scene of emergency housing and was suitable to be implemented. 
However the implementation is not effective at all levels of the National Disaster 
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Management Mechanism and is not tailored for them and the disaster victims individually. 
More input should also come from the disaster community especially NGOs. The literature 
review (e.g. Drabek, 1986; Davis, 2007; UNISDR, 2005) shows that, those countries that 
have achieved high levels of compliance relied on cooperation between the industries (e.g. 
NGOs and private sectors) and the government (e.g. appraisal and incentive) that the 
Malaysians should be learned. 
 Actors had broadly negative attitudes towards regulatory implementation. These 
negative general attitudes were due to their negative thinking towards the level of their 
knowledge and understanding of the MNSC Directive 20. They were unsure about their 
reactions towards the implementation of regulatory compliance but negatively thought 
about their level of knowledge and also their internal feelings, because they know very little 
about the regulatory compliance implementation proposed by the Prime Minister’s 
Department. Information is restricted to specific actors and only and rarely discussed. 
Actors at the national and state level considered themselves as positive but unsure about 
their knowledge in emergency management because they never expected to use any and 
were not ready. Actors at district level got more exposure and experience due to direct 
contact with the disaster victims. Thus, it was hard for most of the actors to accept the 
concept of regulatory compliance voluntarily. The real fact was that actors were unwilling 
to accept regulatory compliance in the present climate. The implementation of full 
regulatory compliance acquires them to be knowledgeable and always aware of 
international standards. Unfortunately they are reluctant to attend in-service training to keep 
themselves up to the international work ethic. They treat their daily working environment 
as a responsibility rather than a culture of regulatory compliance. The information 
distributed by the Prime Minister’s Department was not enough, and the actors accused 
those responsible for the dissemination of the work. Most technical staff interviewed 
claimed that they were familiar with the related programme because they frequently visited 
disaster sites.  
 Actors do wish to see changes at the department levels before regulatory 
compliance is fully implemented, especially with what benefits them (e.g. training, support 
and incentive). Even though the actors’ expressions were more negative, they were actually 
willing to support the implementation especially if instructed by the Prime Minister’s 
Department. As civil servants, actors are required to observe and implement government 
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directives. Additionally, actors were interested to know about their working environments 
because most of them are familiar with the terms used at the disaster scene (e.g. disaster 
victims, emergency housing and regulatory compliance) and willing to talk about it with 
colleagues. Actors also expressed that even though regulatory compliance could be risky 
when involved with legitimacy and liability, it does have the potential to make actors more 
‘caring’ towards the disaster victims. Actors agreed that the involvement of disaster victims 
in disaster victims’ groups would increase their knowledge. However they were uncertain 
about the social development of the disaster victims due to a lack of advice and 
consultation from specialists regarding the MNSC Directive 20. Actors did not agree that 
disaster victims’ emotional development would recover from disaster trauma unless it was 
handed over to the specialist. Nevertheless, actors were most favoured with the programme 
stipulated in the MNSC Directive 20 as guidance for providing emergency housing 
compared to other standards pertaining in international disaster communities. Actors added 
that efforts towards implementing full regulatory compliance are a good step in providing 
emergency housing. 
 At the Ministry level, it is obvious that the actors in Malaysia appear to see the 
process of regulatory compliance from the point of view of the existing customs in the 
public service system and work ethic. The Emergency Management System in Malaysia 
focuses more on action plans at every level from national, state to district rather than local 
encounters. Actors have the perception that handling disaster victims and implementing 
regulatory compliance requires different skills. Thus, actors assumed that their daily routine 
incorporate responsibility. Apparently, disaster situations are demanding and require them 
to become more than just officials, and instead to offer disaster assistance. This alteration 
has become the key issue in moving towards the national Vision 2020 (‘clean, efficient and 
effective’ administration). Therefore, the Ministry level should put more efforts to 
disseminate the MNSC Directive 20 throughout all of the departments under the Prime 
Minister’s Department. The information and training lessons regarding MNSC Directive 20 
should also be closer to all communities.  
 At the department level, it is unfair to criticise actors for currently having this 
negative attitude that results from them being only too well aware of the many barriers and 
uncertainties. They have not been given appropriate detailed information regarding 
regulatory compliance in the MNSC Directive 20 by those responsible for disseminating 
298 
 
such information at the Ministry level. Encouragement should be given to actors interested 
in acquiring information (training and involvement at disaster setting) about disaster 
management/the MNSC Directive 20, in terms of individual appraisal (e.g. promotion and 
incentives). Actors should also be given proper exposure when working together with the 
disaster victims (related to their job). Actors’ lack of experience has created appreciable 
fears about the impending full implementation of regulatory compliance due to an apparent 
lack of planning for fundamental changes in disaster management at department level. 
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CHAPTER 10 
 
Recommendations 
 
“Based on their different risk types and levels, each nation should create their own National 
Emergency Management Model (NEMM) and because of country specific conditions each 
plan must be unique”. 
(Ozceylan et al. 2008: 376) 
 
10.1 Introduction 
Apparently, information about the 'Policy and Mechanism of National Disaster and Relief 
Management’ is important in order to gain support from officials with respect to positive 
attitudes towards regulatory compliance. Even if the complete version of the MNSC 
Directive 20 is restricted, efforts to disseminate the contents must be done effectively 
within and outside the departmental level. The government should encourage the 
participation of officials in training and other learning activities in order to gain knowledge 
and distribute to others (e.g. private agencies and communities) without the opportunity to 
attend such activities. 
 It doesn’t matter what the Prime Minister’s Department has planned, it needs to 
consider that actors could not reasonably be accused of having this negative attitude. They 
need to be convinced that regulatory compliance is of worthwhile benefit for the actors and 
disaster victims. They need informative advice and guidance to enable them to see the very 
probable societal benefits that can lead towards regulatory compliance development. Actors 
cannot simply be expected to accept the programme without any changes made in the 
present department settings or with regard to their working condition status. There is no 
doubt that actors would expect additional input in the form of increased resources and extra 
supports, especially in information dissemination and working assistants.  
 
10.2 Recommendations 
The suggestions made by actors in this research should be able to help personnel involved 
in regulatory compliance implementation to undertake some necessary changes to ensure 
that regulatory compliance gets off on the right track during the initial stages of its 
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development. This will not be easy because change itself does not happen simply, 
immediately and unilaterally, but is a much more awkward, less predictable and often 
painful affair (Clough et al. 1991). 
 It must be conceded that there is no ideal scenario in changing the present situation. 
The real world of disaster management in Malaysia is complicated and there are constraints 
that cannot be ignored. An obstacle should not stop the Prime Minister’s Department from 
trying to refine present compliance provision. Awareness of those obstacles is already a 
positive step with respect to further action because rectification of a holistic system is an on 
going process towards the effort of making things better. To consider the service provided 
as up to other world class standards, the Malaysian must have a strict working ethic towards 
regulatory compliance. This culture will then shape behavior in the members, and the 
success of the organisation, by ongoing compliance with regulatory goals.  
 A social system is a complex set of human relationships interacting in many ways 
(Knoster, 1991). To change the system means to revolutionise the people-organisation 
relationships in terms of the whole person, whole group, whole organisation and whole 
social system. After a thorough consideration, inspired by Knoster (1991) and after 
considering the present state of the administration system in Malaysia and what the Prime 
Minister’s Department and the stakeholders might consider, changes are listed in section 
10.2.1. 
 
10.2.1 Changes to Support Regulatory Compliance Recommended by Knoster (1991) 
One of the executive orders by the Prime Minister in the MNSC Directive 20 is to establish 
a reliable and functional Disaster Management Mechanism in Malaysia (Moin, 2006). This 
practical guideline (consisting of changes to vision, knowledge, incentives, resources and 
actions) must contain a clear purpose for determining diverse agencies roles and 
responsibilities when handling disaster, that must be consistent with the civil service 
framework stipulated in the national constitution of Malaysia (PSD, 1996). 
 
A. Vision Rehabilitation 
The first requirement of change, in order to avoid confusion, is vision. Part of this vision is 
to: (1) understand the differences between the practices of ‘humanity’ and ‘responsibility’ 
and (2) initiate the concept and practice of regulatory compliance in Malaysia. 
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 This vision has already been partly fulfilled. As mentioned by Moin (2006), the 
vision can be seen clearly in the current policy of disaster management in Malaysia. These 
visions are: 
1. To have an integrated mechanism of disaster management with emphasis on the 
concerted and coordinated actions; 
2. Integrated disaster management mechanism means a combined and coordinated 
response of the various agencies in the management of disaster; 
3. Coordinated and concerted actions mean the harmonious integration of all agencies 
involved with the objective to handle the disaster efficiently and bringing the 
situation back to normalcy. 
 
The vision of a safe environment for the community is already started by giving 
training and assistance not only for the actors, but also for the disaster victims. An informed 
and concerned public have a significant amount of strength in disaster planning. 
Furthermore, a sensible emergency manager will ensure that the public stays informed so 
that the public power and public policy contribute to the strength of the disaster 
management programme (William et al. 1991). Concentration should also be giving on 
more encouragement to the actors to ensure a positive result in disaster planning by 
upgrading their departmental appraisal and incentive schemes. Unfortunately, this study 
shows that the Ministry’s top down vision of regulatory compliance has not been widely 
shared with the personnel in the department level, who should be most involved in its 
implementation process. In other words, there is no communal vision between the top 
ministerial administrators and the actors especially those who work at the disaster site. 
Planning is not a product; rather it is an ongoing process (Dynes et al. 1977). This 
understanding would greatly help in the development of the actors’ own vision of 
regulatory compliance and for the Minister it would be to seek and impose vision on 
unreceptive actors.  
 The study findings clearly show that actors would comply with Ministerial 
Directives in accepting regulatory compliance but this would not guarantee commitment 
from them. Imposition of vision might make the actors rebellious towards the programme, 
especially as the research indicates that they have generally negative attitudes towards 
regulatory compliance with the MNSC Directive 20. Actors must be allowed to figure out 
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their own vision (within the broader vision of the Prime Minister’s Department) and the 
Prime Minister’s Department needs to support this outlook change. Therefore the Ministry 
through the state level needs to ensure that the department receives as much information as 
possible regarding regulatory compliance, either through official documentation or by 
sending relevant officers to explain the programme proposed. If disseminating information 
is done through documentation, then special notes need to be attached to the documents 
requesting the head of the department ensures that all actors in the department receive the 
information, especially the technical staff.  
 
B. Working Skills Expansion 
The second requirement for change is for actors to be equipped with the relevant working 
skills through pre-service or in-service training in disaster management. Training in disaster 
management is significant in making actors supportive of regulatory compliance. 
Cooperative actions in ‘Enforcement Pyramid’ provide an extensive base of regulatory 
apparatus consisting of persuasive approach and consultation in technical and 
administration. The constructive motion of punitive actions and ultimate sanctions parallels 
influencing regulatory processes at the base of the ‘Enforcement Pyramid’ throughout a 
mutual relationship between the regulators and regulates (Braithwaite, 1985). Without 
training, actors would experience fears and anxieties about the MNSC Directive 20. Actors 
insisted that it might be necessary to circulate information about the MNSC Directive 20 to 
the disaster victims so that the disaster victims will not be skeptical towards the 
government intention in any disaster assistance. Actors will need to be convinced that 
regulatory compliance is not only their responsibility but also part of humanitarian work. 
As a result, they will use their own initiative to learn the skills to handle disaster victims 
and comply with the MNSC Directive 20.  
 The Prime Minister’s Department may wish to reconsider the training programme 
given to the actors with updated contents. More modules particularly in regulatory 
compliance need to be incorporated in the pre-service training. This progress will hopefully 
increase upcoming actors’ knowledge on the MNSC Directive 20 and therefore would 
likely alter the cognitive element of attitudes towards regulatory compliance. Thus, in-
service training of upcoming actors and established actors during regulatory compliance 
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implementation should be more than just one-off workshops and disconnected training; 
rather it should be a continuous process. 
 
C. Incentives Enhancement 
The third requirement for change is incentives. Without incentives actors would be resistant 
to regulatory compliance implementation because disaster management requires the actors 
work overtime not only in terms of working hours but also working pace. Human 
motivation is economically based on physical wellbeing (Smith, 1957). Actors are 
performing decently when receiving the appreciation of others.  
 There are two ways actors might be convinced to accept the MNSC Directive 20: 
(1) by making it compulsory that it could do more harm than good to the MNSC Directive 
20 because the actors feel frustrated and/or angry and (2) by giving actors incentives in the 
form of department and personal gains (e.g. financial reward, breaks and term) and 
reduction of workloads. Therefore the most appropriate incentives to encourage actors 
should relate to their Professional Status promotion as actors. Thus the most affordable 
personal incentive that could be given to actors within the Ministry’s limitations is to make 
actors’ participation in the MNSC Directive 20 a substantial part of their yearly appraisal, 
since their annual pay increment depends on this. 
 
D. Resources Supplementary 
The fourth requirement of change is in the area of resources. Resource support is essential 
to avoid actors becoming frustrated with the MNSC Directive 20. Actors tend to exhibit 
positive attitudes towards regulatory compliance if they are given appropriate resource 
support. Actors requested that they should be given all the resource support necessary if 
they are required to implement regulatory compliance. There are two types of resource 
support, mentioned by actors, needed for regulatory compliance practice: (1) working 
materials and physical facilities support and (2) human resource support. All actors 
involved in the programme should be supported with appropriate working materials and 
facilities. Human and material resources should be made available to make Disaster 
Management Mechanism in Malaysia work (Aini et al. 2005). Actors also require support 
from their superiors in ancillary professions (e.g. psychologist and therapist). The problem 
with these support services is that most of the department has insufficient numbers of 
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officially trained specialists. The availability of these specialists might assist the actors 
when they are needed and avoid any delays in the process of decision making.  
 
E. Execution of Action Plan 
The fifth requirement for change is an action plan. One of the accepted approaches towards 
regulatory compliance is the ability of organisations to claim regulatory breach and 
potential future violation prevention, with equally reasonable punitive measures and 
sanctions (Reiss, 1984). Thus, an action plan is necessary in order to support actors in 
defining clearly realisable objectives and targets. An action plan might also help in 
producing the means of evaluating programmes as well as assessing need. An action plan 
involves planning strategies for the eventual implementation of regulatory compliance 
downward from the ministerial level to state, district and local people. Implementation of 
strategies in acquiring and distributing resources from all departments in the National 
Disaster Management Mechanism; training of actors; and methods of monitoring 
programme progress, all need to be planned carefully. In reality, there is a multiplicity of 
regulatory goals, with potential for conflict (Haines, 2002). Therefore in order for ongoing 
commitment to the goals of regulation to be secured, compliance needs to be seen as an 
everyday part of business activity (Gunningham et al. 1999a). 
 The Prime Minister’s Department should consider the ‘whole department’ approach 
to regulatory compliance. Everyone associated with the department should play a part in the 
MNSC Directive 20. The actors involved in the MNSC Directive 20 should be supported 
by the entire available department personnel, in respect to implementation of full regulatory 
compliance. The compliance should not be restricted to only the technical staff but also 
include all available personnel. This corporate culture will then shape members behaviour 
toward acting in a manner that recognises that the success of the organisation is best 
achieved by ongoing compliance with regulatory goals (Brooks, 1988). The actors should 
find a way to: 
1. Foster community spaces for regulatory compliance, and help them to integrate and 
forge new social and knowledgeable partnerships with authorities; 
2. Accelerate the process of assistance from federal government and reduce 
bureaucracies;  
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3. Seek ways, even in a short time, to educate disaster victims on how to face the 
difficult times and to get involved in decision making formally. 
 
The compliance culture is not only applicable for the MNSC Directive 20. It is also 
applicable to all government policies and programmes. The related government policies and 
programmes should be parallel to the international directions like the Millennium 
Development Goals and The Hyogo Framework for Action. The policy maker should 
prioritise the needs of disaster victims. There should be closer alignment between the 
government’s policies and assistance programmes, towards addressing the crucial needs of 
the majority of disaster victims. 
 
10.3 Possible Implication for Change 
In a society that is trying to create a ‘harmony’ outlook, the department system would have 
to look beyond a simple understanding of resources and incentives for change. There is a 
need to reconstruct vision and to think about disaster management by acquiring different 
approaches when presenting the MNSC Directive 20. Pre-disaster planning is an essential 
part of the disaster management cycle and, as such, is recognised as being of fundamental 
importance to ensuring that responses to events are as relevant, efficient and effective as 
possible (O’Keefe et al. 2006). There is also a need to rethink the process of merging the 
actors and community (disaster victims) together in a disaster site. This diversity should not 
be limited to those with technical knowledge, but should apply in the humanitarian sense, 
in which differences can be described in ethnic, religious and social-cultural terms. The 
process of bringing this disaster victims’ group together within the existing disaster 
environment/settings will require a fundamental review of existing systems, methods of 
resourcing, process of working and ultimately change in attitudes. Whether or not this 
could be achieved depends heavily on the will of those responsible for its implementation. 
 It cannot be denied that implementing this MNSC Directive 20 in Malaysia could 
well put almost unbearable pressures on the work force, owing to the very necessary 
restructuring of the disaster management environment. But disaster management is much 
more than mere restructuring. Nor are incentives for actors identified as the only obstacle to 
be tackled. Much more significant effort is needed to appreciate and address the many 
cultural prejudices, anxieties and constraints that can paralyse the will to find new ways to 
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solve old problems because disaster management is focus on the process to diminish risk to 
life in the present and future disasters (Alexander, 2002). Last but not least the planning of 
each countries disaster management models must be uniquely designed to suit their specific 
needs (Ozceylan et al. 2008). 
 
10.4  Transferable Lesson 
Learning can help in both redrafting regulation (experimental) and implementation, because 
the decision making circle in Malaysia starts with the social learning process. In every 
project delivered by the authorities, there will be a project report and evaluation. Input from 
academic research and consultation is a must in revising and formulating new policies such 
as the National Structural, Physical and Local Plan and other related works in Malaysia. 
The question is what stakeholders should learn from the ineffective implementation of 
existing policies and approaches and why are they always an issue rather than acted upon? 
Stakeholders should act together to think beyond oganisational or agency boundaries to 
deal effectively with most problems. Policy makers should account for, and measure, what 
matters especially in assessing the needs from victims and be realistic about any evaluation. 
Therefore, policy makers should consider who policy is for, from central government to 
local delivery agents; and from professionals and service delivery to communities and 
service users. Support may also come from good community leadership with good 
personalities and other local conditions such as their own skills, dedication and experience. 
In addition, the sign of significant progress may take a long time to consider as full 
regulatory compliance. Hopefully the policy makers will be patient and persist in delivering 
humanitarian work and policy making. 
 Generally, the case of Malaysia is not adequate enough to result in concrete 
conclusions, given the small scale of the impact of the disaster, as well as the small number 
of houses that have to be built.  Perhaps at a certain point Malaysia might be the leading 
small country in developing actions to cope with disaster prevention and mitigation. The 
findings might not only suit other developing countries administrative situations, but also 
be a useful example of a sensible multi-religious approach. For example, the requirements 
for providing 3 bedrooms, to separate different genders and a different worship hall for 
different groups of people due to religious and cultural demands. 
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10.5 Dissemination 
In contemplating fresh training input for the Malaysian work force, an organised training 
body can display a high level of professional identity and activity and membership 
commitment that enables governments to collaborate with them in a variety of new ways so 
as to expand the approaches to disaster management culture. This could be of major value 
for Malaysia. However, it is not the intention of this research to end up with a new 
constitution that consists of a huge membership. Rather it is to initiate awareness by 
disseminating output. And in addition, the submission of articles extracted from this 
research (see Appendix 5, p.334) to the journals in any disaster management and housing 
related fields for publication both in the English and Malaysia language.  
 
10.5.1 Next Steps as Part of Dissemination 
The next contributory steps in the dissemination process are: 
1. Networking with researchers and other experts towards information exchange; 
2. Lessons learned in developing a plan to build capacity: 
a. Set realistic expectations for what can be accomplished because it takes time to 
build skills among diverse groups of people; 
b. Build awareness and credibility within and among the various stakeholders and 
constituent groups to build capacity for evaluation and to create awareness for 
the necessity to evaluate; 
c. Institutionalise increased capacity efforts by establishing policies, processes, 
training and other knowledge-management approaches (i.e. technology); and 
d. Increase all stakeholders’ understanding of data, uses, need for reliability and 
ability to share or collaborate on data-collection efforts. 
3. Resources provided within reach of each party interested; 
4. Identifying stakeholders (actors and groups of interest) and information needs. Set 
up meeting(s) with them; and 
5. Return back to the samples/actors as promised while doing publicity and 
acknowledgement (small incentives like future venture and sharing findings). 
 
This study of actor’s attitudes towards regulatory compliance is therefore only the 
beginning and is only a very small part of the broad issues of regulatory compliance in 
308 
 
Malaysia. More studies are required to gain deeper understanding of the complex issues in 
handling the disaster victims of disaster scenes, especially in emergency housing. The 
following investigations are recommended: 
1. Study of disaster victims attitudes towards regulatory compliance in emergency 
housing; 
2. Study of the practice of regulatory compliance practice; 
3. Study of Malaysian policies towards the possible changes in current policies to 
support regulatory compliance;  
4. Study of resource management to support regulatory compliance;  
5. Study of the risk assessment procedures by government concerning the control of 
risks through regulatory and managerial devices. Emphasis on assessing potential 
hazards, argue the critics, can prove expensive, infringe civil rights and lead to 
inflexibility and a lack of responsiveness. 
 
10.6 Conclusion 
In summary concerning the main negative attitudes, it is essential to recognise them as the 
barriers that would have to be systematically addressed by the Prime Minister’s Department 
to minimise their negative effects on regulatory compliance implementation. Questions 
which have arisen from this research have to be answered: What are the strategies needed 
to minimise the negative effects? How much funding and commitment is the Prime 
Minister’s Department willing to allocate to a programme that in reality would benefit a 
relatively limited number of disaster victims? Would the Prime Minister’s Department be 
willing to sacrifice other areas of its National Security Programmes in order to boost its 
regulatory compliance implementation? Is there any political will in the government to 
push its policy to this extent? And in a more positive light, what changes is the Prime 
Minister’s Department willing to introduce so as to establish widespread acceptance of 
compliance culture and ‘caring’ community as a whole? It would be easy to feel 
overwhelmed by the immensity of the task that faces the work force, but it may well be 
from within the present human resources that the Prime Minister’s Department may begin 
to seek some of its answers. Ideas and recommendations in finding new solutions to old 
problems can move upwards as well as downwards; therefore the technical design of rules 
and regulations has now to be accompanied by organisational design. Although the 
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established ethos of Malaysia’s public service sector has tended to be one of control from 
above, there is promise and virtue in seeking to promote a professional culture.  
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Appendix 1: Hyogo Framework of Action Summary of Commitment, 2005–2015 
 
 
Expected 
outcome 
 
 
• Substantial reduction of disaster losses (in lives and in the social, economic, and 
environmental assets of communities and countries) 
 
 
Strategic 
goals  
 
 
• Integration of disaster risk reduction (DRR) into sustainable development policies and 
planning 
• Development and strengthening of institutions, mechanisms, and capacities to build 
resilience to hazards 
• Systematic incorporation of risk-reduction approaches into the implementation of 
emergency preparedness, response, and recovery 
 
 
Priorities 
for action 
 
 
• Ensure disaster risk reduction is a national and local priority with a strong institutional 
basis for implementation 
• Identify, assess and monitor disaster risks; and enhance early warning 
• Use knowledge, innovation, and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all 
levels 
• Reduce underlying risk factors 
• Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels 
 
Source: ADB (2008) 
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Appendix 2: The MNSC Directive 20 Cover Page 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                Source: NSC (1997) 
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Appendix 3: Basic Terminology in this Thesis 
 
Term Description 
Actors Managers, clerical staff, technical staff, general officers and special body appointed 
by the government (in qualitative sample only) 
Administration Operating system by the persons (or committees or departments) who make up a 
body for the purpose of meting out justice according to the law 
Affective (adjective) The experience of feeling or emotion 
Attitudes A complex mental state involving beliefs and feelings and values and dispositions 
to act in certain ways 
Behaviour The action or reaction of something (people) under specified circumstances 
Building Codes Ordinances and regulations controlling the design, construction, materials, 
alteration and occupancy of any structure to insure human safety and welfare. 
Building codes include both technical and functional standards 
Capacity A combination of all the strengths and resources available within a community, 
society or organisation that can reduce the level of risk, or the effects of a disaster 
(Capacity may include physical, institutional, social or economic means as well as 
skilled personal or collective attributes such as leadership and management. 
Capacity may also be described as capability) 
Capacity building Efforts aimed to develop human skills or societal infrastructures within a 
community or organisation needed to reduce the level of risk 
(In extended understanding, capacity building also includes development of 
institutional, financial, political and other resources, such as technology at different 
levels and sectors of the society) 
Crisis An acute event that carries the potential to severely disrupt the functioning of an 
organisation or a community 
Crisis management Development and maintenance of measures to respond to or recover from crises 
Crisis management 
team 
Key managers appointed by the organisation to deal with a crisis event in the first 
instance 
Crisis control  center The facility, adequately equipped, from which the crisis will be managed 
Control A relationship that one party can direct the actions of another independent party 
Coordination A relationship that participant agrees to work together, retaining their 
independence, to achieve a result by the most effective means 
Compliance The act adhering to, and demonstrating adherence to, a standard or regulation 
Cognitive 
(adjective) 
The scientific term for ‘the process of thought’ and an information processing view 
of an individual’s psychological functions 
Conative (adjective) Synonymous with motivation/will/drive. The power or act that directs or impels to 
effort of any kind, whether muscular or psychical 
Disaster A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society causing 
widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses that exceed the 
ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources 
(A disaster is a function of the risk process. It results from the combination of 
hazards, conditions of vulnerability and insufficient capacity or measures to reduce 
the potential negative consequences of risk) 
Disaster assessment Surveys carried out to determine the effects of disaster on a community and a 
society. Disaster assessments have three sub-activities: Needs assessment, damage 
assessment and access survey 
Disaster community Actors, disaster victims and stakeholders 
Disaster 
management 
The body of policy and administrative decisions and operational activities that 
pertain to the various stages of a disaster at all levels (short term and long term) 
Disaster plan The documented policies and procedures intended to prevent damage, minimise 
damage, or recover from damage 
Disaster planning The process of planning actions that will prevent, mitigate, or prepare for and 
response to a disaster (the process, policies and procedures related to preparing for 
a disaster) 
Disaster recovery Decisions and actions taken after a disaster with a view to restoring or improving 
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the pre-disaster living conditions of the stricken community, while encouraging and 
facilitating necessary adjustments to reduce disaster risk [Recovery (rehabilitation 
and reconstruction) affords an opportunity to develop and apply disaster risk 
reduction measures] 
Disaster 
response/relief 
The provision of assistance or intervention during or immediately after a disaster to 
meet the life preservation and basic subsistence needs of those people affected. It 
can be of an immediate, short-term, or protracted duration 
Disaster risk 
reduction 
The conceptual framework of elements considered with the possibilities to 
minimise vulnerabilities and disaster risks throughout a society, to avoid 
(prevention) or to limit (mitigation and preparedness) the adverse impacts of 
hazards, within the broad context of sustainable development 
Disaster victims Disaster victims were the victims who were affected by disaster 
Disaster victims’ 
group 
The group consists of disaster victims under actor’s advocacy 
Emergency 
management 
The organisation and management of resources and responsibilities for dealing with 
all aspects of emergencies, in particularly preparedness, response and rehabilitation 
(Emergency management involves plans, structures and arrangements established 
to engage the normal endeavours of government, voluntary and private agencies in 
a comprehensive and coordinated way to respond to the whole spectrum of 
emergency needs. This is also known as disaster management) 
Enforcement A term that refers to the process by which legislation or part of legislation, and 
treaties comes to have legal force and effect. The term is closely related to the date 
of this transition 
Evaluation Post-disaster appraisal of all aspects of the disaster and its effects 
General culture Pattern of human knowledge, belief and behaviour 
Hazards A potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon or human activity that may 
cause the loss of life or injury, property damage, social and economic disruption or 
environmental degradation 
Housing Lodging, shelter for human habitation. The immediate physical environment, both 
within and outside of buildings that families and households live and that serves as 
shelter. Also, a government project to provide shelter to low-income groups 
Humanitarian Someone devoted and involved in promotion of human welfare, improving people's 
lives and reducing suffering 
Institution An organisation founded and united works by social order and cooperation that 
governing the behavior of a set of individuals within a given human collectivity for 
a specific purpose 
Law enforcement 
agency 
A term used to describe either an organisation that enforces the laws of one or more 
governing bodies, or an organisation that actively and directly assists in the 
enforcement of laws. In doing so, the LEA assists the governing bodies to provide 
governance for their subjects and maintains social control 
Legal In accordance with a system of rules enforced through a set of institutions 
Legal framework All public procurement that governed by regulations 
Law A system of rules usually enforced through a set of institutions 
Lifelines The public facilities and systems that provide basic life support services such as 
water, energy, sanitation, communications and transportation 
Mitigation Measures taken in advance of a disaster aimed at decreasing or eliminating its 
impact on society and on environment 
Officials Someone who administers the rules, having official authority or sanction in an 
organisation or government and participates in the exercise of authority 
Organisation A social arrangement (hierarchy-rank, importance, seniority, power status or 
authority) that pursues collective goals, controls its own performance, and has a 
boundary separating it from its environment 
Policy A guide (plan) that establishes the parameters for decision making and action (to 
guide decisions and achieve rational outcome) 
Preparedness Activities and measures (attempt) taken in advance to ensure effective response to 
the impact of hazards, including the issuance of timely and effective early warnings 
and the temporary evacuation of people and property from threatened locations 
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(readiness) 
Prevention The act of dealing with and avoiding risks from having harmful effects on either 
persons or property (preparing, supporting and rebuilding society) 
Population at risk A well-defined population whose lives, property and livelihoods are threatened by 
given hazards 
Procurement The act (activities) of getting possession (acquisition) of something 
Risk Risk is the probability that negative consequences may arise when hazards interact 
with vulnerable areas, people, property and environment. Risk is a concept that 
describes a potential set of consequences that may arise from a given set of 
circumstances 
Risk management Risk management is conceptual framework for understanding risk (hazards, 
vulnerability and readiness). It involves public safety issues at local levels, complex 
process that involves diverse stakeholders and implemented by multidisciplinary 
team working together with the community with many vulnerabilities to hazards. 
Effective implementation can only occur if there’s a mutual agreement on the 
planning and training process 
Readiness Readiness is a sum total of the current competence of an agency, organisation, 
community to response quickly and appropriately to the impact and consequences 
of hazards. Readiness is the outcome of emergency preparedness programme and 
training. If readiness and capacity is insufficient; if vulnerabilities are too great; if 
the scale of hazards is too big; then, the risk is too high, emergencies may not be 
managed locally, the communities may not cope, disaster will occur 
Rehabilitation Efforts to temporarily restore the livelihood of the disaster affected disaster victims 
by providing temporary shelters and compensation aid while reconstruction plans 
are being carried out 
Reconstruction Efforts to permanently restore the livelihood of the disaster affected disaster victims 
by providing permanent housing or development that helps to promote a better and 
safer living environment 
Regulatory 
compliance 
The goal that corporations or public agencies aspire to in their efforts to ensure that 
personnel are aware of and take steps to comply with relevant laws and regulations. 
Regulatory tradition Customs or practices of regulations 
Regulatory work Situational practices of regulations 
Regulation The action controlling human or societal behaviour by rules or restrictions 
Resilience The capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to hazards to 
adapt, by resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain an acceptable level of 
functioning and structure. This is determined by the degree that the social system is 
capable of organising itself to increase its capacity for learning from past disasters 
for better future protection and to improve risk reduction measures 
Rules A prescribed guide for conduct or action. The exercise of authority or control. 
Secondary hazards Those hazards that occur as a result of another hazard or disaster, i.e. fires or 
landslides following earthquakes, epidemics following famines, food shortages 
following drought or floods 
Settlement A community of covered living spaces providing a healthy, secure living 
environment with privacy and dignity to those groups, families, and individuals 
residing within them 
Shelter sector Abbreviation of the term ‘site selection, planning and shelter sector’, describing 
that part of the ‘transitional settlement sector’ that responds to the transitional 
settlement and shelter needs of refugees, within the mandate of UNHCR 
Shelter A habitable covered living space, providing a secure, healthy living environment 
with privacy and dignity to those within it 
Shelter system The combination of structural shelter items and ‘shelter NFIs’ (non-food items) that 
create shelter, such as tents with locally procured blankets and mattresses, and 
possibly stoves, appropriate to a cold climate 
Shelter, adequate Immediate environment for all aspects of family life, providing protection from the 
elements, secure tenure, personal safety, access to clean water and sanitation, 
proximity to places of employment and educational and health care facilities 
Social structure Relationships between individual and groups 
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Stakeholders Individuals or institutions (public and private) interested or affected 
Statute Formal written enactment of a legislative authority that governs a country, state, 
city, or county (legal act) 
Transitional 
settlement 
Settlement and shelter resulting from conflict and natural disasters, from emergency 
response to durable solutions 
Transitional 
settlement sector 
The field of providing settlement and shelter in the context of conflict and natural 
disasters, from emergency response to durable solutions. Aim: communities, 
families, and individuals affected by conflict and natural disasters should be 
afforded, together with any hosting populations, TS support to ensure their security, 
good health, privacy, and dignity, appropriate to their needs 
Transitional shelter Shelter that provides a habitable covered living space and a secure, healthy living 
environment, with privacy and dignity, to those within it, during the period between 
a conflict or natural disaster and the achievement of a durable shelter solution 
Vulnerability Vulnerability is a concept that describes factors or constraints of economic, social, 
physical or geographic nature, that reduce the ability to prepare for and cope with 
the impact of hazards 
Adapted from various sources such as UNHCR, the SPHERE Project and FEMA  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
316 
 
Appendix 4: Summary, Questions and Answer about this Thesis 
 
General Summary 
 
Introduction 
• Inspiration: I volunteered to work in post-disaster recovery when the Tsunami struck Malaysia at the 
end of the year 2004. In this and other activities, I was able to make observations on disaster sites 
and I concluded that there was much scope to improve both planning practice and training for those 
in the front line.  
• Why this Topic: As a volunteer and has education background in housing studies, I realise that 
beneficiaries are actually unaware of non-compliance that exposed them to hazard. They have rights 
to have adequate shelters as agreed by all UN states members. Adequate means adequate privacy; 
adequate space; physical accessibility; adequate security; security of tenure; structural stability and 
durability; adequate lighting, heating and ventilation; adequate basic infrastructure, such as water-
supply, sanitation and waste-management facilities; suitable environmental quality and health-related 
factors; and adequate and accessible location with regard to work and basic facilities: all of that 
should be available at an affordable cost. 
• Motivation: As I explored these issues further, I was aware that, although sufficient regulation 
existed, regulatory compliance was low. I wished to explore why there was a gap between regulation 
and performance. I would like to know the status of this MNSC Directive 20 implementation. 
• Current State: I saw many examples of non-compliance such as the bedroom size not according to 
specification; partition walls built of combustible instead of non-combustible materials; no parking 
and open spaces as required; improper insulation and painting; no front porch as a safety zone 
between the main entrance of the houses and the access road. The failure of the Malaysian 
Government to exercise the proper conduct of post-disaster provision has slowed the process of 
restoring the livelihoods. 
• What is regulation?: Dependable rules that are governed by a mechanism known as an organisation. 
• What is compliance?: The state or fact of according with or meeting rules and regulations. 
• What is problematic? Statement of Problem: From my observation, I judged that implementation was 
not very successful because I thought that regulatory compliance would require making changes to 
existing barriers in the administrative environment. These changes would have to be based, to a large 
extent, on how actors’ perceived and judged the benefits of regulatory compliance implementation. 
• Why there is non-compliance?: Those involved in disaster response received very little information 
about implementation and I saw that no one really knew what they were meant to do. The policy 
effectiveness decays from the central government to the district in parallels with the small number of 
professionals who know what to do and the majority who do not. 
• Key Literature Review:  
(Dynes, 1993): Non-compliance within disaster management institution continues to occur; disaster 
itself is failure of social system. 
(Davis, 2007): The response becomes highly politisised not according to international activities. 
(Quarantelli, 1984): A disaster planning as ‘a process’ rather than a tangible product. 
(Hutter and Meidenger, 1987): Sociological culture becomes a central study of administrative 
regulation. 
(Aini et al. 2006): In Malaysia, organisational error and regulatory failures were found to contribute 
to vulnerability. 
(Braithwaite, 1993): An attitude of the organisation is what values compliance goal at the end. 
(Cohen et al. 2000): There is a necessity to understand behaviour as a better foundation before trying 
to improve public policy. 
(Allport, 1973): Person attitude will determine what the person will hear, think and do about the 
object. 
(Tyler, 1990): Actors perception is significant to include peers’ opinion. 
• Objective: The overall research objective is to determine the present attitudes of Malaysia’s actors 
towards the planned introduction of full regulatory compliance, and if necessary to initiate strategies 
to assist their anxieties. 
• Contributions: Actors’ view toward the implementation of full regulatory compliance will inspire the 
government and related agencies to design a holistic organisation that perhaps will diminish negative 
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disaster likelihood as the nations’ progress. Also will give input towards policy upgrade especially in 
awareness raising and capacity building in organisation. 
• Originality: There were research been done on attitudes of government officials in implementing 
government policies generally but none to the disaster management policies called the MNSC 
Directive 20. 
Disaster Management 
• Significant interrelated concerns in theoretical development in the field of emergency management: 
1. What is a disaster? 
Malaysia lies outside the Pacific Ring of Fire along the north-eastern islands adjacent to and 
including New Guinea and the Alpide belt along the south and west from Sumatra, Java, 
Bali, Flores, and Timor. Malaysia is safe from earthquake but receive a lot of rain rather 
than technological disaster.  
2. What is emergency management? 
The term was widely used in Cold War protecting civilians from military attack. In the EU 
they called crises management. In academic the term disaster risk reduction were used. 
International communities pleasantly use the term disaster management. 
3. What variables should be explored in academic research? 
 Detail explanation will be made in the method section below. 
4. What actors should be incorporated into academic studies? 
Public service community particularly those who are involve in Disaster Management 
Mechanism of Malaysia. They are the managers, clerical staff, technical staff, and officers.  
5. What phases should be given priority? 
Pre and Post-disaster 
• Disaster Planning Principles: Is the prime local response; a process with strategic action, programme 
and project levels. The process is base on disaster community strength before, while disaster and 
after disaster. 
• Roles of Government: Government has close involvement to hazards as they control many effective 
tools to reduce vulnerability to hazards such as land use regulation and building code enforcement. 
• New Emergency Management Model: Based on the combination of socio-technical system and 
human organisation in order to put together technical and organisational response to protect 
vulnerable communities with crucial participation from disaster victims. 
• Potential Risk of Post-Disaster Recovery: Non-compliance will possibly trigger future injurious 
effects such as losses and destruction. The potential risks of post-disaster recovery to the affected 
community are reflecting to ‘impoverishment’ to displace victims and consider as potential risk of 
moderate or serious harm to the health and safety of the occupiers (or others) of the residential 
premises. 
Regulatory Compliance 
• Regulatory Compliance Concepts: There are many models of compliance and enforcement to 
regulation. The traditional model (penalties and punishment), ‘responsive regulation’(an introduction 
of ‘regulatory forgiveness’), enforcement pyramid’ (compliance from all regulators that starts at the 
base of the pyramid consist of persuasion and self-regulation to the top pyramid that consist of 
sanction and punishment), ‘smart regulation’ (a comprehensive approach with enforcement pyramid 
plus influence from outside third parties) and to avoid ‘command and control’ (structured order-
military action) in today’s ‘regulatory mix’ concept that involve participation of all authorities, 
agencies, NGOs and communities. 
• Research in Regulatory Compliance: Analysis regarding policies and government instruments were 
more towards consulting federal governments especially to issues toward institutional compliance. In 
psychology and sociology emphasises, scholars look for cognitive and social learning elements. 
• Compliance Assessment: Three stages of assessment (rectify related laws and other social 
responsibilities involve, considerable outcomes and utilising its own outcome monitoring tools) 
besides of refer to International Standard Organisation (ISO). 
• Legal Context in Shelter/Housing Sector: International guidelines only present the legal context for 
the implementation of emergency housing ‘responses’ and do not represent or bind as a law. These 
guidelines outlined are based upon the consideration of law and human rights. It depends on local 
and national customary law.  
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• Community Participations: To study how to provide income generation, rebuilding social support 
networks, activities essential for maintaining cultural identities. 
• Behaviours of Government Institution in Disaster Planning: Rules (i.e. social, political and 
economic) are conceived in institutions that affect human behavior. Government has to balance their 
responsibility in competing values as authority and their ideological position (political preference) in 
the free market condition (business governed by the laws of supply and demand) with control over 
‘fair rate of return’ principle (earn profit from expenditures and investments, will then turn to service 
upgrades to the public). 
• What is attitudes?: An attitude is a mental process that determines both the actual and potential 
responses of an individual in the social world consists of cognitive, affective and conative  
Cognitive: Intellectually (knowledge and understanding) towards the topic. 
Affective: Individual feelings, moods, emotions or sympathetic nervous system activity in relate to 
the attitude. 
Conative: Individual behavioral response to the attitude. 
Malaysia Context 
• Quality of Public Service Administration: The quality of public administration rates as average 78.8 
by the World Bank in 2009 with 100 is greatest. The Global Competitiveness Report recently 
presented Malaysia at the 26th out of 160 countries (WEF, 2007). However, this rank is considered 
weak once compared to the competitors in the region like Singapore (5th), Hong Kong (11th), 
Taiwan (13th) and South Korea (24th). 
• Malaysia and Asia: Malaysia receive heavy rain that leading to secondary disaster such as landslide 
and flood. The economical, geophysical and geographical characteristics of Asia make the region 
more vulnerable to natural disasters. The ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and 
Emergency Response (AADMER) was signed by the member countries in July 2005 in Laos as a 
result from a significant feature of the agreed HFA framework towards building better resilience 
among members. 
• Malaysian Experience: Neither public officer workers’ attitudes nor private managers followed 
regulatory compliance with the MNSC Directive 20. Previous studies in Malaysia have gauged 
subject knowledge, attitudes of general public and private sectors but none on public officers. They 
were only comfortable with their normal daily routine but not to the MNSC Directive 20. Even 
though Malaysian has shown a high level of satisfaction with the provision of temporary longhouses 
provided by the government, they are unaware of potential risk of harm and rights to equal and 
adequate housing. 
• Disaster Planning in Malaysia: The Highland Towers’ tragedy in 1993 set an exemplar and reference 
for future disasters management. After the tragedy the ‘Policy and Mechanism on National Disaster 
and Relief Management’ was formulated in 1994. The updated content then formulated the MNSC 
Directive 20 as a guidelines or Standards Operational Procedure for the authorities to respond in 
disaster situation.  
• Formulation of the National Disaster Management Programme (Diagram 4.1) is guided by the 
MNSC Directive 20 in the national ‘Policy and Mechanism on National Disaster and Relief 
Management’. 
• The response of all mechanism according to the MNSC Directive 20 (Diagram 4.2). 
• Emergency Housing in Malaysia: There was no information in the United Nation database on 
relevant legislative clauses of national housing rights legislation available from the United Nation 
country members of Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Myanmar and Brunei Darussalam. However, 
Article 8 by clause (1) in the Constitution of Malaysia provides that ‘all persons are equal before the 
law and entitled to its equal protection’. Malaysian are all protected under present laws such as the 
Syaria Law (only applicable to Muslims), the civil and criminal codes; land use, planning laws and 
regulations; building codes and standards, development laws; and environmental standards It is true 
because there is no comprehensive national housing policy in terms of any housing development. 
Most of housing development refers to the guidelines such as the New Economic Policy and Vision 
Development Policy. The main reference is the Malaysia Planning that is renewable every five years. 
• Lesson Learned from Disaster Cases in Housing: Trends in housing policy are very similar in the 
developing countries after a disaster strikes (‘rubber-stamped’, local community initiative and 
limited or imported technology-based) without understanding to local situation such as earthquake 
region and flood area due to comply with seismic codes and latest technology is back on the basis of 
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costs. Additionally, non-compliance stills not a culture in daily basis. States are encouraged to use 
traditional method of constructions in low income country because traditional structure by using 
wood is more elastic and seismic resistance.  
 
Research Methods 
• Combination of both methods (Quantitative and Qualitative): Combining both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches on the grounds that this yields a fuller picture. Different paradigms safely 
separated by using triangulation technique that separate both methods from the beginning and 
analysis but the results were discussed together at the end based on aims stipulated earlier. Thus, this 
is a ‘Two-Phase Design’ approach because both paradigms are clearly separate. 
• Why? Quantitative part or the surveys collected information from general perception. Qualitative 
part will explain what is not clear from the surveys. Furthermore, biographical data able to sort only 
actors involve in providing emergency housing. Hence, the simple was small but it is significant. 
• How? Biographical Data: Biographical (actors’ lives) data gained from the quantitative approach 
were used as guidelines for selecting respondents for the qualitative approach because only actors 
those involve in emergency housing were interviewed. The main aim of the interviews was to 
illuminate and articulate the questionnaire findings that might escape from general question in the 
surveys. 
• Research Approach: Research in regulatory compliance is the sociological approach that should 
emphasise on ‘a cultural perspective’ because culture has become a fundamental construction of 
administrative regulation There are five sources of regulatory culture with significant influences in 
regulatory compliance. 
• Sources of Regulatory Culture: They are general culture; social structure; law; regulatory tradition; 
and regulatory work. 
(General culture): Local cultures are copied in response to present climate. 
(Social structure): Relationships and distribution within the system. 
(Law): Organisation depends on law, regulation and policies. 
(Tradition): Regulatory interaction that general culture, social structure and law contribute to the 
traditions. 
(Work): Worked out in the daily interactions of members of regulatory communities. 
• Three-Component Model of Attitudes: Franzoi (1996)  
(Cognitive): Intellectually (knowledge and understanding) towards the topic. 
(Affective): Individual feelings, moods, emotions or sympathetic nervous system activity in relate to 
the attitude. 
(Conative): Individual behavioral response to the attitude. 
• Core-hypothesis: Actors in the National Disaster Management Mechanism and their perceptions are 
correlated to working environment and sociological culture. 
• Research Aims: To assess attitudes, understanding and rationales of regulatory compliance 
implementation. 
• Research Questions (section 5.13.1, p.145): Formulated from current issues in regulatory 
compliance. 
• These research questions then were used to develop survey questionnaires. 
• Themes (section 6.5.4, p.178) were formulated as a result from literature review and field work 
experience while collecting surveys’ data information. These themes then were used to develop 
interview questionnaires. 
• Quantitative Method: Survey questionnaires  
Questionnaires Designs (41 questions) 
Samples (83% replied): 413 respondents out of 423 (self completion questionnaire) 
Interval constitutes a score of 0.8 (composite mean scores). 
• Questionnaires Design: Interviews questionnaires  
Questionnaires Design (20 questions) 
Interviews – 71 respondents as focus group from biographical data (in-depth interview) 
classify/coding the data into groups (categories) and to identify patterns and relationships among 
these categories: Actors’ perceptions were administered in sequence from positive towards the issue 
pertaining, undecided to negative [(1) affirmative about the issues being discussed (2) undecided on 
the issue, and (3) negative towards the issue] in most designated level (national, state, district and 
under special body appointed by the government). 
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• Standards of Quality: Trustworthiness Model was chosen and rigor to make sure tightness of 
verification and standard of quality in overall phases of research design. This model is based on the 
identification of four aspects, namely: Truth value (consent letter and respondents volunteered to get 
involve), applicability (all of the public service actors in every department in Disaster Management 
Mechanism in Malaysia), consistency (the methodology and findings presented directly without 
repetition) and neutrality (non-bias). 
 
Quantitative Analysis 
• Actors’ cognitive component of attitudes to regulatory compliance. 
>Negative attitude 
• Actors’ affective component of attitudes to regulatory compliance. 
>Negative attitude 
• Actors’ conative component of attitudes to regulatory. 
>Slightly neutral: Not sure 
• General negative attitudes of actors towards regulatory compliance implementation. 
• Conclusion 
>Actors are not knowledgeable because most of the actors who answered the questionnaires are 
working at the administration and clerical level in Malaysian Disaster Management Mechanism. 
 
Qualitative Analysis 
The actors interviewed generally admitted that they know very little about the regulatory compliance 
innovation proposed by the Prime Ministry Department: 
• This lack of knowledge about regulatory compliance is due to the fact that lack of information about 
regulatory compliance given to department at the national, state or district level.  
• Regulatory compliance is rarely discussed within the department either formally or informally.  
• The majority of actors interviewed said they had never been trained to handle victims and to 
understand regulatory compliance during their pre-service training.  
• They also admitted that they never expected to be involved in any way at all in these victims 
adaptation.  
• Generally, actors felt they did not have the required skills to handle victims if included in their 
group. Thus they have the perception that handling victims and implement regulatory compliance 
requires different skills. 
• The majority of actors interviewed agreed that victims have the right to regulatory compliance due to 
the fact that equal rights and socialisation opportunities. 
• They felt victims who are capable (mentally, socially and emotionally) and can behave themselves in 
disaster group and can cope with the rigors of resilient difficulties have the right to in the process of 
decisions making.  
• Actors also expressed the views that even though regulatory compliance could be risky to get them 
involve; it does have the potential to make actors more ‘caring’ towards the victims.  
• They listed nine categories of barrier or obstacle that need to be overcome if regulatory compliance 
is to be given a chance to succeed in Malaysia. 
 
Conclusion 
• Malaysia is a unique and different from other developing countries because of Malaysian has to 
consider cultural and religious matters (e.g. minimum 3 rooms in providing shelter and separate 
worship place). 
• Actors had broadly negative attitudes towards regulatory implementation. These negative general 
attitudes were attributed by their negative thinking towards the level of knowledge and 
understanding (see section 9.1.2, p.386 and section 9.1.3, p.287) regarding MNSC Directive 20. 
• They know very little about the MNSC Directive 20. This lack of knowledge about regulatory 
compliance is due to lack of information about the programme given to department at the national, 
state or district level.  
• Generally, actors felt they did not have the required skills to comply with the programme. 
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• The majority of actors interviewed agreed that victims have the right to regulatory compliance due to 
equal rights and socialisation opportunities. 
• Actors in Malaysia appear to see the process of regulatory compliance from the point of view of the 
existing public service system. 
• Actors aware of the many barriers and uncertainties (see section 9.1.1, p.276) Actors do wish to see 
changes at the department levels before regulatory compliance is implemented. 
• Both methods of quantitative and qualitative proposed that more effort should be done to promote 
the importance of knowledge towards MNSC Directive 20 because of actors were lack of 
information. 
• Transferable lesson: Malaysia is a small country. The finding can be used to also a small country, 
multicultural and multireligion especially in separating bedrooms according to genders and in 
providing worship hall to disaster victims. Actors should understand each other in terms of 
responsibility, think outside of organisation, should consider who this disaster policy are for, should 
know what matters in assessing needs from disaster victims, be patient and persistent in humanitarian 
works and implementing disaster policy.  
 
Q & A 
Contents 
General Questions 
• What you did in your country? Introduce yourself    
Where did your research-project come from? How did your research-questions emerge?  
• What do you get from here/Northumbria University?    
• What do you plan to do back in Malaysia?     
 
Specific Questions 
1. What is the area that you wish to be examined?     
How does your work relate to X?        
2. In one sentence, what is your thesis?       
In open explanation        
3. Key conclusion from literature        
Which are the three most important papers in X?      
Who are the main `players' in X?        
Who are your closest competitors?        
What do you do better than them? What do you do worse?     
4. Summarise your key argument/findings.      
What do your results mean?       
5. What are you most proud of, and why?       
6. What's original about your work? Where is the novelty?  
7. What have you done that merits a PhD?  
What had you learned   
What are the contributions of your thesis?     
7a. to knowledge?         
to other researchers?         
to industry?          
8. How do your contributions generalise?      
To what extent would they generalise to systems other than the one you've worked on?  
9. What do you know about the history of X?      
What is the current state of the art in X? (capabilities and limitations of existing systems)   
10. How do scientists/philosophers carry out experiments?    
What techniques are commonly used?      
Where do current technologies fail such that you (could) make a contribution?     
11. What are the recent major developments in X?      
12. What did you do for your MPhil, and how does your PhD extend it?  
Did you make any changes to the system you implemented for your MPhil?    
13. What are the strongest/weakest parts of your work?      
14. What are the alternatives to your approach?     
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16a. What do you gain by your approach?     
16b. What would you gain by approach X?     
15. Looking back, what might you have done differently?  
(main answer for differences)       
Why didn't you do it this way (the way everyone else does it)?    
Why have you done it this way?        
16. How have you evaluated your work?       
18a. Intrinsic (action that is essential) evaluation:    
18ai. and how well it performs?      
18b. Extrinsic (action that is not essential) evaluation:     
17. How would your system cope with bigger examples? Does it scale up?   
18. How could you improve your work?      
19. What are the motivations for your research?      
21a. Why is the problem you have tackled worth tackling?   
20. What is the implication of your work in your area?  
Can learning help both redrafting regulation and in implementation  
Under what circumstances would your approach be useable? (when it usable)    
What does it change?        
21. How do/would you cope with known problems in your field?    
22. Have you solved the field's problem that you claim to have solved?   
23. Where will you publish your work?       
24. Which aspects of your thesis could be published?     
25. Has your view of your research topic changed during the  
course of the research?      
26. Is your field going in the right direction?      
How do you know that your algorithm (sequence of instruction)/rules are correct?   
How do you expect X to progress over the next five years?  
How long-term is your contribution, given the anticipated future developments in X?   
You discuss future work in your conclusion chapter. How long would it take to implement X, and 
what are the likely problems you envisage/predict?      
27. How victims’ involvement influence decision making? 
28. Transferable lessons  
 
General Questions 
• What you did in your country? Introduce yourself 
I received a degree in building technology and masters in housing studies. This research is 
intentionally further develop from my masters thesis in actors perceptions towards the housing 
development process in the Penang state. Both research at masters and PhD level are the result from 
the national plan to achieve 2020 vision as a developed and industrialise country. Now I’m attaching 
with the University of Science, Malaysia. Before that I worked in the construction industry for about 
5 years. I had been in the technical and administration level related to construction work at that time. 
My last job was the Research and Development Manager. I had to lead a team of staff to produce 
reports, proposals, working papers and related works. At the same time I get involved in 
volunteering work. The most challenged task while doing volunteering work was in the year 2005. 
My 1st hand experience while Tsunami struck inspired me the most in doing this research. I realised 
that there are still scopes of improvement both in planning and training for those in the front line and 
to the victims. 
 
Where did your research-project come from? How did your research-questions emerge?  
There were efforts in implementing full regulatory compliance in the National Disaster Management 
Mechanism after I looked back in the Malaysian experience. The implementation is not according to 
plan because of the implementation of regulatory compliance will probably involve making changes 
to what are considered as barriers to the present department environments, and these changes will 
have to be based, to a large extent, on how actors’ perceive and judge the introduction of regulatory 
compliance implementation. From local experience in Malaysia, recent work in public officers 
behaviours proposed that studies should been done to understand barriers that inhibit behaviour 
change not only from the private officers but also the public officers. Research question emerged 
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from the issues pertaining in the topics studied that conclude in the introduction at the beginning of 
Chapter2, Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and 4. 
 
• What do you get from here/Northumbria University? 
The 1st day at this university I was a bit nervous because do not know yet the team of supervision. 
After I met them they are so professional, supportive and cheerful. Most of the event occurred in no 
tense environment. I was introduced to the Disaster and Development Centre, research trainings, 
registered as a member with professional bodies (RICS, CIAT, ABE, and CIH-network organisation 
of development from Disaster network, Development Areas Research Network, North East Housing, 
SPHERE Project, ADPC, Humanitarian Policy Group/ODI), writing articles, attending workshops, 
courses and conferences. I was ready for my mid point progression after about a year started my PhD 
and sent off to field trip in Malaysia for 6 months. One of my biggest achievements here yet is to 
receive the Provention Consortium Grant and then the International Student Award.  
 
• What do you plan to do back in Malaysia? 
I am bonded with University of Science, Malaysia for 5 years in return of financial support for my 
PhD here. They spent a lot of money for me to study here. The sooner I can complete my study less 
burden to my government. As a top university in Malaysia, University Sains Malaysia receives lots 
of research grants from the Malaysian Government and International Institutions. Besides of giving 
lectures, I will be active in doing research. I even plan for my academic expansion by taking post 
doctorate in the future. At the same time, dissemination work will keep on going.  
 
Specific Questions 
1. What is the area in which you wish to be examined?  
As we can see from the research title, the key area is in disaster management. My research focus on 
the attitudes to regulation and compliance, of government officers, that I called actors in the National 
Disaster Management Mechanism in providing emergency housing in Malaysia.  
 
How does your work relate to X?  
This research intentionally further develop from my masters’ Thesis (title: Housing Development 
Process in the Penang State, Malaysia: The Actors Perceptions) towards the Vision 2020 with a 
‘clean, efficient and effective’ government administration as the authorities elected. The keyword in 
regulatory compliance is effectiveness of authorities’ enforcement. Therefore, the nature of 
institution and behaviour of authority is significant to compliance with the emergency management 
programmes. Research in building a better foundation for understanding behaviour is a necessary 
step before trying to improve public policy implementation because the public perception of risk 
strongly affecting the actors involve in the National Disaster Management Mechanism. Therefore, an 
informed public can be a major ally because awareness can lead to action, including pressure on 
legislators and other policymakers. 
 
2. In one sentence, what is your thesis?   
I collected actors’ views towards the implementation of disaster management policy in Malaysia 
through surveys and in depth interviews. 
 
In open explanation 
I live in Malaysia. Inspired from my previous experience in emergency housing, I decided to do 
research about how the authorities in the National Disaster Management Mechanism respond to the 
intention of implementing full regulatory compliance. Malaysia is not a developing country but not 
yet a developed country. Developed country has establishing compliance culture, but not in 
Malaysia. Malaysia has a policy in disaster management. Unfortunately the effectiveness and 
commitment from the enforcers is decaying from central government to district and from 
professionals to local people. The problem was that the actors received very little information about 
this implementation. The actors are knowledgeable about their own scope of work but not to the 
information regarding MNSC Directive 20. Consequently, non-compliance occurs; for example, 
from my observation at site authorities can provide 3 bedrooms as required by building standard but 
the size is not adequate. I hope I can highlights shortfalls in provision, training and awareness, and to 
recommend ways of improvement. At the end, I can reveal the status of implementation and why it is 
still not implemented successfully and how to overcome the problems.  
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3. Key conclusion from literature  
Available literatures suggest that non-compliance within disaster management institution continues 
to occur (Dynes, 1993). Things will get worst if the response become highly politisised not 
according to international activities and only 40-60 per cent of authorities committed to contribute in 
recovery period (Davis, 2007). Quarantelli (1984) who identified that a disaster planning as ‘a 
process’ rather than a tangible product because disaster itself are failure of social system as 
mentioned by Dynes and any development at that time can be seriously damaging (Allen, 1990) as a 
result from the communities who give very low priority to disaster planning and actions. Hutter 
(1989) and Meidenger (1987) suggested that this sociological culture become a central study of 
administrative regulation in order to rectify what is problematic that should focused on how 
organisational routines, the attitudes and values of bureaucrats shape governmental actors that 
predominantly influenced by a institutional cultural approach. The issue is that the meaning of 
culture remains quite unclear because culture is a complex construction of organisations, consisting 
of attitudes, perceptions and values and belief. In Malaysia, organisational error and regulatory 
failures were found to contribute to how the public service behaves far from the main objective of 
any regulations that is regulatory compliance (Aini et al. 2006). Nurturing a compliance culture, an 
attitude of the organisation is what values compliance goal at the end (Braithwaite, 1993). 
Compliance goal will determine compliance culture. Therefore, there is a necessity to understand 
behaviour as a better foundation before trying to improve public policy (Cohen et al. 2000). A 
person attitude will determine what the person will hear, think and do about the object (Allport, 
1973). It is a significant to include peers’ opinion and the significant of social influence in 
determining key variables in attitude to compliance (Tyler, 1990). 
 
Which are the three most important papers in X?  
These are not the most important in the field but to me they provide the most relevant guide in this 
research: 
1) Quarantelli, E. L (1984): Organisational Behaviour in Disasters and Implications for 
Disaster Planning. 
2) Meidinger, E. (1987): ‘Regulatory Culture: Theoretical Outline’.  
3) Aini, M. S., Laily, P., Sharifah, A., H., Zuroni, J. and Norhasmah, S. (2006): Sustainability 
knowledge, attitude and practices of Malaysians. 
 
Who are the main `players' in X?  
They are clustered in the specific topics 
1) Attitudes: Stalberg,  Frey and Allport 
2) Behaviour in Disaster: Quarantelli, Fritz, Tyler and Dynes 
3) Effective Regulation: Parker 
4) Regulatory Compliance: Hutter, Gunningham, Braithwaite, Ayres and Johnston 
5) Regulatory Culture: Meidenger 
6) Technical and Regulation: Crawford and Sauders 
7) Emergency Housing and Development: Quarantelli, Corsellis, Barakat, Davis, Foong, 
Lizarralde and Aysan 
8) Disaster Management: Aini, Shaluf, Fakru’l-Razi, O’Keefe, McEntire, Allen and Drabek 
9) Malaysia Administration: Mantogmary, Quah and Sarji 
10) Workplace Regulation: Cunningham 
11) Questionnaire and Interview Design: Openheim 
12) Quantitative and Qualitative Combination: Creswell and Yin 
 
Key Literature Review 
(Dynes, 1993): Non-compliance within disaster management institution continues to occur, 
disaster itself is failure of social system. 
(Davis, 2007): The response becomes highly politisised not according to international activities. 
(Quarantelli, 1984): A disaster planning as ‘a process’ rather than a tangible product. 
(Hutter, 1989 and Meidenger, 1987): Sociological culture becomes a central study of administrative 
regulation. 
(Aini et al. 2006): In Malaysia, organisational error and regulatory failures were found to contribute 
to vulnerability. 
(Braithwaite, 1993): An attitude of the organisation is what values compliance goal at the end. 
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(Cohen et al. 2000): there is a necessity to understand behaviour as a better foundation before trying 
to improve public policy. 
(Allport, 1973): Person attitude will determine what the person will hear, think and do about the 
object. 
(Tyler, 1990): Actors perception is significant to include peers’ opinion. 
 
Who are your closest competitors?  
Quarantelli, Enrico Louis, with 29 books, 259 works in 330 publications. He is the specialist in 
collective behavior, social movements and social change, mass communication, field research 
techniques, complex organisations, sociology of knowledge and science and popular culture. The E. 
L. Quarantelli Resource Collection in DRC, Delaware University contains the world’s most 
complete collection on the social and behavioral science aspects of disasters. The second competitor 
with a new approach in the 3rd world is Gonzalo Lizarralde from IF Research Group, Montreal 
University. He is the analysis expert of the relationships between planning, design and construction 
processes especially in project management and organisational system. Unfortunately, there is no 
such competitor locally in my country. 
 
What do you do better than them? What do you do worse?  
I understand more in local scenario and worked as a volunteering worker and still. The only thing is 
that I am lack of academic and fieldwork experience. 
 
4. Summarise your key argument/findings. 
Concerning in summary that the main negative attitudes due to the fact that only 18 % had accepted 
the implementation positively. It is essential to recognise them as the barriers to improving 
enforcement of regulation on emergency housing. These findings necessarily have direct relevance to 
further development in Malaysia because actors are actually willing to support the implementation if 
they are provided with enough support in terms of resources, training, exposures and incentives. The 
MNSC contents are suitable and practical to implement at the department level but not to the actors 
and victims and reveals that policy delivery system is not yet effective enough. 
 
What do your results mean? 
It needs to consider that actors could not reasonably be accused for having this negative attitude. 
They need to be convinced that regulatory compliance is a good effort for the benefits of the actors 
and the victims. They need informative advice and guidance to enable them to see the very probable 
societal benefits that can lead towards regulatory compliance development. Actors might be 
persuaded to accept regulatory compliance, cannot simply be expected them to accept the 
programme without any changes made in the present department settings or as regard to their 
working condition status. There is no doubt that actors would expect to see triumph over barriers and 
additional input in the form of increased resources and extra supports, especially in working 
assistants. 
 
5. What are you most proud of, and why?  
This research encouraged me to study multiple fields of studies. Literature works been done in this 
research emphasised the issues from the past to the most recent that relate to the international 
scenarios as the developed countries to the local situations. This research is important because 
research in providing shelter is the most important in emergency relief work due to land ownership 
issues. Furthermore, the root of the disaster problems are poverty and underdevelopment that been 
covered in this research. This research also covers issues that are commonly related to most disasters 
situation (e.g. dangerous location of building, improper construction, cultural attitudes about 
development, political preference). At the end, I could discover central premises, subject matter, 
triangulation technique in methodology and revealed actors’ biographical data. The reason is back to 
the reason inspired me to do this research; I hope to highlight shortfalls in provision, training and 
awareness, and to recommend ways of improvement. From the findings summarised I am proud and 
believe that I achieved it that revealed the status of implementation and why it is still not 
implemented successfully.  
6. What's original about your work? Where is the novelty? 
There is lack of recent information available on the opinions and attitudes of actors in regulatory 
compliance and emergency housing. Much past research has focused on levels of compliance and 
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quotes in an organisation rather than understanding of attitudes towards regulatory within the context 
of emergency housing in the public sector in Malaysia. The research shows the results of actors’ 
perceptions to the MNSC Directive 20 particularly in the public service sector that has never been 
done before in Malaysia. Information collected generated from the key variables that include peers 
opinions and social influence. Furthermore, key recent practice focuses on regulatory compliance is 
not in prescriptive rules or command and control anymore rather the outcomes of regulatory aims 
that match with business goals and some political interest that were highlighted in this research. The 
perceptions gathered were purely from the actors who are involve only in emergency housing as 
result from biographical data. 
 
7. What have you done that merits a PhD?  
My investigation provides insight and understanding the attitudes of actors to phenomenon of 
regulatory compliance with disaster management policy particularly in providing emergency housing 
in the Malaysian context. By using triangulation technique I could develop methodologies combining 
quantitative and qualitative as a result from literature reviews and survey experience. This clear 
conceptual framework I believed as the key contribution in configuring the answers to the 
hypotheses and research questions. From literature review also, identification of the subject matter 
(no. 10) and the central premises (no. 13) were cleared in order to configure key instrument of this 
research work. 
 
What do you learnt? 
I learnt a lot in networking and extension of research works and also familiar with research 
environments. Now I am able to consider research problems, design, execute and assess 
methodologies in research, formulate new hypotheses and ideas, and discuss my research with 
colleagues including other stakeholders in the field. At the same time I have confidence in written 
and verbal communication towards the issues in my field, have an understanding of key issues such 
as supervising junior staff and students, broad aspects of my field, relevant methodologies, seeking 
funding, publishing, and some knowledge of intellectual property, public opinion and engagement, 
careers and opportunities in my field and most importantly work independently. 
 
What are the contributions of your thesis? 
Generally, this research provides thorough analysis of the views and perceptions of officials in 
Malaysia towards the implementation of regulations as set out in the MNSC Directive 20 with 
respect to emergency housing standards. Actors’ view toward the implementation of full regulatory 
compliance will inspire the government and related agencies to design a holistic organisation that 
perhaps will diminish negative disaster likelihood as the nations’ progress. The outcome of this 
research reveals the reasons why it is important to ensure that policy makers have to be responsive 
and have a grasp on current research findings in particular to the subject of policy implementation 
status. 
 
 to knowledge? 
The aim of a disaster response is to restore normality as quickly as possible and a reduction 
in the loss of life and the prevention of human suffering. At the end, victims can stand on 
their own feet. However, the real world of disaster management in Malaysia is complicated 
and there are constraints/barriers that cannot be ignored as revealed in this research. It was 
suggested that depoliticise in recovery planning and decentralised by the government may 
be best serve in implementing policies. The current level of acceptance towards regulatory 
compliance, barriers mentioned and changes suggested by actors in this research should be 
able to help personnel involved in regulatory compliance implementation to undertake some 
necessary changes to ensure that regulatory compliance gets off on the right track. The 
government and public are aware about the status of achievement in MNSC Directive 20 
from the findings presented in this research. This research outcome can be used to develop a 
strategy and actions that include awareness raising and capacity building for enhancing 
enforcement of current legislation. The on going process of social learning might enhance 
the quality of the present Mechanism of Disaster Management in Malaysia. There is no 
specific document or reference can provide list of actors those who are involve directly in 
providing emergency housing in Malaysia. As a result of biographical data, I can reveal list 
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of actors involve in emergency housing. However, the list is not in the writing in this 
research because not the intention of this research to expose the identity of respondents. 
 
to other researchers?  
Ideas and recommendations in finding new solutions to old problems can move upwards as 
well as downwards due to the technical design in rules and regulations. Researchers can 
benefit from the output of this research.  
 
to industry?  
The accusation is not only on actors but also the policy makers. Extra attention should be 
given in areas highlighted in the discussion and recommendation. Malaysia is on the right 
track in providing adequate, affordable and decent housing as mentioned in the national 
housing development policy and Vision 2020. Therefore rectifications in actors’ attitudes 
mean a lot in terms of delivering successful national policies.     
 
8. How do your contributions generalise?  
To what extent would they generalise to systems other than the one you've worked on? 
The findings are applicable that is unique and not amendable or transferable (uniqueness is that the 
findings would be the same if the research was repeated in a similar context. Meanwhile, not 
transferable is the findings’ are not fit into contexts outside the study situation that are determined by 
the degree of similarity). The outputs from the focus group are also the example of attitudes of 
typical public sector community in delivering government policies. 
 
9. What do you know about the history of X?  
Definitive conclusions to define the concept of a disaster have not been generated till now and the 
complete disaster prevention is ultimately unachievable. Furthermore, it is true that there is no 
agreement on what represent universal disaster response effectiveness. Academically, the studies 
about disaster management started in 1920 from the dissertation by Samuel Prince’s that he 
investigated the response in 1917 Halifax shipping explosion. In Malaysia, in terms of national 
security, resulted from racial riot, National Operation Council was the main reference in 1969 to 
implement security measures. In providing housing, after independence day, the Municipal Building 
by Law was found outdated but updating work been carry out from time to time until the last 
amendment called Uniform Building by Law in 1984. This UBBL is become one of the main 
reference in providing emergency housing together with other international and national guidelines. 
 
What is the current state of the art in X? (capabilities and limitations of existing systems) 
The issue of government responsibility is in competing values as assurance role as the government 
and ideological positions in public welfare versus free market in order to balance both competing 
values and ideological position. In order to suit the demand from internal and external environment, 
guidelines in handling disaster in Malaysia is base on the official document called ‘The Policy and 
Mechanism on National Disaster and Relief management’ In this Policy under the MNSC Directive 
20 clearly stated guidelines on the management of disasters including the responsibilities and 
functions of the various agencies under an integrated emergency management system within the 
scope of national and international legislation. The control of operation is in Putrajaya called the 
Malaysia Disaster Management Council. Information management system in use is called the 
Natural Disaster Data and Information Management System (NADDI) in Malaysia Centre for 
Remote Sensing (MACRES) in Kuala Lumpur. The system depends much on information 
technology and judgment from human behaviour that is subjective to measure. 
 
     10. How do scientists/philosophers carry out experiments? 
The writers that trying to experience the world from the participant’s point of view usually involves 
qualitative studies because of these forms of data results from an attempt to specify the quality of the 
relationship between two or more things. Researchers in doing qualitative research had little control 
over the events and the study required a contemporary focus within a real life context. Researchers in 
this are chose to do qualitative research because they know little about a group of people or 
phenomena. Compared to quantitative, these forms of data results are from an attempt to quantify the 
relationship between two or more things. Both methods were found as relevant in order to achieve 
the aims of this research.   
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What techniques are commonly used? 
Much of the recent scholarship in enforcement and compliance focused on how organisational 
routines, the attitudes and values of bureaucrats shape governmental actors. Enforcement and 
compliance are measured with reference to such factors as commitment to regulatory objective and 
attitudes to compliance toward effectiveness. Key variables determining compliance includes peers’ 
opinion and the extent of social influence on individual encounters. Therefore, collecting actors 
views through surveys and in-depth interviews were considered as relevant in doing this research. In 
disaster management and social studies, researchers would prefer to do field work to be part of the 
subject matters in this research that identified as an attitude by the actors. Individual behaviour in a 
particular setting is affected by an individual’s initial emotional or normative state and then by direct 
experience with others in a specific setting. Attitudes depend much on what people do together to 
respond in an organised fashion to the crises of disaster and on the continuities between pre and post-
disaster of social organisations.  
 
Where do current technologies fail such that you (could) make a contribution?  
There is no technology can measure human psychological behaviour especially in attitudes. It is an 
abstract in nature and thus, it cannot be measured directly, but there are methods in research might be 
used especially in this research to measure attitudes by his/her opinions or beliefs about the attitude 
object (as shown in quantitative analysis) and level of regulatory compliance (as shown in qualitative 
analysis). One of the major problems confronting scholars in the field is the inability to define 
subject matter that been translated in this research. After thorough literature reviews and surveys 
experience I found out that attitude appears as significant in influencing actors’ behaviour in 
regulatory compliance.  
 
      11. What are the recent major developments in X?  
Lately, the Sphere is revising the Sphere Handbook in the new guidelines in providing emergency 
housing. The revision process will run from May 2009 until March 2010. At the same time, Sphere is 
announcing latest update to keep stakeholders aware in relation to humanitarian actions (e.g. 
companionship with INEE Secretariat in October 2009 to further develop ways not only educating 
victims but also meet the needs and rights of populations affected by crises). Humanitarian Policy 
Group, (ODI) is also look into the matter of a good humanitarian government as vital with emphasise 
in the role of the affected state in disaster response in 2009 report. Chartered Institute of Housing 
Conference held in Harrogate in June 2009 emphasised in regulatory compliance towards zero 
carbon and sustainable development. Even, the Asian ministerial conferences on disaster risk 
reduction represent a high level forum for Governments to reaffirm their commitment to the Hyogo 
Framework for Action and exchange practical ways to implement effective disaster risk reduction at 
the national and local levels and move towards sustainable development. Meanwhile, the 
International Sociological Association’s International Housing Conference 2009 was held in 
September in Glasgow to answer the question of housing as globalise commodity or is it 
fundamentally local? (the issue is due to housing credit and its human impacts on communities and 
different spatial scale). The United Nations Global Research Network on Human Settlements annual 
meeting is being hosted by GURU in September 2009 to debate the contents of the 2009 Global 
Report on Human Settlements. In Malaysia, CIBD is introducing the Q-lassic in August 2009 in 
order to assure the quality in building construction and development from a better way of 
enforcement and evaluation. Q-lassic is the scoring system to measure and evaluate the quality of 
workmanship of a construction based on relevant approved standards. Even the government of 
Malaysia tries to enhance relationship between multiracial by launching 1Malaysia that hopefully 
boost strategies to achieve the national 2020 vision. 
 
12. What did you do for your MPhil, and how does your PhD extend it? Did you make any changes to 
the system you implemented for your MPhil? 
This is an exploratory research to get an in depth understanding towards the issues. The focused on 
the literature underpinning the Thesis aims and develops methods by combining quantitative and 
qualitative. At the same time, hypothesis and research questions establishment been done in mid 
point progression. At the end of my work, I managed to demonstrate the results that match my 
hypothesis and answered all of those research questions. Due to clear objective and aims, less 
amendment been done when it come to identification of additional themes as a result from surveys 
experience. It was a challenging task to analyse qualitative data as extracting rich information to 
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determine beneficial patterns and to build a framework vision of it in order to arrive at the essence of 
what this information claimed. Theme number 15 has something to do with The Vision 2020 that 
will benefit the public service sector in order to increase work ethics and at the same time produce 
the caring feeling to the public. 
 
13. What are the strongest/weakest parts of your work? 
A theory that tries to explain everything may run a risk of explaining nothing at all. Therefore, it is 
important to clarify the subject matter as described before (no. 10) and the central premises in this 
research. The central premise is that regulatory compliance by the authorities called the actors to the 
programme in MNSC due to their crucial participation towards the implementation. As a result, the 
strongest part was that the research covers all possible actors involve directly in providing 
emergency housing as a result from biographical data in surveys phase to support the model of 
trustworthiness in doing this research. Only actors involve in emergency housing so called as the 
focus group were interviewed from the convenience samples in phase 1 with no restriction on who 
was included in the sample but still under the sample framework. They were all been chosen from 
the Malaysia Disaster Management Mechanism. The weakest part might be that the actors tried to 
make it safe and low profile in given their honest answers both in surveys and in depth interview to 
protect their own interest that resulted to the predictable answers. The participants could only report 
their personal perceptions that were limited to their own understanding and by the emotional that 
might lead to inaccurate answer or over emphasised issue. In order to overcome these weaknesses, 
qualitative method was chosen that hopefully can produce evidence (barriers, suggestions) to 
illuminate and articulate the findings established by the questionnaires to support aspects especially 
those concerning negative aspects or feelings towards the issue.  
 
14. Where did you go wrong?  
There is no single technique that could claim a monopoly on inference in choosing methods of doing 
research. For the purpose of my research, I did started my research with quantitative studies first that 
is normally considered as secondary or deductive then followed by primary that is qualitative. I did 
not consider this as a go wrong part rather than triangulation strategies in theoretical and 
methodological because combining difference paradigm in one research. Phase 1 as the macro level 
providing general description followed by phase 2 as the micro level providing in depth evidence 
towards the issue. 
 
15. What are the alternatives to your approach? 
As we can see from the design of my research, I choose to combine both quantitative and qualitative 
by using triangulation approach in all phases. I had to do this because there is no official document 
can reveal the list of actors in providing emergency housing. I had to get the general perception 
about the policy implementation and at the same time ascertain biographical data for the next phase 
to get significant answers from those who are really involved in providing emergency housing in 
Malaysia.  
 
15a. What do you gain by your approach? 
It is a question of not interviewing the most important individual, but the right person. I 
could now capture the prospect that might escape from broader surveys systematically and 
reliable from the actors purely involve in emergency housing.  
 
15b. What would you gain by approach X? 
The focus group approached were the right actors that could give the answer towards the 
issue. 
 
16. Looking back, what might you have done differently? (main answer for differences) 
This research been done according to the recent practice that focuses on the outcomes of regulatory 
aims, business goal and some political interest besides of prescriptive rules or command and control. 
As a result, 2 phases of investigation involved in order to get general opinions of beliefs about the 
attitude object then followed by measuring level of acceptance of implementation from specific 
actors in regulatory compliance. Phase 1 is very important that include biographical variables. This 
information is vital to ascertain the Malaysian actors’ background characteristics known as the focus 
group. This information then was used as guidelines for selecting respondents for the qualitative 
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approach. The information collected was based on peers opinion and social influence rather than 
personal individual opinion only. In terms of application, I tested the theories first in quantitative 
studies then followed by developing theories from the themes in qualitative studies. Normally, the 
qualitative is the phase to generate hypotheses and theories that could be verified later on in a 
quantitative (confirmatory) section of the study. The quantitative part could be used for 
generalisation of qualitative findings. Both methods are important in order to keep the standard of 
verification high because only conclusion from deductive (quantitative) research has high reliability 
and thus support claims of generalisability. Conclusion from inductive (qualitative) research display 
high validity. Quantitative and qualitative can complete each other by supporting and conformity.  
 
Why didn't you do it this way (the way everyone else does it)?  
It is going to be complicated and confusing if I go straight to the field and get the information from 
the entire department in Disaster Management Mechanism in Malaysia. Researcher can understand 
more the issues pertaining in the field before personally interview the focus group especially the 
reason not clear in phase 1. In additional, I could identify the potential actors and introduced myself 
from the beginning of my data collection process for the next phase and dissemination work.  
 
Why have you done it this way?  
Not all the actors in Disaster Management Mechanism in Malaysia involve directly in providing 
emergency housing. Furthermore there is no official document or information about the list of actors 
involve in emergency housing. Biographical information were used as an instrument to select the 
exact actors for the next phase in order to get the required answers to the reason not cleared from 
phase 1. The next phase is the micro level that was the interviews to produce evidence (barriers, 
suggestions) to illuminate and articulate the findings established by the questionnaires to support 
aspects especially those concerning negative aspects or feelings towards the issue.  
 
17. How have you evaluated your work?  
Two types of evaluation involve 
17a. Intrinsic (action which is essential) evaluation:  
A Model of Trustworthiness was chosen and rigor to make sure tightness of verification and 
standard of quality in overall phases of research design. This model is based on the 
identification of four aspects, namely: truth value (consent letter and respondents 
volunteered to get involve), applicability (all of the public service actors in every 
department in Disaster Management Mechanism in Malaysia), consistency (the 
methodology and findings presented directly without repetition) and neutrality (non-bias). 
 
17ai. and how well it performs?  
From credibility test (reliability and validity);  
Reliability: The internal reliability coefficient of the survey general attitudinal scale was 
calculated as +0.96 as close to 1, 
and validity: All the items in questionnaire design will be based on the analysis of the 
literature been supervised by experts in the topics and pre-tested in pilot study. 
 
17b. Extrinsic (action which is not essential) evaluation:  
Only conclusion from deductive (quantitative) research has high reliability and thus support 
claims of generalisability. Conclusion from inductive (qualitative) research display high 
validity. Quantitative and qualitative can complete each other by supporting and 
conformity.  
 
18. How would your system cope with bigger examples? Does it scale up?  
89% of populations in Asia were affected by disasters since the past 20 years. Attitudes and 
regulatory compliance in the context of public service community in disaster management 
community might be used as an indicator to other public service sectors. 
 
 
19. How could you improve your work? 
My work might improve if I can acquire more fieldwork and academic experience by getting wider 
networking from local experts and other third parties such as community leaders and manufactures in 
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housing development. Researcher also should engage key stakeholders surveyed in developing such 
a strategy that should include awareness raising and capacity building. 
 
20. What are the motivations for your research?  
As I explored these issues further, I was aware that, although sufficient regulation existed, regulatory 
compliance was low. I wished to explore why there was a gap between regulation and performance. I 
would like to know the status of this MNSC Directive 20 implementation. Besides that, my vision is 
what motivates me in doing this research. The short term motivation is while I’m doing this research. 
The long term is when I go back to my country as a lecturer after get a proper recognition from here I 
hope. I enjoy the dynamics of learning process from undergraduate to postgraduate and hopefully to 
the post doctorate. Moreover recently, political atmosphere in Malaysia is not so convincing. Some 
people say that politics will bankrupt the nation in the way to gain support (e.g. charity, donation). 
The world economy recession makes the people around the world put the blame to the government. I 
have to go back soon in Malaysia to contribute something at least to my community. 
 
20a. Why is the problem you have tackled worth tackling? 
Instrument in combining both methods that is triangulation, biographical data, the 
identification of the subject matter and central premises take me a lot of time and effort to 
configure that was the main contribution to my research work. 
 
21. What is the implication of your work in your area? Can learning help both redrafting regulation 
and in implementation 
The findings from this research might attract the interest of stakeholders especially those who would 
like to know the status of achievement in MNSC Directive 20. Presently, Malaysia is still in the 
phase of restructuring and reorganising the National Disaster Management Mechanism to fit in the 
HFA and ISDR Programme. These research outcomes can be used by the decision makers, 
authorities and NGOs to develop strategies and actions that include awareness raising and capacity 
building for enhancing enforcement of current legislation. The findings of this research might give 
inputs in designing and planning the national policy and disaster management framework by 
restructuring and reorganising the present Disaster Management Mechanism in terms of enhancing 
coordination of responsibility between and within the government bodies in National Disaster 
Management Mechanism. 
 
Under what circumstances would your approach be useable? (when it usable) 
The decision making circle in Malaysia starts with social learning process. In every project delivered 
by the authorities, there will be a project report and evaluation. The output from this research is 
considered as trusted sources due to thorough and reliable primary and secondary data resources and 
considerations that might become as reference to the stakeholders. Furthermore, the ongoing 
dissemination work might attract the attention of decision makers and policy makers. As one of an 
established academic institution in Malaysia, Science University is always invited officially in giving 
consultation in implementing new policies and legislations. 
 
What does it change? 
The intention in providing emergency housing not only to satisfy the victims but also to please the 
actors in carrying their daily job that hopefully resulting to positive actions. 
 
22. How do/would you cope with known problems in your field?  
Keep updating with new information from articles, attending workshops, and conferences and also 
establish networking (RICS, CIAT, ABE, CIH-network organisation of development from Disaster 
network, Development Areas Research Network, North East Housing, SPHERE Project, ADPC, 
Humanitarian Policy Group/ODI), especially with local experts. At the same time, keep alerting with 
neighbouring countries approaches in handling disaster impact, NGOs assistance and efforts from 
other ministerial level. I hope through my dissemination strategies, the actors, victims and 
stakeholders are aware about the risk they are facing today and in the future. The feedback receive 
will be reconsidered for the future research efforts. The establishment of long-term relationship with 
the present research team and experts even after this research work. 
 
23. Have you solved the field's problem that you claim to have solved?  
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Yes. This research is not trying to proposed new model or approach in regulatory compliance. This 
research tries to configure the status of achievement in implementation and why it is still not 
implemented successfully.  
 
24. Where will you publish your work?  
5 articles written is ready waiting for the manuscript to be sent to relevant Journals: 1) The Attitudes 
of officials on Compliance with Disaster Planning; the case of the Malaysian MNSC Directive 20; 2) 
Barriers towards the Implementation of Regulatory Compliance with the Disaster Planning 
Programme in Malaysia; 3) Social Learning in Regulatory Compliance Attitudes of the Malaysian 
Officials with the Malaysian Disaster Planning Programme; 4) Post Disaster Housing in Malaysia: A 
Literature Reviews; and 5) A Literature Reviews on Evolution of Disaster Planning in Malaysia. 
Potential Journals to be submitted are: 
1) Asian Journal of Environment and Disaster Management (AJEDM), 2) Disaster Prevention and 
Management, 3) Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, 4) Journal of Public Administration and 
Management, 5) Social Science Research Network, 6) Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 
Management, 7) International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disaster, 8) International Review of 
the Red Cross, 9) Journal of Emergency Management 
 
25. Which aspects of your thesis could be published? 
The aspects are most probably in methodologies, findings, social learning and barriers in regulatory 
compliance implementation. 
 
26. Has your view of your research topic changed during the course of the research? 
Only research title keeps changing for 4 -5 times. The topic never changed. 
 
27. Is your field going in the right direction?  
Yes, because researchers, academicians, authorities are more concern in providing accommodations 
and amenities to protect the rights of the victims. At the same time they forget about the perception 
that shape behaviour of the actors that playing an important role towards the success to deliver any 
policies especially towards the 2020 vision. Malaysian direction in providing accommodation is clear 
and on the right track. Even the central recent reviews in the Global Report on Human Settlements 
2009 discusses constraints and conflicts and identifies innovative approaches that are more 
responsive to current challenges of housing settlements providing (particularly in developing 
country). Furthermore as one of the United Nation country and agreed to support all of the 
programmes consigning by the international treaties, I am confident that the field in this research is 
going in the right direction. 
 
How do you know that your algorithm (sequence of instruction)/rules are correct? 
The hypotheses tested were matched and most findings especially in relation to the international 
context were consistence with the core literature reviews.  
 
How do you expect X to progress over the next five years? How long-term is your contribution, given 
the anticipated future developments in X?  
The concern is increasing in regulatory compliance especially towards sustainable development. 
Even most themes of discussion amongst scholars are towards the matter. The issues in emergency 
housing and disaster management never end and I hope I can play my part as an academician here 
especially in educating the public regarding how important compliance and regulations are. 
 
You discuss future work in your conclusion chapter. How long would it take to implement X, and 
what are the likely problems you envisage/predict?  
This is an on going process towards the effort to make things better. As the matter of fact, Malaysia 
is serious about the vision 2020, to become an industrialised and developed country. The direction is 
for the public service reform with clear emphasis on the development of a clean, efficient and 
effective administration. It is not easy, even if Malaysia can not achieve it on time, the mission is 
definitely the same to upgrade the standard of service to the people. To consider it as up to other 
world class standard, the Malaysian must have strict working ethics towards regulatory compliance. 
This culture then will shape behaviour to the members and the success of the organisation is best 
achieved by ongoing compliance with regulatory goals. However, the problem is that besides of 
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multiracial and religious demands, how far the flexibility is permissible in the process of regulatory 
compliance and what aspects to give priority when it comes to regulatory aims and situational based 
on the theory of the good regulatory practice in Malaysia.  
 
28. How victims’ involvement influence decision making? 
Recovery is not just in physical appearance in order to restore normality. The principle in any 
development from disasters focus on the crucial participation from affected communities in order to 
study how to provide income generation, rebuilding social support networks, activities essential for 
maintaining cultural identities and reviving and conserving the often protective but vulnerable 
ecosystem. Therefore, people should be centrally involved in planning the recovery and 
rehabilitation of their own communities. Assessments of needs should be based on the expressed 
priorities of affected communities. For example, background of the place (majority ethnic and 
religion; history; attractions and income generation).  
 
29. Transferable lessons 
The question is that what stakeholders should learn from the ineffectiveness implementation of 
existing policies and approaches. And why are they always an issues rather than acted upon? 
Stakeholders should get the act together to think beyond oganisational or agency boundaries to deal 
effectively with most problems. Policy makers should account and measure what matters especially 
in assessing the needs from victims and realistic about any evaluation. Therefore, policy makers 
should consider who policy is for from central government to local delivery agents, and from 
professionals and service delivery to communities and service users. Support also may come from a 
good community leadership with good personalities and other local condition such as their own 
skills, dedication and experience. In addition, the sign of significant progress may take a long time to 
consider as full regulatory compliance. Hopefully the policy makers will be patient and persistent in 
delivering humanitarian work and policy making. 
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Appendix 5: Author’s Published Articles and Forthcoming Publications Related to this Thesis 
Roosli, R. (2009) Emergency Housing in Malaysia: Research on Attitudes to Regulation and 
Compliance [Online] http://www.sphereproject.org/component/option,com_docman/task,doc_view/gid,281/ 
Itemid, 203/lang,french/ 
Project Summary: 
This research focused on pre and post-disaster planning with particular reference to housing. A review of the 
existing research and practice in Malaysia including the structure and attitude of central and local 
government to risk was the starting point. Development assistance has a chequered history. Few would doubt 
that, at least at a local level and, quite possibly, more generally, it has had many successes, but its failures 
are also numerous. Gathered actors’ perspectives in the implementation of regulatory compliance in all level 
of emergency management system in Malaysia; helps to explain the reason of regulatory compliance failures. 
Measuring their attitudes towards regulatory compliance reveals actual commitment. The regulatory 
compliance with the Malaysia National Security Council MNSC Directive 20 programme is a key focus. The 
research tries to assess attitudes towards and reasons for compliance and non-compliance with the 
regulations in the MNSC Directive 20 and to highlight the causes of any shortfall in understanding and 
applying the MNSC Directive 20. Actors had broadly negative attitudes towards regulatory implementation. 
These negative general attitudes were attributed by their negative thinking towards the level of knowledge 
and understanding regarding MNSC Directive 20. Actors aware of the many barriers and uncertainties hence 
do wish to see changes at the department levels before regulatory compliance is implemented. 
Keywords: Emergency Housing, Disaster Management, Attitudes, Regulation and Compliance 
 
 
 
 
Roosli, R. (2008) In-depth Research on Attitudes to Regulation and Compliance, Part of ProVention 
Consortium Project Report. 
Project Summary:  
The analysis to test the Malaysian major hazard installations through the awareness and application of the 
Malaysian National Security Council (MNSC) Directive 20 revealed that 30 per cent of the safety, health and 
environment managers (respondents) unaware with the MNSC Directive 20 disaster management guidelines, 
and 62 per cent of the respondents believe that the MNSC Directive 20 is essential. Therefore, the authority 
that is responsible for the enforcement of the disaster respond relevant regulations should be vigilant and 
follow up the international standard to apply the relevant regulation, that suit the safety culture of Malaysia. 
This research was further actions particularly in emergency housing. This project aims to answer the 
questions: Do people care about the level of compliance in disaster assistance, or compliance with 
regulations? For the purpose of this project, compliance is measured with reference to such factors as: 
commitment to regulatory objectives, attitudes to compliance; quality of management; organisational ability 
to comply and treatment of staff. This project also uses attitude scales to measure attitudes of those involved 
with regards to compliance and regulations for people in crisis of disaster.  
Keywords: MNSC Directive 20, Emergency Housing, Disaster Management, Attitudes, Regulation and 
Compliance 
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Vebry, M. and Roosli, R. (2008) Building versus Planning – A Working Paper, the paper was presented 
in 29 February 2008 in general lecture at MSc Planning Programme, University of Moratuwa, Sri Lanka. 
 
Brief Summary: 
 
This working paper simply elaborates the approach of planners in dealing with post-disaster rehabilitation 
and reconstruction both in Aceh and Sri Lanka. The discussion will explore how effective was the emergency 
planning process and the ability to cope with the critical needs on a timely fashion and deliver a spatial 
product as a basis for physical reconstruction. The next discussion will explore what comes out from the 
emergency planning, identified the results and consequences and ultimately foreseen what future challenges 
are and how we planners and practitioners can mitigate those issues practically. 
 
Keywords: Recovery, Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, Tsunami, Planning, Co-ordination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Title: The Attitude of officials on Compliance with Disaster Planning and Housing Policy; the Case of 
Malaysia  
 
Journal: Asian Journal of Environment and Disaster Management (Research Publishing Services) 
OR 
HABITAT International (Elsevier) 
Abstract: 
The failures in regulation and compliance were identified as the key vulnerability and disaster causes in 
Malaysia. The beneficiaries were actually unaware of non-compliance that exposed them to hazard. The 
MNSC Directive 20 exists as the important core of disaster regulation in Malaysia. However, the 
implementation is not according to plan and regulatory compliance was low. A research been done to 
highlight shortfalls in provision, training and awareness, and to recommend ways of improvement. Gathered 
actors’ perspectives in the implementation of regulatory compliance at all level of emergency management 
system in Malaysia helps to explain the reason of regulatory compliance failures. Measuring their attitudes 
towards regulatory compliance reveals actual commitment because the implementation will probably involve 
making changes to existing barriers and on how actors’ perceive and judge the benefit of it. The research 
uses both quantitative and qualitative methods together that involved 484 respondents. They have broadly 
negative general attitudes towards regulatory compliance, arguing that currently too many barriers are 
present in department levels to make regulatory compliance implementation straightforward.  They need 
informative advice and guidance to enable them to see the very probable societal benefits that can lead 
towards regulatory compliance development. The research concludes by categorising obstacles that need to 
be overcome, to encourage actors to accept regulatory compliance and recommends changes to department 
structures, systems and practices prior to regulatory compliance implementation.  
Keywords: Attitudes, Disaster Management, Disaster Planning, Emergency Housing, Malaysia, Regulatory 
Compliance 
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Title: Barriers towards the Implementation of Regulatory Compliance with the Disaster Planning 
Programme in Malaysia 
Journal: The Australian Journal of Emergency Management 
Abstract: 
The implementation of full regulatory compliance in Malaysian Disaster Management Mechanism will 
probably come in the form of a directive from Prime Minister’s Department¹ of Malaysia. The success or 
failure of regulatory compliance in Malaysia will depend to a large extent on the readiness of actors to accept 
responsibility to implement at every level. Undoubtedly some actors have reservations about accepting 
regulatory compliance. This reservation might be the key to the main issue towards implementation. 
Concerning the main negative attitudes as a result of a research on actors’ perceptions about compliance 
with disaster planning policy  in Malaysia, it is essential to recognise them as the barriers that would have to 
be systematically addressed by the Prime Minister’s Department  to minimise their negative effects on 
regulatory compliance implementation. Discussion about these barriers will then highlight sectors that the 
Prime Minister’s Department should look into in order to get full support from officials as government 
machinery. 
Keywords: Attitudes, Barriers, Disaster Management, Emergency Housing, Malaysia, Regulatory 
Compliance 
 
 
 
Title: Social Learning in Regulatory Compliance Attitudes of the Malaysian Officials with the 
Malaysian Disaster Planning Programme 
Journal: Disaster Prevention and Management (Emerald) 
Abstract: 
This paper argues that there are still many scope of improvement in planning and training for both actors and 
disaster victims in the front line of disaster management in Malaysia. Although the established ethos of 
Malaysia’s public service sector has tended to be one of control from above, there is promise and virtue in 
seeking to promote a professional culture. Ideas and recommendations in finding new solutions to old 
problems can move upwards as well as downwards due to the technical design in rules and regulations has 
now to be accompanied by organisational design. It would be easy to feel overwhelmed by the immensity of 
the task that faces the work force, but it may well be from within the present resources of the human resource 
that the Prime Minister’s Department may begin to seek some of solution to get support from actors in the 
Disaster Management Mechanism in Malaysia. The actors in public service sectors in Malaysia had a 
negative attitude towards disaster planning implementation because they are usually not familiar with the 
Standard Operational Procedure in handling land disaster management in Malaysia called the MNSC 
Directive 20. Social learning is about initiative of organisation and policy maker in learning through actor’s 
interactions with others and through the knowledge and expertise of others. The MNSC Directive 20 
document is not available for public scrutiny and restricted for reasons of national security that limits the 
policy effectiveness. Even then, documents were circulated for office use only. Learning from status of current 
policy implementation and suggestion will promote awareness raising and capacity building from inside of 
organisation. 
Keywords: Attitudes, Disaster Management, Emergency Housing, Malaysia, Regulatory Compliance, Social 
Learning 
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Title: Post Disaster Housing in Malaysia: A Literature Reviews 
Journal: International Journal of Disaster Resilience in the Built Environment (Emerald) 
Abstract: 
Malaysia is still in the process of reorganising and restructuring disaster management policy learning from 
the national and international experiences. This paper argues that providing post disaster housing must 
accommodate requirement in the national disaster management policy and parallel with the needs from 
international concern to the rights of disaster victims. International guidelines only present the legal context 
for the implementation of emergency housing ‘responses’ and do not represent or bind as a law. These 
guidelines outlined are based upon the consideration of law and human rights. It depends on local and 
national customary law. Analysis regarding policies and government instruments were more towards 
consulting federal governments. Malaysia is not a developed country and also not a developing country but 
more in the middle. Malaysia has a developed country approach in disaster management policy but with the 
implementation of developing country. Trends in housing policy are very similar in the developing countries 
after a disaster strikes without enough attention to the needs of disaster victims, depend much on local 
initiatives and imported technology. Compliance culture is also still not established in most of developing 
countries. 
Keywords: Emergency Housing, Housing Rights, Adequate Housing, International Legislations, Malaysia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Title: A Literature Reviews on Evolution of Disaster Planning in Malaysia 
Journal: Journal of Public Administration and Management (Oxford Journals) 
Abstract: 
This article reviews the literature concerning studies of international and national disaster planning and 
management in Malaysia. Focus of argument centered to the very classic evolution of disaster planning 
transformation from the notion of disaster represented as natural event and an ‘act of God ’ (natural event 
that not preventable by any human agency) to act of social phenomena that emphasis comes to be on internal 
rather than external factors. Government as a social regime not only formulates a complete framework of 
disaster planning but also has to make sure the plan works throughout the whole cycle of disaster 
management (i.e. warning, preparedness, prevention and mitigation, recovery, ongoing relief and emergency 
response). It is essential to ensure close liaison between the body responsible for recovery and that concerned 
with disaster management (e.g. hazard assessment, relief and housing reconstruction). Learning can be used 
to develop a strategy and actions that include awareness raising and capacity building for enhancing 
enforcement of current legislation in order to ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and local 
priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation. 
Keywords: Disaster Management, Disaster Planning, MNSC Directive 20, Emergency Housing, Malaysia 
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Appendix 6: Comparing Reconstruction Pace across Countries  
 
Country Year & Disaster victims Descriptions 
Honduras Hurricane Mitch  
devastated several  
Central American 
countries in 1998 
More than 441,000 were displaced. Four 
years later, about 85,000 houses were rebuilt, 
but hundreds were still living in temporary 
shelters 
India The Gujarat earthquake in 
2001 killed about 14,000 
people 
The recovery programme aimed to rebuild 
214,000 houses; in the first two years 113,000 
had been built (53 per cent) 
Iran In December 2003 an 
earthquake in Bam killed 
more than 30,000 and left 
75,000 homeless 
One year later, most people lived in pre-
fabricated temporary shelters and only 5 per 
cent of the permanent houses needed were 
rebuilt 
Japan The Kobe earthquake 
killed 6,400 and displaced 
300,000 in 1995 
It took seven years to fully recover in terms 
of population, income, and industrial indices 
Turkey After the Erzincan 
earthquake in 1992 
A government programme to build 3,600 
houses didn’t start until two years later 
Following the August 
1999 Marmara earthquake 
(which destroyed 64,000 
houses) 
Government capacity for reconstruction had 
increased, and it took about three years to 
complete the bulk of the housing 
reconstruction 
United States of America Hurricane Ivan struck in 
2004 
In Florida some people are still living in 
mobile housing more than a year 
Venezuela The floods and landslides 
of 1999 displaced 80-
100,000 
More than one- third of them still lived in 
barracks/temporary shelters 8 months later. A 
year after the disaster, all of the displaced had 
homes; however many were pressured to 
relocate 
Aceh & Nias Tsunami & earthquake  80,000 – 110,000 new houses in Aceh needed 
and 13,500 in Nias, about 50,000 are housed 
in barracks; about 67,500 remain in tents, 
16,200 new houses completed in Aceh and 
200 in Nias, 13,200 under construction, 
5,000/month new houses being built 
Malaysia Tsunami Syarikat Perumahan Negara Berhad (SPN), 
the national housing corporation, has decided 
to build 1,066 houses on permanent sites : 
900 in Penang, 126 in Kota Kuala Muda, 
Kedah, and 40 in Langkawi for the disaster 
victims at a cost of 62 million ringgit 
(16.13million US dollars). SPN will also 
repair 523 damaged houses in Kedah and 
Penang 
                                                                                                                                      Sources: ADB (2005) 
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Appendix 7: Regulatory Framework 
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Appendix 8: Post-Disaster Reconstruction Theories 
 
Author Publication Year Topic studied 
World Bank Risks and reconstruction: Experiences of 
resettlers and Refugees 
2000 Social improvements 
after relocation 
El-Mansari 
et al. 
Reconstruction after disaster: Issues and 
practices 
1997 Reconstruction with 
people 
UNESCO DHA News Journal 1997 Programmes of 
education, participation 
United Nation UNDRO. Shelter after disaster 
 
UNDRO News 
1993 
 
1992 
The social 
reconstruction of the 
community 
Weldelibanos 
 
A survey of earthquake mitigation strategies and 
building principles for small traditional 
dwellings 
1993 The importance and 
possibilities of 
traditional technologies 
in the reconstruction 
process 
Oliver-Smith Post-disaster housing reconstruction and social 
inequality: A change to policy and practice 
1990 The importance of social 
aspects in post-disaster 
reconstruction 
Maskrey Disaster mitigation: A community based 
approach 
1989 Community based 
mitigation programmes 
Aysan 
et al. 
Housing and culture after disasters: A guide for 
future policy making on housing in seismic 
areas 
1987 Permanent 
reconstruction and 
social consequences 
after resettlement.  
The importance of 
the community in the 
reconstruction process 
Oliver  “Developments in the provision of culturally 
sensitive housing within seismic areas 1981-
1986” Proceedings of Middle East and 
Mediterranean regional conference on earthen 
and low strength masonry buildings in seismic 
areas 
1987 The importance of the 
participation of 
survivors and 
education programmes 
Davis Disasters and the small dwelling 1981 The importance of 
understanding low-cost 
residential  
reconstruction 
beyond the technical 
aspects 
Adapted from Berman (2007) 
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Appendix 9: Summary of Malaysia Housing Policy 
 
Phase Period Focus of 
Attention 
Strategies Key Documents Policy Analysis 
Colonial 
period 
Before 
1957 
- Housing for 
government staff 
quarters  
- Resettlement of 
people during 
communist 
insurgencies to 
the new village  
- Resettlement of 
people to Felda 
scheme  
- Provision of 
housing especially 
for  
low income 
people in urban 
areas 
- Construction of 
government quarters 
based on department 
requirement 
- Building of houses 
in the new 
settlements with 
facilities for more 
than 500,000 people 
- Planning and 
development of 
Felda 
Scheme with the 
housing and facilities 
- Setting-up of 
Housing Trust in 
1952 
- Briggs Plan, 
1952  
- Land 
Resettlement 
Act, 1956 
- Housing Trust 
Ordinance, 1949 
- G. Rudduck 
Report, 1950s 
- Government 
are the key 
player in 
housing 
provision 
- Physical 
oriented 
- Ad-hoc 
policies 
 
 
Early stage 
of 
independence 
1957 – 
1970 
- Continuing the 
colonial 
government 
policies with 
minor 
improvement 
- Emphasis on 
housing especially 
for low income 
group in urban 
areas 
- Private sector 
involvement in 
housing provision  
- Improvement of 
basic 
infrastructure 
- Implementation 
follow the colonial 
policies with limited 
budget 
- Housing Trust 
involved actively 
low cost housing 
development in 
urban areas such as 
KL and Penang 
- Private sector to 
concentrate on 
medium and high 
cost housing 
- First and 
Second Malaya 
Plan 
(1955 - 1964) 
- First Malaysia 
Plan (1965 - 
1969) 
- Government as 
key player in 
housing 
provision 
especially low 
cost 
- Private sector 
to focus on 
medium and 
high cost 
housing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
New 
Economic 
Policy 
1971- 
1990 
- Eradication of 
poverty & 
restructure  
the society  
- Implementation 
of Human 
Settlement  
Concept in 
housing 
development  
- Housing for low 
income group 
given priority in 
national policies  
- Private sector 
play as key player 
in housing 
provision 
 
- High rate of rural-
urban migration  
- Private sector was 
responsible to built 
large portion of 
housing for people 
including low cost 
- Ceiling price for 
low cost house was 
set at RM25,000 in 
1982 
- Government 
established state 
agencies 
- Encourage national 
unity in housing 
development 
- New Economic 
Policy, 1971 
- Second 
Malaysia Plan to 
Fifth Malaysia 
Plan (1971-
1990) 
- Private sector 
as key player in 
housing 
provision 
including low 
cost 
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National 
Development 
Plan 
Housing 
1991- 
2000 
- Continue 
implementation of 
NEP policies and 
strategies 
- Human 
Settlement 
Concept with 
Emphasis on 
sustainable 
development 
- To ensure all 
people regardless 
of their income to 
live in decent 
house 
- Private sector 
continue to 
responsible in 
housing provision 
for the people 
- To build more 
affordable housing 
especially low and 
low medium cost 
housing (Low 
medium cost 
housing as major 
component in 
housing provision 
since Seventh 
Malaysia Plan) 
(1996-2000) 
- Emphasis on 
squatters’ 
elimination by the 
year 2005 
- Government 
created new laws 
and 
guidelines to control 
private sector 
- National 
Development 
Plan, 1991 
- Sixth and 
Seventh 
Malaysia Plan 
(1991 - 2000) 
- Agenda 21 
(UNCHS), 1994  
- The Habitat 
Agenda 1996 
- Private sector 
still play as key 
player in 
housing 
provision but 
government 
created many 
new laws and 
guidelines to 
ensure quality 
housing 
 
Vision 
Development 
Plan 
2001- 
2010 
- Emphasis on 
sustainable urban 
Plan development 
and adequate 
housing for all 
income groups 
- Housing 
development will 
be integrate with 
other type of 
development  
such as industry 
and commercial 
- Emphasis on 
ICT 
- Government as 
key player in low  
cost housing 
provision and 
private  
sector for medium 
and high cost  
- Continue effort to 
provide the 
guidelines and 
inculcate the citizen 
understanding 
towards sustainable 
development and 
encourage citizen to 
participate in 
housing 
development in line 
with Local Agenda 
21 
- Encourage more 
private developers to 
construct low 
medium cost house 
- Setting-up Human 
Settlement Research 
Institute or 
MAHSURI to 
encourage 
housing (research 
and development in 
housing) 
- Vision 
Development 
Plan 2001 
- Eight Malaysia 
Plan, 2001 - 
2005 
- Government as 
key player in 
provision of low 
cost housing 
provision 
 
 
 
Source: Various Five Years Malaysia National Plan23
                                                        
23 Adopted from Razali, A. (2001) Public Housing in Malaysia: Policy and Practice (Perumahan Awam Di 
Malaysia: Dasar dan Amalan), Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publication and Distribution Sdn Bhd. 
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Appendix 10: Case Studies of Reconstruction Projects 
 
 Project Reference 
1 Core shelter project in Philippines after Typhoon Sisang (1987) Diacon (1992)  
2 CIDA-CECI-Atlas Logistics reconstruction project in Honduras after Mitch (1999)  Ranaganath (2000)  
3 Post-earthquake relocation project of the Lio Village, Indonesia (1992) Gunawan (1999)  
4 Post-earthquake emergency housing project carried out by OXFAM in Turkey (1975) 
UNDRO 
(1993)  
5 Emergency housing projects carried out by the West Red Cross in Turkey (1970) and in Nicaragua (1972) 
UNDRO 
(1993)  
6 Post-earthquake cardboard city project in Turkey (2000) 
Ban (1996), 
Johnson 
(2002) 
7 Post-earthquake reconstruction project in San Salvador by the Cooperative Housing Foundation (1986) Solo (1991)  
8 Post-disaster prefabricated housing project (so-called 'Casas Rusas') in Yungay, Peru (1973) 
Oliver-
Smith 
(1990)  
9 Post-earthquake relocation project organised by the Government of Maharashtra in India (1993)  
Salazar 
(1999)  
10 Post-earthquake reconstruction project in Ecuador by CAAP (1987) Dudley (1988)  
11 Colombian Coffee Growers Federation's rural post-earthquake reconstruction project in Colombia  
Lizarralde 
(2000) 
12 Colombian urban reconstruction project in Armenia, Colombia (2000) by Forec Lizarralde (2000)  
13 UNCHS-Habitat's approach for reconstruction programs in Bolivia (1986) and Ecuador (1987) 
Habitat 
(1985) 
14 ASIPE's self-help construction project in San Francisco de Ayutuxtepeque, Salvador (1993) Hays (1995)  
15 Post-avalanche reconstruction project for Armero by the Save the Children Federation in Colombia (1985) 
Anderson 
(1989)  
16 Post-earthquake housing and rural development by ALIANZA in Joyabaj, Guatemala (1977) 
Anderson 
(1989)  
17 Sites-and-services project in Aranya, India (1981). This is not a post-disaster project Bhatt (1999)  
Adapted from Berman (2007) 
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Appendix 11: Comparison between Quantitative and Qualitative 
 
Quantitative Qualitative 
Uses deductive form of reasoning: collect data to 
assess preconceived models, hypotheses and theories 
Uses an inductive form of reasoning: develops 
concepts, insights and understanding form 
patterns of data 
Uses an ethic perspective: the meaning is determined 
by the researcher 
Uses a perspective of enquiry: derives meaning 
from the subject perspective 
Is homothetic: aims to objectively measure the social 
world, to test hypothesis and to predict and control 
human behaviour 
Is idiographic: aims to understand the meaning 
that people attach to everyday life 
See reality as objective Regards reality as subjective 
Research questions: How many? Strength of 
association? 
Research questions: What? Why? 
Designs: descriptive, correlative, quasi-experimental, 
experimental 
Designs: phenomenological grounded in theory, 
ethnographic, historical, philosophical, case study 
Concept are in the form of distinct variables Concept is in the form of themes, motifs and 
categories 
The research design is standardised according to a 
fixed procedure and can de replicated 
The research design is flexible and unique and 
evolves throughout the research process. There 
are no fixed steps that should be followed and 
therefore cannot be exactly replicated 
The units of analysis are variables which are 
atomistic 1. elements that form part of a whole 
The unit of analysis is holistic, concentrating on 
the relationship between elements and contexts. 
The whole is always more than the sum of its 
parts 
Seeks to control phenomena Seeks to understand phenomena 
‘Hard’ science ‘Soft’ science 
Literature review must be done early in study Literature review may be done as study 
progresses or afterwards 
One reality: focus is singular and narrow Multiple realities: focus is complex and broad 
Test theory Develops theory 
One reality: focus is concise and narrow Multiple realities: focus is complex and broad 
Facts are value-free and unbiased Facts are value-laden and biased 
Report contains statistical analysis. Basic elements 
of analysis are numbers 
Report contains rich narrative, individual 
interpretation. Basic elements of analysis are 
words/ideas 
Reduction, control, precision Discovery, description, understanding, shared 
interpretation 
Measurable Interpretive 
Mechanistic: parts equal the whole Organismic: whole is greater than the parts 
Report statistical analysis Report rich narrative, individual; interpretation 
Basic element of analysis is numbers Basic element of analysis is words/ideas 
Researcher is separate Researcher is part of process 
Subjects Participants 
Context free Context dependent 
Hypothesis Research questions 
Reasoning is logistic and deductive Reasoning is dialectic and inductive 
Establishes relationships, causation Describes meaning, discovery 
Uses instruments Uses communications and observation 
Strives for generalisation Strives for uniqueness 
Generalisations leading to prediction, explanation, 
and understanding 
Patterns and theories developed for understanding 
Highly controlled setting: experimental setting 
(outcome oriented) 
Flexible approach: natural setting (process 
oriented) 
Sample size: n (30-500) Sample size is not a concern; seeks "informal 
345 
 
rich" sample 
"Counts the beans" Provides information as to "which beans are 
worth counting" 
                                                            Sources: Babbie & Mounton (1998); Denzin & Lincon (1994);  
                                                               Foley (2003); Bateman & Ferris (1984) and Neuman (1997) 
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Appendix 12: Survey Questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
 
Department :   
 
Level :   
 
No :    
For office only 
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please fill in the relevant information of your personal details by making a cross (X) or by printing the 
required information in the box provided. 
 
1. Gender :  M   F   2. Age        
 
 
3. No. of years service :   
 
 
4. Current professional status : 
(Mark with a cross x 
 all that is relevant) 
1. Chairman  
  
 
 2. Manager   
 
 3. Technical  
  
4. Clerical  
  
 5. Officer  
   
 6. Others : Please specify  
 
5. Level Control :   National   
(Mark x all that is relevant)   State  
  District  
 
6. Have you ever attended an in-service course in disaster management? 
 
Yes   No  
 
7. Does your department have trained actors for regulatory compliance? 
 
Yes   No   
 
8. Does your department have actors to look after compliance with the regulations? 
 
Yes   No  
 
9. Does your department related directly to the scene of emergency housing? 
  
Yes   No  
 
10. Does your department have specific regulation to make sure compliance with the regulation? 
 
Yes   No   
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Attitudinal Scale 
 
Please respond honestly to ALL the items below. Please remember there is no right or wrong answers. 
 
To respond to all the items, circle a number each time: 
1. Circle 1 if you STRONGLY DISAGREE (SD) with this statement. 
2. Circle 2 if you DISAGREE (S) with this statement. 
3. Circle 3 if you UNDECIDED (U) with this statement. 
4. Circle 4 if you AGREE (A) with this statement. 
5. Circle 5 if you STRONGLY AGREE (SA) with this statement. 
 
SECTION A SD D U A SA  
 
1. 
 
Actors do understand the Malaysian National Security Council 
(MNSC) rationale. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
 
 
2. Actors are well versed in the concept of the regulatory compliance. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
 
3. Actors have the necessary knowledge to apply regulatory 
compliance. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
 
4. Including disaster victims in compliance decision would necessitate 
retraining of actors. 
1 2 3 4 5  
 
5. Actors do have the necessary skills to apply regulatory compliance. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
 
6. Actors do have the necessary skills to apply regulatory compliance 
together with the disaster victims.                      
 
1 2 3 4 5  
 
7. Actors frequently discuss in department meetings the application of 
regulatory compliance. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
 
8. Actors have read many printed materials available in the department 
about regulatory compliance. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
 
9. Actors have frequent informal talks with head departments on the 
possibility of achieving regulatory compliance. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
 
SECTION B 
 
10. 
 
Disaster victims have the right to regulatory compliance. 
   
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
 
 
11. Disaster victims and actors should be working together. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
 
12. The participation of disaster victims can not best be served through 
separate entity without actors. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
 
13. The MNSC Directive 20 is right in giving special attention to the 
disaster victims’ needs. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
 
14. Exposure to disaster victims will encourage actors to be more caring 
towards better emergency housing. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
 
15. It is appropriate to fully include disaster victims in making decision 
towards regulatory compliance. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
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Please respond honestly to ALL the items below. Please remember there is no right or wrong answers. 
 
To respond to all the items, circle a number each time: 
1. Circle 1 if you STRONGLY DISAGREE (SD) with this statement. 
2. Circle 2 if you DISAGREE (S) with this statement. 
3. Circle 3 if you UNDECIDED (U) with this statement. 
4. Circle 4 if you AGREE (A) with this statement. 
5. Circle 5 if you STRONGLY AGREE (SA) with this statement. 
 
 SD D U A SA  
16. Disaster victims without knowledge about regulation should be 
involved in regulatory compliance decision. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
 
17. Disaster victims with experience but without knowledge should also 
be involved in regulatory compliance decision. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
 
18. Disaster victims should be more sensitive and participate in 
regulatory compliance. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
 
19. The psychological development of the disaster victims would be 
promoted if included in the process of regulatory compliance. 
1 2 3 4 5  
 
20. Actors would be able to learn more appropriate social skills if 
involved with the disaster victims. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
 
21. The understanding and knowledge of the actors would not be 
adversely affected if the disaster victims involve in the process of 
regulatory compliance. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
 
22. Including disaster victims in the process of regulatory compliance 
decision would not increase actors’ workloads. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
 
23. The behaviours of disaster victims would not make regulatory 
compliance impractical. 
1 2 3 4 5  
 
24. Disaster victims would be able to move easily to adapt as a group in 
the process of regulatory compliance. 
1 2 3 4 5  
 
25. The communication difficulties between disaster victims and actors 
would not create confusion in regulatory compliance. 
       
1 2 3 4 5  
 
26. Disaster victims would be able to cope with emergency housings’ 
regulation. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
 
27. Disaster victims would be able to cope with all actors’ behaviour in 
the process of regulatory compliance. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
 
28. Disaster victims would be able to cope with the entire disaster 
environment in the process of regulatory compliance. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
 
29. Educating the disaster victims should not be left to specialist in 
disaster recovery or psychologist. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
 
30. Actors have a responsibility for the education of disaster victims in 
the process of regulatory compliance. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
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Please respond honestly to ALL the items below. Please remember there is no right or wrong answers. 
 
To respond to all the items, circle a number each time: 
1. Circle 1 if you STRONGLY DISAGREE (SD) with this statement. 
2. Circle 2 if you DISAGREE (S) with this statement. 
3. Circle 3 if you UNDECIDED (U) with this statement. 
4. Circle 4 if you AGREE (A) with this statement. 
5. Circle 5 if you STRONGLY AGREE (SA) with this statement. 
 
SECTION C SD D U A SA  
 
31. 
 
Actors are supportive of the idea of regulatory compliance. 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
 
 
32. Actors will accept the current regulations about to change. 
              
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
33 Actors will volunteer to attend relevant in-service training on 
regulatory compliance. 
1 2 3 4 5  
 
34. Actors will accept the regulatory compliance under present 
regulation only if directed. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
 
35. Actors will only accept the idea of participate disaster victims who 
do not have disruptive behaviours. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
 
36. Actors will accept the regulatory compliance if relevant specialist 
support is available. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
 
37. Actors will accept regulatory compliance even though there is no 
change in current regulation or conditions. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
 
38. Actors will only accept regulatory compliance if given incentives. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
 
39. Actors will accept regulatory compliance even though will affect 
annual appraisal. 
     
1 2 3 4 5  
 
 
 
40. Please state your views on regulatory compliance with the MNSC Directive 20. 
 
 
 
41. What changes do you feel need to be made at the department level before regulatory compliance fully 
implement? 
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Appendix 13: Rationale of the Questionnaires (Dependent Variables) 
                                                                                                                              Source: Author 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Item Number, Q Rationale 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
3, 4, 5, 6 
 
 
7, 8, 9 
 
Section A 
 
Elicit actors’ perceived knowledge of the MNSC Directive 20 aims and objective of 
regulatory compliance and related programme 
 
Elicit actors’ perceived knowledge about the ‘compliance’, its aims and objectives 
 
Elicit actors’ perceived abilities to apply regulatory compliance requirement within 
the MNSC Directive 20 
 
Elicit the department readiness at least at the planning level for the implementation of 
regulatory compliance with the MNSC Directive 20. Also to gauge actors exposure 
towards the ideas of regulatory compliance at the department level 
 
 
 
10,13 
 
 
11, 12, 29, 30 
 
 
14, 21 
 
 
15, 16, 17, 23, 24, 
25 
 
18, 19, 20 
 
 
22 
 
 
26, 27,  28 
 
Section B 
 
Elicit actors’ perception of ‘rights’ of disaster victims’ needs to be educated to 
disaster environment 
 
Elicit actors feeling towards the need of regulatory compliance and disaster victims’ 
participatory, that is, inclusion or separation 
 
Elicit actors’ perceived effect of disaster victims’ involvement as the result of 
regulatory compliance 
 
Elicit actors’ perceived suitability of disaster victims’ to be included into the process 
of regulatory compliance 
 
Elicit actors’ perceived advantages/disadvantages of disaster victims’ development 
when included in the decision making of regulatory compliance 
 
Elicit actors’ perceived increases in the amount of responsibility if implement 
regulatory compliance  
 
Elicit actors’ perceived suitable of the current MNSC Directive 20 towards regulatory 
compliance 
 
 
 
31, 32 
 
34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 
39 
 
33 
 
Section C 
 
Elicit actors’ support of the MNSC Directive 20  
 
Elicit some of regulations’ condition that needs to be changed if actors are to accept 
regulatory compliance implementation in Malaysia 
 
Elicit willingness of actors to develop skills towards regulatory compliance 
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Appendix 14: Codes Used in Analysing Open-Ended Item 40 of the Survey Questionnaire 
 
A :  Disagreed; Reasons 
 
A1 :   Regulatory compliance would disrupt the current norms of the working process. 
A2 :  Regulatory compliance will increase actors’ workload. 
A3 :   Regulatory compliance will have negative effect on other disaster victims’ adaptation. 
A4          :  Actors do not have the appropriate skills in emergency housing and to manage disaster 
victims. 
A5 :  Disaster victims need specialised actors in emergency management to handle them. 
A6 :  Disaster victims would not be able to cope with adaptation. 
A7 :  Disaster victims’ group size is too large to support the adaptation process. 
A8 :  Disaster victims would be discriminated and victimised by other disaster victims. 
A9 :   Disaster victims would be demoralised if included in disaster victims’ group. 
A10        :  Regulatory compliance is difficult to implement because of disruptive behaviours in    
disaster victims. 
A11 :   Regulatory compliance is difficult to implement because of appraisal pressures. 
A12 :   Regulatory compliance is difficult to implement because of negative acceptance of actors. 
A13 :   Regulatory compliance is difficult to implement because of insufficient resources. 
A14        :  Regulatory compliance is difficult to implement because of negative acceptance of disaster 
victims. 
A15 :  Regulation and guidelines are unsuitable for actors and disaster victims. 
A16 : Disaster victims are not interested in being included in disaster victims’ group. 
A17 :  There are no working assistants to help actors involved in regulatory compliance. 
 
B :  Undecided; Reasons 
 
B1          :  if, departments are given extensive information on regulatory compliance implementation 
process. 
B2 : if, actors are given training in emergency management. 
B3 : if, appropriate resourcing is made available on site. 
B4 : if, disaster victims included in disaster victims’ group do not have a behavioural problem. 
B5          :  if, disaster victims included in disaster victims’ group have the prerequisite skills (are 
ready). 
B6 : if, disaster victims included in disaster victims’ group are psychologically able. 
B7 : if, disaster victims included in disaster victims’ group have moderate difficulties. 
B8 : if, regulatory compliance involves non-religious matters only. 
B9          : if, all actors in the department are willing to co-operate in the regulatory compliance 
programme. 
B10 : if, the implementation of regulatory compliance is properly planned. 
B11 : but, difficult to implement because disaster victims have behavioural problem. 
B12 : but, difficult to implement because disaster victims’ group is too large. 
B13 : but, regulatory compliance will increase actors’ workload. 
B14        : but, regulatory compliance implementation needs to be planned carefully. 
B15 : but, depends on the types of disaster victims difficulties. 
B16 : but, regulatory compliance will benefit only some actors and disaster victims. 
B17 : but, disaster victims have psychological problems. 
B18 : but, disaster victims will develop traumatic problems. 
B19        : but, department do not have the appropriate resources in emergency housing and to handle 
disaster victims. 
B20 : but, actors are not trained in emergency management and to manage disaster victims. 
B21 : but, regulatory compliance will take time to succeed. 
 
C :  Agreed; Reasons 
 
C1 :  Regulatory compliance would help in the realisation of the ‘caring society’ 
C2          :  Regulatory compliance would promote and develop self-esteem in actors and disaster 
victims 
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C3  :  Regulatory compliance is in line with the national philosophy of equal opportunities 
C4          :  Regulatory compliance would make it easier for disaster victims to accommodate 
themselves in actors-disaster victims’ group 
C5 :  A good idea (no reasons provided) 
C6 :  Regulatory compliance would promote adaptation atmosphere in disaster victims 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 15: Codes Used in Analysing Open-Ended Item 41 (Changes Recommended) of the Survey 
Questionnaire 
 
1 Actors should be given in-service training. 
2   The department should be articulate on the rationale of implementing regulatory compliance.  
3 All department involved in the regulatory compliance programme should be provided with appropriate 
physical resources (e.g. access to information, site office and suitable dressings) and working equipment 
(e.g. tools, first aid kit and furniture). 
4 The members in disaster victims’ group needs to be reduced to enable actors to attend to adaptation 
needed by the disaster victims appropriately. 
5 All departments involved in the regulatory compliance programme should be provided with the service of 
relevant specialist to act as adviser or consultant to actors. 
6 The post of actors’ assistant is created in the department involved in the MNSC Directive 20 to support 
actors toward regulatory compliance. 
7 Incentives are given to actors involved in regulatory compliance programme. 
8 Certain aspects of the current MNSC Directive 20 should be customised to ensure that disaster victims 
may have wider access to relevant information and other facilities. 
9 Disaster victims should be ready (mentally and emotionally) before being included in actors and disaster 
victims’ group. 
10 Actors’ workload need to be reduced. 
11 Attainment of individual actors’ appraisal should not be the sole basis of department yearly appraisal or 
evaluation. 
12 Credit should be given to the department in its yearly appraisal or evaluation for their good practice in 
regulatory compliance. 
13 Everyone in the department involved must be participated in the programme. 
14 Continuous evaluation and assistance to the programme at district, state and national levels. 
15 Only actors interested in the programme should be involved in the regulatory compliance programme. 
16 Acknowledge and promote the benefits of regulatory compliance to all communities and relatives. 
17 Actors should be given easy access to the programme information and facilities. 
18 Different types of actors’ evaluation (i.e. not for appraisal only rather to other personal achievement). 
19 Freedom for actors to work without interference from NGO’s. 
20 Provide more opportunities to other related department to volunteer to get involved. 
21 Increased financial support to department involved in regulatory compliance programme. 
22 The number of disaster victims included in disaster victims’ group should be limited. 
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Appendix 16: Interview Questionnaire 
 
 
 
Department :   
 
Level :   
 
No :    For office only 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please fill in the relevant information of your personal details by making a cross (X) or by printing the 
required information in the box provided. 
 
1. Gender :  M   F   2. Age  
 
3. No. of years service :   
 
4. Current professional status : 
(Mark with a cross x 
 all that is relevant) 
1. Chairman  
  
 
 2. Manager   
                                                         (contact with disaster victims)  
 
 3. Technical  
  
4. Clerical  
  
 5. Officer  
   
 6. Others : Please specify  
 
5. Level Control :    National   
(Mark x all that is relevant)    State  
   District  
 
6. Have you ever attended an in-service course in disaster management? 
 
Yes   No  
 
7. Does your department have trained actors for regulatory compliance? 
 
Yes   No   
 
8. Does your department have actors to look after compliance with the regulations? 
 
Yes   No  
 
9. Does your department related directly to the scene of emergency housing? 
  
Yes   No  
 
10. Does your department have specific regulation to make sure compliance with the regulation? 
 
Yes   No   
 
Respondent name/Code number  
 
Department :   
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Interview Protocol 
 
I am doing a study on actors’ attitudes towards the intended implementation of regulatory compliance in 
providing emergency housing under the Malaysian National Security Council (MNSC) Programme. I am 
doing this study in order to gain a better understanding of actors’ attitudes, and I hope to be able to forward 
actors’ views on this issue to the relevant disaster management authorities for consideration, prior to its 
implementation in every level of actions. 
 
I would like to record this interview with your permission because that would be a true record of our 
conversation. In no way would your identity be revealed. Data used will be treated in strict confidential. 
Answer can be given in English Language or in Malay Language. 
 
Thank you for your co-operation. 
 
Interview schedule 
Note: Term ‘Sir or equal’ when used in individual interviews with specific status will be change appropriate 
to ‘you’ when interviewing individual actors. 
 
Cognitive 
 
1. Have you read any of the circulars, bulletins or any printed materials available in this department on 
the Malaysia National Security Council Programme and what do you think about its intention 
towards the implementation of regulatory compliance with this programme? 
 
Yes      No 
Why not? 
 
2. What does the term ‘regulatory compliance’ mean to you? 
 
3. What do you understand by the term ‘emergency housing’ and the term ‘disaster victims’ in disaster 
scene? 
 
4. Have you discussed with your officers/colleague(s) about the implementation of regulatory 
compliance related to emergency housing and how well do you think they know about this 
implementation? Do you make contact with the disaster victims? 
 
Yes       No 
i. formally  informally   Why not? 
 
5. What do you think the reasons towards this implementation? 
 
6. How would you rate your officers/colleague(s) abilities to apply regulatory compliance? Why? 
 
Affective 
 
7. Do you think disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20 have the rights towards regulatory 
compliance? Why? 
 
8. Do you feel it would be beneficial in terms of ; 
a. Knowledge, 
b. Social development, and 
c. Emotional development, 
for the disaster victims to be included in the process of decision making? Why? 
 
9. What is your comment on the suitability of the current regulations/guidelines, programme in disaster 
management especially in emergency housing? 
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10. In what way do you think your officers/colleague(s)’ workload would be affected if disaster victims 
are included in the process of regulatory compliance? 
 
11. What effect do you think including disaster victims in regulatory compliance would have on actors 
on the scene of disaster? 
 
12. How do you feel your departments’ appraisal would be affected by implementing regulatory 
compliance in emergency housing? 
 
Positive answer   Negative answer 
 
Do you mind?  (Yes, No) 
 
Can you suggest any other ways the department should 
be assessed? 
 
13. What do you think is the most and least important regulations/guidelines towards regulatory 
compliance in emergency housing? Why? 
a. Regulations in the present national planning and building codes applied for all 
authorities in Malaysia in developing commercial housing scheme. 
b. Guidelines under the MNSC Directive 20. 
c. International Standard by the international bodies like SPHERE, UNHCR and 
OXFAM in disaster actions. 
 
Conative 
 
14. Do you think your officers/colleague(s) would support the MNSC Directive 20 to maximise 
regulatory compliance with the emergency housing requirement? Why? 
 
15. Do you agree that regulatory compliance may promote a ‘caring feeling’ and acceptance between 
actors and disaster victims? 
 
Yes       No  
 
                                     Why?  
Please elaborate 
 
16. Do you think your officers/colleague(s) would be willing to attend the relevant in-service courses 
towards the understanding of the implementation of regulatory compliance? Why? 
 
17. Under what condition(s) do you think you would accept regulatory compliance (e.g. only if directed 
to do so, availability of specialist support, incentives (types), in group, annual appraisal,  no change 
to the current regulation environment) (for every condition)?  Why? 
 
18. Under the prevalent regulation conditions, what do you think is/are the barrier(s) to implementation 
of regulatory compliance in your department? Why? 
 
19. What changes would you like to see happening in your department prior to regulatory compliance 
implementation? Why? 
 
20. Can you suggest ways on how to gain actors’ support in the implementation of regulatory 
compliance in this department? 
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Appendix 17: Rational of the Interview Questions 
 
Rational of the Interview Questions 
 
Question number 
 
Rational 
 
 
 
3, 4, 5 
 
1, 2 
 
 
6 
 
  
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
 
11 
 
 
12 
 
 
13 
 
 
 
14 
 
15 
 
 
16 
 
 
17, 20 
 
18 
 
19 
Cognitive 
 
Gauge perceived knowledge and understanding of regulatory compliance 
 
Gauge perceived knowledge of regulatory compliance in disaster management 
under the Malaysia National Security Council Programme 
 
Perceived ability to apply regulatory compliance with the MNSC Directive 20 
 
Affective 
Actors' feelings about the ‘rights’ of the disaster victims to regulatory compliance  
 
Advantages/disadvantages of regulatory compliance to the disaster victims 
 
Perceived suitability of the present regulations/programme to the actors 
 
Perceived suitability of the present workload for the actors in sharing responsible 
with the disaster victims in decision making 
 
Perceived effect of disaster victims’ involvement in decision making together 
with the actors 
 
Perceived effect of department level appraisal towards implementing regulatory 
compliance 
 
Perceived the most favour regulations on the scene of disaster management and 
emergency housing   
 
Conative 
Willingness to support regulatory compliance 
 
Willingness to promoting a ‘caring feeling’ and acceptance of disaster victims 
under the MNSC Directive 20 
 
Willingness to attend in-service course as the result of regulatory compliance 
implementation 
 
Conditions to support regulatory compliance implementation 
 
Perceived barriers to regulatory compliance implementation 
 
Changes suggested before regulatory compliance implementation 
                                                                                                                                                    Source: Author 
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Appendix 18: Codes Used to Analyse Interviews 
 
1 : Circulars/bulletins on the MNSC Directive 20  
1a : Had read/received 
Reasons  
1ai : Department level have received circulars on the MNSC Directive 20 
 
1b : Had not read/received 
Reasons 
1bi : Department level had not received circulars  
1bii : Circulars only for technical staff  
1biii : Not interested because not technical staff 
1biv : Department level had not received circulars 
 
1A : Intention towards regulatory compliance 
1Ai : Agree 
        Reasons 
1Aia : Already implemented 
 
1Aii : Undecided 
        Reasons 
1Aiia : Situational actions 
 
1Aiii : Disagreed 
        Reasons 
1Aiiia : Practically impossible 
 
2 : Meaning of regulatory compliance 
2i : No comment 
2ii : Systems or departments in any organisations and public agencies to ensure that personnel are aware 
of and take steps to comply with relevant laws and regulations 
2iia : Agencies should ensure and document that their activities are in compliance with all applicable 
federal, state, and local laws and regulations 
2iib : Agencies should ensure that all staff is appropriately credentialed for the functions they will be 
performing 
2iic  : Agencies should be aware of, and comply with, any state or local requirements related to the 
provisions or regulations 
 
3 : Meaning of emergency housing 
3i : Is the fast build process when an emergency occurs; when the life of a person is at risk by a natural 
or non-ordinary situation 
3ii : Any tent, trailer, mobile home, or other structure used for human shelter that is designed to be 
transportable and which is not attached to the ground, to another structure, or to any utility system on 
the same premises for more than 30 consecutive days 
3iii : A shaded room or group of rooms located within a dwelling forming a single habitable unit with 
facilities used or intended to be used by a single family for living, sleeping, cooking, and eating 
3iv : A room or enclosed floor space used or intended to be used for living, sleeping, cooking or eating 
purposes, excluding bathrooms, laundries, furnace rooms, pantries, kitchenettes and utility rooms, 
foyers, or communicating corridors, stairways, closets, storage spaces, workshops, and hobby and 
recreation areas 
3v : Any enclosed space wholly or partly used or intended to be used for living, sleeping, cooking, and 
eating                                                                                         
 
3A : Meaning of disaster victims  
3Ai : Disaster victims under resilience difficulties 
3Aii : Disaster victims under physical distraction under resilience difficulties 
3Aiii : Disaster victims under adaptation problems 
3Aiv  : Disaster victims who resilience difficulties under authorities responsibilities’ 
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4 : Discussion about regulatory compliance  
4a  : Yes 
Reasons 
4ai : Only with actors involved in regulatory compliance  
4aii : Only informally 
4aiii : Their fairly work will be misjudged 
4b : No 
Reasons 
4bi : Not emergency housing department at the moment  
4bii : Never occurs to discuss it 
 
4A : Knowing disaster victims 
4Aa : Quite well 
        Reasons 
4Aai : Regularly visit disaster site 
4Aaii : Involved in engagement programme 
 
4Ab : Moderately well/some do, some do not 
        Reasons 
4Abi  : Only those who sent to the group 
4Abii : Hardly visit disaster site 
4Abiii : Only those who regularly visit disaster site 
4Abiv : Very little/only from afar 
 
4Ac : Not very well 
        Reasons 
4Aci : Lack of interest 
4Acii : Never go to disaster site 
4Aciii : Not interested in disaster victims 
4Aciv : Very few actors discussed disaster victims’ affairs 
 
5  : Rationales of regulatory compliance  
5a  : No comment 
5b  : Very few actors understand 
Reasons 
5bi : Lack of information about regulatory compliance  
5bii : Not interested in regulatory compliance 
 
5A : Rationales for regulatory compliance 
5Ai : To set a margin and uniformity to the actors in carrying their duties 
5Aii : To prevent disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20 from having inferiority complexes 
5Aiii : To establish understanding towards regulatory compliance in department level 
5Aiv : To increase the regulatory compliance in all departments 
5Av : To accommodate disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20 into disaster society. 
5Avi : To create a “caring feeling” under in the actors. 
5Avii : To give disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20 equal opportunities in regulatory 
compliance 
 
6 : Actors’ ability to handle disaster victims  
6a : Can handle 
Reasons 
6ai : Disaster victims included had intellectual ability equal to disaster peers in the group  
6aii : Just can 
6aiii : Are trained actors  
6aiv : Had experienced working in disaster victims environment 
 
6b : Undecided 
Reasons  
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6bi : Not patient  
6bii : Depends on types of resilience difficulties 
 
6c : Cannot handle 
Reasons  
6ci : No training  
6cii : Just cannot 
6ciii : Never experienced working with disaster victims  
6civ : No skills to handle disaster victims 
 
7 : Rights to regulatory compliance  
7a : Have rights 
Reason 
7ai : Equal compliance opportunities/Humanitarian  
7aii : Socialisation process 
 
7b : Undecided 
Reasons 
7bi : If disaster victims can cope with disaster adaptation  
7bii : For certain regulations only  
7biii : If appropriate resources are available 
 
7c  : Disagreed 
Reasons 
7ci : Disaster victims have rights to get different provisions 
 
8  : Advantages/Disadvantages of regulatory compliance to disaster victims  
8A : Knowledge gain  
8Ai : Improved 
Reasons 
8Aia : Learned from actors 
8Aib : Disaster victims have equal intellectual ability to disaster victims 
8Aic : Learned from disaster victims 
8Aii : Undecided 
Reasons 
8Aiia : If actors are committed in their working  
8Aiib : If actors have required skills  
8Aiic : If disaster victims have prerequisite skills  
8Aiid : If disaster victims are given adequate individual attention  
8Aiie : Depends on disaster victims resilience difficulties  
8Aiif : Never handled disaster victims 
8Aiii : Not improved 
Reasons 
8Aiiia : Disaster victims will not get individual attention  
8Aiiib : Group size high 
8Aiiic : Disaster victims cannot cope with disaster adaptation  
8Aiiid : Actors prioritise disaster victims’ adaptation 
 
8B : Social development  
8Bi : Improved 
Reasons 
8Bia : Learned from actors  
8Bib : Regulatory compliance will improve disaster victims’ social skills  
8Bic : Familiarise disaster victims with actors 
8Bid : Learned from disaster victims 
 
8Bii : Undecided 
Reasons 
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8Biia : If actors play their part  
8Biib : No experience working with disaster victims  
8Biic : Not all actors can accept disaster victims 
 
8c : Emotional development  
8Ci : Improved 
Reasons 
8Cia : Widen the scope for emotional development  
8Cib : Boost disaster victims confidence 
8Cii : Undecided 
Reasons 
8Ciia  : For some disaster victims but not others  
8Ciib : Difficult for department level practicing streaming 
8Ciii : Not improved 
Reasons 
8Ciiia   : Disaster victims will be embarrassed 
8Ciiib   : Disaster victims will be victimised 
 
10 : Suitability of regulations  
10a : Suitable 
 
9ai : With modification 
9aii : Regulations is used to handle disaster victims 
 
9b : Undecided 
9bi : Depends on earlier stage or later stage  
9bii : Depends on disaster victims education  
9biii : Certain regulations only 
 
9C : Not suitable 
Reasons 
9Ci : Standard too high  
9Cii  : Too many regulations 
 
10 : Effect on actors’ workload  
10a : Will increase 
Reason 
10ai : More handling preparations  
10aii : More attention to disaster victims  
10aiii : Delay in finishing programme 
10aiv  : More work to record disaster victims’ progress 
 
11 : Effect on disaster victims  
11i : Not affected 
Reasons 
11ia : Normal working process as usual  
11ib : Disaster victims are intellectually able  
11ic : Disaster victims will work harder  
11id : Disaster victims learned better when helping other disaster victims 
 
11ii : Undecided 
Reasons 
11iia : If regulatory compliance involves earlier phase of recovery only 
11iib : If actors give more than the usual attention to disaster victims  
11iic : If actors not able to apportion working time equally  
11iid : If disaster victims have serious problems 
11iii : Negatively affected 
Reasons  
361 
 
11iiia : Actors attention to disaster victims will neglect other disaster victims 
 
12 : Affect appraisal 
12a : No 
        Reasons 
12ai : Job is not just providing housing 
12aii : Regulatory compliance is not part of the department level’s appraisal 
12aiii : Regulatory compliance already calculated 
12aiv : Part of their work 
12b  : Undecided 
Reasons 
12bi : Main objectives in emergency housing is to provide enough houses 
12bii : Depends on disaster victims resilience difficulties  
12biii : It depends on the actors’ willingness to comply 
12biv  : Depends on actors’ ability to apportion working time 
12c : Negatively affected 
Reasons 
12ci : Extra attention may result project delays 
12cii : Had other responsibilities and commitments 
12ciii  : Could never achieve the standard required 
12civ : Not all the actors got the same abilities 
 
12A : Alternative evaluation of department level 
12Ai : Valuation in training programme should also be part of overall individual appraisal 
12Aii : Valuation on behalf of the department should be done to the right person who are really specialise 
in emergency housing 
12Aiii : Give credit to department level with good regulatory compliance practice 
 
13 : Disaster victims favoured for regulatory compliance  
13i : Present planning and building codes 
13ii : MNSC Directive 20 
13iii :  International Standard 
13a  : First    Second         Third 
        Reasons 
13ai : Already familiar 
13aii : Available resources 
13aiii : Practically proven 
13aiv : Internationally recognised 
 
14 : Willingness to support regulatory compliance  
I4a : Unwilling 
14ai : Present conditions not conducive  
I4aii : Too demanding to actors  
I4aiii : Not trained in emergency housing  
14aiv : Difficult to communicate with disaster victims  
I4av : Interfere with normal working and adaptation 
 
I4b : Undecided 
Reason 
14bi : Some will; some won't  
14bii : If actors are well informed about regulatory compliance  
14biii : If regulatory compliance involves earlier stage only  
14biv : Depends on managers’ support  
I4vi : If majority of actors support regulatory compliance 
 
14c : Willing 
Reasons 
14ci : Humanitarian 
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14cii : Actors have been co-operative under the MNSC Directive 20 in the past 
15 : Caring feeling and acceptance of disaster victims  
15i : Increased 
Reasons  
15ia : Interaction will familiarise actors with disaster victims 
15ib : Increased understanding of disaster victims problems 
15ic : Helpful to disaster victims 
15id : Aware of disaster victims’ difficulties 
15ii : Undecided 
        Reasons 
15iia : Some will and some won't 
15iib  : If actors play their part 
15iic : Depend on actors’ acceptance 
15iid : If actors are active in its promotion 
15iii : Will not increase 
Reasons 
16 : Actors willingness to attend training  
16a : Will attend 
Reasons  
16ai : To learn new skills 
16b : Undecided 
Reasons  
16bi : If directed  
16bii : If given information about regulatory compliance 
16biii : Very few clerical staff interested  
16biv : If duration of training is shortened  
16bv  : If have disabled relatives 
 
16c : Reluctant 
Reasons 
16ci : Not interested  
16cii : Personal problems  
16cii : Will retire soon  
16civ      : Difficult to handle disaster victims  
16cv       : Training too long 
 
17 : Conditions for accepting regulatory compliance 
A : Directed by the Prime Minister’s Department 
B : Disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20 have certain abilities; 
C : Have acquired the prerequisite skills 
D : Have no behavioural problems 
E : Would not accept disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20 even under out behavioural 
problems 
F : For non-religious regulations only 
 
18 : Barriers towards regulatory compliance 
A : Lack of information. 
B : System applied. 
C : Internal. 
D : International. 
E : Actors workloads 
F : Capacity of emergency housing. 
G : Responsibilities not related to working. 
H : Actors skill 
I : Actors not trained towards the MNSC Directive 20. 
J : Actors with specific skills only. 
K : Appraisal pressure 
L : Acceptance of disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20 
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M : Managers’ negative perception about the importance of regulatory compliance to disaster victims 
under the MNSC Directive 20 
N : Unwillingness of actors to accept disaster victims under the MNSC into their groups 
O : Negative acceptance of disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20 by disaster communities 
P : Negative perception of disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20 by relatives of disaster 
victims 
Q : Unwillingness of actors to relinquish their working responsibilities 
R : Resourcing 
S : Lack of regulatory compliance facilities and/or materials under the MNSC Directive 20 
T  : Lack of emergency housing 
U : Inadequate number or lack of technical staff in the department level 
V : Abilities of disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20 
W : Disaster victims’ behaviours 
X : Disaster victims without formal education 
Y : Unwillingness of disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20s themselves to be included in 
disaster victims’ group 
 
19 : Changes suggested prior to regulatory compliance  
A : Training in emergency housing 
B : Actors given in-service training in emergency housing 
C : Disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20 and regulatory compliance to be included in 
programme at actors training sessions  
D : Department level should be supplied with in-depth and extensive information on the Prime 
Minister’s Department regulatory compliance plan 
E : Resourcing 
F : Build more emergency housing 
G : Create the post of working assistant 
H : Department level system 
I : Systems that is clear and focus 
J : Longer periods of direct contact with the disaster victims 
K : Volunteered by the disaster victims to get involve  
L : Regulatory compliance enforcement office 
M : Every District Office should have an officer in charge of regulatory compliance 
N : Relevant authorities should carry out continuous monitoring 
O : Officer in charge should have regulatory compliance background 
 
20 : Strategies recommended encouraging acceptance of regulatory compliance  
A : Personal incentives 
B : Monetary rewards 
C : Actors participation in the regulatory compliance programme made part of   actor’s appraisal 
D : Actors sent for overseas trips to study working techniques and strategies towards regulatory 
compliance group setting 
E : Actors involved in regulatory compliance programme are given a chance to further their studies in 
emergency assistance and housing studies at a higher level 
F : Material resources 
G : Provide all human support 
H : Support from technical staff 
I : Support from managers 
J : Support from other actors 
K : Reduction of actors’ workload 
L : Reduce group of population involved in regulatory compliance programme 
M : Restriction of regulations 
N : Include disaster victims with resilience difficulties under the MNSC Directive 20 in the low in 
come and get benefit from other national programme 
O : Reduce actors working periods and non-working responsibilities 
P : Different community, place in different group 
Q : Provide proof to actors that regulatory compliance does work 
R : Involve actors recognised as excellent actors 
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Appendix 19: Consent Letter by the Respondents 
 
Research Title: 
 
‘MANAGING DISASTERS IN MALAYSIA:  
THE ATTITUDE OF OFFICIALS TOWARDS COMPLIANCE WITH  
THE MNSC DIRECTIVE 20’ 
 
 
I the undersigned am willing to take part in the above study of Ruhizal Roosli by participating in an interview. 
 
I have received and read the letter outlines the issues that the interview will cover. I understand that I have the 
rights to answer only the questions I feel comfortable replying to.  
 
I agree to be interview and give consent for it to be tape recorded. I understand that anything I say is 
confidential and that I can withdraw at any time. 
 
 
 
Signed: 
 
Date:  
 
 Name (Block Capitals): 
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Appendix 20: Letter to the Respondents 
 
School of Applied Science, 
Ellison Building,  
Northumbria University,  
Newcastle upon Tyne. 
 
‘MANAGING DISASTERS IN MALAYSIA:  
THE ATTITUDE OF OFFICIALS TOWARDS COMPLIANCE WITH  
THE MNSC DIRECTIVE 20’ 
 
Dear Sir, 
 
I am a PhD student sponsored by the Higher Education Minister of Malaysia, currently studying at 
Northumbria University in the United Kingdom, undertaking a study on the above topic. The main aim of the 
study is to gather actors’ perspectives on the implementation of regulatory compliance in all level of Disaster 
Management Mechanism in Malaysia. 
 
For your information, the Disaster Management Mechanism in Malaysia focus more in action plan in every 
level from national, state to district. At the same time the compliance with all Malaysia National Security 
Council (MNSC) Programme has to be implemented. All of the actors are hopefully should participate from 
department of national, state and district level who are involve in disaster management especially in providing 
emergency housing from administration level to technical, those who are responsible for the implementation 
of regulatory compliance. 
 
In order to gather useful data, I hope that you will respond to all items in the questionnaire as honestly as 
possible. All information given will be held in the strictest of confidence, and only retained for my use within 
this study. This data will be held to secure circumstances and destroyed at the end of my study. 
 
It is also hope that the findings of this study would be helpful to the Prime Minister’s Department, in planning 
strategies to support actors in the implementation of regulatory compliance for the benefit to the actors and 
the disaster victims in Malaysia especially in awareness raising and capacity building. 
 
Attention to: 
1. Head of department; 
2. Administrative officer; and 
3. Technical officer. 
 
Your corporation is most appreciated.  
 
 Thanks you 
 
 Ruhizal Roosli 
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Appendix 21: Details Answers to the Broad Questions (Sub-divided into Specific Research Questions) 
 
• What are the general attitudes of actors towards the intended implementation of regulatory 
compliance? 
• How do actors’ backgrounds influence their general attitudes? 
General conclusion  
The findings from the questionnaires showed that actors had broadly negative attitudes towards regulatory 
implementation. These negative general attitudes due to the fact that their negative cognitive and affective 
components of attitudes to regulatory compliance, although the conative components of attitudes being 
slightly neutral. They were unsure about their reactions towards the implementation of regulatory compliance 
but negatively thinking about the level of knowledge and understanding and also negatively accepting the 
concept from their internal feelings. However the tests did show that there were strong significant positive 
relationships between the three components of attitudes. The three components gave influenced to the way 
actors react to their perception towards the implementation of regulatory compliance. Statistically, there were 
no significant differences in actors’ general attitudes to regulatory compliance based on their background 
characteristics of (1) Gender, (2) Number of Years Working, (3) Professional Status, (4) Level of control, and 
(5) Department has Specific Regulation towards Regulatory Compliance. Different Gender, Experience, 
Position, Mechanism and Availability of Specific Regulation had no influence towards the implementation of 
regulatory compliance. The background characteristic that seems to have significant influence on actors 
attitudes to regulatory compliance were Department that had Trained Actors, had Actors willing to Attend 
Trainings, had Actors taking care of Regulatory Compliance and Related to Emergency Housing. Actors 
provided thirteen reasons for opposing regulatory compliance implementation in their department. 
 
• What is the actors’ understanding of regulatory compliance? 
• Is there any effect if the department has actors to look after regulatory compliance, related directly to 
the scene of emergency housing, have specific regulation to make sure compliance with the 
regulation? 
Actors’ knowledge (K1), their abilities (K2) in regulatory compliance, Q5 and (independent variable 8, 9 
and 10) 
The element of knowledge and abilities work together. The tests did show that there were strong significant 
positive relationships between the both elements. Statistically, background characteristics influenced the 
abilities but not the knowledge of actors. Only chairman, technical staff and clerical staff considered 
themselves as knowledgeable actors due to the fact that they were statistically significant. And only Chairman 
was the only group had high confidence in managing their own skills to apply regulatory compliance. Actors 
perceived themselves as unsure about their level of knowledge in regulatory compliance in MNSC Directive 
20 although had a low confidence of their own ability to comply with regulations and guidelines. The 
knowledge and abilities of actors had not affected different level of control in the emergency mechanism in 
Malaysia. Actors in the national and state level considered themselves as positive and unsure about their 
knowledge in emergency management. Actors in the national and state level however perceived themselves as 
negative and undecided about their abilities to implement regulatory compliance. But the actors clearly 
admitted that they were lack of knowledge and confidence towards their own abilities in emergency 
management. The knowledge and abilities of actors contributed to the positive development of department 
that had actors to look after regulatory compliance due to the fact that there were statistically significant 
between both K1 and K2 and independent variable ‘Actors to look after Regulatory Compliance.’ There were 
no significant influence between both K1 and K2 and independent variable (1) Department Related to the 
Scene of Emergency Housing and (2) Department has Specific Regulation towards Regulatory Compliance. 
As results the knowledge and abilities of actors had no influence if the Department Related to the Scene of 
Emergency Housing or not and if the Department has Specific Regulations towards Regulatory Compliance 
or not.  
 
• What do the actors and disaster victims get from the implementation of regulatory compliance? 
• How effective the present MNSC Directive 20? 
• Is there any effect if the department has actors to look after regulatory compliance, related directly to 
the scene of emergency housing, have specific regulation to make sure compliance with the 
regulation? 
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Benefit (F1), perceived suitability (F2) of the regulations and guidelines to actors and disaster victims and 
(independent variable 8, 9 and 10) 
The tests did show that there were strong significant positive relationships between the both benefit (F1) and 
suitability (F2) of regulations and guidelines in MNSC Directive 20. They perceived that the programme is 
suitable if it is benefiting both actors and disaster victims. Actors perceived themselves as against the fact that 
regulatory compliance would benefit them and the disaster victims. They were not agreed that present MNSC 
Directive 20 is suitable for them and disaster victims. Statistically, background characteristics gave no 
influenced to the benefit and suitability of regulations and guidelines to the actors and disaster victims. 
However, regulatory compliance would give benefit and significantly suitable to the department related to the 
scene of emergency housing. The department that had actors to look after regulatory compliance would not 
going to get benefit from regulatory compliance but these departments considered as suitable to accept 
regulatory compliance implementation. Nevertheless the Department that had Specific Regulation towards 
Regulatory Compliance would not get benefit from regulatory compliance and the MNSC Directive 20 was 
not suitable for these departments statistically. Different level in Malaysian emergency mechanism did benefit 
from regulatory compliance but the MNSC Directive 20 not suitable to implement at every level of 
mechanism. The statement of suitability of regulatory compliance implementation was confirmed by the 
actors from national, state and district.  
 
• What are some training developments to support regulatory compliance? 
• What are some resources to support regulatory compliance? 
• Is there any effect if the department has actors to look after regulatory compliance, related directly to 
the scene of emergency housing, have specific regulation to make sure compliance with the 
regulation? 
Support, training of actors (Q31, Q32 and Q33, independent variable 6 and 7) and (independent variable 8, 
9 and 10) 
Statistically, background characteristics of actors did not influence actors’ support of the MNSC Directive 20. 
Although the tests did show that there were strong significant positive relationships amongst the actors (1) 
ability to apply (K2), their (2) feeling, moods, emotions and sympathetic nervous system (Section B) and (3) 
willingness to attend relevant in-service training on regulatory compliance. If actors’ internal feeling were 
positive that they were in high ability to implement regulatory compliance, they would prefer not willing to 
attend relevant in service training due to the fact that there was a negative correlation in actors willingness to 
attend relevant in service training. Statistically, the support and willingness to develop skills towards the 
regulatory compliance had no influenced by the (1) Department that had actors to look after regulatory 
compliance, (2) Department Related to the Scene of Emergency Housing’ and (3) Department has Specific 
Regulation towards Regulatory Compliance. Chairmen was positively thinking that the actors willing to 
support and attend training in order to develop knowledge and skills in emergency management but not 
overall actors. Most of the actors presumed that they were unsure whether to support or object the 
implementation of regulatory compliance but clearly object towards their willingness to attend trainings. 
Simultaneously, they admitted that their department lack of actors trained in emergency housing. These facts 
supported by the actors in every level in the emergency management mechanism in Malaysia from national, 
state and district. Most of the actors perceived themselves as unsure whether to support or not the 
implementation but slightly had negative perception to volunteer themselves to attend in service training. 
 
• How do actors’ perceived ability to comply with regulations and their willingness to support 
regulatory compliance implementation? 
Actors’ ability (K2), affective component (feeling) and support (Q31) 
Actor’s ability (K2), feelings (affective component) and willingness to attend in-service training (Q31) had a 
strong relationship. The significant relationship is negative between both K2 and affective attitude towards 
their willingness to support the implementation of regulatory compliance (Q31). Even if actors’ internal 
feeling were positive and were in high ability to implement regulatory compliance, they would prefer not to 
support the implementation of regulatory compliance because there was a negative correlation between 
actors’ ability-affective component and willingness to support the implementation of regulatory compliance. 
 
• How do victims influence regulatory compliance? 
Disaster victims rights (Q1, Q2, Q10, Q13 and Q14) 
The findings from Q10 and Q13 of the questionnaires showed that there was a conflict between actors' 
perceptions of the 'rights of disaster victims in regulatory compliance' and the 'benefit of rights disaster 
victims might get from MNSC Directive 20’. The actors perceived themselves as understanding the concept 
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of regulatory compliance and the implementation with the CMS 3.73 for Q1 and CMS 3.73 for Q2. They 
perceived themselves as negative towards the matter of 'rights of disaster victims in regulatory compliance' 
but were slightly neutral on the 'benefit of rights disaster victims might get from MNSC Directive 20’. They 
also denied that regulatory compliance might increase relationship between actors and disaster victims due to 
the fact that exposed to disaster victims would encourage actors to be more caring feelings. Thus, the findings 
indicated that the disaster victims do extend to the rights of equal opportunities in regulatory compliance with 
some adjustment to the present MNSC regulations and guidelines as clearly suggested in Q41.  
 
• How do disaster victims respond to the regulatory compliance? 
Disaster victims’ participations (Q11, Q12, Q10 and Q30), Q22 and (Q15, Q16, Q17, Q23, Q24 and Q25) 
Statistically, disaster victims’ participations did increase actors working workloads and actors’ background 
characteristics did influenced working responsibility if regulatory compliance implemented. Difference 
professional status had different loads of responsibilities. However background characteristics did not 
influenced actors’ perceptions of disaster victims’ suitability to be included into the process of regulatory 
compliance. Most actors had not sure whether it is suitable to get the disaster victims participated in the 
process of regulatory compliance. They highlighted that it was not appropriate to involve disaster victims with 
disruptive behaviour but might tolerate if the disaster victims not fully involve in decision making, the 
disaster victims with knowledge, the disaster victims without knowledge but had experience, disaster victims 
working as a group and not individually and lastly the interaction will not create complications. Actors’ 
background characteristics did not influence the perception of actors in disaster victims work alone and none 
involvement of actors in disaster victims educations. Actors admitted that disaster victims should not be 
isolated but not sure whether to let the responsibility handling disaster victims to be left to the specialist only. 
Simultaneously, Actors’ background characteristics did influenced the perceptions of actors in victim and 
actors should be working together and actors have a responsibility for the education of victim in the process 
of regulatory compliance. Different profession status effected to both of the perceptions. The chairmen, 
managers, technical staff members, clerical staff members and officers disagreed that they should work 
together with disaster victims and have to carry responsibility educate the disaster victims in the scene of 
emergency management. 
 
• What are some of the key changes actors feel need to be undertaken prior to regulatory compliance 
implementation? 
Conditions of accepting regulatory compliance (Q34 and Q39) 
The findings for conditions for accepting regulatory compliance showed that actors may be persuaded to 
accept regulatory implementation, if certain conditions are met by the Prime Minister’s Department the most 
popular condition was the need for specialist support to be provided whom might be the well trained in 
emergency housing and emergency management. This was also confirmed by chairmen, managers, and 
technical staff members, clerical staff members and officers, who agreed that actors would be willing to give 
regulatory compliance a chance if actors are given specialist support. Actors would also positively accept 
regulatory compliance if they are given the direct orders from their superiors, accept only disaster victims 
without disruptive behaviour and even volunteering themselves working towards regulatory compliance. The 
findings also showed that actors would not accept regulatory compliance voluntarily unless there are some 
changes in working with incentives and their contribution will be affected annual appraisal. 
 
• How do actors’ backgrounds influence these components of attitudes? 
Cognitive (understanding and knowledge) and independent variables of background characteristics 
Actors perceived themselves as having perception of negative capability towards their own understanding and 
knowledge in regulatory compliance. Variables that contributed to their own attitudes were different gender, 
how many experienced worked to the department, which level do they serve, whether they attended the 
training or not, whether the department has trained actors, whether the department has actors handling 
regulatory compliance or whether the department related to the scene of emergency housing or not. The main 
significant influenced from the actors that served to the department below 5 years and 16 to 20 years. The 
state and district level were the mechanism level that influenced most of the attitudes towards their 
understanding and knowledge in regulatory compliance implementation. Actors’ professional status and the 
department with specific regulation towards regulatory compliance never influenced actors’ attitudes in 
regulatory compliance. 
 
 
 
369 
 
• How do actors’ backgrounds influence these components of attitudes? 
Affective (feeling, moods, emotions and sympathetic nervous system) and independent variables of 
background characteristics 
Actors perceived themselves as having perception of negative reactions towards their own feeling, moods, 
emotions and sympathetic nervous system in regulatory compliance. Different Level of Control, Attendance 
In-service Courses, Availability of Trained Actors in the Department, Availability of Actors to look after 
Regulatory Compliance, and Department Involvement to the Scene of Emergency Housing contributed to the 
ways actors react in regulatory compliance implementation. The variables that not affecting actors attitudes 
were Gender, Number of Years Working and Availability of Department with Specific Regulation towards 
Regulatory Compliance. 
 
• How do actors’ backgrounds influence these components of attitudes? 
Conative (behavioral response) and independent variables of background characteristics 
Actors perceive themselves as having perception of neutral behavioral response of attitudes in regulatory 
compliance. Actors’ perception of affective attitude resulted from their differences in Gender, Professional 
Status, and Status of Attended In-service Courses, but not How Long they had been Working, which Level 
they Work, Availability of Trained Actors in Department, Availability of Actors to look after Regulatory 
Compliance, Department Related to the Scene of Emergency Housing, and Availability of Specific 
Regulation in Department towards Regulatory Compliance. 
 
• Actors general perception on the MNSC Directive 20 
Views on the MNSC Directive 20 towards regulatory compliance in emergency housing (item no. 40) and 
changes or actions recommended by actors prior to regulatory compliance implementation (item no. 41). 
Most of actors were disagreed with the regulatory compliance plan. The most cited reason among actors who 
disagreed with the regulatory compliance was the perception that regulatory compliance would disrupt the 
normal routine of working process besides of other reasons such as workload increment, effect on actors and 
other disaster victims’ adaptation and actors work without appropriate skills. Actors who were undecided used 
‘if’ (more toward supporting the implementation) and ‘but’ (more toward against the implementation) for the 
reasons. Actors with the ‘if’, reasons were cited that they wanted to get more support such as information, 
trainings and resources. Meanwhile, actors with the ‘but’ reasons were cited that it is difficult to implement 
regulatory compliance due to disaster victims have behavioural problem, disaster victims’ group is too large, 
regulatory compliance will increase actors’ workload and needs to be planned carefully. Only few actors (11.1 
per cent) agreed with the idea to implement regulatory compliance. They cited that the MNSC Directive 20 is 
formulated for good reasons such as to help in the realisation of the ‘caring society’; would promote and 
develop self-esteem in actors and disaster victims and is in line with the national philosophy of equal 
opportunities (National Constitution: see section 4.1, p.92). However, most of actors (82 per cent) still wanted 
to see changes at the department level before regulatory compliance implementation even though some of 
them were against the implementation. The most cited suggestion were that actors should be given in-service 
training, the department should be articulate on the rationale of implementing regulatory compliance and all 
department involved in the regulatory compliance programme should be provided with appropriate physical 
resources and working equipments. 
 
Conclusion 
The result indicates that actors were knowledgeable about regulatory compliance and perceived themselves as 
having the appropriate and necessary skills in line of duties, they would be likely to exhibit positive feelings 
towards regulatory compliance, and may then be the more willing to accept its implementation. The real fact 
was that actors were unwilling to accept regulatory compliance in the present climate. Actors do wish to see 
changes at the department level before regulatory compliance is implemented. Yet actors in general are also 
of the opinion that actors would accept regulatory compliance if directed by the Prime Minister’s Department. 
As civil servants actors are of course required to observe and implement Prime Minister’s Department 
directives. Nevertheless in the light of the present research evidence there may be need for careful preparation 
at several levels before regulatory compliance implementation. Careful preparation might be vital to secure 
maximum co-operation from the working force and to prevent alienation and consequent failure. As a result, 
the questionnaire findings showed that generally actors have negative attitudes to regulatory compliance. 
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Appendix 22: Details of Quantitative Analysis 
 
a. Cognitive Component 
 
Influence of Actors’ Background Characteristics (independent variables) on the Cognitive Components of 
Attitudes (dependent variables) to Regulatory Compliance 
The result of statistical tests (one way ANOVA) shows that there were significant differences in the 
perception of actors’ general cognitive component for the independent variable of (1) Gender {F(1, 411) = 
4.54, p< 0.05), (2) Number of Years Working {F(4, 408) = 2.91, p< 0.05), (3) Level of Control {F(2, 410) = 
3.75, p< 0.05), (4) Attended In-service Courses {F(1, 411) = 6.94, p< 0.05) (5) Availability of Trained Actors 
{F(1, 411) = 7.13, p< 0.05), (6) Actors to look after Regulatory Compliance {F(1, 411) = 12.63, p< 0.05), and 
(7) Department Related to the Scene of Emergency Housing {F(1, 411) = 5.84, p< 0.05). Tukey HSD in Post-
hoc tests for number of years working shows that significance difference occur between the group of working 
below 5 years and 16 to 20 years. Tukey HSD in Post-hoc tests for level of control shows that significance 
difference occurs between pair group of the state level and district. 
 The result of statistical tests (one way ANOVA) shows that there was no significant differences in 
the perception of actors’ general cognitive component for the independent variable of (1) Professional Status 
{F (4, 408) = 0.06, p> 0.05) and (2) Department has Specific Regulation towards Regulatory Compliance 
{F(1, 411) = 0.52, p> 0.05).  
 
Table 7.21: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Scores of General Cognitive Component of Attitude to 
Regulatory Compliance of Actors’ Background Characteristics 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
General cognitive 
attitude 
2.32 ± 0.44 211 51.0 147 35.6 55 13.4 413 
a. Gender 
Male 2.36 ± 0.29 144 49.4 106 36.3 41 14.2 291 
Female 2.26 ± 0.37 66.7 54.6 41 33.9 14 11.5 122 
b. Number of Years Working 
Under 5 2.47 ± 0.27 36 44.9 31 38.3 14 16.9 81 
6 to 10 2.33 ± 0.31 54 50.6 39 36.7 13 12.7 106 
11 to 15 2.33 ± 0.31 31 50.1 22 36.4 8 13.5 61 
16 to 20 2.21 ± 0.33 46 56.7 27 33.3 8 10.0 81 
More than 20 2.29 ± 0.31 44 52.5 28 33.3 12 14.2 84 
c. Professional Status 
Chairman 2.70 ± 0.25 4 48.1 2 18.5 3 33.3 9 
Manager 2.32 ± 0.40 30 51.2 21 36.3 7 12.4 59 
Technical 2.31 ± 0.45 52 51.4 37 36.3 13 12.3 102 
Clerical 2.31 ± 0.43 56 51.2 40 36.4 14 12.4 109 
Officer 2.33 ± 0.46 68 50.6 47 35.3 19 14.1 134 
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Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
d. Level of Control 
National 2.41 ± 0.41 26 47.9 19 36.0 9 16.0 54 
State 2.37 ± 0.46 99 48.8 74 36.7 29 14.5 202 
District 2.24 ± 0.35 86 54.8 53 34.0 17 11.1 157 
e. Attended In-service Courses 
Yes 2.41 ± 0.31 80 47.5 61 36.4 27 16.2 169 
No 2.26 ± 0.33 130 53.4 86 35.1 28 11.5 244 
f. Availability of Trained Actors 
Yes 2.41 ± 0.31 83 47.5 64 36.6 28 15.9 174 
No 2.27 ± 0.34 128 53.5 83 34.9 28 11.6 239 
g. Actors to look after Regulatory Compliance 
Yes 2.42 ± 0.34 81 46.4 66 37.7 28 15.9 175 
No 2.26 ± 0.32 129 54.3 81 34.1 27 11.5 238 
h. Department Related to the Scene of Emergency Housing 
Yes 2.40 ± 0.31 82 47.8 62 35.8 28 16.4 172 
No 2.27 ± 0.33 128 53.3 86 35.5 27 11.2 241 
i. Department has Specific Regulation towards Regulatory Compliance 
Yes 2.33 ± 0.33 72 52.1 48 34.5 19 13.3 139 
No 2.33 ± 0.32 138 50.4 99 36.2 37 13.4 274 
    Source: Author 
 
CMS (Table 7.21) shows that actors perceived themselves as having perception of negative 
capability towards their own understanding and knowledge in regulatory compliance. Only 13.4 per cent of 
actors have a high (positive) perception of their capability, with 35.6 per cent undecided. There was 
statistically difference between actors’ perception of cognitive attitude for the independent variables (1) 
Gender, (2) Number of Years Working, (3) Level of Control, (4) Attended In-service Courses, (5) Availability 
of Trained Actors, (6) Actors to look after Regulatory Compliance, and (7) Department Related to the Scene 
of Emergency Housing. Statistically significant differences of perception also occur between group of 
working below 5 years and 16 to 20 years. Statistically significant differences of perception also occur 
between pair groups of the state level and district. 
 There was no statistically difference between actors’ perception of cognitive attitudes for the 
independent variables of (1) Professional Status and (2) Department has Specific Regulation towards 
Regulatory Compliance. CMS (Table 7.21) shows that actors perceive themselves as having perception of 
negative capability towards their own understanding and knowledge in regulatory compliance. Only 13.4 per 
cent of actors have a high (positive) perception of their capability, with 35.6 per cent undecided. There were 
slightly positive attitudes from the chairmen that contributed 33.3 per cent from overall attitudes. Standard 
deviations show that there were few differences of perception regarding actors’ general cognitive component 
within groups of actors. There was no statistically difference between actors’ perception of cognitive 
attitudes. 
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Influence of Actors’ Background (independent variables) on (1) Actors to Look After Regulatory 
Compliance, (2) Department Related to the Scene of Emergency Housing, and (3) Department has Specific 
Regulation towards Regulatory Compliance, on K1 and K2 
Multivariate tests showed that there were a statistically significant differences between the background 
characteristics of actors to look after regulatory compliance {Wλ = 0.97, F (2, 410) = 5.78, p< 0.05} for the 
dependent variable K1 and K2.  
 There were no statistically significant differences between the background characteristics of 
Department Related to the Scene of Emergency Housing {Wλ = 0.99, F (2, 410) = 1. 51, p> 0.05} for the 
dependent variable K1 and K2.  
 There was no statistically significant differences between the background characteristics of 
Department has Specific Regulation towards Regulatory Compliance {Wλ = 0.99, F (2, 410) = 0.13, p> 0.05} 
for the dependent variable K1 and K2. 
 
Table 7.22: CMS, Frequency, Percentage Scores for K1 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
a. Actors to Look After Regulatory Compliance 
Yes 2.85 ± 0.24 36 20.7 94 53.5 45 25.8 175 
No 2.62 ± 0.35 71 29.7 123 51.8 44 18.4 238 
b. Department Related to the Scene of Emergency Housing 
Yes 2.83 ± 0.25 38 22.3 89 52.0 44 25.7 171 
No 2.64 ± 0.34 69 28.5 128 52.9 45 18.6 242 
c. Department has Specific Regulation towards Regulatory Compliance 
Yes 2.69 ± 0.35 38 27.2 73 52.8 28 20.0 139 
No 2.74 ± 0.32 69 25.3 144 52.4 61 22.3 274 
                                                                                                                                                  Source: Author 
 
CMS (Table 7.22) shows that actors for all groups of the three independent variables mentioned have 
generally a non-committal perception of K1. Statistical tests show that the department that had actors to look 
after regulatory compliance had a significantly more favourable perception of K1 compared to department 
without such actors. There was no statistically difference between actors’ perception of K1, for the two 
independent variables (1) Department Related to the Scene of Emergency Housing, and (2) Department has 
Specific Regulation towards Regulatory Compliance.   
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Table 7.23: CMS, Frequency, Percentage Scores for K2 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
a. Actors to Look After Regulatory Compliance 
Yes 1.87 ± 0.35 137 78.6 32 17.9 6 3.6 175 
No 1.81 ± 0.32 202 85.1 29 12.0 7 2.9 238 
b. Department Related to the Scene of Emergency Housing 
Yes 1.87 ± 0.34 137 79.7 27 15.6 8 4.8 172 
No 1.81 ± 0.35 203 84.2 32 13.7 6 2.1 241 
c. Department has Specific Regulation towards Regulatory Compliance 
Yes 1.89 ± 0.34 116 83.3 16 11.7 7 5.0 139 
No 1.81 ± 0.34 224 81.8 43 15.9 7 2.6 274 
                                                                                                                                                 Source: Author 
 
CMS (Table 7.23) shows that actors for all groups of the three independent variables mentioned have 
generally a negative perception of K1. Statistical tests show that the department that had actors to look after 
regulatory compliance had a significantly more favourable perception of K2 compared to department without 
such actors. There was no statistically difference between actors’ perception of K2, for the two independent 
variables (1) Department Related to the Scene of Emergency Housing, and (2) Department has Specific 
Regulation towards Regulatory Compliance.   
 
Influence of Actors’ Level of Control on the Dependent Variable Actors’ Perceived Knowledge of the MNSC 
Directive 20, K1 
There was no statistically (one way ANOVA) significant differences between the background characteristics 
of level control {F (2, 410) = 0.65, p> 0.05} for the dependent variable K1. 
 
Table 7.24: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Scores for K1 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
K1 attitude 2.72 ± 0.34 107 25.9 217 52.5 89 21.5 413 
National 2.81 ± 0.36 12 22.6 28 52.6 14 24.8 54 
State 2.79 ± 0.33 46 22.7 108 53.7 48 23.7 202 
District 2.60 ± 0.33 49 31.2 80 51.1 28 17.7 157 
                                                                                                                                                 Source: Author 
 
CMS (Table 7.24) shows that actors for all groups had generally a non-committal perception of the 
independent variables level of control for the dependent variable K1. There was no statistically difference 
between actors’ perception of K1, for the independent variables of level control.  
 
Influence of Actors’ Level of Control on the Dependent Variable Actors’ Perceived Abilities Apply 
Regulatory Compliance, K2 
There was no statistically (one way ANOVA) significant differences between the background characteristics 
of level control {F (2, 410) = 0.80, p> 0.05} for the dependent variable K2. 
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Table 7.25: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Scores for K2 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
K2 attitude 1.83 ± 0.35 172 41.7 189 45.8 51 12.4 413 
National 1.91 ± 0.30 19 35.8 28 51.9 7 12.3 54 
State 1.84 ± 0.33 75 37.1 100 49.3 27 13.5 202 
District 1.80 ± 0.33 78 49.7 62 39.2 17 11.0 157 
                                                                                                                                                 Source: Author 
 
Cumulatively in CMS the perception more towards negative perceptions. Percentage scattered (Table 
7.25) shows that actors for all groups had generally in the middle of negative and neutral perception of the 
independent variables level of control for the dependent variable K1. There was no statistically difference 
between actors’ perception of K1, for the independent variables of level control.  
 
Response to an Item in Section A of Attitudinal Scale 
 
Item no. 5: Actors do have the Necessary Skills to Apply Regulatory Compliance 
The result of statistical tests (one way ANOVA) shows that there was significant differences in the perception 
of Q5 for the independent variable of Professional Status of actors {F (4, 408) = 4.56, p< 0.05}. Tukey HSD 
in Post-hoc tests for Q5 shows that significance difference occur between pair group of (1) Chairman and 
Manager, (2) Chairman and Technical, (3) Chairman and Clerical, and (4) Chairman and Officer. 
 
Table 7.26: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Scores for Q5 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
Q5 attitude 1.81 ± 0.35 342 83.8 58 14.0 13 3.1 413 
Chairman 2.89 ± 0.38 6 66.7 0 0.0 3 33.3 9 
Manager 1.88 ± 0.37 47 79.7 11 18.6 1 1.7 59 
Technical 1.81 ± 0.30 85 83.3 14 13.7 3 2.9 102 
Clerical 1.77 ± 0.34 92 84.4 15 13.8 2 1.8 109 
Officer 2.75 ± 0.36 112 83.6 18 13.4 4 3.0 134 
                                                                                                                                                 Source: Author 
 
CMS (Table 7.26) shows that actors perceive themselves as having low (negative) capability 
managing necessary skills in regulatory compliance. Only 3.1 per cent of actors have a high (positive) 
perception of their capability, with 14.0 per cent undecided. Chairman was the only group had high 
confidence in managing their own skills to apply regulatory compliance with 33.3 per cent positive 
contribution. Standard deviations show that there were few differences of perception regarding actors’ general 
attitudes within groups of actors. There was statistically difference between actors’ perception of actors with 
necessary skills for the independent variables of professional status. Statistically significant differences of 
perception also occur between actors with all groups (Chairman, Manager, Technical, Clerical and Officer).  
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b.  Affective Component 
 
Influence of Actors’ Background Characteristics (independent variables) on the Affective Components of 
Attitudes (dependent variables) to Regulatory Compliance 
The result of statistical tests (one way ANOVA) shows that there were significant differences in the 
perception of actors’ general affective component for the independent variable of (1) Level of Control {F (2, 
410) = 3.07, p< 0.05), (2) Attended In-service Courses {F(1, 411) = 6.29, p< 0.05) (3) Availability of Trained 
Actors {F(1, 411) = 5.76, p< 0.05), (4) Actors to look after Regulatory Compliance {F(1, 411) = 4.89, p< 
0.05), and (5) Department Related to the Scene of Emergency Housing {F(1, 411) = 5.49, p< 0.05). Tukey 
HSD in Post-hoc tests for general cognitive component shows that significance differences occur between the 
level pair group of state and district. 
 The result of statistical tests (one way ANOVA) shows that there was no significant differences in 
the perception of actors’ general cognitive component for the independent variable of (1) Gender {F(1, 411) = 
2.34, p> 0.05), (2) Number of Years Working {F(4, 408) = 2.16, p> 0.05), (3) Professional Status {F (4, 408) 
= 0.27, p> 0.05).and (4) Department has Specific Regulation towards Regulatory Compliance {F(1, 411) = 
0.69, p> 0.05). 
 
Table 7.27: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Scores of General Affective Component of Attitude to 
Regulatory Compliance of Actors’ Background Characteristics 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
General affective 
attitude 
2.42 ± 0.28 218 52.7 129 31.2 66 16.1 413 
a. Gender 
Male 2.45 ± 0.33 149 51.1 96 32.9 47 16.1 291 
female 2.35 ± 0.31 69 56.6 33 27.3 20 16.1 122 
b. Number of Years Working 
Under 5 2.58 ± 0.32 36 44.3 29 35.7 16 20.0 82 
6 to 10 2.38 ± 0.34 58 54.5 32 30.4 16 16.1 106 
11 to 15 2.42 ± 0.32 32 52.5 19 31.2 10 16.3 61 
16 to 20 2.28 ± 0.32 48 59.2 23 28.7 10 12.1 81 
More than 20 2.43 ± 0.33 44 52.4 26 30.4 14 17.1 84 
c. Professional Status 
Chairman 2.72 ± 0.24 5 55.6 1 12.2 3 33.3 9 
Manager 2.42 ± 0.32 30 51.0 20 33.1 9 15.9 59 
Technical 2.37 ± 0.26 55 54.3 31 30.8 15 14.8 102 
Clerical 2.37 ± 0.27 59 54.0 34 31.3 16 14.6 102 
Officer 2.46 ± 0.29 68 50.8 43 32.0 23 17.2 134 
d. Level of Control 
National 2.49 ± 0.29 27 49.1 19 35.0 9 15.9 54 
State 2.47 ± 0.29 100 49.6 67 33.1 35 17.3 202 
District 2.31 ± 0.26 91 57.8 43 27.6 23 14.6 157 
376 
 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
e. Attended In-service Courses 
Yes 2.56 ± 0.32 81 47.8 56 33.0 33 19.2 169 
No 2.39 ± 0.34 137 56.0 72 30.3 33 13.9 244 
f. Availability of Trained Actors 
Yes 2.56 ± 0.32 84 48.1 57 32.5 34 19.3 174 
No 2.39 ± 0.34 134 56.0 72 30.3 33 13.7 239 
g. Actors to look after Regulatory Compliance 
Yes 2.56 ± 0.32 85 48.5 57 32.6 33 18.9 175 
No 2.39 ± 0.34 133 55.8 72 30.3 33 13.9 238 
h. Department Related to the Scene of Emergency Housing 
Yes 2.56 ± 0.32 83 48.2 56 32.4 33 19.4 172 
No 2.39 ± 0.34 135 55.9 73 30.4 33 13.7 241 
i. Department has Specific Regulation towards Regulatory Compliance 
Yes 2.56 ± 0.32 76 54.6 42 29.9 22 15.5 139 
No 2.39 ± 0.34 172 51.7 87 31.9 45 16.4 274 
   Source: Author 
 
CMS (Table 7.27) shows that actors perceived themselves as having perception of negative reactions 
towards their own feeling, moods, emotions and sympathetic nervous system in regulatory compliance. Only 
16.1 per cent of actors have a high (positive) perception of their reactions, with 31.2 per cent undecided. 
There were slightly positive attitudes from the chairmen that contributed 33.3 per cent from overall attitudes. 
Standard deviations show that there were few differences of perception regarding actors’ general affective 
component within groups of actors. There was statistically difference between actors’ perception of affective 
attitude for the independent variables (1) Level of Control, (2) Attended In-service Courses, (3) Availability 
of Trained Actors, (4) Actors to Look After Regulatory Compliance, and (5) Department Related to the Scene 
of Emergency Housing. Statistically significant differences of perception also occur between pair groups of 
the state level and district. 
 There was no statistically difference between actors’ perception of cognitive attitudes for the 
independent variables of (1) Gender, (2) Number of Years Working, and (3) Department has Specific 
Regulation towards Regulatory Compliance. 
 
Influence of Actors’ Background (independent variables) on (1) Actors to Look After Regulatory 
Compliance, (2) Department Related to the Scene of Emergency Housing, and (3) Department has Specific 
Regulation towards Regulatory Compliance, on Fl and F2 
Multivariate tests showed that there was a statistically significant relationship between the background 
characteristics of Actors to look after Regulatory Compliance {Wλ = 0.98, F (2, 410) = 3.87, p< 0.05} for the 
dependent variable F1, {F (1, 411) = 5.84, p< 0.05} and F2, {F (1, 411) = 7.53, p< 0.05}. 
 There were statistically significant relationship between the background characteristics of 
Department Related to the Scene of Emergency Housing {Wλ = 0.98, F (2, 410) = 3.67, p< 0.05} for the 
dependent variable F1 and F2. Univariate F-tests showed that there were no significant difference between 
knowledge (F1), {F (1, 411) = 3.16, p> 0.05} mean refers to Actors to look after Regulatory Compliance. But, 
there were significant difference between knowledge (F2), {F (1, 411) = 7.17, p< 0.05} mean refers to Actors 
to look after Regulatory Compliance.  
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 There was no statistically significant relationship between the background characteristics of 
Department has Specific Regulation towards Regulatory Compliance {Wλ = 0.99, F (2, 410) = 0.34, p> 0.05} 
for the dependent variable F1, {F (1, 411) = 0.60, p> 0.05} and F2, {F (1, 411) = 0.60, p> 0.05}. 
 
Table 7.28: CMS, Frequency, Percentage Scores for F1 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
a: Actors to look after Regulatory Compliance 
Yes 2.27 ± 0.32 84 48.0 72 41.0 19 11.0 175 
No 2.09 ± 0.31 137 57.8 82 34.3 19 7.8 238 
b. Department Related to the Scene of Emergency Housing 
Yes 2.28 ± 0.32 85 49.4 66 38.6 21 12.0 172 
No 2.08 ± 0.32 137 56.7 87 36.1 17 7.2 241 
c. Department has Specific Regulation towards Regulatory Compliance 
Yes 2.13 ± 0.37 78 55.9 48 34.8 13 9.4 139 
No 2.18 ± 0.32 144 52.6 105 38.3 25 9.1 274 
                                                                                                                                                 Source: Author 
 
CMS (Table 7.28) shows that actors for all groups of the three independent variables mentioned have 
generally a negative perception of F1. Statistical tests show that the department that had Department Related 
to the Scene of Emergency Housing had a significantly more favourable perception of F1 compared to 
department without such department. There were no statistically difference between actors’ perception of F1, 
for the two independent variables (1) Actors to Look after Regulatory Compliance, and (2) Department has 
Specific Regulation towards Regulatory Compliance.   
 
Table 7.29: CMS, Frequency, Percentage Scores for F2 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
a. Actors to look after Regulatory Compliance 
Yes 2.47 ± 0.32 64 36.2 86 49.3 25 14.5 175 
No 2.27 ± 0.34 109 45.8 103 43.3 26 10.9 238 
b. Department Related to the Scene of Emergency Housing 
Yes 2.48 ± 0.31 62 36.2 84 48.8 26 14.9 172 
No 2.26 ± 0.33 110 45.6 105 43.7 26 10.7 241 
c. Department has Specific Regulation towards Regulatory Compliance 
Yes 2.31 ± 0.35 61 43.6 61 44.1 17 12.2 139 
No 2.38 ± 0.30 112 40.8 128 46.7 34 12.5 274 
                                                                                                                                                  Source: Author 
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CMS (Table 7.29) shows that actors for all groups of the three independent variables mentioned have 
generally a negative perception of F2. Statistical tests show that (1) Actors to Look after Regulatory 
Compliance, and (2) The department that had Department Related to the Scene of Emergency Housing had a 
significantly more favourable perception of F2 compared to department without (1) and (2). There was no 
statistically difference between actors’ perception of F2, for the two independent variables department has 
specific regulation towards regulatory compliance.   
 
Influence of Actors’ Level of Control on the Dependent Variables of Actors’ Perceived 
Advantages/Disadvantages of Disaster Victims’ Development When Included in the Decision Making of 
Regulatory Compliance (F1) 
There was no statistically (one way ANOVA) significant differences between the background characteristics 
of level control {F (2, 410) = 0.48, p> 0.05} for the dependent variable F1. 
 
Table 7.30: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Scores for F1 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
F1 attitude 2.17 ± 0.35 222 53.7 153 37.2 38 9.2 413 
National 2.13 ± 0.39 31 57.4 19 34.6 4 8.0 54 
State 2.20 ± 0.32 105 51.8 76 37.8 21 10.3 202 
District 2.14 ± 0.34 86 54.8 58 37.0 13 8.1 157 
                                                                                                                                                 Source: Author 
  
CMS (Table 7.30) shows that actors perceive themselves as having perception of negative reactions 
towards the benefit of regulatory compliance to actors and disaster victims in regulatory compliance. Standard 
deviations show that there were few differences of perception regarding actors’ general F1 within groups of 
actors. There was no statistically difference between actors’ perception of F1 attitude for the independent 
variables level control. The differences of opinion between actors’ knowledge of regulatory compliance were 
significant statistically. 
 
Influence of Actors’ Level of Control on the Dependent Variables of Actors’ Perceived Suitable of the 
Current MNSC Directive 20 towards Regulatory Compliance (F2) 
There was statistically (one way ANOVA) significant differences between the background characteristics of 
Level Control {F (2, 410) = 6.58, p< 0.05} for the dependent variable F2. Tukey HSD in Post-hoc tests for 
Q10 shows that significance differences occur between pair group of (1) National and State and (2) National 
and District. 
 
Table 7.31: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Scores for F2 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
F2 attitude 2.36 ± 0.34 172 41.7 189 45.8 51 12.4 413 
National 2.44 ± 0.37 19 35.8 28 51.9 7 12.3 54 
State 2.46 ± 0.32 75 37.1 100 49.3 27 13.5 202 
District 2.20 ± 0.34 78 49.7 62 39.2 17 11.0 157 
                                                                                                                                                 Source: Author 
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CMS (Table 7.31) shows that actors perceive themselves as having perception of negative reactions 
towards the suitability of the regulations and guidelines to actors and disaster victims. Table 7.31 also shows 
that at the national and state level the actors had neutral perception with contribution of 51.9 per cent and 49.3 
per cent in percentage. Standard deviations show that there were few differences of perception regarding 
actors’ general F2 within groups of actors. The differences of opinion between actors’ general F2 of 
regulatory compliance were significant statistically for the independent variables level of control. 
 
Response to Items in Section B of Attitudinal Scale 
 
Influence of Items 10 and 13: Actors’ Perception of the ‘Rights’ of Disaster Victims’ Needs to be Educated 
Together in the Disaster Environment 
Multivariate tests showed that there were statistically significant differences between the background 
characteristics of Professional Status {Wλ = 0.96, F (8, 814) = 1.98, p< 0.05} for the dependent variable Q10 
and Q13. Univariate F-tests showed that there were significant difference between (Q10), {F (4, 408) = 3.83, 
p< 0.05} mean refers to actors Professional Status. But, there were no significant difference between Q13, {F 
(4, 408) = 0.28, p> 0.05} mean refers to Professional Status.  
 Tukey HSD in Post-hoc tests for Q10 shows that significance differences occur between pair group 
of (1) Chairman and Manager, (2) Chairman and Technical, (3) Chairman and Clerical, and (4) Chairman and 
Officer. 
 
Table 7.32: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Scores for Item 10 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
Q10 attitude 2.00 ± 0.33 301 72.9 89 21.5 23 33.3 413 
Chairman 2.44 ± 0.44 6 66.7 0 0.0 3 33.3 9 
Manager 2.00 ± 0.30 40 67.8 15 25.4 4 6.8 59 
Technical 1.93 ± 0.37 77 75.0 22 21.6 3 2.9 102 
Clerical 1.93 ± 0.37 83 76.1 21 19.2 5 4.6 109 
Officer 2.07 ± 0.37 95 71.0 31 23.1 8 5.9 134 
                                                                                                                                                 Source: Author 
 
CMS (Table 7.32) shows that actors perceive themselves as having low (negative) of acceptance that 
victim has the rights to regulatory compliance. Only 33.3 per cent of actors have a high (positive) perception 
of acceptance, with 21.5 per cent undecided. Chairman was the only group had high attitude to accept that 
disaster victims has the rights in regulatory compliance with 33.3 per cent positive contribution. Standard 
deviations show that there were few differences of perception regarding actors’ general attitudes within 
groups of actors. There was statistically difference between actors’ perception of actors admitted that disaster 
victims had the rights for the independent variables of Professional Status. Statistically significant differences 
of perception also occur between actors with all Groups (Chairman, Manager, Technical, Clerical and 
Officer).  
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Table 7.33: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Scores for Item 13 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
Q13 attitude 2.86 ± 0.39 181 43.8 86 20.8 146 35.4 413 
Chairman 2.89 ± 0.33 5 55.6 1 11.1 3 33.3 9 
Manager 2.97 ± 0.31 26 44.1 11 18.6 22 37.3 59 
Technical 2.68 ± 0.38 49 48.0 20 19.6 33 32.4 102 
Clerical 2.87 ± 0.31 47 43.1 25 22.9 37 33.9 109 
Officer 2.96 ± 0.30 54 40.3 29 21.6 51 38.1 134 
                                                                                                                                                  Source: Author 
 
CMS (Table 7.33) shows that actors perceive themselves as having neutral attitudes towards the 
issue of that the MNSC Directive 20 is right in giving special attention to the victim needs regulatory 
compliance. Contradiction between three types of attitudes that was considered as negative (43.8 per cent), 
neutral (20.8 per cent) and positive (35.4 per cent) attitudes resulted the overall attitudes as neutral (CMS 
2.86). Standard deviations show that there were few differences of perception regarding actors’ general 
attitudes within groups of actors. There was no statistically difference between actors’ perception of actors 
admitted that the MNSC Directive 20 is right in giving special attention to the victim needs regulatory 
compliance for the independent variables of Professional Status.  
 
Influence of Item 11, 12, 29 and 30: Actors Feeling towards Regulatory Compliance Need into Disaster 
Victims’ Participatory 
Multivariate tests showed that there were statistically significant differences between the background 
characteristics of Professional Status {Wλ = 0.89, F (16, 1237) = 2.82, p< 0.05} for the dependent variable 
Q11, Q12, Q29, and Q30. Univariate F-tests showed that there were statistically significant relationship 
between the background characteristics of Professional Status for the dependent variable Q11, {F (4, 408) = 
6.69, p< 0.05} and Q30, {F (4, 408) = 3.58, p< 0.05}. But, Univariate F-tests showed that there were no 
statistically significant relationship between the background characteristics of Professional Status for the 
dependent variable Q12, {F (4, 408) = 0.32, p> 0.05} and Q29, {F (4, 408) = 0.29, p> 0.05}. 
 Tukey HSD in Post-hoc tests for Q11 and Q30 shows that significance differences occur between 
pair group of (1) Chairman and Manager, (2) Chairman and Technical, (3) Chairman and Clerical, and (4) 
Chairman and Officer. 
 
Table 7.34: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Scores for Item 11 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
Q11 attitude 1.94 ± 0.21 323 78.2 73 17.7 17 4.1 413 
Chairman 2.67 ± 0.73 5 55.6 1 11.1 3 33.3 9 
Manager 2.12 ± 0.28 43 72.9 11 18.6 5 8.5 59 
Technical 1.90 ± 0.34 84 82.4 17 16.7 1 1.0 102 
Clerical 1.83 ± 0.31 89 81.7 17 11.6 3 2.8 109 
Officer 1.93 ± 0.31 102 76.1 27 20.1 5 3.7 134 
                                                                                                                                                 Source: Author 
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CMS (Table 7.34) shows that actors perceive themselves as having low (negative) of acceptance that 
victim and actors should be working together. Only 4.1 per cent of actors have a high (positive) perception of 
acceptance, with 17.7 per cent undecided. Chairman was the only group had high attitude to accept that victim 
and actors should be working together with 33.3 per cent positive contribution. Standard deviations show that 
there were few differences of perception regarding actors’ general attitudes within groups of actors. There 
was statistically difference between actors’ perception of actors admitted that victim and actors should be 
working together for the independent variables of Professional Status. Statistically significant differences of 
perception also occur between actors with all groups (Chairman, Manager, Technical, Clerical and Officer).  
 
Table 7.35: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Scores for Item 12 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
Q12 attitude 2.10 ± 0.35 284 68.8 97 23.5 32 7.7 413 
Chairman 2.22 ± 0.35 7 77.8 0 0.0 2 22.2 9 
Manager 2.07 ± 0.33 39 66.1 17 28.8 3 5.1 59 
Technical 2.13 ± 0.33 71 70.0 22 21.6 9 8.8 102 
Clerical 2.07 ± 0.33 78 71.6 24 22.0 7 6.4 109 
officer 2.10 ± 0.30 89 66.4 34 25.4 11 8.2 134 
                                                                                                                                                 Source: Author 
 
CMS (Table 7.35) shows that actors perceive themselves as having low (negative) of acceptance that 
victim can not best be served through separate entity without actors. Only 7.7 per cent of actors have a high 
(positive) perception of acceptance, with 23.5 per cent undecided. Chairman was the only group had high 
attitude to accept that victim can not best be served through separate entity without actors with 22.2 per cent 
positive contribution. Standard deviations show that there were few differences of perception regarding 
actors’ general attitudes within groups of actors. There was no statistically difference between actors’ 
perception of actors admitted that victim can not best be served through separate entity without actors for the 
independent variables of Professional Status.  
 
Table 7.36: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Scores for Item 29 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
Q29 attitude 2.71 ± 0.34 186 45.0 124 30.0 103 24.9 413 
Chairman 3.22 ± 0.51 3 33.3 3 33.3 3 33.3 9 
Manager 2.66 ± 0.35 29 49.2 15 25.4 15 25.4 59 
Technical 2.65 ± 0.26 34 33.3 20 19.6 68 66.7 102 
Clerical 2.70 ± 0.31 49 44.9 32 29.4 28 25.7 109 
Officer 2.76 ± 0.35 40 29.8 37 27.6 57 42.6 134 
                                                                                                                                                  Source: Author 
 
CMS (Table 7.36) shows that actors perceive themselves as having neutral attitudes towards the 
matter to educate disaster victims should not be left to specialist in disaster recovery or psychologist. 
Contradiction between three types of attitudes that was considered as negative (45.0 per cent), neutral (30.0 
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per cent) and positive (24.9 per cent) attitudes resulted the overall attitudes as neutral (CMS 2.71). Standard 
deviations show that there were few differences of perception regarding actors’ general attitudes within 
groups of actors. There was no statistically difference between actors’ perception of actors admitted that the 
matter to educate disaster victims should not be left to specialist in disaster recovery or psychologist for the 
independent variables of Professional Status.  
 
Table 7.37: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Scores for Item 30 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
Q30 attitude 2.21 ± 0.32 265 64.2 122 29.5 26 6.3 413 
Chairman 2.56 ± 0.35 6 66.7 0 0.0 3 33.3 9 
Manager 2.10 ± 0.31 39 66.1 17 28.8 3 5.1 59 
Technical 2.15 ± 0.35 68 66.7 27 26.5 7 6.9 102 
Clerical 2.19 ± 0.32 71 65.1 35 32.1 3 2.8 109 
Officer 2.28 ± 0.37 81 60.4 43 32.1 10 7.5 134 
                                                                                                                                                 Source: Author 
 
CMS (Table 7.37) shows that actors perceive themselves as having low (negative) of acceptance that 
actors have a responsibility for the education of victim in the process of regulatory compliance. Only 6.3 per 
cent of actors have a high (positive) perception of acceptance, with 29.5 per cent undecided. Chairman was 
the only group had high attitude to accept that actors have a responsibility for the education of victim in the 
process of regulatory compliance with 33.3 per cent positive contribution. Standard deviations show that there 
were few differences of perception regarding actors’ general attitudes within groups of actors. There was 
statistically difference between actors’ perception of actors admitted that actors have a responsibility for the 
education of victim in the process of regulatory compliance for the independent variables of Professional 
Status. Statistically significant differences of perception also occur between actors with all groups (Chairman, 
Manager, Technical, Clerical and Officer).  
 
Influence of Item 14: Perceived Effect to Disaster Victims’ Development as the Result of Regulatory 
Compliance 
There were no statistically (one way ANOVA) significant differences between the background characteristics 
of professional status {F (4, 408) = .081, p> 0.05} for the dependent variable Q14. 
 
Table 7.38: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Scores for item 14 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
Q14 attitude 2.02 ± 0.36 296 71.7 103 24.9 14 3.4 413 
Chairman 2.67 ± 0.65 5 66.7 1 11.1 3 33.3 9 
Manager 1.97 ± 0.25 42 71.2 16 27.1 1 1.7 59 
Technical 1.97 ± 0.35 79 77.5 19 18.6 4 3.9 102 
Clerical 1.77 ± 0.34 77 70.6 29 26.6 3 2.7 109 
Officer 2.06 ± 0.34 93 69.4 38 28.4 3 2.2 134 
                                                                                                                                                  Source: Author 
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CMS (Table 7.38) shows that actors perceive themselves as having low (negative) of acceptance that 
exposure to victim will encourage actors to be more caring feelings. Only 7.7 per cent of actors have a high 
(positive) perception of acceptance, with 23.5 per cent undecided. Chairman was the only group had high 
attitude to accept that exposure to victim will encourage actors to be more caring feelings with 33.3 per cent 
positive contribution. Standard deviations show that there were few differences of perception regarding 
actors’ general attitudes within groups of actors. There was no statistically difference between actors’ 
perception of actors admitted that exposure to victim will encourage actors to be more caring feelings for the 
independent variables of Professional Status.  
 
Influence of Item 15, 16, 17, 23, 24 and 25: Actors Perceived Suitability of Disaster Victims’ to be Included 
into the Process of Regulatory Compliance 
Multivariate tests showed that there were no statistically significant relationship between the background 
characteristics of Professional Status {Wλ = 0.89, F (24, 1407) = 0.59, p> 0.05} for the dependent variable 
Q15, Q16, Q17, 23, 24 and Q25. Univariate F-tests showed that there were no statistically significant 
relationship between the background characteristics of Professional Status for the dependent variable Q15, {F 
(4, 408) = 1.06, p> 0.05} Q16, {F (4, 408) = 0.38, p> 0.05}, Q17, {F (4, 408) = 0.21, p> 0.05}, Q23, {F (4, 
408) = 0.65, p> 0.05}, Q24, {F (4, 408) = 0.142, p> 0.05} and Q25, {F (4, 408) = 0.59, p> 0.05}. 
 
Table 7.39: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Scores for Item 15 
  Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
Q15 attitude 2.73 ± 0.37 177 42.9 138 33.4 98 23.7 413 
Chairman 3.33 ± 0.60 3 33.3 3 33.3 3 33.3 9 
Manager 2.66 ± 0.27 27 45.8 20 33.9 12 20.3 59 
Technical 2.63 ± 0.30 47 46.0 32 31.4 23 22.5 102 
Clerical 2.77 ± 0.24 41 37.6 42 38.5 26 23.9 109 
Officer 2.78 ± 0.35 59 44.0 41 30.6 34 25.4 134 
                                                                                                                                                 Source: Author 
 
CMS (Table 7.39) shows that actors perceive themselves as having neutral attitudes towards the 
matter that it is appropriate to fully include victim in making decision towards regulatory compliance. 
Contradiction between three types of attitudes that was considered as negative (42.9 per cent), neutral (33.4 
per cent) and positive (23.7 per cent) attitudes contributed to the overall attitudes as neutral (CMS 2.73). 
Standard deviations show that there were few differences of perception regarding actors’ general attitudes 
within groups of actors. There was no statistically difference between actors’ perception of actors admitted 
that it is appropriate to fully include victim in making decision towards regulatory compliance for the 
independent variables of Professional Status.  
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Table 7.40: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Scores for Item 16 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
Q16 attitude 2.69 ± 0.30 188 45.5 121 29.3 104 25.2 413 
Chairman 3.00 ± 0.31 6 66.7 0 0.0 3 33.3 9 
Manager 2.64 ± 0.35 26 44.1 20 33.9 13 22.0 59 
Technical 2.67 ± 0.32 48 47.1 29 28.4 25 24.5 102 
Clerical 2.64 ± 0.35 54 49.5 28 25.7 27 24.8 109 
Officer 2.76 ± 0.37 54 40.3 44 32.8 36 26.9 134 
                                                                                                                                                 Source: Author 
 
CMS (Table 7.40) shows that actors perceive themselves as having neutral attitudes towards the 
matter that victim without knowledge about regulation should be involved in regulatory compliance decision. 
Contradiction between three types of attitudes that was considered as negative (45.5 per cent), neutral (29.3 
per cent) and positive (25.2 per cent) attitudes contributed to the overall attitudes as neutral (CMS 2.69). 
Standard deviations show that there were few differences of perception regarding actors’ general attitudes 
within groups of actors. There was no statistically difference between actors’ perception of actors admitted 
that victim without knowledge about regulation should be involved in regulatory compliance decision for the 
independent variables of Professional Status.  
 
Table 7.41: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Scores for Item 17 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
Q17 attitude 2.69 ± 0.37 196 47.5 109 26.4 108 26.2 413 
Chairman 2.89 ± 0.20 6 66.7 0 0.0 3 33.3 9 
Manager 2.73 ± 0.34 26 44.1 18 30.5 15 25.4 59 
Technical 2.67 ± 0.32 48 47.1 30 29.4 24 23.5 102 
Clerical 2.63 ± 0.36 55 50.5 26 23.9 28 25.7 109 
Officer 2.73 ± 0.24 61 45.5 35 26.1 38 28.4 134 
                                                                                                                                                  Source: Author 
 
CMS (Table 7.41) shows that actors perceive themselves as having neutral attitudes towards the 
matter that victim with experience but without knowledge should also be involved in regulatory compliance. 
Contradiction between three types of attitudes that was considered as negative (47.5 per cent), neutral (26.4 
per cent) and positive (26.2 per cent) attitudes resulted the overall attitudes as neutral (CMS 2.69). Standard 
deviations show that there were few differences of perception regarding actors’ general attitudes within 
groups of actors. There was no statistically difference between actors’ perception of actors admitted that 
victim with experience but without knowledge should also be involved in regulatory compliance for the 
independent variables of Professional Status.  
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Table 7.42: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Scores for Item 23 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
Q23 attitude 2.54 ± 0.30 206 49.8 142 34.4 65 15.7 413 
Chairman 2.78 ± 0.34 5 55.6 1 11.1 3 33.3 9 
Manager 2.61 ± 0.27 25 42.4 23 38.9 11 18.6 59 
Technical 2.46 ± 0.28 55 53.9 35 34.3 12 11.8 102 
Clerical 2.47 ± 0.27 57 52.3 38 34.9 14 12.8 109 
Officer 2.60 ± 0.26 64 47.8 45 33.6 25 18.7 134 
                                                                                                                                                  Source: Author 
 
CMS (Table 7.42) shows that actors perceive themselves as having low (negative) of acceptance that 
the behaviours of victim would not make regulatory compliance impractical. Only 15.7 per cent of actors 
have a high (positive) perception of acceptance, with 34.4 per cent undecided. Chairman was the only group 
had high attitude to accept that the behaviours of victim would not make regulatory compliance impractical 
with 33.3 per cent positive contribution. Standard deviations show that there were few differences of 
perception regarding actors’ general attitudes within groups of actors. There was no statistically difference 
between actors’ perception of actors admitted that the behaviours of victim would not make regulatory 
compliance impractical for the independent variables of Professional Status.  
 
Table 7.43: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Scores for Item 24 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
Q24 attitude 2.76 ± 0.23 179 43.3 126 30.5 108 26.2 413 
Chairman 2.78 ± 0.32 6 66.7 0 0.0 3 33.3 9 
Manager 2.80 ± 0.24 23 38.9 19 32.2 17 28.8 59 
Technical 2.79 ± 0.33 42 41.2 32 31.4 28 27.5 102 
Clerical 2.70 ± 0.26 48 44.0 39 35.8 22 20.2 102 
officer 2.78 ± 0.32 60 44.8 36 26.9 38 28.4 134 
                                                                                                                                                  Source: Author 
 
CMS (Table 7.43) shows that actors perceive themselves as having neutral attitudes towards the 
matter that victim would be able to move easily to adapt as a group in the process of regulatory compliance. 
Contradiction between three types of attitudes that was considered as negative (43.3 per cent), neutral (30.5 
per cent) and positive (26.2 per cent) attitudes resulted the overall attitudes as neutral (CMS 2.76). Standard 
deviations show that there were few differences of perception regarding actors’ general attitudes within 
groups of actors. There was no statistically difference between actors’ perception of actors admitted that 
victim would be able to move easily to adapt as a group in the process of regulatory compliance for the 
independent variables of Professional Status.  
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Table 7.44: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Scores for Item 25 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
Q25 attitude 2.82 ± 0.25 152 36.8 160 38.7 101 24.4 413 
Chairman 2.78 ± 0.34 5 55.6 2 22.2 2 22.2 9 
Manager 2.81 ± 0.31 23 38.9 21 35.6 15 25.4 59 
Technical 2.80 ± 0.32 32 31.4 49 48.0 21 20.6 102 
Clerical 2.72 ± 0.30 45 41.3 41 37.6 23 21.1 109 
Officer 2.92 ± 0.30 47 35.1 47 35.1 40 29.9 134 
                                                                                                                                                  Source: Author 
 
CMS (Table 7.44) shows that actors perceive themselves as having neutral attitudes towards the 
matter that the communication difficulties between victim and actors would not create confusion in regulatory 
compliance. Contradiction between three types of attitudes that was considered as negative (36.8 per cent), 
neutral (38.7 per cent) and positive (24.4 per cent) attitudes resulted the overall attitudes as neutral (CMS 
2.82). Standard deviations show that there were few differences of perception regarding actors’ general 
attitudes within groups of actors. There was no statistically difference between actors’ perception of actors 
admitted that the communication difficulties between victim and actors would not create confusion in 
regulatory compliance for the independent variables of Professional Status.  
 
Influence of Item 22: Actors’ Perceived Increases in the Amount of Responsibility If Regulatory Compliance 
Implemented in Malaysia Disaster Management Programme 
There were statistically (one way ANOVA) significant differences between the background characteristics of 
Professional Status F (4, 408) = 2.76, p< 0.05} for the dependent variable Q22. 
 
Table 7.45: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Scores for Item 22 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
Q22 attitude 2.24 ± 0.31 265 64.2 103 24.9 45 10.9 413 
Chairman 2.56 ± 0.32 6 66.7 0 0.0 3 33.3 9 
Manager 2.08 ± 0.36 39 66.1 17 28.8 3 5.1 59 
Technical 2.30 ± 0.26 65 63.7 21 20.6 16 16.7 102 
Clerical 2.25 ± 0.31 71 65.1 25 22.9 13 11.9 109 
Officer 2.25 ± 0.31 84 62.7 40 29.9 10 7.5 134 
                                                                                                                                                  Source: Author 
 
CMS (Table 7.45) shows that actors perceive themselves as having low (negative) attitudes about 
regulatory compliance would not increase actors’ workloads. Only 10.9 per cent of actors have a high 
(positive) perception of their capability, with 24.9 per cent undecided. Chairman was the only group had high 
confidence that regulatory compliance would not increase actors’ workloads with 33.3 per cent positive 
contribution. Standard deviations show that there were few differences of perception regarding actors’ general 
attitudes within groups of actors. There was statistically difference between actors’ perception of actors that 
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regulatory compliance would not increase actors’ workloads for the independent variables of Professional 
Status.  
 
Influence of Item 26, 27 and 28: Actors’ Perceived Suitable of the Current Malaysia Disaster Management 
Programme towards Regulatory Compliance 
Multivariate tests showed that there were no statistically significant relationship between the background 
characteristics of Professional Status {Wλ = 0.98, F (12, 1074) = 0.65, p> 0.05} for the dependent variable 
Q26, Q27 and Q28. Univariate F-tests showed that there were no statistically significant relationship between 
the background characteristics of Professional Status for the dependent variable Q26, {F (4, 408) = 0.52, p> 
0.05}, Q27, {F (4, 408) = 0.79, p> 0.05} and Q28, {F (4, 408) = 0.49, p> 0.05}. 
 
Table 7.46: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Scores for Item 26 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
Q26 attitude 2.37 ± 0.38 173 41.9 187 45.3 53 12.8 413 
Chairman 2.44 ± 0.37 4 44.4 2 22.2 3 33.3 9 
Manager 2.53 ± 0.36 21 35.6 28 47.5 10 16.9 59 
Technical 2.31 ± 0.36 43 42.2 50 49.0 9 8.8 102 
Clerical 2.29 ± 0.38 50 45.9 45 41.3 14 12.8 109 
Officer 2.39 ± 0.32 55 41.0 62 46.3 17 12.7 134 
                                                                                                                                                  Source: Author 
 
CMS (Table 7.46) shows that actors perceive themselves as having low (negative) of acceptance that 
victim would be able to cope with emergency housings’ regulation. Only 12.8 per cent of actors have a high 
(positive) perception of acceptance. Even though undecided with attitudes contributed 45.3 per cent; it was 
still not affected overall attitudes. Chairman was the only group had high attitude to accept that victim would 
be able to cope with emergency housings’ regulation with 33.3 per cent positive contribution. Standard 
deviations show that there were few differences of perception regarding actors’ general attitudes within 
groups of actors. There was no statistically difference between actors’ perception of actors admitted that 
victim would be able to cope with emergency housings’ regulation for the independent variables of 
Professional Status.  
 
Table 7.47: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Scores for Item 27 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
Q27 attitude 2.37 ± 0.30 173 41.9 191 46.2 49 11.9 413 
Chairman 2.56 ± 0.39 5 55.6 1 11.1 3 33.3 9 
Manager 2.56 ± 0.29 20 33.9 31 52.5 8 13.6 59 
Technical 2.26 ± 0.31 46 45.1 45 44.1 11 10.8 102 
Clerical 2.35 ± 0.32 45 41.3 53 48.6 11 10.1 109 
Officer 2.37 ± 0.30 57 42.5 61 45.5 16 11.9 134 
                                                                                                                                                  Source: Author 
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CMS (Table 7.47) shows that actors perceive themselves as having low (negative) of acceptance that 
victim would be able to cope with all actors’ behaviour in the process of regulatory compliance. Only 11.9 per 
cent of actors have a high (positive) perception of acceptance. Even though undecided with attitudes 
contributed 46.2 per cent; it was still not affected overall attitudes. Chairman was the only group had high 
attitude to accept that victim would be able to cope with all actors’ behaviour in the process of regulatory 
compliance with 33.3 per cent positive contribution. Standard deviations show that there were few differences 
of perception regarding actors’ general attitudes within groups of actors. There was no statistically difference 
between actors’ perception of actors admitted that victim would be able to cope with all actors’ behaviour in 
the process of regulatory compliance for the independent variables of Professional Status.  
 
Table 7.48: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Scores for Item 28 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
Q28 attitude 2.33 ± 0.30 171 41.4 190 46.0 52 12.6 413 
Chairman 2.56 ± 0.33 5 55.6 1 11.1 3 33.3 9 
Manager 2.19 ± 0.34 27 45.8 28 47.5 4 6.8 59 
Technical 2.33 ± 0.30 41 40.2 48 47.1 4 6.8 102 
Clerical 2.29 ± 0.34 47 43.1 49 44.9 13 11.9 109 
Officer 2.40 ± 0.27 51 38.1 64 47.8 19 14.2 134 
                                                                                                                                                  Source: Author 
 
CMS (Table 7.48) shows that actors perceive themselves as having low (negative) of acceptance that 
victim would be able to cope with the entire disaster environment in the process of regulatory compliance. 
Only 12.6 per cent of actors have a high (positive) perception of acceptance. Even though undecided with 
attitudes contributed 46.0 per cent; it was still not affected overall attitudes. Chairman was the only group had 
high attitude to accept that victim would be able to cope with the entire disaster environment in the process of 
regulatory compliance with 33.3 per cent positive contribution. Standard deviations show that there were few 
differences of perception regarding actors’ general attitudes within groups of actors. There was no statistically 
difference between actors’ perception of actors admitted that victim would be able to cope with the entire 
disaster environment in the process of regulatory compliance for the independent variables of Professional 
Status.  
 
c. Conative Component 
 
Influence of Actors’ Background Characteristics (independent variables) on the Conative Components of 
Attitudes (dependent variables) to Regulatory Compliance 
The result of statistical tests (one way ANOVA) shows that there were significant differences in the 
perception of actors’ general cognitive component for the independent variable of (1) Gender {F(1, 411) = 
10.61, p< 0.05), (2) Professional Status {F (4, 408) = 4.02, p< 0.05), and (3) Attended In-service Courses 
{F(4, 408) = 4.25, p< 0.05). 
 Tukey HSD in Post-hoc tests for general conative attitude shows that significance differences occur 
between pair group of (1) Chairman and Manager, (2) Chairman and Technical, (3) Chairman and Clerical, 
and (4) Chairman and Officer. 
 The result of statistical tests (one way ANOVA) shows that there was no significant differences in 
the perception of actors’ general cognitive component for the independent variable of Number of years 
Working (1) Number of Years Working, F (4, 408) = 1.98, p> 0.05), (2) Level of Control, F (2, 410) = 2.56, 
p> 0.05), and (3) Availability of Trained Actors, F(1, 411) = 0.45, p> 0.05), (4) Actors to look after 
Regulatory Compliance F(1, 411) = 0.88, p> 0.05), (5) Department Related to the Scene of Emergency 
Housing F(1, 411) = 0.001, p> 0.05, and (6) Department has Specific Regulation towards Regulatory 
Compliance F(1, 411) = 2.26, p> 0.05. 
 
389 
 
Table 7.49: CMS, Frequency and Percentage Scores of General Conative Component of Attitude to 
Regulatory Compliance of Actors’ Background Characteristics 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
General conative attitude 2.70 ± 0.29 145 35.1 156 37.9 112 27.0 413 
a. Gender 
Male 2.71 ± 0.32 103 35.3 106 36.4 82 28.3 291 
female 2.69 ± 0.35 42.2 34.6 51 41.4 29 23.9 122 
b. Number of Years Working 
Under 5 2.80 ± 0.31 26 31.7 31 37.9 25 30.5 81 
6 to 10 2.66 ± 0.34 39 36.8 40 37.5 27 25.7 106 
11 to 15 2.72 ± 0.33 22 35.3 22 36.4 17 28.2 61 
16 to 20 2.62 ± 0.31 31 38.8 29 35.7 21 25.5 81 
More than 20 2.73 ± 0.30 27 32.5 35 41.5 22 25.9 84 
c. Professional Status 
Chairman 2.97 ± 0.20 3 37.0 2 21.0 4 42.0 9 
Manager 2.67 ± 0.24 21 36.2 21 36.3 16 27.5 59 
Technical 2.67 ± 0.28 37 36.4 38 37.6 27 26.0 102 
Clerical 2.68 ± 0.33 39 36.0 41 37.8 29 26.2 109 
Officer 2.75 ± 0.29 44 32.8 54 40.0 36 27.2 134 
d. Level of Control 
National 2.73 ± 0.35 19 36.0 20 37.2 14 26.7 54 
State 2.75 ± 0.31 69 34.1 74 36.5 59 29.4 202 
District 2.64 ± 0.33 57 36.1 63 39.9 38 23.9 157 
e. Attended In-service Courses 
Yes 2.79 ± 0.31 53 31.4 67 39.6 49 28.9 169 
No 2.65 ± 0.35 92 37.7 89 36.7 63 25.7 244 
f. Availability of Trained Actors 
Yes 2.78 ± 0.31 56 31.9 67 38.4 51 29.6 174 
No 2.65 ± 0.35 89 37.34 90 37.5 27 11.1 239 
g. Actors to look after Regulatory Compliance 
Yes 2.77 ± 0.33 57 32.6 68 38.7 50.3 28.8 175 
No 2.66 ± 0.33 88 36.9 89 37.3 61 25.7 238 
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Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
h. Department Related to the Scene of Emergency Housing 
Yes 2.80 ± 0.36 55 31.8 65 37.9 52 30.4 172 
No 2.64 ± 0.30 90 37.5 91 37.9 59 24.6 142 
i. Department has Specific Regulation towards Regulatory Compliance 
Yes 2.68 ± 0.29 52 37.2 50 36.4 37 26.5 139 
No 2.72 ± 0.37 93 34.1 106 38.6 75 27.3 274 
   Source: Author 
 
CMS (Table 7.49) shows that actors perceive themselves as having perception of neutral (37.9 per 
cent) behavioural response of attitudes in regulatory compliance. The difference from neutral and negative 
were not very obvious because negative perception contributed 35.1 per cent from overall attitudes. 27.0 per 
cent of actors have a high (positive) perception of their behavioural response of attitudes. There was 
statistically difference between actors’ perception of affective attitude for the independent variables (1) 
Gender, (2) Professional Status, and (3) Attended In-service Courses. CMS (Table 7.49) shows that actors 
perceive themselves as having perception of neutral (37.9 per cent) behavioural response of attitudes in 
regulatory compliance. The difference from neutral and negative were not very obvious because negative 
perception contributed 35.1 per cent from overall attitudes. 27.0 per cent of actors have a high (positive) 
perception of their behavioural response of attitudes. Standard deviations show that there were few 
differences of perception regarding actors’ general conative component within groups of actors.  
There was no statistically difference between actors’ perception of cognitive attitudes for the 
independent variables of (1) Number of Years Working, (2) Level of Control, and (3) Availability of Trained 
Actors, (4) Actors to look after Regulatory Compliance, (5) Department Related to the Scene of Emergency 
Housing, and (6) Department has Specific Regulation towards Regulatory Compliance. 
 
Influence of Actors’ Background Characteristics (independent variables) on (1) Actors to Look After 
Regulatory Compliance, (2) Department Related to the Scene of Emergency Housing, and (3) Department has 
Specific Regulation towards Regulatory Compliance, on Q31 and Q33 
Multivariate tests showed that there were no statistically significant main effects for the independent 
variables, (1) Actors to look after Regulatory Compliance {Wλ = 0.99, F(2, 410) = 0.99, p> 0.05}, (2) 
Department Related to the Scene of Emergency Housing {Wλ = 0.99, F(2, 410) = 1.90, p> 0.05} and (3) 
Department has Specific Regulation towards Regulatory Compliance {Wλ = 0.98, F(4, 410) = 2.25, p> 0.05} 
for the dependent variables Q31 and Q33. 
 
Table 7.50: CMS, Frequency, Percentage Scores for Q31 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
a. Actors to look after Regulatory Compliance 
Yes 2.85 ± 0.32 40 22.9 109 62.3 26 14.9 175 
No 2.81 ± 0.31 60 25.2 157 65.9 21 8.8 238 
b. Department Related to the Scene of Emergency Housing 
Yes 2.92 ± 0.30 35 20.3 106 61.6 31 18.0 172 
No 2.76 ± 0.36 65 26.9 160 66.4 16 6.6 241 
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Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
c: Department has Specific Regulation towards Regulatory Compliance 
Yes 2.78 ± 0.34 41 29.5 80 57.6 18 12.9 139 
No 2.85 ± 0.33 59 21.5 186 67.9 29 10.6 274 
    Source: Author 
 
CMS (Table 7.50) shows that actors for all groups of the three independent variables mentioned have 
generally a non-committal perception of actors were supportive of the idea of regulatory compliance. 
Statistical tests show that all three independent variable of (1) the Department that had Actors to look after 
Regulatory Compliance, (2) Department Related to the Scene of Emergency Housing, and (3) Department has 
Specific Regulation towards Regulatory Compliance had no significantly difference for the perception of 
actors were supportive of the idea of regulatory compliance.  
 
Table 7.51: CMS, Frequency, Percentage Scores for Q33 
Grouping/Frequency/Percentage/n 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  
n CMS f % f % f % 
a. Actors to look after Regulatory Compliance 
Yes 2.51 ± 0.32 78 44.6 54 30.9 43 24.6 175 
No 2.31 ± 0.38 121 50.8 81 34.0 36 15.1 238 
b: Department Related to the Scene of Emergency Housing 
Yes 2.58 ± 0.39 74 43.0 51 29.7 47 27.3 172 
No 2.26 ± 0.33 125 51.9 84 34.9 32 13.3 241 
c. Department has Specific Regulation towards Regulatory Compliance 
Yes 2.43 ± 0.34 68 48.9 42 30.2 29 20.9 139 
No 2.38 ± 0.31 131 47.8 93 33.9 50 18.2 274 
                                                                                                                                                  Source: Author 
 
CMS (Table 7.51) shows that actors for all groups of the three independent variables mentioned have 
generally a non-committal perception of actors will volunteer to attend relevant in-service training on 
regulatory compliance. Statistical tests show that all three independent variable of (1) the Department that had 
Actors to look after Regulatory Compliance, (2) Department Related to the Scene of Emergency Housing, and 
(3) Department has Specific Regulation towards Regulatory Compliance had no significantly difference for 
the perception actors will volunteer to attend relevant in-service training on regulatory compliance.  
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Appendix 23: Translated Quotation of the Interviews 
 
1.1 
Actors Perceived Knowledge of the Regulatory Compliance under the MNSC Directive 20 
Manager (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
“When I was posted to this department level, its regulatory compliance practice was already 
established. Ever since I arrived I have never received any circulars from the Prime Minister’s 
Department or other relevant authorities concerning regulatory compliance towards disaster victims 
under resilience difficulties”. 
 
Manager (under state level) 
“There were circulars from the Prime Minister’s Department when the department level was 
requested by the Prime Minister’s Department to the actors”. 
 
Technical Staff (under national level) 
“The problem is clerical staff are not interested in reading something they feel doesn't concern them 
or is not in their field of interest. But if they are interested, these documents could be found in 
department level files at the office”. 
 
Technical Staff (under national level) 
“The Prime Minister’s Department wants to introduce regulatory compliance but until now, as the 
actors in this department level had not been informed either verbally or in writing of what is 
expected of us in relation to the programme. I think it is about time someone from the Prime 
Minister’s Department came to the department level and explained to us what is going on”. 
 
Clerical Staff (under state level) 
“A few days ago the department level distributed questionnaires asking actors' opinions on the 
regulatory compliance and participation into disaster victims’ group. That's the first time I have 
read about it”. 
 
Clerical Staff (under state level) 
“I had briefly seen the documents before, but it was some time ago. I can't even remember what was 
in it now”. 
 
Clerical Staff (under national level) 
“I am not sure the department level has any circulars concerning the department level towards the 
MNSC Directive 20. It was never discussed before. Maybe because of I am not an emergency 
housing actor”. 
 
Manager (under state level)  
“Since being in this department level there are circulars on emergency housing, but it was meant for 
technical staff, so, I can't recall any”. 
 
1.1.1 
Prime Minister’s Department intention towards Regulatory Compliance 
a. Department (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
Manager 
“After the Highland Tower tragedy in the 90s the department level decided after consultation with 
our technical staff to straighten the regulations in developing new development even in providing 
emergency housing. Main regulation to be applied are Land Conservation Act, Environmental 
Quality Act 1974, Local Government Act 1976, Road, Drainage and Building Act and Occupational 
Safety and Health Act will definitely become the main reference”. 
 
Technical Staff  
“What we did was to placed selected regulation according to the resources available because of on 
the scene of disaster everything has to be done fast and unfortunately we have to put the regulation 
aside. For example we have to put many disaster victims in one hall and it is cramped. We have to 
wait for quit sometime until other resources arrived”. 
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Clerical Staff  
“The intension is good but the implementation for totally complied towards regulatory and 
guidelines is impossible”. 
 
b. Department (under national level) 
Clerical Staff 
“I did discuss with the department level housing coordinator on the possibility of this intension. We 
were all agreed and tried our best to achieve the objective. At this stage, we just wanted to make sure 
other department did the same way we did”.  
 
Technical Staff 
“There are too many disaster victims in the disaster victims’ group; therefore we could not cope 
with the varied behaviours of disaster victims. On paper we can try to comply but when it comes to 
face the disaster victims, it will go to the other way”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“We should think positive. I am confident that this is a good intention and can be done”. 
 
c. Department (under state level) 
Manager 
“At this department level, we never faced a big disaster until Tsunami strikes. We are implementing 
regulatory compliance. So, there was no problem to implement in the future”. 
 
d. Department (under district level) 
Manager 
“Under the MNSC Directive 20, rehabilitation and reconstruction is one of the main priorities. As 
enforcers, we are always ready to implement whatever circular or latest guidelines instructed by the 
federal”. 
 
1.2 
Actors’ Understanding of Regulatory Compliance in Malaysia 
Manager (Under national level) 
“Frankly speaking, I’m not sure if I wanted to refer to the term of regulatory compliance according 
to the MNSC requirement. As a trained officer of course we were familiar with this term as an 
organisation in any department and public agencies to ensure that personnel are aware of and take 
steps to comply with relevant laws and regulations”. 
 
Technical Staff (under national level) 
“As far as I’m concerned, the department should ensure and document that their activities are in 
compliance with all applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulations”. 
 
Technical Staff (under district level) 
“As an organisation we should ensure that all staff is appropriately credentialed for the functions 
they will be performing”. 
 
Officer (district level) 
“This department should be aware of, and comply with, any state or local requirements related to 
the provisions or regulations”.  
 
1.3 
Actors’ Understanding of Emergency Housing in Malaysia 
Technical Staff (under national level) that had tried direct contact with disaster victims 
“As far as I’m concerned, when the life of a person is at risk by a natural or non-ordinary situation, 
emergency housing is the fast build process when an emergency occurs”. 
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Manager (under national level) 
“Any structure of tent, trailer, mobile home, or other structure used for human shelter that is 
designed to be transportable that can move from one place to one another and that is not attached to 
the ground, to another structure, or to any utility system on the same premises for more than 30 
consecutive days”. 
 
Technical Staff (under district level) 
“If I’m not mistaken, emergency housing refers to a walled and roofed space or group of rooms 
located within a dwelling forming a single habitable unit with facilities used or intended to be used 
by a single family for living, sleeping, cooking, and eating”. 
 
Clerical Staff (under district level) 
“From the book here, emergency housing is a room or enclosed floor space used or intended to be 
used for living, sleeping, cooking or eating purposes, excluding bathrooms, laundries, furnace 
rooms, pantries, kitchenettes and utility rooms, foyers, or communicating corridors, stairways, 
closets, storage spaces, workshops, and hobby and recreation areas”.  
 
Technical Staff (under special body appointed by the government) 
“Any enclosed space wholly or partly used or intended to be used for living, sleeping, cooking, and 
eating”. 
 
1.3.1 
Actors’ Concepts of Disaster Victims under the MNSC Directive 20 
Manager (under national level) 
“Disaster victims under resilience difficulties after disaster strike”. 
 
Manager (under state level) 
“There is currently a move to include disaster victims under physical distractions as part of disaster 
victims under resilience difficulties. But we are still awaiting the decision of the Prime Minister’s 
Department”. 
 
Clerical Staff (under national level) 
“Disaster victims with adaptation problems in some specific areas to recover but not necessarily can 
not stand on their own”.  
 
Technical Staff (special body appointed by the government) 
“Disaster victims got problems in resilience difficulties under the supervision of local authorities 
under the MNSC guidelines”. 
 
1.4 
Department Level’s Discussions on Regulatory Compliance 
a. Department (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
Clerical Staff 
“When we planned to place disaster victims into disaster victims’ group, we and the manager invited 
other actors who agreed to have these disaster victims in their groups for discussions on how the 
programme should be implemented. Actors who were not involved in the MNSC Directive 20 did not 
take part in the discussions”. 
 
“There were discussions between several of us with the manager and technical staff on the 
participation of disaster victims into our groups formally and informally. We were involved in the 
programme”. 
 
“I never asked the manager about this programme”. 
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b. Department (under national level) 
Technical Staff 
“I had a policy of open-group. I invited actors to come over to my group whenever they feel like 
dropping in. When they come over (even not all of them) I try to tell them about the disaster victims 
in my group. I find this more effective because they can see the disaster victims for themselves if we 
make site visit, and when they see these disaster victims they tend to ask questions about them”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“I was told by technical staff that they intend to include these disaster victims into disaster victims’ 
group when they are ready”. 
 
“It never occurs to me to discuss the topic with either the manager or technical staff”. 
 
c. Department (under state level) 
Manager 
“The discussions were done informally between me, technical staff and Clerical staff involved in the 
handling of these disaster victims included in disaster victims’ group. There were no such 
discussions with other actors who were not involved in the programme of these disaster victims”. 
 
Technical Staff 
“I had talks with several actors on its possibilities (regulatory compliance), but none of them were 
interested. After that I just keep quiet”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“We never discussed about it before. Maybe the department level does not have a plan to include 
disaster victims into my group”. 
 
d. Department (under district level) 
Manager 
“We had never discussed the possible direct contact with disaster victims under resilience difficulties 
into this department level. But we did discuss on few occasions about a regulatory compliance for 
disaster victims established recently in one disaster department level nearby. Our discussions were 
on how to provide things that is not in regulations or guidelines that sometimes requested by the 
disaster victims. This is the opposite of what we are discussing now”. 
 
Officer 
“We don’t have any circular about this programme. So we don’t discuss it”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“What do we need to discuss it for?” 
 
e. Department (special body appointed by the government) 
Technical Staff 
“I did discuss the possibility of our disaster victims being included in disaster victims’ group with 
several actors. They told me if these disaster victims are included, they would still handle like they 
normally do as part of their daily job. They said that they should be accused of not doing their job 
properly if these disaster victims do not do well in their groups” 
 
“Maybe the department levels’ concerned about bureaucracy and handed over this matter to other 
relevant authorities. For me, I better keep it quite because what you did, didn’t mean all were right. 
We were not interested to talk about this. ” 
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1.4.1 
Actors’ Perceived Knowledge on Regulatory Compliance towards Disaster Victims under the MNSC 
Directive 20 
a. Department (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
Manager 
“During my informal discussions with actors in this department level, the majority of actors rarely 
used disaster victims as the topics of our discussions in their enquiries. Only a small minority of 
actors frequently discuss the welfare of disaster victims with me. They are either the department 
level technical staff or clerical staff”. 
 
Technical Staff 
“There are actors who know my group of disaster victims and there are also those who don't. Those 
who regularly visit our group during their working time are aware of the existence of our disaster 
victims, and usually are sensitive towards these disaster victims’ welfare. If anything happens to our 
disaster victims they will either help them or inform us about it. Actors who are not interested only 
know these disaster victims from a far”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“Not personally. But I did observe from a far. These disaster victims are difficult to control because 
of some of them were demanding”. 
 
b. Department (under national level) 
Clerical Staff 
“Formally I have not had a chance to actually get to know with these disaster victims. I had only 
seen their request in the department level report”. 
 
“Not all, only those who were placed in my group. Based on my experience, these disaster victims 
can adapt but they need a lot of attention”.  
 
“I regularly visit the disaster site, just to talk to the technical staff, and say hello to the group 
disaster victims. I don't know deeply their adaptation problems, but I do know that they are resilient 
difficulties compared to other disaster victims. Some of these disaster victims experienced some kind 
of behavioural problems as well”. 
 
c. Department (under state level) 
Clerical Staff 
“They don't know these disaster victims personally. Only at a distance, they don’t understand the 
term regulatory compliance and therefore are not interested in these disaster victims’ affairs”. 
 
“Maybe they know more about the disaster victims that are currently being included in disaster 
victims’ group. But they are not concerned about other disaster victims outside their group”. 
 
“Sorry. I don’t really know these disaster victims personally. I seldom visit the disaster site”. 
 
“I know these disaster victims quite well even though I had been posted to this department level for a 
month. This is because I am given the responsibilities to oversee their everyday resilience difficulties 
and welfare”. 
 
d. Department (under district level) 
Clerical Staff 
“We visited disaster site regularly until both side of actors and disaster victims satisfied with the 
works. Of course we know disaster victims very well especially their leaders in my group that I in 
charge”. 
 
Technical Staff 
“Our contact with the disaster victims is very limited because we had to limit our relationship as 
actors and disaster victims. Not more than that. That was why our knowledge about them very little”. 
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e. Department (special body appointed by the government) 
Manager 
“I am not sure about this because compliance is subjective and no instrument yet to measure. Till 
now the only way to know about it if there is any complaint about the project carried out”. 
 
Technical Staff 
“They just see these disaster victims from the other side. They treat their duties as responsibilities 
and not charities or whatsoever”. 
 
“Most of the disaster victims’ channel any demands through their leaders. So, most of us know their 
leaders better than other disaster victims”. 
 
1.5 
Actors perceived rationale of the Prime Minister’s Department Plan 
Technical Staff (under national staff) 
“Regulatory compliance if properly implemented could have a positive effect to disaster victims 
under resilience difficulties. Sadly as far as I can remember no one on behalf of the Prime Minister’s 
Department has come to this department level to explain to all our actors the rationale and the 
importance of its implementation and so on. You can't expect actors to simply accept something that 
they don't understand or implement a new concept of compliance that they know very little about. 
Presently regulatory compliance is being planned by the top administration of the Prime Minister’s 
Department, but we the actors in the department level have no clue to what it is all about or what is 
expected of us with reference to the programme”. 
 
Manager (under state level) 
“Actors are not given much information on regulatory compliance by the relevant authorities. We, at 
the department level’s administrators seldom discussed with actors about it”. 
 
Technical Staff (under state level) 
“As far as I know, as long as actors are not involved in the regulatory compliance of disaster 
victims, and they don't have any relatives who are considered as disaster victims, they won't make 
any effort to find out about this regulatory compliance. Never mind regulatory compliance”. 
 
Technical Staff (special body appointed by the government) 
“I don’t think they (actors) know. When I was working in this department level, the concept of 
regulatory compliance never crossed my mind according to the MNSC Directive 20. What's more, 
regulatory compliance”? 
 
Officer 
“There were no circulars sent to the department level as far as I know on this regulatory compliance 
programme. Therefore I can only assume that actors in this department level do not know much 
about the Prime Minister’s Department reasons for wanting to introduce regulatory compliance”. 
 
Suggestion of Possible Reasons of Regulatory Compliance  
Clerical Staff (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims  
“As can be seen from the current situation in this department level, when we have separate groups 
for disaster victims and actors, there might appear differences between these disaster victims in 
many aspects. The caring feeling between these two sides in disaster victims’ group doesn't seem to 
exist. They seem separated and distant. Actors tend to take it for granted when it is time to handle 
disaster victims whenever they transfer them in the department level responsibility”. 
 
Clerical Staff (under national level) 
“They have to learn to live in disaster society eventually. So they might as well learn to mix with 
actors now”. 
 
“Maybe the Prime Minister’s Department does not want to separate these disaster victims because 
in regulatory compliance they have to mix with their own kind plus involvement from the actors. 
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When included in disaster victims’ group, their abilities to survive perhaps develop better because 
they are sharing and exchanging in formations”. 
 
“The Prime Minister’s Department wanted these disaster victims to receive the same types of 
regulatory compliance as other disaster victims in other place, so that these disaster victims will feel 
that they are treated the same”. 
 
Clerical Staff (under state level) 
“Disaster victims under resilience difficulties have very low confidence. By including them in 
disaster victims’ group, maybe the Prime Minister’s Department hope they would feel less inferior, 
and not being embarrassed about their resilience difficulties. It could be that they could learn much 
better when mixed with actors”. 
 
Clerical Staff in Disaster Department Level (district) 
“To develop understanding in disaster victims’ group the importance of rules and regulations in 
order to built a new better community”. 
 
1.6 
Perceived Abilities of Actors towards Regulatory Compliance under the MNSC Directive 20 
a. Department (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
Manager 
“I think actors are able to comply with any regulations in order for them to deliver any housing to 
the disaster victims. Even though it is hard to comply totally, at least it can please the disaster 
victims. Therefore I don’t have any hesitation in my colleagues” 
 
Technical Staff 
“It is our responsibilities to stick to the regulations in emergency housing. Sadly I had no training in 
emergency housing or experiences in handling these disaster victims prior to that. I had to learn 
from scratch on how to handle these disaster victims and try to comply with all regulations. I used 
my previous experience of having handled disaster victims to adapt myself to the new situation. I 
think I have been quite successful, but if we are trained in emergency housing, that's even better”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“I think I can, but it would be better if I had the proper training”. 
 
“I am not sure whether I can comply with all the regulations and guidelines. I have no patience to 
handle so many things in one time. I meant regulations requirement plus the pressure from disaster 
victims”. 
 
“I don't think I have the capability to comply totally with the regulations because of we just 
following orders given from two sides. One from our bosses and the other side is from the disaster 
victims. Nothing is perfect”. 
 
b. Department (under national level) 
Technical Staff 
“There are actors working in regulatory compliance who never had any training in emergency 
housing. With a right guidance they have managed to learn to handle these disaster victims and 
regulations quite well. If we have enough training in emergency housing, than we don’t need many 
actors to look after our level of compliance. I guess any actors can comply with regulations related 
to emergency housing. The requirements are interest, commitment and a little help from experienced 
technical staff”. 
 
“Every actor can comply because that's what actors do. But how effective is the compliance? 
Handling disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20 are not easy. I am not convinced that actors 
can comply totally because of their inexperience with these disaster victims and regulations at the 
same time. New housing development is a different thing”. 
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Clerical Staff 
“I think I can because I used to handle disaster victims with resilience difficulties before”. 
 
“I have never attended in-service training in emergency housing or remedial compliance. I also have 
no experience handling these disaster victims. No, I can’t handle them”. 
 
c. Department (under state level) 
Technical Staff 
“There is only two officially trained technical staff in disaster management in this department level. 
The rest of us had never attended in-service training. If we can do it, why shouldn't other actors be 
able to it as well because it is part of our duties as government servant”? 
 
“Actors in general do not have the capability to comply totally. Even though the adaptation and 
working processes are the same in their routine, they still have to present details and report in their 
group meeting and decision will be made together”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“I don’t have the ability to produce robust decision by my own in emergency response”. 
 
“I think I can if given a little bit of training in emergency housing. Fortunately many of the actors’ 
especially technical staff was on site. Even though had never attended in-service in emergency 
housing they were familiar with regulation and guidelines”. 
 
d. Department (under district level) 
Manager 
“If these regulations require our colleague to comply totally based on disaster site situation, I 
assumed my colleagues don’t have the capability to comply and handle disaster victims. If it were the 
building control and regulations applied to other commercial housing development I think actors 
can use compliance knowledge to comply but not in emergency housing”. 
 
Officer 
“They are not trained. But they might have the capabilities to comply and follow orders. In the case 
of resilience difficulties they are not able to overcome the pressure from the disaster victims or other 
outside parties because of their responsibilities is to the government”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“We had disaster victims in this department level who actors classified them with resilience 
difficulties. We tried to handle them as best we can but until now but they still cannot understand 
what regulations and guidelines is all about. All they know is their own needs that we can’t make it 
happened because of it was out of the orders given by our superiors. But that demands came from 
communities that we can not simply put aside. It is out of our control”. 
 
e. Emergency Housing Department Level (special body appointed by the government) 
Manager 
“I am not sure about this because compliance is subjective and no instrument yet to measure. Till 
now the only way to know about it if there is any complaint about the project carried out”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“I was requested to manage this department level because the department short of staff. I agreed 
voluntarily to work here. When I first arrived I just didn’t know how to start to comply with 
regulations, because my working experience had always been more with disaster victims but not 
guidelines or regulations. For days I had sleepless nights. With the manager’s encouragement and 
the help of other technical staff, 1 slowly began to communicate with the disaster victims using 
psychology and translate it accordingly with the requirement in rules and regulations. Now I feel 
confident in my work. Thus if I can do it, I am sure other actors can do it too”. 
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Technical Staff 
“Actors are not trained in psychology communication. It will take some time for these actors to 
acquire mastery in the use of psychology”. 
 
Affective Component of Attitudes 
 
2.1 
Perceived Rights of Disaster Victims under the MNSC Directive 20 to Regulatory Compliance 
a. Department (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
Technical Staff 
“For some disaster victims, yes, for others, no, because of the types of responsibilities used in 
disaster victims’ group is not suitable for some of these disaster victims who are not ready for 
regulatory compliance. The capabilities of adaptation and most of them without formal education 
make it difficult for the majority of our disaster victims to cope with disaster adaptation”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“It will help them learn about how to mix with the outside group”. 
“Maybe it is suitable for certain regulation(s). Also for those disaster victims who actors feel are 
ready to be included”. 
 
“If we gave them the rights to recover independently they would not get their full rights in regulatory 
compliance in MNSC Directive 20. In regulatory compliance not everybody may get what they are 
asking for. It is not easy to please everybody. We have to consider the benefit for both sides here”.  
 
b. Department (under national level) 
Technical Staff 
“Our regulatory compliance philosophy clearly stated that 'Compliance is for all', and the MNSC 
Directive 20 states that 'Disaster victims with resilience difficulties should be given the opportunities 
to maximise their potential recovery'. So I don’t see why they should be denied their rights to be 
included in disaster victims’ group if it could maximise their adaptation potential”. 
 
“Only those considered as 'high-functioning' and can cope in disaster victims’ group, but not those 
disaster victims with severe adaptation resilience difficulties or/and have behavioural problems”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“They have the rights to mix with disaster victims to prevent them from being isolated and 
demoralised”. 
 
“I think they have the rights to become members of disaster victims’ group. They got their own 
leaders at least can represent them and voice their feeling”. 
 
c. Department (under state level) 
Technical Staff 
“They are also human. If we can clarify their rights towards regulatory compliance they will feel 
appreciated and try to contribute to the benefit of their communities. Above all they can also help the 
government to deliver what the purpose of the development”. 
 
“Disaster victims with moderate difficulties may have the rights to regulatory compliance because 
they are able to cope with disaster adaptation. For those with total lost, they have the rights to get 
extra attention especially their rights”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“Some disaster victims are able to rise from the fall. Unfortunately most of them are vulnerable. 
Government is their only hope to help them back to their previous life before disaster. To make 
things worst, most of them do not have knowledge in emergency housing”. 
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“Not every disaster victims willing to be pampered. Some of them even though not capable to 
recover do not want any help. They wanted to do their own way legally or illegally. This type of 
people is not ready to be regulated”. 
 
d. Department (under district level) 
Officer 
“They have the rights especially disaster victims under resilience difficulties because I heard for the 
time being only government capable to fulfill their needs”. 
 
“It is not just the question of rights it is whether these disaster victims can cope with disaster 
adaptation. What's the point of granting them their rights to regulatory compliance when the 
objectives of assisting them are unreachable? They are in trouble and no where to turn to. Anyway it 
is the government responsibilities to look after them”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“The victim who the actors in this department level regarded as having resilience difficulties should 
be assisted not only because of they got the rights but also they need to be on the right track to cope 
with any obstacles in order to get back on their own. 
 
e. Department (special body appointed by the government) 
Manager 
“If there are ways that disaster victims under resilience difficulties can be helped, then they should 
be included in order for them to become part of other communities, and for humanitarian reasons”. 
 
Technical Staff 
“They have the rights but would only be suitable for non-religious demands. Regulatory compliance 
in non-religious demands would permit disaster victims to actively interact with actors and thus 
learn how to accommodate themselves to disaster society without hesitation”. 
 
2.2 
Perceived Benefit of Regulatory Compliance to Disaster Victims under the MNSC Directive 20 
2.2.1  
Knowledge Gained of Disaster Victims under the MNSC Directive 20 
a. Department (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
Technical Staff 
“In terms of knowledge, some disaster victims included in disaster victims’ group showed 
improvement and some didn’t. For some disaster victims it is better to handle them fully according to 
MNSC Directive 20 and regulatory compliance until they are ready to be included in whatever level 
is appropriate”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“Disaster victims might think that they are weaker than other disaster victims in the groups in terms 
of knowledge. In disaster victims’ group, they might cope with other members’ adaptation. Even if 
these disaster victims just followed what his/her colleagues do, eventually they would learn 
something”. 
 
“There could be two side effects. If actors could provide these disaster victims with all attention they 
require then maybe their knowledge will improve. But if actors are too occupied and busy with other 
disaster victims and can only give minimal individual guidance to these disaster victims, then their 
learning process will decline”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
i. Psychology 
“There were few disaster victims included in my group. For some, I felt, had improved, but not entire 
group. The adaptation environment might have been conducive to some but not to everybody”. 
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ii. Also psychology 
“The disaster victims included in my group could not give attention to me because of distractions. I 
am embarrassed to admit it. I think their performance psychologically declined rather than 
improved”. 
 
b. Department (under national level) 
Technical Staff 
“From my experience with disaster victims who regularly interact with actors during break times or 
discussion, their ability to communicate has improved. My assumption is that there will be an 
improvement in their knowledge about regulations, guidelines and policies”. 
 
“Maybe the knowledge will be increased but for certain disaster victims only”. 
 
“Actors don’t have time for disaster victims in their group”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“They can always learn from actors who usually understand regulations more than them”. 
 
“From my experience, they are very talkative if we discussed anything informally. They are active in 
discussions with actors and involvement in the communities. But, when they return to my disaster 
victims’ group, they are quiet and timid. Based on this, maybe, it is better in terms of knowledge to 
let their leaders to voice their needs based on the limited information they knew”. 
 
c. Department (under state level) 
Technical Staff 
“Some disaster victims who have ability equal to if not better than the majority of actors. Their 
knowledge will surely increase”. 
 
“If disaster victims have normal ability they will be able to catch up with actors, and their 
knowledge should be better in disaster victims’ group. But lately disaster victims sent to this 
department level are also suffering from other resilience difficulties, like mental and physical 
difficulties. Those who also suffer from mental difficulties, even though not very severe, will not 
achieve much in terms of knowledge if included in disaster victims’ group”. 
 
“Their knowledge gained would be better if they stayed to the regulatory compliance. These disaster 
victims would have problems catching up in disaster victims’ group because actors will be working 
according to their normal pace. If the disaster victims cannot catch up or follow the pace, actors 
would not be able to help them”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“For some disaster victims who are able to understand and interested to know and the answer is yes, 
for others no”. 
 
“Their knowledge gained even worse because actors will always concentrate on handling the 
majority. Therefore they did not have time for slow learners”. 
 
d. Department (under district level) 
Manager 
“My experience was only with some disaster victims under resilience difficulties but I think it would 
depend on the types of resilience difficulties the disaster victims have. For disaster victims with 
severe difficulties, it is very difficult to improve their knowledge in disaster victims’ group”. 
 
Technical Staff 
“Among themselves, they may feel they are lagging behind compared to other disaster victims in 
their communities. Thus they may be encouraged to try harder to catch up with each other. In 
disaster victims’ group they could simply give up because they could not keep up with other disaster 
victims’ progress. But if these disaster victims under resilience difficulties can be persuaded to do 
their best irrespective of other disaster victims’ achievements, and they can comfortably learn side 
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by side with other disaster victims and actors, then their knowledge could better improve in disaster 
victims’ group compared to what they know before disaster strike”. 
 
Officer 
“If the disaster victims were without formal education, they are slower in their understanding 
process compared to other disaster victims, but there will be an improvement if they wanted to”. 
 
“Based on my experience of handling disaster victims, I found that for knowledge sharing, they 
achieve better in my group compared to when they were in disaster victims’ group without actors or 
a good leader. Maybe, because of I can give them the individual attention towards their resilience 
difficulties that other disaster victims in their communities can’t give them while they were 
together”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“When mixed together with actors their thinking could be further developed compared to when they 
are mixing only with their own society. They can always learn from actors”. 
 
“Technical staff is better trained to handle these disaster victims particularly in building 
regulations. They know what is required because they have been specially trained for the task. We 
clerical staff will handle them like other disaster victims that might not be suitable. Maybe it is better 
practically if the victim with resilience difficulties in the department level is handled by specialist 
actors in emergency housing”. 
 
e. Department (special body appointed by the government) 
Technical Staff 
 “This is a slow process but the disaster victims might do it if they want it to”. 
 
“Their knowledge would not progress rapidly because clerical staff would have difficulties in trying 
to make disaster victims understand the essence of regulations. Clerical staff has to go back to 
technical staff for certain information about buildings and regulations. Most of technical staff can 
make direct contact and explain the real scenario in emergency housing and what to provide the 
victim”. 
 
2.2.2 
Disaster Victims under the MNSC Directive 20 Social Development  
a. Department (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
Technical Staff 
“Socially, the engagement of disaster victims was a success. These disaster victims were able to 
make friends with actors, even though there are still those who would discriminate these disaster 
victims”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“Their social skills will develop because they will interact and socialise regularly with actors, thus 
ensuring that they behave in a socially acceptable manner”. 
 
“Disaster victims nowadays are very choosy who their friends are. If they are uncomfortable with 
actors in the group, they will just ignore them. If this happens, then disaster victims would learn how 
not to accept outside people rather than the opposite. If actors are accepting towards them, then 
their social skills will improve”. 
 
b. Department (under national level) 
Technical Staff 
“It will depend on the clerical staff in the group”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“If just among them, maybe there will not be much change in the social skills development. But, if 
included in disaster victims’ group it will make great improvements. They will tend to imitate 
disaster peer behaviours that hopefully are those that are socially acceptable”. 
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c. Department (under state level) 
Technical Staff 
“When disaster victims are exposed to actors, and these disaster victims are willing to help them in 
whatever way they can towards regulatory compliance, then disaster victims will not be conscious of 
their resilience difficulties and would be at ease interaction with disaster society”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“If the intention of regulatory compliance is just to develop these disaster victims’ social skills, then 
yes, regulatory compliance will enhance it”. 
 
“Hopefully actors will encourage these disaster victims to learn to accept the other disaster victims 
in the group. If not, then these disaster victims would remain rooted in their area”. 
 
d. Department (under district level) 
Manager 
“The main way we can help our victim who we think has resilience difficulties is to improve his 
social skills. We can try to make him independent in handling himself, conscious of the groups 
around him, and know how to behave when interacting with other communities even outside disaster 
victims’ group”. 
 
Officer 
“It can be achieved if actors can persuade disaster victims to acts as 'role models’ for other disaster 
victims under resilience difficulties”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“The victim regarded as having mental resilience difficulties gets along superbly in communities. 
Socially, he is just like any other victim that needs to be part of communities”. 
 
“Maybe it will improve their social skills. But I can't say for sure because the department level 
doesn't have cases where the disaster victims don’t want to get involve in communities or disaster 
victims’ group”. 
 
e. Department (special body appointed by the government) 
Technical Staff 
“They will be able to develop their social skills. Recently we had a meeting in disaster victims’ 
group explaining our plan of recoveries. They (disaster victims) seem to get along fine with actors 
even though they have lots of difficulty understanding each other especially when it is the part of 
rules and regulations”. 
 
2.2.3 
The Emotional Development of Disaster Victims under the MNSC Directive 20 
a. Department (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
Technical Staff 
“Disaster victims would not feel isolated and segregated from disaster adaptation if they are able to 
mix with disaster victims for certain regulations in disaster victims’ group. But for disaster victims 
who are older and more mature, they do feel embarrassed when called resilience difficulties in 
victims’ group”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“Including disaster victims in disaster victims’ group would make them feel accepted”. 
 
“For disaster victims with severe emotional depressed from what they had lost, it was not easy to 
convince them that authorities will give their best to assist them to get back to their old life”. 
Also disaster victims felt uncomfortable if they are putting together with other races. Sometimes it is 
tenser when it is come to religious practice and believes”. 
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b. Department (under national level) 
Technical Staff 
“Disaster victims would feel embarrassed and isolated if included in disaster victims’ group”. 
“We had tried to convince disaster victims that what happened was temporarily and government is 
here to help. Actors even elected some of the leaders in their group to make a report and raised their 
needs. They have the responsibilities to assist their disaster victims’ group members according to 
regulatory compliance. This hopefully will make our disaster victims feel independent and useful. So 
far they have done a good job in undertaking the roles expected of them. 
 
“We also noticed that disaster victims showed tremendous respect to our colleagues even though 
these disaster victims realised that these actors are from the outsider and from different background. 
For example when our colleague made an inspection on the site and the construction progress is 
very slow and needs to put more labours. Fortunately, most of the disaster victims volunteers to help. 
In terms of emotional development I believed this is a good progress”. 
 
c. Department (under state level) 
Technical Staff 
“Disaster victims will move in their own group and rise together after the disaster strike. The unity 
and sense of belonging between them would enhance the self confidence”. 
 
“Emotionally they would be demoralised because other disaster victims catching up and adapt but 
they can’t”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“Disaster victims would be victimised by other disaster victims because of they are not as strong as 
other disaster victims in terms of survival”. 
 
“Some would be happy in disaster victims’ group and some who could not cope will suffer 
emotionally”. 
 
“Aid or whatever helps the disaster victims get sometimes not enough and only those who can fight 
will get the helps first. Some of them have to wait. They will definitely get it but a bit late”. 
 
d. Department (under district level) 
Manager 
“At the earlier stage of recovery disaster victims just needed accommodation, but after we provide 
them accommodation, they will request more than that and makes things complicated that caused 
emotionally depressed”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“Emotionally disaster victims under resilience difficulties would have more confidence in themselves 
because of their abilities to mix and learn together with other disaster victims”. 
  
“When other disaster victims can, and they can’t because of aged factors, they would be 
demoralised”. 
 
Officer 
“Maybe initially disaster victims under resilience difficulties would feel humble, embarrassed and at 
times isolated when included in disaster victims’ group. Once they feel they are being accepted by 
both other disaster victims and actors they will have confidence in themselves and will like disaster 
victims’ group better”. 
 
2.3 
Perceived Suitability of Regulations for Actors and Disaster Victims under the MNSC Directive 20 
a. Department (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
Manager 
“Only the emphasis on the acquisition of basic amenities in earlier phase of recovery is suitable for 
our actors”. 
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Technical Staff 
“The present regulations are suitable for our actors. All we need to do is some requirement 
modifications in order to make it accessible to these actors”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
i. psychology 
“After we received transcribed in information from disaster site we will calculate and plan required 
accommodation and will be approved by the superior committee. This is the earlier stage, but if we 
are trying to comply with the demand from each and every victim at the later stage at site, it will be 
complicated”. 
 
ii. Also psychology 
“Regulations that require equality of all disaster victims are not suitable for these disaster victims. 
Regulations that require the separation of gender are okay for these disaster victims. For example in 
equality of the disaster victims, all disaster victims will be treated as one community doesn’t matters 
if they are Malays, Chinese or Indians. In reality they got different house of worship but has to 
provide them separate house of worship even for odd number of races. Waste of unutilised facilities 
sometime”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“The present regulatory programme demand equality of all disaster victims; that these actors might 
not be capable of to comply”. 
 
“Nowadays actors are required to learn too many regulations. As it is, they have problems coping 
with it, especially when it is time to treat disaster victims raised the issue of believes and worship 
that is out of the regulations in providing them amenities”. 
 
b. Department (under national level) 
Technical Staff 
“It is suitable for non-religious demands. But for religious demands like places of worship or way of 
living, it is a bit difficult for actors to cope with. These actors are the enforcers and not politicians. 
This situations make it difficult to handle especially if involve disaster victims in decision making”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“It is too advanced for actors in this department level. From my discussions with other actors, these 
disaster victims’ main priorities are adaptation to the present days and the way to start back their 
life. So, the present regulations most of it are still relevant unless it touches the issues of races and 
religions. Last but not least gender issues”. 
 
c. Department (under state level) 
Manager 
“Of course regulations are suitable for actors because it is all based on previous experience in the 
country”. 
 
Technical staff 
“It is suitable, as a government servant we still have to obey with all other regulations not only in 
emergency housing that requires all government servants to serve the nation base on our oath made. 
We will follow orders from our superiors but not from the disaster victims especially when it is time 
to make decision for the good of all. Unfortunately according to humanitarians’ actions we are 
always in dilemma”.  
 
"I prefers to get involve in the earlier planning stage because of less bureaucracy involve and 
disaster victims sometimes too demanding. At the end, the development of amenities always delayed 
because of the authorities has to fulfill demands from each individual in disaster victims’ group”. 
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d. Department (under district level) 
Officer 
“For actors, it is a bit difficult for them to make any decision because of they has to consider so 
many things for example culture, gender and religion. But for non-religious demand should be fine”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“The current regulatory programme that involves religious or culture or gender is too difficult for 
our occasional actors in our department to cope with. Surely for actors, it is only suitable with 
modifications and some reconsideration”. 
 
e. Department (special body appointed by the government) 
Technical Staff 
“We feel that the religious section of regulation or programme is too demanding for our colleagues, 
but we have no choice because we must subscribe to the directives of the Prime Minister’s 
Department to handle according to this guideline”. 
 
2.4 
Perceived Effect of Regulatory Compliance on Actors' Workload 
a. Department (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
Manager 
“If actors were to handle disaster victims, there would not be much increase in their everyday 
workload. But the official requirement is that the regulatory compliance progress of disaster victims 
needs in accommodation under resilience difficulties, and this would definitely increase actors’ 
present workload. Actors also have to put in extra effort to control and handle disaster victims. They 
also have to give special attention to these disaster victims according to MNSC Directive 20 that 
might necessitate using different strategies to those usually employed”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“My working workload increases because of I have to put extra attention to these disaster victims. I 
have to employ different strategies to make them understand just for one regulation that also 
requires the preparation of various working skill”. 
 
It was a bit distracted because I had to keep my working pace slow just to accommodate demands 
from these disaster victims. Most of the time I have to explain what they are going to get and who is 
going to do that work”. 
 
“Presently, actors are required to go to the site and make presentation to the disaster victims and 
get their feedback. Then go back and amend and present again. It takes time and effort”. 
 
b. Department (under national level) 
Technical Staff 
“Workload will increase because of they have to fill in various detailing forms based on the 
everyday progress of their work plus disaster victims before come out with development plan”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“These disaster victims under resilience difficulties need special attention from group of actors. For 
example, if they got 8 kids, demand for an extra rooms or space. But in the MNSC Directive 20 
guidelines stated only 1 unit for a family, and then we have to back to the central and amend those 
things and definitely increase our workload”. 
 
c. Department (under state level) 
Technical Staff 
“Actors handle as usual. When disaster victims are included in their groups, all these disaster 
victims’ needs would be sent to technical staff for transcribing. Actors only have to mark the 
transcripts and try to fulfill their needs. Then compare with guidelines in the MNSC Directive 20 or 
other guidelines provided specific to that project. There will only be a slight increase because that is 
our duties”. 
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Clerical Staff 
“I would have to prepare lots of paperwork just to make sure everybody is satisfied”. 
 
d. Department (under district level) 
Manager 
“Actors’ burdens would definitely increase. First, they would have to give extra attention to the 
regulatory compliance. Then, they have to listen to the disaster victims demands. This unconsciously 
would increase work in material preparation and administration”. 
 
Officer 
“If the actors are expected to prepare all the materials and get involve in regulatory compliance, 
and of course there will be an increase in actors’ workload. If actors are being supported by 
working assistant and enough working material preparation, then the increase would be 
acceptable”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“Actors have to give extra attention to the only victim with mentally depressions in the department 
level. Often with this victim, actors have to prepare adaptation materials that are totally different to 
those we give the other disaster victims in the group. If we really want to stick to the regulations just 
imagine how much time and effort it might take” 
 
e. Department (special body appointed by the government) 
Technical Staff 
“As it is actors who are not only expected to handle regulations. They are also required to be 
involved in communities’ activities, clerical work concerning the disaster victims in the group, and 
other appraisal activities at the district, state and sometimes at the national level. If disaster victims 
under resilience difficulties are also included in their groups, and the latest requirement is that every 
victim under resilience difficulties must have an individualised plan, then the actors would have a 
heart attack”. 
 
2.5 
Perceived Effect of Regulatory Compliance on Disaster Victims 
a. Department (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
Manager 
“If regulatory compliance is done at the beginning phase, disaster victims’ resilience progress 
would not be affected, but I am not sure if regulatory compliance would affect later phase of disaster 
victims’ recovery process”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“Disaster victims don’t have any adaptation problems. Thus, it will not have any affect on their 
resilience progress”. 
 
“If actors can separate their working time appropriately, maybe it would not have an affect on the 
resilience progress of disaster victims”. 
 
“Regulatory compliance had an affect on disaster victims’ resilience progress because I had to 
reallocate my working time in order to overcome the adaptation difficulties of disaster victims. If 
these disaster victims don’t understand, I have to put in extra effort to make them understand and 
this affected my progress in finishing my duties. If I didn't finish the job, disaster victims would not 
be able to get what had already planned for them. Focus on regulatory compliance always the main 
task”. 
 
b. Department (under national level) 
Technical Staff 
“Normal work would proceed as usual with or under out disaster victims in the group”. 
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“Maybe it will negatively affect disaster victims’ resilience progress slightly if other disaster victims 
have some kinds of behavioural problems. Their difficulties in the group could cause distractions to 
other victim”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“At earlier phase, it will not have much affected because actors’ priorities at this stage are to ensure 
that disaster victims’ basic needs, information and survival kit”. 
 
c. Department (under state level) 
Manager 
“Disaster victims’ resilience progress would not be negatively affected because actors would try to 
finish their task on time, and that's the problem. Sometimes it is too fast for disaster victims to 
follow”. 
 
Technical Staff 
“Disaster victims who act as readers in regulations practice would benefit in the recovery process 
because sharing information would enhance their knowledge of regulations and rights”. 
“Actors would spend more time with disaster victims, thus depriving other disaster victims time”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“Actors would have to make extra effort to convey to disaster victims things they can't see but 
essential to the process of recovery. This would definitely mean giving more attention to these 
disaster victims, thus denying other disaster victims the attention they need in resilience difficulties”. 
 
d. Department (under district level) 
Clerical Staff 
“If these specific disaster victims have abnormal behaviour and like to disturb other disaster victims, 
then these disaster victims would keep their distance from them. If they don’t have such awkward 
behaviours, maybe they could accept them in their group”. 
 
“When disaster victims help other disaster victims under resilience difficulties, they would increase 
their understanding of the regulation matters or concepts. This would enhance resilience progress 
rather than diminishing it”. 
 
“I am not sure because of regulations and guidelines exist for a good reason and from the previous 
experience. In the scene of disaster it is depends on the disaster victims behaviours whether they can 
adapt with other disaster victims or not and whether their demands are rational or not”. 
 
Officer 
“When disaster victims help other disaster victims under resilience difficulties, they increase their 
understanding of the regulation matter or concepts. This would enhance resilience progress rather 
than diminishing it”. 
 
“The more time actors spend with disaster victims under resilience difficulties, the less time they 
have with other disaster victims”. 
 
e. Department (Special body appointed by government) 
Technical Staff 
“This regulatory compliance concept will keep actors focus on their duties more towards providing 
accommodation that is already planned. At the same time they are responsible to hear from the 
disaster victims’ side too of what they need and what don’t. Foremost, some of the actors may only 
cater specific disaster victims needs rather then overall disaster victims”. 
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2.6 
Perceived Effect of Regulatory Compliance on Department Levels’ Performance  
a. Department (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
Manager 
“Regulatory compliance is not the priority here. We are trying to do our best to help the disaster 
victims. Regulatory compliance is just a guide of practice. Anyway our job is not just providing 
housing to the disaster victims but more then that”.  
 
Clerical Staff 
“I don’t think I would agree that regulatory compliance implementation will negatively effect our 
appraisal as government officers”. 
 
b. Department (under national level) 
Clerical Staff 
“Practically, they can never achieve the standard required in their training programme. They are 
government officers or enforcers that follow orders from their superior. In the scene of disaster you 
never know what will happen. What I am trying to say here is that department levels’ performance 
might be good, but for the actors not really matters”. 
 
c. Department (under state level) 
Manager 
“In this department level, we combine training programme and application on site. When disasters 
strike especially Tsunami, it did negatively affect our compliance practice because of time 
constraints and everybody was panicked. However, in the previous years we tried to enhance our 
regulatory compliance because of we learnt from our mistakes. Therefore it depends on time 
constraint”. 
 
Technical Staff 
“In emergency relief, we are bonded with the matter of time. Everything has to be done as quickly as 
possible. Some of the disaster victims judge us from the quality service we gave. Not easy to please 
everybody. It will affect our performance”. 
 
“In the past, there were actors who did quite well in training programme. The interest in regulatory 
compliance improves from time to time”. 
 
“If actors can give appropriate time to the matters of regulatory compliance, maybe it will not 
negatively affect the department levels’ performance”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“Some of us will fail and there will also be those who will pass in training programme”. 
 
“Based on regulatory compliance, the majority of actors who took training programme failed it 
whether to attend or complete. Since the department level takes it seriously, there was an 
improvement in the department level performance”. 
 
d. Department (under district level) 
Manager 
“For the actors who got so many commitments, it will depend on them whether to comply with the 
regulations or not because most of them were familiar with regulatory compliance. But their 
attentions were distracted by external matters on the scene of disaster”. 
 
Officer 
“Some actors got qualifications in disaster and emergency management. They were all performed 
well in the scene of disaster”. 
 
“There are two possibilities. It could increase the department level’s performance if the actors 
agreed to comply with the appropriate regulations due to the fact that there are actors that familiar 
with emergency action and compliance, or may be not”. 
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“They know what to do with the regulations but ignore most of it in the name of other 
responsibilities and commitments”. 
 
e. Department (special body appointed by the government)  
Technical Staff 
 “Regulatory compliance will definitely give us pressure and distract our concentration in disaster 
relief. But, that is what we do. I don’t see any problem there”. 
 
 “It will affect the department level performance because up till now most of our consideration is to 
complete and achieve our mission according to the time frame and working schedule”. 
 
2.6.1 
Suggestions on Alternative Methods of Evaluating Department Levels’ Performance Practicing 
Regulatory Compliance 
Technical Staff (under national level) had tried direct contact with the disaster victims 
“Evaluate the regulatory compliance progress of actors is not the whole picture of what we have 
done. If the government want to make valuation they should start with appointing an officer or put 
more staff specialise in emergency housing. Valuation can be started with calculating their 
performance. Some of us involve in this department on behalf of the department and not really 
understand what emergency housing is all about”.  
 
Clerical Staff (under national level) 
“No doubt actors would fail in their training programme because of other commitments. The 
department level just ignored these actors achievement while doing their training programme when 
calculating their appraisal in order to avoid it affecting the whole department”. 
 
Technical Staff (under state level) 
“The success of actors towards regulatory compliance should not be based solely on their regulatory 
compliances application in the line of duty. It should also take into account these actors 
achievements in other fields. For example, their involvement in representing the department level in 
sports and cultural activities at district, state and national level. Actors in this department level are 
heavily involved in these activities. This should also be referred to when assessing the regulatory 
compliance success of these actors, and credit is given to the department level for this achievement”. 
 
Technical Staff (special body appointed by the government) 
“Valuation should be done to the actors professionally involve in disaster management”. 
 
2.7 
Types of Regulations Favoured by Actors for Regulatory Compliance 
a. Department (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
Manager 
“The most suitable would be regulations in present planning and building codes applied for all 
authorities in Malaysia in developing commercial housing scheme because of them already familiar 
with it. As for the regulations under the MNSC Directive 20 and the international standards, my 
colleagues do not have facilities to it”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“I felt that regulations under the MNSC Directive 20 and the international standards are most 
suitable because those were suitable in disaster actions, unlike regulations in present planning and 
building codes. They are unlikely suitable because of emergency housing is not for permanent 
development”. 
 
b. Department (under national level) 
Clerical Staff 
“I am preferred with the regulations in the present national planning and building codes because 
already familiar with it. They assumed that actors have required skills and technique to handle these 
regulations. As for regulations under the MNSC Directive 20 and the international standards are not 
my concerned because never work with that”. 
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“Based on ability to learn, I would prefer regulations under the MNSC Directive 20 followed by the 
international standards”. 
 
c. Department (under state level) 
Technical Staff 
“Maybe regulations in the present national planning and building codes are the most suitable 
because I have required skills and technique to handle these regulations, followed by regulations 
under the MNSC Directive 20 because of government knows better about disaster situations. Third, 
the international standards because of the guidelines have been practicing outside Malaysia”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“Guidelines in the international standards are the most suitable because of the guidelines are 
suitable for everybody without discrimination. The most unsuitable would be regulations in the 
present national planning and building codes because of not practical in the disaster scene”. 
 
“For me, regulations under the MNSC Directive 20 are more suitable practically based on local 
experiences compared to guidelines in the international standards. As for regulations in the present 
national planning and building codes, they are not practical. That's just my opinion anyway”. 
 
d. Department (under district level) 
Manager 
“Based on current department level facilities, the most suitable would be regulations in the present 
national planning and building codes”. 
 
Officer 
“All three types are suitable to the department level due to availability of appropriate facilities”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“I would prefer regulations in the present national planning and building codes because of 
availability of the facilities. As for regulations under the MNSC Directive 20 and the international 
standards, I don't have the knowledge to handle them. But I don’t think there is a problem if we get 
appropriate training”. 
 
“Currently there are regulations under the MNSC Directive 20 that had succeeded in this regulatory 
compliance and project delivered with fewer complaints. I haven't heard of the international 
standards, but there are efforts towards the implementations. As for regulations in the present 
national planning and building codes it will be a great achievement if it is accomplished towards 
regulatory compliance”. 
 
e. Department (special body appointed by the government) 
Manager 
“I’m in this line for quite sometime and my main reference is planning and building codes. But there 
is not a problem for me to follow any instruction from the above”. 
 
Technical Staff 
“We have proof that regulations under the MNSC Directive 20 could be achieved. No major 
complaints from the disaster victims”.  
 
Clerical Staff 
“All three types are unsuitable because each type has its own problems”. 
 
“Sorry, I am not with any of the option given because of everything depends on availability of the 
resources at that time”. 
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Conative Component of Attitude  
 
3.1 
Perceived Actors Support for Regulatory Compliance Implementation  
a. Department (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
Manager 
“Actors first reaction would give excuses to reject the intention of regulatory compliance 
implementation. Actors should be given all the information associated with the programme if the 
Prime Minister’s Department insisted and persevered with the plan. However, they can be persuaded 
to accept it”. 
 
Technical Staff 
“Actors support would depend on department levels’ managers. If the manager continuously stresses 
the importance of the MNSC Directive 20 for the department level in their meetings, they might be 
persuaded to accept it. But, if the manager rarely mentions it in his/her meetings, then regulatory 
compliance would be seen as another unwelcome addition to their working responsibilities”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
i. psychology 
“The current conditions in this department level do not guarantee for this MNSC Directive 20 
implementation. Neither actors nor disaster victims will benefit from it because it is going to takes 
time in the construction process”. 
 
ii. Medical 
“For earlier phase that is the planning stage, it should be okay. But for later phase of recovery at 
site, I am a bit reluctant because of the pressure from surroundings”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“I will support it if other actors support the programme. If I am alone I am not so sure. If there are 
others willing to support, we can sort of help each other morally and mentally” 
 
“I guess I will support the programme for humanitarian reasons”. 
 
b. Department (under national level) 
Technical Staff 
“Regulatory compliance would be too demanding on actors to cope with because of the pressure 
from the media, disaster victims and even from my department”. 
 
“Not all actors will support the regulatory compliance with the MNSC Directive 20, but I think they 
will support the programme if they have a better understanding of it”. 
 
“I think actors will give their support because so far they have been supportive towards all our 
activities regarding disaster victims”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“It is difficult for me to support the programmes’ implementation because the majority of the 
department levels’ actors and I have not attended any training courses in the handling of disaster 
victims under this programme”. 
 
c. Department (under state level) 
Manager 
“I don’t think actors will support the programmes’ implementation because they are convenience 
with the present progress but it is not easy to grant all disaster victims demands. Actors not provided 
with enough information about this programme and I don’t think this is easy for them”. 
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Technical Staff 
“Only some actors will support regulatory compliance because they don’t have any emergency 
housing background. Like myself, when I was involved in disaster site, I didn’t know anything about 
regulatory compliance. It was difficult of having these disaster victims in my group and then to 
follow the regulations accordingly”. 
 
“I don’t have any problem with that because of this is our duties and do our best to serve the 
public”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“I will not support the programme because of actors are not trained in emergency housing. These 
disaster victims will suffer emotionally because the actors do not have the knowledge to handle 
them”. 
 
"This is a new thing. I have to know more about it before I can make up my mind to support or not to 
support its implementation”. 
 
d. Department (district) 
Manager 
“Actors will not support it at present condition because it demands too much of actors’ capabilities. 
There are problems with disaster victims that have yet to be overcome, and now with this 
programme. It will make our job more challenging”. 
 
Officer 
“Based on the department level’s of current conditions, maybe at the earlier stage actors will 
support this MNSC Directive 20 for these disaster victims under resilience difficulties because of 
most of the work can be monitored. As for later phase of recovery, I don't think they will support it 
because their work is geared toward accommodate facilities with a lot of pressure from 
surroundings”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“We had disaster victims with diverse types of difficulties in our group that all the actors involved in 
handling them faced a lot of trouble. Maybe if they were handled by actors trained in emergency 
housing they could do better”. 
 
“I will support it because if we don't try, we won't know”. 
 
e. Department (special body appointed by the government) 
Technical Staff 
“They will not support regulatory compliance because they know that handling these disaster victims 
would be problematic. Actors would still have to prepare about the risk of dragging their time 
frame”. 
 
“Very few will support regulatory compliance because of their inability to communicate with 
disaster victims, and also it will increase the actors’ burden”. 
 
3.2 
Perceived Ability of Regulatory Compliance on Promoting a ‘Caring Feeling’ and Acceptance of 
Disaster Victims under the MNSC Directive 20 by the Actors 
a. Department (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
Clerical Staff  
“I do agree with this type of approach that may create more caring and accepting of disaster victims 
in disaster victims’ group”. 
 
“The disaster victims have very poor knowledge in regulatory compliance and the MNSC Directive 
20. In training programme we are prepared for this. That is why in some cases we had to exclude 
these disaster victims from our action group”. 
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Technical Staff 
“I’m afraid at the beginning stage disaster victims are not welcome in any decision making process. 
However after the relationship developed actors might understand the needs between two parties”. 
 
b. Department (under national level) 
Technical Staff  
“There will always be a section of actors who will use practical approach to describe disaster 
victims included in disaster victims’ group. They will only select the disaster victims they preferred 
to. But if actors play their part in preventing this from happening, they will eventually accept these 
disaster victims”. 
 
“Including disaster victims will make actors more caring. In the past during any department level 
activities, actors would always give disaster victims first priority”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“Including disaster victims will help facilitate the creation of a 'caring society ', but I am worried a 
section of our actors would discriminate these disaster victims in their disaster victims’ group 
because disaster victims under resilience difficulties were too demanding”. 
“Mixing these two groups in the same group would help them understand each other more, thus 
become more caring towards each other’s”. 
 
“Even though these disaster victims and actors are not adaptation in the same group, we can still 
encourage the 'caring feeling' among disaster victims. The department level frequently arranged 
activities for our disaster victims and in all these activities we involved actors as well. From my 
everyday observation, actors can get along very well with our disaster victims”. 
 
“Depends on how many disaster victims included in disaster victims’ group at one time. If there are 
only two or three actors in a group of 240 disaster victims, the effect will be negligible”. 
 
“We will try our best to handle these disaster victims and comply with MNSC Directive 20, but I’m 
still thinking that it is not good enough for them to please their needs”. 
 
c. Department (under state level)  
Manager 
“It will make actors more caring because from what I can see in the department level and at the 
shelter, actors are always helpful to the disaster victims. But there are also actors who are 
mischievous that ignored disaster victims. Thankfully there are not many of these types of actors in 
the department level”. 
 
Technical Staff 
“From my observations, actors are very concerned about disaster victims in this department level. 
For example, actors would take turns to hear disaster victims request so that disaster victims might 
know their rights and response to it”.  
 
Clerical Staff 
“Some will accept these disaster victims, but there are also those who won't. Those who are not 
accepting would ignore these disaster victims, thus making them more isolated from the rest of the 
group”. 
 
“I don't think there will be a negative attitude towards disaster victims by actors. They seem to have 
accepted the disaster victims with moderate difficulties presently in disaster victims’ group”. 
 
d. Department (under district level)  
Manager 
“There would be mixed acceptance by actors towards disaster victims under resilience difficulties. 
There would be one section of actors who could accept disaster victims under resilience difficulties, 
make friends with them, help them, and realise how lucky they are. But there is also a section of 
actors who would discriminate and ignore them”. 
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e. Department (special body appointed by the government) 
Technical Staff 
“Of course government will propose the good things to the public. This concept of regulatory 
compliance is actually to protect disaster victims’ rights and start back what they had lost. I support 
this caring feeling and acceptance between actors and disaster victims”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“I don’t know. I’m worried that disaster victims would be more isolated and segregated because of 
their inability to express their feeling and their thoughts to actors”. 
 
3.3 
Perceived Willingness of Actors to Attend In-Service Training in Emergency Housing                                                                                                     
a. Department (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
Manager 
“As far as I know actors are only interested to attend in-service courses in emergency housing if they 
have disaster victims under resilience difficulties. They are not interested if their disaster victims are 
perfectly normal and competence. To them handling these disaster victims is a waste of time”. 
 
Technical Staff 
“Actors are not interested in the regulatory compliance”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
i. Psychology 
“I don’t think I will go because firstly I don't have the patience to handle these disaster victims. 
Secondly, the main emphasis in training courses are theories that tend to make things looks easy. 
When you try practising it yourself you will realise that it is difficult to implement what has been 
handled. I don't want to get frustrated in my work”. 
 
ii. Medical 
“If given the chance I want to go because we can learn latest updates in compliance and regulations. 
Anyway we will often meet disaster victims under resilience difficulties and it is different”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“I don't think so because it won't be long before I retire, thus not interested”. 
 
“I will go if been directed by my superior. But, I won't volunteer to go. What if I could not deliver 
what is expected from attending the course? I should not have gone in the first place because of 
personally I just don't have what it takes to handle these disaster victims”. 
 
b. Department (under national level) 
Technical Staff 
“If actors are given information on regulatory compliance beforehand, they might be interested. 
What makes actors reluctant to attend emergency housing courses is that they are unsure what they 
are getting themselves into. If they have a rough idea of what this programme is about, maybe they 
can be persuaded to attend courses in emergency housing”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“I don't think I will because of my work commitment. Even now I sometimes have to miss working 
with disaster victims because I have to attend meetings organised by either the District and/or the 
state”. 
 
“I will go so as to increase the range of my working abilities to include disaster victims under 
resilience difficulties”. 
 
c. Department (under state level) 
Manager 
“Some actors will agree to accept disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20 in their group if 
they are given relevant training”. 
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Clerical Staff 
“I am hesitant because, one, the course is too long. Two, the centre of training is too far from home, 
and three, family commitments”. 
 
“I will go because I can learn something different. Previously I learned how to handle disaster 
victims, and this time I am adaptation how to handle disaster victims”. 
 
d. Department (under district level) 
Manager 
“In the past, actors in this department level were not receptive towards in-service courses in 
emergency housing. Maybe, they are not interested or they have family commitments”. 
 
Officer 
“There are actors who would be interested to attend such courses. First thing to do is give them 
some information on what regulatory is all about. For example when I discussed about this MNSC 
Directive 20 there were many actors who came over to see what this regulatory compliance is all 
about, and they asked a lot of questions. That shows that clerical staff is interested in the regulatory 
compliance too”. 
 
“Some actors like to handle certain disaster victims only. Very few of them like to handle disaster 
victims without formal education, not from their group and under resilience difficulties”. 
 
“They might be willing but it should only be a short term course. Actors have family commitments 
that also require their attention”. 
 
Clerical Staff 
“When you have been working for as long as I have and got so used to the current types of works, I 
guess I have lost interest in changing my ways”. 
 
“I will volunteer because in disaster victims’ group there are also disaster victims with adaptation 
problems who are very low in income group and fighting spirit. Maybe I can learn the techniques on 
how to handle them more efficiently”. 
 
e. Department (special body appointed by the government) 
Clerical Staff 
“Not a problem for me because of that is the way to get more information about this programme”. 
 
Technical Staff 
“I volunteered to handle in this department level because I have relatives involve in the MNSC 
Directive 20. Hopefully by working in this department level, I could help them”. 
 
“Maybe actors who have been handling disaster victims for many years might not be interested in 
attending courses in emergency housing, just to escape from the monotonous routine of disaster 
works. But I think the number is very small. Only those who would like to widen their working skills 
will attend in-service training”. 
 
3.4 
Actor Perceptions of the Conditions to Accept Regulatory Compliance  
Directed by the Prime Minister’s Department    
Manager (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
“There are actors who will accept regulatory compliance into regulatory process, like those who 
were involved in other government programmes. All I did was to ask them to give this programme a 
chance, and they agreed to try it. This department only included disaster victims into disaster 
victims’ group when the actors agreed to it. If the actors refuse, we don’t force them”. 
 
Clerical Staff (under national level) 
“If the Prime Minister’s Department likes it, we have to do it”. 
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Clerical Staff (under district level) 
“In this department level, actors accept disaster victims under resilience difficulties because of they 
are in trouble”. 
 
Technical Staff (special body appointed by the government) 
“I don’t think actors will accept disaster victims into the most important part that is the decision 
making, but if directed by the Prime Minister’s Department, we have no choice but to accept it”. 
 
Disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20 have Certain Abilities  
a. Have Acquired Pre-Requisite Skills 
Clerical Staff (under national level) 
“At least disaster victims must be able to handle themselves and become efficient in self-help skills. 
Not forget to handle psychological matters”. 
 
Technical Staff (under state level) 
“Prepare these disaster victims with basic knowledge such as medical response and survival skill so 
that disaster victims are confident of their adaptation abilities”. 
 
b. Have No Behavioural Problems 
Clerical Staff (under national level) had tried direct contact with disaster victims 
“If the disaster victims do not have serious behavioural problems and have acquired skills in self-
management, then they are very similar to other people around them. This would make them 
acceptable to both other disaster victims and actors”. 
 
Clerical Staff (under district level) 
“Actors are willing to accept disaster victims into their group because they did not have behavioural 
problems. Thus, actors did not complain about having him”. 
 
c. Would Not Accept Disaster Victims under the MNSC Directive 20 Even Without Behavioural 
Problems 
Clerical Staff (under national level) 
“I would not accept this even if these disaster victims don’t have behavioural problems. I did try 
handling these disaster victims in my group for the last two years. They do not have abnormal 
behaviours, but I just cannot handle them”. 
 
Clerical Staff (under national level) 
“Even under out behavioural problems it is difficult to accept these disaster victims because they 
don’t know regulations”. 
 
For Non-Religious Regulations Only 
Technical Staff (under national level)  
“There are actors who visit our group regularly, who would accept our disaster victims into their 
groups if these disaster victims can self-handle, especially groups involving non-religious 
regulations. Actors not only interested in religious matter but also races and cultures that is very 
sensitive”. 
 
Technical Staff (special body appointed by the government)  
“Regulatory compliance should initially involve non-religious regulations only, because have 
different needs and interests”. 
 
3.5 
Barriers towards the Implementation of Regulatory Compliance 
Lack, of Information 
Clerical Staff (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
“It is important for every department to have a deep understanding of the regulatory compliance to 
serve the public. When they are able to associate the importance of both the regulatory compliance 
and disaster victims needs, only then will they accept the nature of regulations and disaster victims”. 
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Department Levels’ System 
a. Internal 
Manager (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
“We have to consider orders that might involve political interest or different ethnic demand. After all 
consideration noted then we will proceed with actions. This is all takes time”. 
 
b. International 
Manager (under national level) 
“We tried our best to provide disaster victims with every resource available in the country. 
Unfortunately we can’t satisfy everybody especially from international committees”. 
 
Actors' Workloads 
a. Capacity of Emergency Housing 
Clerical Staff (under state level) 
“There are differences in emergency housing on site and disaster victims’ group. There are 
hundreds or maybe thousands disaster victims in a disaster victims’ group and only few 
professionals or practitioners to handle them. Thus actors cannot give these disaster victims 
individual attention”. 
 
b. Responsibilities not related to Working 
Clerical Staff (under national level) 
“In the scene of disaster actors are currently given too many responsibilities unrelated to their 
works that makes it difficult to fulfill regulations totally”. 
 
Actors’ Skill  
a. Actors not trained towards the MNSC Directive 20 
Technical Staff (under national level) 
“After actors received their training from private or government, we will be sent to the appropriate 
department/division. (Most of us) were never told about the regulatory compliance is a mandatory. 
Sad but true, I don’t know anything about this MNSC Directive 20. Everything has to be done fast. 
We will provide the plan but most of the work handed over to the contractors”. 
 
b. Actors with Specific Skills Only 
Manager (under district level) 
“Most of us know how to manage the scene of disaster but the rest we leave it to the professionals”. 
 
Appraisal Pressure  
Clerical Staff (under national level) 
“The demand by compliance authorities and achievement in training programme makes actors 
unwilling to prioritise the disaster victims or their responsibilities towards the MNSC Directive 20”. 
 
Manager (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
“When the managers (District) receive information from actors regarding issues in regulatory 
compliance, their immediate response is to send these disaster victims matters to the related 
department. These managers seem reluctant to maintain these disaster victims’ matters in their own 
department level. They are afraid that these disaster victims will affect their department level’s 
overall percentage of appraisal”. 
 
Acceptance of Disaster Victims under the MNSC Directive 20  
a. Managers’ Negative Perception about the Importance of Regulatory Compliance to Disaster Victims 
under the MNSC Directive 20 
Manager (special body appointed by the government) 
“There are managers who leave the compliance matters to other regulatory compliance coordinator. 
They let the coordinator to overcome the issues pertaining without giving proper solution. Sadly, 
some of these managers had attended seminars on the regulatory compliance and serve the disaster 
victims under resilience difficulties”. 
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b. Unwillingness of Actors to accept Disaster Victims under the MNSC Directive 20 into their Groups. 
Technical Staff (under national level) 
“What saddens me the most was that actors’ perceived ignorance whenever they encounter disaster 
victims with adaptation problems in their group, instead of trying to overcome these disaster victims’ 
difficulties in the context of emergency housing. They assumed that their involvements in the 
development work will just slower the process”. 
 
Clerical Staff (under state level) 
“Most of them still under trauma and can’t think rationally. They will disturb the process of making 
any decisions”. 
 
c. Negative Acceptance of Disaster Victims under the MNSC Directive 20 by Disaster Communities 
Technical Staff (special body appointed by the government) 
“There was an incident when one group of victim and other disaster victims quarreled with each 
other. Miscommunication between these two groups was due to the fact that they were actually 
having negative perception among them”. 
 
d. Negative Perception of Disaster Victims under the MNSC Directive 20 by Relatives of Disaster 
Victims. 
Clerical Staff (under national level) 
“When these disaster victims mutually involved in disaster victims’ group, their relatives were 
uneasy about the presence of actors because of they thought the actors will just doing their job 
without considering what the disaster victims really needs. Consequently, there was not much 
cooperation between disaster victims’ relatives and actors”.  
 
Manager (under state level) 
“In some cases, the disaster victims’ relatives thought that the actors will take more than 
appropriate time to provide accommodations. Consequently, the disaster victims will stay much 
longer in their house”. 
 
Technical Staff (under state level) 
“Maybe relatives of disaster victims do not want the disaster victims to be included in disaster 
victims’ group. There are three reasons for this. One, in disaster victims’ group there are too many 
disaster victims. Secondly, they might not be able to meet the disaster victims as often as they are 
able to meet. Thirdly, they are worry of some of these actors would discriminate their disaster 
victims”. 
 
e. Unwillingness of Actors to relinquish their Working Responsibilities 
Technical Staff (special body appointed by the government) 
“Attitudes of the technical staff should be changed. These actors are usually very protective of their 
working territories. For technical staff, handling disaster victims under resilience difficulties is their 
duties. Both clerical staff and technical staff should be able to accept encroachment into each 
other’s working territories. There should not be any barriers in terms of responsibilities towards 
both disaster victims and disaster victims’ relatives. Everybody must play their part”. 
 
Resourcing 
a. Lack of Regulatory Compliance Facilities and/or Materials under the MNSC Directive 20 
Manager (under state level) 
“We still have an insufficient number of site office facilities and medical response machines to 
accommodate all our works. And we’re still awaiting our supply from the department and emergency 
funds”. 
 
Clerical Staff (district) 
“Sometimes it’s hard to received assistance from national level especially latest equipment because 
of we have to go to the lab or equipment not available”. 
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Technical Staff (under national level) 
“There are no problems with working materials for disaster victims because I can always borrow 
anything or buy my own from volunteers or disaster staff”. 
 
Technical Staff (special body appointed by the government) 
“Most of the latest equipment like mobile toilet and shower not in this country. So it is going to take 
time to arrive after made orders”. 
 
b. Lack of Emergency Housing 
Technical Staff (under national level) 
“Immediate recovery demands acquire immediate accommodations to set up. Sometimes we have to 
put more disaster victims in one place until proper emergency housing built up”. 
 
c. Inadequate Number or Lack of Technical Staff in the Department Level 
Technical Staff (under state level) 
“As a government officer we always have to go for training and other functions. For some cases 
actors had to do covering job in case of the specific actors on leave”. 
 
Manager (district) 
“The district level doesn’t have any professionals to consult if regulatory compliance is 
implemented. We have to wait for state or national assistance”. 
 
Abilities of Disaster Victims under the MNSC Directive 20  
a. Disaster Victims’ Behaviours 
Technical Staff (under national level) 
“Under great trauma aftermath, disaster victims were desperate for help but they try to do 
everything by their own way like rebuilt accommodation on old destructive site that is very danger 
and set up their own group declining help from authorities”. 
 
Clerical Staff (under district level) 
“Worst scenario case was that they rejected government offers and assume that authorities were not 
helpful”. 
 
b. Disaster Victims without Formal Education 
Clerical Staff (under national level) 
“Disaster victims were not formally educated or skeptical of what the government will provide, thus 
they will try to get their own channel of helps”. 
 
Negative Acceptance of Regulatory Compliance by Disaster Victims under the MNSC Directive 20  
Clerical Staff (under national level) 
“Some of the disaster victims considered about their group of interest and really hesitant if the 
authorities gave them facilities not according to their needs”. 
 
Technical Staff (under state level) 
“I once asked disaster victims whether they would like to involve in disaster victims’ group. They 
were all said no. Their reasoned was that they were happy where they were and let the actors do 
their job”. 
 
3.6 
Changes Suggested by Actors Prior to Regulatory Compliance Implementation in Disaster Department 
Levels 
Training in Emergency Housing 
a. Actors given In-service Training in Emergency Housing 
Technical Staff (under national level) 
“If regulatory compliance is to be implemented in this department, this department in association 
with the Prime Minister’s Department should organise in-house training for actors on what is the 
best way to handle disaster victims under resilience difficulties included in their groups”. 
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“The other alternative is the establishment of emergency housing training centres by the state 
compliance department in the various district compliance offices, that actors involved in MNSC 
Directive 20 could be involved to handle disaster victims group under resilience difficulties. This 
training should be continuous until they are confident to cope with disaster victims under resilience 
difficulties included in disaster victims’ group. Setting up training centre at district level would also 
ensure that actors can travel to and from their home”. 
 
b. Disaster Victims under the MNSC Directive 20 and Regulatory Compliance to be included in the 
Programme at Actors Training Sessions 
Manager (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
“Disaster victims under resilience difficulties in the MNSC Directive 20 should get involve in this 
training and are made part of actors training session so that actors are well prepared mentally”. 
 
Officer (under national level) 
“These are the entire subject we took as part of the training programme and I hope everybody who 
is interested in recovery assistance should take too. 1) First Aid. 2) International Humanitarian Law 
(IHL). 3) Psychological Support Programme (PSP). 3) Simulation 4) Integrated Community Based 
Risk Reduction Risk (ICBRR). 4) Rapid Deployment Squad (RDS). 5) Disaster Management. 6) 
Radio Communications. 7) Regional Disaster Response Team (RDRT). 8) Boat Handling. These 
subjects organised by the Malaysian Red Crescent under supervision of the International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL) with International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Regional 
Disaster Response Team (RDRT) with International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
(IFRC)”. 
 
More Information on Regulatory Compliance to Department Levels 
Manager (under national level) 
“My department should be supplied with in depth and extensive information on the Prime Minister’s 
Department intention regarding regulatory compliance plan and training programme. At least we 
know some clue what is going on now”. 
 
Resourcing 
a. Build more Emergency Housing 
Technical Staff (under state level) 
“Build more emergency housing to reduce group population. Group size should be reduced to one 
family per room or the best is one unit per family. Odd cases two flat per family because of 
household members more than capacities allowed in one flat”. 
 
b. Create the Post of Working Assistant 
Clerical Staff (under national level) 
“If actors are aided in their work by actors' assistants, maybe they would agree to give regulatory 
compliance implementation a try, but I still think it would be difficult for them to cope”. 
 
Department Level System 
a. Systems that is clear and Focus 
Manager (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
“The system applied got to be clear and focus in order to give speedy work towards disaster victims’ 
satisfaction. Less bureaucracy, please”. 
 
b. Longer Periods of Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
Clerical Staff 
“The actors that are responsible to do their work should give extra attention to the disaster victims 
and stay with them much longer. Maybe this way at least may comfort them”. 
 
c. Volunteered by the Disaster Victims to Get Involve 
Technical Staff (under national level) 
“Make sure that the disaster victims who want to get involve in disaster victims’ group really want to 
help and not to be forced. I meant that they volunteered themselves”. 
 
423 
 
Regulatory Compliance Enforcement Office  
a. Every District Office should have An Officer In-charge of Regulatory Compliance 
Technical Staff (under national level) 
“There should be always being one emergency housing officer in every district offices looking after 
regulatory compliance so that actors don’t have to go to the state or national department every time 
they have problems. These officers should also be responsible for ensuring that regulatory 
compliance implementation runs smoothly, and would be a trouble shooter if there are hitches in its 
implementation”. 
 
b. Relevant Authorities should carry Out Continuous Monitoring 
Clerical Staff (under district level) 
“Continuous monitoring of the MNSC Directive 20 once implemented is the key towards regulatory 
compliance”. 
 
c. Officer in Charge should have Regulatory Compliance Background 
Technical Staff (special body appointed by the government) 
“An officer in charge of every department in compliance matters should have emergency housing 
background. If not, they would not appreciate the problems of providing emergency housing for the 
disaster victims under resilience difficulties”. 
 
3.7 
Strategies to Encourage Actors to Accept Regulatory Compliance under the MNSC Directive 20  
Personal Incentives 
 
a. Monetary Rewards 
Clerical Staff (under national level) 
“Site staff is currently being paid incentive allowance. Therefore other actors who are involved in 
the regulatory compliance implementation should also be given such allowance”. 
 
Clerical Staff (under state level) 
“I don’t care much about monetary rewards. If including these disaster victims makes my work 
difficult and troublesome, I don't want it even if the government gives me extra money per month”. 
 
b. Actors Participation in the Regulatory Compliance Programme Made Part of Actors’ Appraisal 
Clerical Staff (under district level) 
 “It will meant something if this regulatory compliance is part of our appraisal”. 
 
c. Actors Send for Overseas Trips to Study Working Techniques and Strategies towards Regulatory 
Compliance Group Setting  
Clerical Staff (under national level) 
“Actors involved in regulatory compliance should be sent to foreign country practicing full 
regulatory compliance. This would enable actors to learn and experience different working 
techniques and strategies used by their foreign counterparts in dealing with disaster victims under 
resilience difficulties. They could then share and spread their knowledge and experiences to other 
actors involved in handling disaster victims under resilience difficulties”. 
 
d. Further Studies in Emergency Housing 
Technical Staff (special body appointed by the government) 
“At the moment, there are several academic institutions offer studies in compliance, emergency 
assistance and housing studies. Actors involved in the implementation of regulatory compliance 
should be sponsored by the Prime Minister’s Department to attend these courses”. 
 
Material Resources 
Clerical Staff (under national level) 
“I want all working materials required to handle disaster victims in my group to be made available. 
I don't want to share my own personal belongings especially for these disaster victims. From what I 
can see at site these disaster victims require lots of different types of working materials. Not only for 
the disaster victims, hopefully had the site office got to be complete too”. 
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Manager (under state level) 
“At the moment in our department we don’t have enough facilities and responders for each of our 
disaster victims. They have to share whatever facilities and medical stuff that are available. We try 
to give each victim medical responses as soon as possible”. 
 
Human Support 
a. Support from Technical Staff 
Clerical Staff (under district level) 
“If this programme is implemented totally, assistants to site staff should be made available 
especially from technical division because we are inexperienced in dealing with these disaster 
victims’ under resilience difficulties. We need to ask someone how to start, what to do and what not 
to do”. 
 
b. Support from Managers 
Clerical Staff (under national level) 
“Actors who have disaster victims included in their groups should be given moral support by the 
manager. Don’t just put these disaster victims in the group and leave them to the discretion of the 
actors to fulfill their resilience difficulties. The manager should discuss with actors the problems 
they are having with the programme, and try to solve these problems”. 
 
c. Support from other Actors 
Officer 
“The actors must be encouraged to work together in overcoming the compliance problems of 
disaster victims under resilience difficulties. There must not be any boundary between actors’ in the 
department level. Actors who are not involved in this programme must not feel that regulatory 
compliance in the department level is not their responsibility. AII actors should shoulder the same 
responsibilities at site. If this can be achieved, then regulatory compliance would have a chance to 
succeed”. 
 
Reduction of Clerical Staff Workloads  
a. Reduce Group of Population 
Clerical Staff (under state level) 
“Reduce the group population. Fewer disaster victims create fewer facilities sharing in the group. 
Thus more space for movement and more opportunity to give special attention to disaster victims”. 
 
b. Restriction of Regulations 
Technical Staff (under national level) 
“Actors will accept these disaster victims if regulations totally restricted”. 
 
c. Include Disaster Victims with Resilience Difficulties under the MNSC Directive 20 in the Low 
Income Group 
Technical Staff (under national level) 
“Our department may find the right channel to help people under low income group. Thus it would 
be more appropriate to include disaster victims under this group and benefit from not only disaster 
programme but also other national programme for low income group”. 
 
d. Reduce Working Periods and Non-working Responsibilities 
Manager (district) 
“I am not very keen on giving monetary rewards as incentive just because actors have to give that 
extra attention to disaster victims under resilience difficulties. What should be done is to lessen 
actors’ workloads because actors I think would prefer to have fewer working burdens rather than 
monetary rewards”. 
 
e. Different community, Place in Different Group 
Clerical Staff (district) 
“There should be different community place for one particular different group. Malays in their own 
group and the way around because of different race got their own belief”. 
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Provide Proof to Actors that Regulatory Compliance does Work  
Clerical staff (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
“The compliance authorities should prove to the actors that the MNSC Directive 20 can work and 
would benefit both disaster victims and actors. When actors have seen that it really does work, they 
would be more receptive toward the idea”. 
 
Involve Actors Recognised as Excellent Actors  
Technical Staff (special body appointed by the government) 
“Initially actors involved in this programme should be chosen from those recognised by the Prime 
Minister’s Department as the national excellent actors and awarded good working performance 
appraisal. As officially recognised excellent actors, they will have all the working qualities that were 
expected to make regulatory compliance work”. 
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Appendix 24: Summarises Response 
 
Table 8.1: Document on the Prime Minister’s Department of Regulatory Compliance under  
the MNSC Directive 20 
 
Professional Status 
Received 
YES NO 
N S D SB n N S D SB n 
1.  Clerical Staff 
2.  Manager 
3.  Technical Staff 
4.  Officer                                          
1 
 
7 
3 
1 
7 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
4 
1 
21 
 
14 
1 
2 
5 
 
 
 
10 
1 
1 
5 
5 
1 
34 
3 
3 
5 
Total                               26                               45 
% 35.0 65.0 
                                                                                                                                                Source: Author 
 
 
 
Table 8.2: Actors Acceptance to the MNSC Directive 20 Implementation  
 
Professional Status 
No Undecided Yes 
N S D SB n N S D SB n N S D SB N 
1.  Clerical Staff 
2.  Manager 
3.  Technical Staff 
4.  Officer 
 
1 
2 
4 
 
2 
5 
1 
2 
2 
4 
 
 
13 
2 
6 
2 
3 1 
 
2 
 
 
1 
 
2 
1 
6 
1 
3 
9 
1 
6 
3 
5 
 
2 
5 
 
4 
 
 
 
3 
19 
1 
15 
3 
Total                                23                             10                             38 
% 32.0 14.0 54.0 
                                                                                                                                                Source: Author 
 
 
 
Table 8.3: Actors Description of Regulatory Compliance 
Descriptions Number 
N S D SB n 
Efforts of personnel in department of agencies to comply with relevant 
regulations 
 
Agencies should ensure that their activities are in compliance with all 
applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulations 
 
Agencies should ensure that all staff members are appropriately credited for 
the functions they will be performing 
 
Agencies should be aware of, and comply with, any state or local 
requirements related to the provisions or regulations                                                                                       
 
7 
 
 
5 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
5 
 
 
5 
 
 
2 
 
 
1
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
21 
 
 
11 
 
 
7 
 
 
5
                                                                                                   Total                             44 
% 62.0 
                                                                                                                                               Source: Author 
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Table 8.4: Actors Description of Emergency Housing 
Descriptions Number 
N S D SB n % 
Considered as a place with the fast build process after emergency 
occurs before disaster victims move to permanent house 
 
Any rigid or mobalise structures without attaching to the ground 
permanently for human shelter for the usage within 30 
consecutive days 
 
A closed partition or group of rooms built within an existing 
dwelling to form a single habitable unit 
 
An enclosed floor space to make a room or habitable area so that 
disaster victims can continue livelihood 
 
A wholly or partly enclosed space intended to be used by disaster 
victims                                                                                                             
 
16 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
2 
 
 
2 
 
 
10 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
7 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
6 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
39 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
7 
 
 
7 
 
 
6 
 
55.0 
 
 
 
17.0 
 
 
10.0 
 
 
10.0 
 
 
8.0 
Total                                        71                           100.0 
                                                                                                                                              Source: Author 
 
 
 
Table 8.5: Definition of Disaster Victims under the MNSC Directive 20 in the Malaysian Context 
Definitions N S D SB n % 
1. Disaster victims under resilience difficulties 
2. Disaster victims with physical effects under resilience 
difficulties 
3. Disaster victims under adaptation problems 
4. Disaster victims with resilience difficulties under 
authorities’ responsibilities                                                                                                
21 
 
2 
1 
 
1 
15 
 
 
1 
 
11 
 
6 
 
 
3
7 
 
2 
 
 
1
54 
 
10 
2 
 
5 
76.0 
 
14.0 
3.0 
 
7.0 
                                                                                                 Total 71 100.0 
                                                                                                                                                Source: Author 
 
 
 
Table 8.6: Discussion of Regulatory Compliance 
 
Professional Status 
Never Discussed Had Discussed Only with Selected 
Actors 
N S D SB n N S D SB n N S D SB n 
1.  Clerical Staff 
2.  Manager 
3.  Technical Staff 
4.  Officer 
11 
1 
5 
8 
 
4 
9 
 
4 
4 
2 
 
1 
30 
1 
14 
4 
4 
 
 
 
  3 
1 
7 
1 
 
 
4 
 
1 
3 
1 
1 
 
1 
 
 
3 
1 
2 
10 
1 
Total                                49                             8                             14 
% 69.0 11.0 20.0 
                                                                                                                                                 Source: Author 
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Table 8.7: Actors’ Knowledge of their Department Level’s of Disaster Victims’ Involvement under the 
MNSC Directive 20 
 
 
Professional Status 
Know Disaster Victims under the MNSC Directive 20 
Not very Well Moderately Well/ 
some do, some do not 
Quite Well 
N S D SB n N S D SB n N S D SB n 
1.  Clerical Staff 
2.  Manager 
3.  Technical Staff 
4.  Officer                                 
9 
 
4 
 
7 
 
5 
7 
1 
1 
4 
1 
4 
27 
2 
14 
3 
1 
 
1 
2 
2 
 
3 
1 6 
2 
5 
3 
 
5 
 
1 
 
1  5 
 
5 
Total                               43                             13                              10 
% 65.0 20.0 15.0 
Note: 5 Officers (D) without comment. 
                                                                                                                                                 Source: Author 
 
Table 8.8: Actors Perceived Rationale of the Prime Minister’s Department Plan 
Descriptions N S D SB n 
To set a margin and uniformity to the actors in carrying their duties 
 
To prevent disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20 from having 
trauma 
 
To establish understanding towards regulatory compliance in department 
level 
 
To increase the level of regulatory compliance in all department 
 
To accommodate disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20 into a 
progressive disaster society 
 
To create a ‘caring feeling’ by the actors 
 
To give disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20 equal opportunities 
in regulatory compliance 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
2 
 
 
1 
4 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
2 
 
2 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
1 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
2 
9 
 
 
7 
 
 
6 
 
6 
 
 
5 
 
5 
 
 
1 
                                                                                                      Total                            39 
% 55.0 
                                                                                                                                           Source: Author 
 
Table 8.9: Actors’ Ability towards Regulatory Compliance under the MNSC Directive 20 
 
Professional Status 
Abilities to Comply 
No Unsure Yes 
N S D SB n N S D SB n N S D SB n 
1.  Clerical Staff 
2.  Manager 
3.  Technical Staff 
4.  Officer                                                    
10 
 
4 
7 
1 
1 
4 
 
1 
4
1 
 
4 
22 
1 
10 
4 
3 
 
 
 
 2 
 
3 
 
1 
5 
1 
3 
2 
1 
5 
1 
 
6 
 
4 
1 
 
1 
4 11 
2 
11 
1 
Total                               37                             9                             25 
% 52.0 13.0 35.0 
                                                                                                                                                 Source: Author 
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Table 8.10: Rights of Disaster Victims under the MNSC Directive 20 to Regulatory Compliance 
 
Professional Status 
Have Rights to Regulatory Compliance 
Disagreed Undecided Agreed 
N S D SB n N S D SB n N S D SB n 
1.  Clerical Staff 
2.  Manager 
3.  Technical Staff 
4.  Officer                                                     
4 1 2 
 
 
1 
 7 
 
 
1 
6 
1 
5 
3 
 
4 
1 
1 
4 
2 
1 
 
3 
 
11 
2 
16 
2 
4 
 
4 
4 
1 
3 
7 
 
 
2 
 
1 
1 
15 
2 
8 
2 
Total                             8                            31                           27 
% 12.0 47.0 41.0 
Note: 5 clerical staff (1 N, 4 SB) declined to comment.     
                                                                                                                                             Source: Author                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
 
Table 8.11: Disaster victims Knowledge Gained of Regulatory Compliance 
 
Professional Status                                  
Will Improve 
Disagreed Undecided Agreed 
N S D SB n N S D SB n N S D SB n 
1.  Clerical Staff 
2.  Manager 
3.  Technical Staff 
4.  Officer 
4 
 
1 
4 
 
3 
3 
 
 
3 
 
1 
11 
1 
4 
3 
8 
 
5 
 
4 
1 
2 
6 
 
4 
5 
 
3 
23 
1 
14 
3 
1 
3 
 
 
2 
 
1 
1 
 
2 
 
 
1 
4 
2 
6 
2 
Total                            19                            38                           14 
% 27.0 54.0 19.0 
                                                                                                                                             Source: Author 
 
Table 8.12: Disaster Victim Development of Social Skills of Regulatory Compliance 
 
Professional Status                                       
Will Develop 
Disagreed Undecided Agreed 
N S D SB n N S D SB n N S D SB n 
1.  Clerical Staff 
2.  Manager 
3.  Technical Staff 
4.  Officer 
     8 
 
 
4 
1 
6 
 
4 
1 
 
 
 
18 
1 
4 
1 
7 
1 
9 
4 
 
7 
4 
1 
 
4 
5 
1 
4 
20 
3 
20 
4 
Total                                     24                             47 
%  34.0 66.0 
                                                                                                                                          Source: Author 
 
Table 8.13: Disaster Victims Emotional Development  
 
Professional Status 
Emotional Development will Enhance 
Disagreed Undecided Agreed 
N S D SB n N S D SB n N S D SB n 
1.  Clerical Staff 
2.  Manager 
3.  Technical Staff 
4.  Officer 
2 1 
 
3 
2 
 
1 
1 
 5 
 
4 
1 
3 
 
2 
1  
1 
 4 
1 
2 
1 
 
2 
 
 
1 
2 
 
 
2 
 3 
 
3 
2 
Total                             10                               7                               8 
% 40.0 28.0 32.0 
                                                                                                                                        Source: Author 
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Table 8.14: Suitability of Regulations for Actors and Disaster Victims under the MNSC Directive 20 
 
Professional Status 
Is Suitable 
Disagreed Undecided Agreed 
N S D SB n N S D SB n N S D SB n 
1.  Clerical Staff 
2.  Manager 
3.  Technical Staff 
4.  Officer 
3 1   4 11 
1 
3 
1 
1 
6 
10 
1 
4 
5 
5 
1 
4 
 
27 
4 
17 
5 
1 
 
6 
6 
 
1 
  7 
 
7 
Total                             4                               53                           14 
% 6.0 75.0 19.0 
                                                                                                                                          Source: Author 
 
Table 8.15: Effect of Regulatory Compliance on Disaster Victims’ Adaptation 
 
Professional Status 
Will Negatively Effect 
Disagreed Undecided Agreed 
N S D SB n N S D SB n N S D SB n 
1.  Clerical Staff 
2.  Manager 
3.  Technical Staff 
4.  Officer 
6 
 
7 
5 
 
4 
5 
1 
4 
3 
5 
 
3 
21 
1 
18 
3 
5 
1 
2 
 2  7 
2 
2 
 
4 
 
3 
1 
3 
3 
 
 
2 
 
 
1 
10 
1 
4 
2 
Total                             43                           11                            17 
% 61.0 15.0 24.0 
                                                                                                                                             Source: Author 
 
Table 8.16: Effects on Department Levels’ Performance 
 
Professional Status 
Will Negatively Effect Percentages 
Disagreed Undecided Agreed 
N S D SB n N S D SB n N S D SB n 
1.  Clerical Staff 
2.  Manager 
3.  Technical Staff 
4.  Officer 
 
1 
9 
8 
1 
4 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
12 
2 
14 
 
2  3 
1 
1 6 
1 
13  
 
3 
3 
 
4 
5 
4 
1 
3 
20 
1 
10 
5 
Total                             28                             7                              36 
% 39.0 10.0 51.0 
                                                                                                                                      Source: Author 
 
Table 8.17: Regulations Most Favoured for Regulatory Compliance 
 
Professional Status 
Most Favoured for Regulatory Compliance 
Planning and Building 
Codes 
MNSC Directive 20 International 
Standard 
N S D SB n N S D SB n N S D SB n 
1.  Clerical Staff 
2.   Manager 
3.  Technical Staff 
4.  Officer 
10 
1 
5 
 
 
 
1 
5 
 
 
1 
15 
2 
6 
3 
 
4 
5 
1 
6 
4 
1 
 
3 
 
 
4 
12 
2 
14 
3 
2 3   5 
Total                              23                             31                             5 
% 39.0 53.0 8.0 
Notes: 4 clerical staff (SB) and 2 technical staff (D) said all three types are not suitable.  1 clerical staff 
(SB) was unsure, and 1 clerical staff (D) declined to nominate.  2 officers (D) and 2 technical staff (D) 
said all three are suitable. 
                                                                                                                                                  Source: Author 
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Table 8.18: Actors Willingness to Support Regulatory Compliance 
 
Professional Status 
Willingness to Support Regulatory Compliance Implementation 
No Undecided Yes 
N S D SB n N S D SB n N S D SB n 
1.  Clerical Staff 
2.   Manager 
3.  Technical Staff 
4.  Officer 
9 
 
1 
2 
1 
6 
1 
4 
1 
1 
3 
18 
3 
8 
3 
1 
2 
2 
 
6 
 
 
 
5 
 5 
1 
8 
5 
3 
 
3 
3 
 
1 
4  
 
1 
10 
 
5 
Total                                 29                             19                             15 
% 46.0 30.0 24.0 
Notes:  No comments from 5 clerical staff (1 S, 4 SB), 3 technical staff (N). 
                                                                                                                                                  Source: Author 
Table 8.19: Ability of Regulatory Compliance to Produce ‘Caring Feeling’ and Acceptance 
 
Professional Status 
Generate ‘Caring-feeling’ and Acceptance 
Disagreed Undecided Agreed 
N S D SB n N S D SB n N S D SB n 
1.  Clerical Staff 
2.  Manager 
3.  Technical Staff 
4.  Officer 
     10 
 
5 
5 
1 
3 
 
5 
1 
1 
2 
1 
 
2 
21 
2 
11 
2 
5 
1 
4 
3 
 
4 
5 
 
2 
3 
3 
 
2 
16 
1 
12 
3 
Total  36 32 
%  53.0 47.0 
Note: 1 clerical staff (SB), 1 manager (SB), 1 technical staff (District) said acceptance and ‘caring-
feeling’ can be generated even under out regulatory compliance. 
                                                                                                                                          Source: Author 
Table 8.20: Actors Willingness to Attend In-Service Training 
 
Professional Status 
Willingness to Attend In-service Training 
No Undecided Yes 
N S D SB n N S D SB n N S D SB n 
1.  Clerical Staff 
2.  Manager 
3.  Technical Staff 
4.  Officer 
10 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
3 
1 
 
2 
2 
1 
4 
18 
2 
10 
2 
3 
1 
5 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
4 
1 
 
 
2 
3 
1 
13 
1 
2 5 
1 
1 
7 
 
 
2 
3 17 
1 
1 
2 
Total                               32                               18                                    21 
% 45.0 25.0 30.0 
                                                                                                                                         Source: Author 
Table 8.21: Conditions for Accepting Regulatory Compliance as Perceived by Actors 
Conditions Total 
N S D SB n % 
1.  Directed by the Prime Minister’s Department 
 
2.  Disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20 have certain 
abilities: 
a.  Have acquired the prerequisite skills; 
b.  Have no behavioural problems; 
c. Would not accept disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20 
without behavioural problems 
 
3.  For non-religious regulations only 
12 
 
 
 
4 
3 
 
1 
9 
 
 
 
3 
6 
7 
 
 
 
4 
4 
 
3 
 
5 
7 
 
 
 
1 
6 
 
1 
35 
 
 
 
12 
19 
 
5 
 
5 
46.0 
 
 
 
15.0 
25.0 
 
6.8 
 
6.8 
                                                                                      Total                                  76 
                                                                                                                                                 Source: Author 
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Table 8.22: Barriers towards Regulatory Compliance Implementation 
Barriers Total 
N S D SB n % 
1.  Lack of information 
 
2.  System applied: 
a. Internal; 
b. International 
 
3.  Actors workloads: 
a. Capacity of emergency housing; 
b. Responsibilities not related to working 
 
4.  Actors skill: 
a. Actors not trained towards the MNSC Directive 20; 
b. Actors with specific skills only 
 
5.  Appraisal pressure 
 
6.  Acceptance of disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20: 
a. Managers’ negative perception about the importance of regulatory 
compliance to disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20;   
b. Unwillingness of actors to accept disaster victims under the MNSC 
Directive 20 into their groups; 
c. Negative acceptance of disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 
20 by disaster communities; 
d. Negative perception of disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 
20 by relatives of disaster victims;  
e. Unwillingness of actors to relinquish their working responsibilities 
  
7.  Resourcing: 
a. Lack of regulatory compliance facilities and/or materials under the 
MNSC Directive 20; 
b. Lack of emergency housing; 
c. Inadequate number or lack of technical staff in the department level. 
 
8.  Abilities of disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20: 
a. Disaster victims behaviours; 
b. Disaster victims without formal education 
 
9. Unwillingness of disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20s 
themselves to be included in disaster victims’ group 
2 
 
 
2 
5 
 
 
4 
2 
 
 
5 
1 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
2 
1 
 
 
 
2 
8 
 
 
4 
1 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
 
12 
4 
 
3 
 
 
 
6 
 
5 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
7 
8 
10 
 
 
2 
2 
9 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
12 
 
 
 
21 
8 
 
1 
 
 
 
4 
 
3 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
15 
1 
8 
 
 
1 
1 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
7 
8 
3 
14 
 
 
6 
6 
 
 
47 
2 
 
 
55 
12 
 
6 
 
 
 
10 
 
24 
 
7 
 
11 
1 
 
 
 
31 
18 
21 
 
 
5 
11 
 
 
4 
4.8 
 
 
2.1 
2.1 
 
 
16.2 
0.5 
 
 
19.0 
4.1 
 
2.1 
 
 
 
3.4 
 
8.3 
 
2.4 
 
3.8 
0.3 
 
 
 
10.7 
6.2 
7.2 
 
 
1.7 
3.8 
 
 
1.3 
                                                                                                                                                       Source: Author 
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Table 8.23: Changes Suggested Prior to Regulatory Compliance Implementation 
Changes Total 
N S D SB n % 
1.  Training in emergency housing: 
a.  Actors given in-service training in emergency housing; 
b. Disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20 and regulatory 
compliance to be included in the training programme together 
with the actors 
 
2. Department level should be supplied with in-depth and 
extensive information on the Prime Minister’s Department 
regulatory compliance plan 
 
3.  Resourcing: 
a.  Build more emergency housing; 
b.  Create the post of working assistant 
 
4.  Department level system: 
a.  Systems that is clear and focus; 
b.  Longer periods of direct contact with the disaster victims; 
c.  Volunteered by the disaster victims to get involve 
      
5.  Regulatory compliance enforcement office: 
a. Every district office should has an officer in charge of 
regulatory compliance; 
b.  Relevant authorities should carry out continuous monitoring; 
c. Officer in charge should have regulatory compliance 
background 
 
15 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
1 
 
12 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
2 
1 
 
 
1 
2 
1 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
 
5 
9 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
2 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
41 
 
 
16 
16 
 
 
7 
2 
1 
 
 
 
2 
1 
 
2 
 
35.6 
 
 
4.1 
 
 
 
28.1 
 
 
11.0 
11.0 
 
 
4.8 
1.4 
0.7 
 
 
 
1.4 
0.7 
 
1.4 
                                                                                                                                                     Source: Author 
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Table 8.24: Strategies Recommended to Encouraging Acceptance of Regulatory Compliance by Actors 
Strategies Total 
N S D SB n % 
1.  Personal incentives: 
a. Monetary rewards; 
b. Actors participation in the regulatory compliance programme made 
part of actor’s appraisal; 
c. Actors send for overseas trip to study working techniques and 
strategies toward regulatory compliance; 
d. Actors involved in regulatory compliance programme are given 
chances to further their studies in emergency assistance and 
housing studies at higher level 
 
2.  Material resources 
 
3.  Provide all human support: 
a. Support from technical staff members; 
b. Support from managers; 
c. Support from other actors 
 
4.  Reduction of actors’ workload: 
a.  Reduce disaster victims and group of population involved in 
regulatory compliance programme; 
b.  Restriction of regulations; 
c. Include disaster victims with resilience difficulties under the MNSC 
Directive 20 in the low in come group and get benefit from other 
national programmes; 
d.  Reduce actors working periods and non-working responsibilities; 
e. Different community, place in a different group 
 
5. Provide proof to actors that regulatory compliance does work 
 
6.  Involve actors recognised as excellent actors    
 
6 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
9 
1 
3 
 
 
 
7 
1 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
 
8 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
4 
 
 
12 
5 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
2 
 
20 
 
6 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
12 
6 
 
 
 
 
13 
5 
 
 
2 
5 
 
 
4 
 
6 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
1 
 
7 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
1 
 
 
 
1 
1 
 
1 
 
40 
 
12 
 
4 
 
 
3 
 
33 
 
 
38 
12 
3 
 
 
 
48 
7 
 
 
5 
14 
1 
 
10 
 
2 
 
17.0 
 
5.2 
 
1.7 
 
 
1.3 
 
15.0 
 
 
16.0 
5.1 
1.3 
 
 
 
20.4 
2.9 
 
 
2.1 
6.0 
0.4 
 
4.2 
 
0.9 
                                                                                                                                                        Source: Author 
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Appendix 25: Typical Qualitative Analysis (National and State level)  
 
Affective 
 
Perceived Rights of Disaster Victims under the MNSC Directive 20 to Regulatory Compliance 
 
a. Department (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
Three clerical staff members in the department level expressed the opinions that disaster victims have the 
rights to be included in disaster victims’ group. Their reasons were that the human rights policy guarantees 
equal opportunities for all disaster victims. One clerical staff was clearly of the opinion that these disaster 
victims have the rights to regulatory compliance provision who stated that (Appendix 23, 2.1): 
 
“If we gave them the rights to recover independently they would not get their full rights in regulatory 
compliance in MNSC Directive 20. In regulatory compliance not everybody may get what they are asking for. 
It is not easy to please everybody. We have to consider the benefit for both sides here”.  
 
The manager, one technical staff and three clerical staff members had mixed views about this. They 
reasoned that disaster victims might have the rights to regulatory compliance, if they are ready mentally and 
behaviourally, and if they could cope with the adaptation environment of disaster victims’ group.  These 
actors felt the over-emphasis on religious and cultural matters in disaster adaptation would make regulatory 
compliance difficult for these disaster victims. They recommended partially rather than full recommendation 
of disaster victims and only in certain regulations. To quote one technical staff that (Appendix 23, 2.1): 
 
“For some disaster victims, yes, for others, no, because of the types of responsibilities used in disaster 
victims’ group is not suitable for some of these disaster victims who are not ready for regulatory compliance. 
The capabilities of adaptation and most of them without formal education make it difficult for the majority of 
our disaster victims to cope with disaster adaptation”. 
 
b. Department (under national level 
Four technical staff members and one clerical staff in this department level agreed that disaster victims have 
the rights to regulatory compliance because equal regulatory compliance opportunities so as to maximise their 
adaptation potential, to socialise fully and recovered faster. To quote one technical staff that (Appendix 23, 
2.1): 
 
“Our regulatory compliance philosophy clearly stated that 'Compliance is for all’, and the MNSC Directive 
20 states that 'Disaster victims with resilience difficulties should be given the opportunities to maximise their 
potential recovery'. So I don’t see why they should be denied their rights to be included in disaster victims’ 
group if it could maximise their adaptation potential”. 
 
 They conceded that regulatory compliance would prevent these disaster victims from developing 
feelings of inferiority. One clerical staff stated that (Appendix 23, 2.1): 
 
“They have the rights to mix with disaster victims to prevent them from being isolated and demoralised”. 
 
Four technical staff members and three clerical staff members had mixed feelings. They argued that 
only ‘high-functioning’ disaster victims might have the capacity to benefit from regulatory compliance 
because the assumption that these disaster victims could cope with the pace of disaster recovery adaptation. 
However, they agreed that other disaster victims might have the rights to be placed in disaster victims’ group 
represented by their leader. One clerical staff said that (Appendix 23, 2.1): 
 
“I think they have the rights to become members of disaster victims’ group. They got their own leaders at 
least can represent them and voice their feeling”. 
 
Four clerical staff members said the current regulatory compliance facilities for disaster victims 
should be maintained to prevent them from isolation and negative effects. These were the reason why they 
disagreed about these disaster victims’ rights towards regulatory compliance. One clerical staff declined to 
make any comment. 
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c. Department (under state level) 
The manager, four clerical staff members and three technical staff members accepted that disaster victims had 
the rights to regulatory compliance in order to prevent them from being isolated in disaster society and also to 
give them the chance to learn to be independent. Disaster victims felt appreciated and show positive action 
towards every issue arises. This was clearly stated by the technical staff who stated that (Appendix 23, 2.1): 
 
“They are also human. If we can clarify their rights towards regulatory compliance they will feel appreciated 
and try to contribute to the benefit of their communities. Above all they can also help the government to 
deliver what the purpose of the development”. 
 
Four technical staff members and three clerical staff members who were unsure said that maybe 
disaster victims with moderate difficulties may recovered by themselves, but this concept of regulatory 
compliance was necessary for those with severe recovery difficulties. One clerical staff said that (Appendix 
23, 2.1): 
 
“Some disaster victims are able to rise from the fall. Unfortunately most of them are vulnerable. Government 
is their only hope to help them back to their previous life before disaster. Even worse, most of them do not 
have knowledge in emergency housing”. 
 
One clerical staff said that only disaster victims who wanted to be regulated deserved regulatory 
compliance.  
 
Perceived Benefit of Regulatory Compliance to Disaster Victims under the MNSC Directive 20 
 
Actors were asked about the benefit of regulatory compliance to disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 
20. All actors mentioned the knowledge and social benefits of regulatory compliance. However, some actors 
interviewed expressed that some disaster victims with adaptation difficulties might experience a degree of 
personal support and emotional satisfaction if other disaster victims including the actors were socialised with 
them for longer term.   
 
Knowledge Gained of Disaster Victims under the MNSC Directive 20 
 
a. Department (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
The manager and two clerical staff members acknowledged that regulatory compliance would increase the 
knowledge of disaster victims because they can learn form their disaster peers. For example, they could learn 
new guidelines in everyday conversations. Regulatory compliance would also help disaster victims to learn to 
concentrate on their recovery process by following the example of other disaster victims in the group. 
Besides, they argued that the knowledge of disaster victims is bound to improve even if they just involved in 
recovery work of their disaster peers. One clerical staff said that (Appendix 23, 2.2.1): 
 
“Disaster victims might think that they are weaker than other disaster victims in the groups in terms of 
knowledge. In disaster victims’ group, they might cope with other members’ adaptation. Even if these disaster 
victims just followed what his/her colleagues do, eventually they would learn something”. 
 
The two technical staff members and two clerical staff members had mixed feelings. Two clerical 
staff members were unsure because they had never handled disaster victims. The technical staff noted that, 
when the department level tried direct contact with the disaster victims, the knowledge of some disaster 
victims included in disaster victims’ group did improve. Therefore they claimed that disaster adaptation might 
have been conducive to the adaptation of some disaster victims in improving their knowledge in regulations. 
They also reasoned that these disaster victims’ knowledge might improve if actors working along with them 
and give them enough attention they required.  
Two clerical staff members disagreed that regulatory compliance would educationally benefit 
disaster victims in terms of knowledge because they questioned about inability of these disaster victims to 
cope with the pace of disaster adaptation. Actors would not be able to give these disaster victims their full 
attention due to the size of disaster victims in their groups. One clerical staff said that (Appendix 23, 2.2.1): 
 
“There could be two side effects. If actors could provide these disaster victims with all attention they require 
then maybe their knowledge will improve. But if actors are too occupied and busy with other disaster victims 
437 
 
and can only give minimal individual guidance to these disaster victims, then their learning process will 
decline”. 
 
b. Department (under national level) 
Three technical staff members and one clerical staff agreed that regulatory compliance would improve the 
knowledge of disaster victims. They said that regular interaction between disaster victims and actors would 
increase communication skills of the disaster victims. They felt that this would incidentally increase some 
aspects of knowledge attainment. They also commented that the ability of social learning would help to 
improve their knowledge. One technical staff said that (Appendix 23, 2.2.1): 
 
“From my experience with disaster victims who regularly interact with actors during break times or 
discussion, their ability to communicate has improved. My assumption is that there will be an improvement in 
their knowledge about regulations, guidelines and policies”. 
 
Three technical staff members and six clerical staff members were unsure. Four clerical staff 
members were unsure because they had never handled disaster victims. The other actors said the knowledge 
of disaster victims might improve if actors were able to provide the maximum individual attention required. 
Regulatory compliance will not increase the knowledge of every victim because some of these disaster 
victims have serious depressions problem.  
 One technical staff and two clerical staff members disagreed that regulatory compliance will improve 
the knowledge of disaster victims because actors do not have time to provide enough individual attention as 
required. They argued that actors would always prioritise some cases in disaster victims group. They also said 
that disaster victims would not be able cope with the pace of disaster adaptation. This was the opinion of one 
clerical staff who said that (Appendix 23, 2.2.1): 
 
“From my experience, they are very talkative if we discussed anything informally. They are active in 
discussions with actors and involvement in the communities. But, when they return to my disaster victims’ 
group, they are quiet and timid. Based on this, maybe, it is better in terms of knowledge to let their leaders to 
voice their needs based on the limited information they knew”. 
 
c. Department (under state level) 
Two technical staff members agreed that the knowledge of disaster victims will increase if included in 
disaster victims’ group because their abilities are considered equal to if not better than the majority of actors. 
One technical staff said that (Appendix 23, 2.2.1): 
 
“Some disaster victims who have ability equal to if not better than the majority of actors. Their knowledge 
will surely increase”. 
 
The manager, two technical staff members and four clerical staff members expressed mixed views. 
Two clerical staff members were unsure because they had never handled disaster victims. The rest of the 
actors argued that, for disaster victims who have ‘normal’ abilities, knowledge gained might improve. It was 
also considered that regulatory compliance might improve the knowledge of disaster victims if actors are able 
to provide them with enough individual attention they required. But, for those who also suffered from 
depressions, regulatory compliance would not help their knowledge improvement. This was exemplified by 
the viewpoint of the technical staff who stated that (Appendix 23, 2.2.1): 
 
“If disaster victims have normal ability they will be able to catch up with actors, and their knowledge should 
be better in disaster victims’ group. But lately disaster victims sent to this department level are also suffering 
from other resilience difficulties, like mental and physical difficulties. Those who also suffer from mental 
difficulties, even though not very severe, will not achieve much in terms of knowledge if included in disaster 
victims’ group”. 
 
Three technical staff members and four clerical staff members disagreed because the knowledge 
gained by disaster victims’ could be improved only if they were involved in regulatory compliance process 
because of their participation in decision making. Besides, they argued that disaster victims would not be able 
to keep up the pace in disaster atmosphere without accompanying by the actors. 
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Disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20, Social Development 
 
All actors interviewed either agreed or had mixed views on the benefits of regulatory compliance to the social 
development of disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20. This was also considered as acceptance of 
disaster victims by actors in disaster victims’ group. 
 
a. Department (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
The manager, two technical staff members and three clerical staff members believed that regulatory 
compliance would improve the social development of disaster victims. They claimed the major success of any 
development project was the forging of positive relationships between disaster victims and actors. Regulatory 
compliance implementation was also enabling the disaster victims’ to adapt to their peers. One technical staff 
and one clerical staff said that (Appendix 23, 2.2.2): 
 
“Socially, the engagement of disaster victims was a success. These disaster victims were able to make friends 
with actors, even though there are still those who would discriminate these disaster victims”. 
 
“Their social skills will develop because of they will interact and socialise regularly with actors, thus 
ensuring that they behave in a socially acceptable manner”. 
 
Four clerical staff members had mixed opinions. They agreed the disaster victims’ social 
development might improve if (1) Actors were to play their part in encouraging meaningful relationship 
between actors and disaster victims, and (2) if actors themselves were willing to accept disaster victims. 
 
b. Department level (under national level) 
Seven technical staff members and four clerical staff members in the department level were confident that 
regulatory compliance would improve the social skills of disaster victims. Regular interaction would 
familiarise both actors and disaster victims with each other, thus giving disaster victims opportunities to learn 
socially. One clerical staff said that (Appendix 23, 2.2.2): 
 
“If just among them, maybe there will not be much change in the social skills development. But, if included in 
disaster victims’ group it will make great improvements. They will tend to imitate disaster peer behaviours 
that hopefully are those that are socially acceptable”. 
 
Four clerical staff members were unsure because they had never handled disaster victims. They also 
argued that the social skills of disaster victims might improve if actors play an active role in their adaptation 
development. Unwillingness of actors to accept disaster victims was also given as a reason for their 
uncertainty. 
 
c. Department level (under state level) 
All seven technical staff members and four clerical staff members agreed that regulatory compliance will 
improve the social skills of disaster victims because positive effect interaction with the actors, disaster victims 
and societies. Regulatory compliance could make both disaster victims and actors understand and accept each 
other, thus helping disaster victims to learn to accommodate in disaster society. As one technical staff said 
that (Appendix 23, 2.2.2): 
 
“When disaster victims are exposed to actors, and these disaster victims are willing to help them in whatever 
way they can towards regulatory compliance, then disaster victims will not be conscious of their resilience 
difficulties and would be at ease interaction with disaster society”. 
 
The manager was unsure without any reason. The four clerical staff members who were unsure said 
the social skills of disaster victims might improve if actors could be persuaded to forge a positive relationship 
with them. Otherwise, social skills development in disaster victims could only develop from their contact with 
other disaster victims. Thus, the role of the actors is to ensure that this positive relationship actually happens. 
One clerical staff said that (Appendix 23, 2.2.2): 
 
“Hopefully actors will encourage these disaster victims to learn to accept other disaster victims in the group. 
If not, these disaster victims would remain rooted in their area”. 
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The Emotional Development of Disaster Victims under the MNSC Directive 20 
 
During discussion with actors on the issues of disaster victims’ emotional development, only 25 actors 
interviewed were adjudged to have included emotional development in their discussions. 
 
a. Department (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
One clerical staff claimed that regulatory compliance would enhance the emotional development of disaster 
victims because it would make these disaster victims feel accepted by the department level, thus boosting 
their confidence. The clerical staff said that (Appendix 23, 2.2.3): 
 
“Including disaster victims in disaster victims’ group would make them feel accepted”. 
 
 However the two technical staff members and one clerical staff expressed mixed views. On the 
positive side, regulatory compliance would not make disaster victims feel isolated and segregated. But, the 
mature disaster victims might be embarrassed when placed in younger groups of disaster victims. They also 
argued that it was not considered to be placed in disaster victims’ group of different races. Besides this, they 
reasoned that emotional development will be more complicated when it was come to the subject of races and 
religions. This is expressed in the viewpoint of one technical staff that (Appendix 23, 2.2.3): 
 
“Disaster victims would not feel isolated and segregated from disaster adaptation if they are able to mix with 
other in disaster victims’ group. But for disaster victims who are older and more mature, they do feel 
embarrassed when called resilience difficulties in victims’ group”. 
 
One clerical staff argued that regulatory compliance would only make disaster victims feel more 
insecure and isolated because potential of discrimination by actors. 
 
b. Department (under national level) 
Two technical staff members were positive that regulatory compliance would widen the scope for unlimited 
emotional development of the disaster victims. Unrestricted interaction with other disaster victims would 
increase the disaster victims’ self-esteem. Two of these actors offered a detailed account that (Appendix 23, 
2.2.3): 
 
“We had tried to convince disaster victims that what happened was temporarily and government is here to 
help. Actors even elected some of the leaders in their group to make a report and raised their needs. They 
have the responsibilities to assist their disaster victims’ group members according to regulatory compliance. 
This hopefully will make our disaster victims feel independent and useful. So far they have done a good job in 
undertaking the roles expected of them”. 
 
“We also noticed that disaster victims showed tremendous respect to our colleagues even though these 
disaster victims realised that these actors are from the outsider and from different background. For example 
when our colleague made an inspection on the site and the construction progress is very slow and needs to 
put more labours. Fortunately, most of the disaster victims volunteers to help. In terms of emotional 
development I believed this is a good progress”. 
 
Two clerical staff members who had mixed opinion felt these disaster victims’ confidence might 
increase if they were placed in disaster victims’ group and not to be isolated.  
Another clerical staff argued that regulatory compliance would only make these disaster victims feel 
embarrassed and more aware of their vulnerabilities, thus demoralising them further. 
 
c. Department (under state level) 
One technical staff felt that regulatory compliance would enhance the self-confidence of disaster victims 
because they felt accepted by their disaster peers. The technical staff said that (Appendix 23, 2.2.3): 
 
“Disaster victims will move in their own group and rise together after the disaster strike. The unity and sense 
of belonging between them would enhance the self confidence”. 
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One clerical staff was unsure. They reasoned that disaster victims who would cope with disaster 
adaptation could be more confident in themselves, but those who encountered difficulties might suffer 
emotionally in disaster victims’ group.  
 Three technical staff members and one clerical staff stated that regulatory compliance would 
demoralise these disaster victims because they will be made more aware of their vulnerabilities. The technical 
staff said that (Appendix 23, 2.2.3): 
 
“Emotionally, they would be demoralised because of other disaster victims catching up and adapt 
but they can’t”. 
 
They also frightened that these disaster victims would be victimised by other disaster victims. Other 
disaster victims might take advantage of the difficulties that these disaster victims had. In the scene of disaster 
sometimes it comes back to the concept of first come first serve. Disaster victims who are not strong enough 
will get the benefit provided by the authorities later on. 
 
Perceived Suitability of Regulations for Actors and Disaster Victims under the MNSC Directive 20 
 
During the time of this study, disaster victims in regulatory compliance were handled by different department 
levels based on the MNSC Directive 20. The main reference in Malaysia emergency housing relief is the 
MNSC Directive 20.  
 
a. Department (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
The six technical staff members and one clerical staff agreed that regulations with some modifications are 
suitable for them. The technical staff stressed that (Appendix 23, 2.3): 
 
“The present regulations are suitable for our actors. All we need to do is some requirement modifications in 
order to make it accessible to these actors”. 
 
The manager and five clerical staff members were unsure. They argued that earlier phase of recovery 
that emphasis on the acquisition of basic amenities and recovery might be suitable, but not sure about the later 
phase of recovery because of the uncertainty in resilience difficulties. One clerical staff reported that 
(Appendix 23, 2.3): 
 
“After we received transcribed information from disaster site we will calculate and plan required 
accommodation and will be approved by the superior committee. This is the earlier stage, but if we are trying 
to comply with the demand from each and every victim at the later stage at site, it will be complicated”. 
 
Others reasoned that regulations that demanded equality of all disaster victims, especially religious 
oriented regulations, might not be suitable, but regulations that have a strong emphasis on gender separation 
might be suitable for these disaster victims. Thus another clerical staff actor reported that (Appendix 23, 2.3): 
 
“Regulations that require equality of all disaster victims are not suitable for these disaster victims. 
Regulations that require the separation of gender are okay for these disaster victims. For example in equality 
of the disaster victims, all disaster victims will be treated as one community doesn’t matters if they are 
Malays, Chinese or Indians. In reality they got different house of worship but has to provide them separate 
house of worship even for odd number of races. Waste of unutilised facilities sometime”. 
 
  Two clerical staff members disagreed, thus argued that regulations demand equality of all disaster 
victims that actors are not capable to resist, and also there are too many religious issues that were not stated in 
regulations but actors have to look after, for example one clerical staff said that (Appendix 23, 2.3): 
 
“Nowadays actors are required to learn too many regulations. As it is, they have problems coping with it, 
especially when it is time to treat disaster victims raised the issue of believes and worship that is out of the 
regulations in providing them amenities”. 
 
b. Department (under national level) 
Three technical staff members and six clerical staff members had mixed views. They agreed that regulations 
related to non-religious issue might be suitable for actors but not to religious demand. Religious demands, 
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especially places of worship and the way of living might be too difficult for these actors to comply. In the 
words of one technical staff who stated that (Appendix, 23, 2.3): 
 
“It is suitable for non-religious demands. But for religious demands like places of worship or way of living, it 
is a bit difficult for actors to cope with. These actors are the enforcers and not politicians. This situations 
make it difficult to handle especially if involve disaster victims in decision making”. 
 
One clerical staff disagreed with the proposition that regulations is suitable for actors because these 
actors main compliance priorities are the acquisition to facilitate the disaster victims with physical 
development that may help the victim start back their new life as before disaster strike. 
 
c. Department (under state level) 
One technical staff and six clerical staff members said that current regulations are suitable. They claimed that 
the contents of entire regulations are practical. Also they commented that actors are currently being handled 
regulations just like other government officers in the country. But they admitted that for certain constraints 
that involve observations and inquiries, these actors would just have to accept the pressure from the public. As 
reported by one technical staff that (Appendix 23, 2.3): 
 
“It is suitable, as a government servant we still have to obey with all other regulations not only in emergency 
housing that requires all government servants to serve the nation base on our oath and ethics. We will follow 
orders from our superiors but not from the disaster victims especially when it is time to make decision for the 
good of all side. Unfortunately, according to humanitarians’ actions we are always in dilemma”.  
 
The manager, six technical staff members and one clerical staff had mixed views. Their argument 
was that regulations are only suitable for actors who were involved at the earlier stage of recovery. However, 
for those at the later stage of recovery at site, regulations are not definite due to the pressure from different 
groups of communities and disaster victims’ group.   
 One clerical staff disagreed with the proposition that regulations is suitable for actors and disaster 
victims because too many religious issues that always highlighted by the disaster victims were not stated in 
regulations. 
 
Perceived Effect of Regulatory Compliance on Disaster Victims 
 
Actors were asked to express their views on the effect of regulatory compliance on victim’ resilience 
progress. 
 
a. Department (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
Two clerical staff members claimed that regulatory compliance would negatively affect victim’ resilience 
progress because the special attention demanded by disaster victims would make it difficult for actors to 
finish their duties in the stipulated time. This would be the reason why there was always having a conflict 
between actors and disaster victims. To quote in full the experience of one actor who said that (Appendix 23, 
2.5): 
 
“Regulatory compliance had an affect on disaster victims’ resilience progress because I had to reallocate my 
working time in order to overcome the adaptation difficulties of disaster victims. If these disaster victims 
don’t understand, I have to put in extra effort to make them understand and this affected my progress in 
finishing my duties. If I didn't finish the job, disaster victims would not be able to get what had already 
planned for them. Focus on regulatory compliance always the main task”. 
 
The manager and two clerical staff members were unsure. If regulatory compliance involves only 
earlier phase of recovery process, it might not negatively affect the resilience progress of disaster victims. But 
if it also involves later phase recovery process, then it might then have negative effects because this stage of 
department levels, actors’ priorities are resilience progress and the presence of disaster victims could be a 
distraction to carry their work in providing emergency housing. They also argued that if actors could 
apportion their working time appropriately, disaster victims’ resilience progress might not be negatively 
affected.  
 The two technical staff members and four clerical staff members admitted that regulatory compliance 
would not negatively effect on victim’ resilience progress because (1) actors will handle normally with or 
442 
 
under out regulatory compliance, and (2) Disaster victims do not have adaptation difficulties and thus would 
be able to live normally.  
 
b. Department (under national level)  
Two clerical staff members argued that regulatory compliance would have negative effects on victim’ 
adaptation because of the special attention required by other disaster victims that would restricted the amount 
of time actors spent with disaster victims. 
 Two technical staff members and three clerical staff members had mixed views. They said that it 
might not have a negative effect if disaster victims included in the disaster victims’ group were free from 
behavioural problems that would not distracted adaptation of other disaster victims’. Regulatory compliance 
might have a limited negative effect if it involves at earlier phase of recovery because everybody was not 
ready. As one technical staff said that (Appendix 23, 2.5): 
 
“Maybe it will negatively affect disaster victims’ resilience progress slightly if other disaster victims have 
some kinds of behavioural problems. Their difficulties in the group could cause distractions to other victim”. 
 
Five technical staff members and two clerical staff members admitted that regulatory compliance 
would not negatively affect disaster victims’ resilience progress because normal task would proceed as usual, 
and also disaster victims have ‘normal’ mentally and psychologically abilities that can adapt to the demanding 
environment.  
 
c. Department (under state level) 
The manager, three technical staff members and three clerical staff members felt that regulatory compliance 
would have a negative effect on victim’ resilience progress because actors would spend more time than usual 
on the other disaster victims, thus depriving disaster victims of working time. 
 Six technical staff members and five clerical staff members in the department level said that 
regulatory compliance would not have a negative effect on disaster victims’ resilience progress because actors 
will still try to finish their duties on time. Meanwhile, disaster victims who socialise with other disaster 
victims and who indeed may be chosen to involve in disaster victims’ group decision making would increase 
their understanding or reinforce their knowledge on the regulations knowledge. As one technical staff said 
that (Appendix 23, 2.5): 
 
“Disaster victims who act as readers in regulations practice would benefit in the recovery process because of 
sharing information would enhance their knowledge of regulations and rights”. 
 
Perceived Effect of Regulatory Compliance on Department Levels’ Performance 
 
Most of the actors at department level are required to attend the training programme many times a year related 
to disaster management and many others not only in disaster management. Then, all of these trainings, 
seminars and anything related to attendance towards knowledge attainment will be counted in order to get 
promoted and department level appraisal.  
 
a. Department (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
Four clerical staff members considered that regulatory compliance would lower the department level’s 
performance. They argued that not all the actors had the same abilities to carry out work accordingly. The 
actors interviewed were unhappy about regulatory compliance that lowering the appraisal of department level 
performance. Complaints from the disaster victims never stop.  
 Two clerical staff members who were unsure reasoned that if the regulatory compliance is the key 
mechanism in their appraisal, they were all disagreed. It might have a negative effect in their performance if 
they have to follow exactly what is written in regulations because of their main objectives in emergency 
housing are to provide enough houses.  
 The manager and one technical staff claimed that regulatory compliance had nothing to do on the 
department level’s appraisal because their job is not just providing housing to the disaster victims instead of 
their relationship with other actors and department. The managers quote that (Appendix 23, 2.6):  
 
“Regulatory compliance is not the priority here. We are trying to do our best to help the disaster victims. 
Regulatory compliance is just a guide of practice. Anyway our job is not just providing housing to the disaster 
victims but more than that”.  
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b. Department (under national level) 
Nine clerical staff members felt that regulatory compliance would lower the department levels’ performance 
because the actors could never achieve the standard required in their training programme. Nothing changes 
for the actors even if the appraisal might be good for the department.  
 Eight technical staff members believed that regulatory compliance would not have any effect on their 
performance because they knew with the purpose of regulatory compliance is not part of the department 
level’s appraisal.  
 
c. Department (under state level) 
Three technical staff members felt that regulatory compliance would lower the department levels’ 
performance because most of the request from the disaster victims might drag their time in providing 
emergency relief. One technical staff said that (Appendix 23, 2.6): 
 
“In emergency relief, we are bonded with the matter of time. Everything has to be done as quickly as possible. 
Some of the disaster victims judge us from the quality service we gave. Not easy to please everybody. It will 
affect our performance”. 
 
Most of the actors interviewed said that the training programme in regulatory compliance had always 
been included when calculating the department level’s appraisal. Thus, regulatory compliance would make no 
difference to the department level’s performance. Actors claimed that there were several occasions in the past 
once regulatory compliance helped to enhance the department levels’ performance. The report of their 
manager was that (Appendix 23, 2.6): 
 
“In this department level, we combine training programme and application on site. When disasters strike 
especially Tsunami, it did negatively affect our compliance practice because of time constraints and 
everybody was panicked. However, in the previous years we tried to enhance our regulatory compliance 
because of we learnt from our mistakes. Therefore it depends on time constraint”. 
 
Conative 
 
Perceived Actors Support for Regulatory Compliance Implementation  
 
a. Department (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
One technical staff had the perception that actors might be willing to support regulatory compliance if the 
manager gave full support to its implementation. The manager should continuously stress the importance of 
the programme to actors. Two clerical staff members were willing to support regulatory compliance for 
humanitarian reasons. Typical illustrative comments from clerical staff members were that (Appendix 23, 
3.1): 
 
“I will support it if other actors support the programme. If I am alone I am not so sure. If there are others 
willing to support, we can sort of help each other morally and mentally”. 
 
“I guess I will support the programme for humanitarian reasons”. 
 
The manager and one technical staff had mixed perceptions of actors’ willingness to support 
regulatory compliance implementation, even though the department level had tried direct contact with the 
disaster victims. The manager felt that actors would reject regulatory compliance initially but could be 
persuaded to accept it eventually if they are given enough information about it, and if the Prime Minister’s 
Department perseveres with the programme. Two clerical staff members were unsure. They said that they 
might be willing to support if; (1) regulatory compliance is implemented at earlier phase of recovery, (2) the 
majority of actors in the department level also support it, (3) disaster victims are ready to be placed in disaster 
victims’ group, and (4) the manager gives his/her full back up to the programme.  
 Three clerical staff members were unwilling to support regulatory compliance because they felt that 
present conditions in the department level were not conducive toward its implementation, and it would not 
benefit actors and disaster victims. They also argued that regulatory compliance would be too demanding 
because they were not trained in emergency housing. One technical staff declined to comment. 
 
 
444 
 
b. Department (under national level) 
Two technical staff members said that actors in the department level would support regulatory compliance for 
humanitarian reasons, and they also noted that actors had been supportive of any activities involving disaster 
victims. One clerical staff was willing to support regulatory compliance for humanitarian reasons. One 
technical staff offered the comment that (Appendix 23, 3.1): 
 
“Not all actors will support the implementation of regulatory compliance with the MNSC Directive 20, but I 
think they will support the programme if they have a better understanding of it”. 
 
One clerical staff and one technical staff were unsure because they argued that there are actors who 
might support it and there are also those who might not. Clerical staff members might not be willing to 
support regulatory compliance because generally they do not know much about it, although might be willing 
to give it a try if they get more information about regulatory compliance implementation.  
 One technical staff stated that actors in the department level would not support regulatory 
compliance because it is too demanding in terms of responsibility. Six clerical staff members expressed their 
objection towards the implementation because they are not trained to handle disaster victims. They perceived 
that regulatory compliance gives more pressure on their work responsibilities. Two technical staff members 
declined to comment. 
 
c. Department (under state level) 
Three clerical staff members and one technical staff were willing to support the implementation of regulatory 
compliance because of it is their duties to the public. He quoted that (Appendix 23, 3.1): 
 
“I don’t have any problem with that because of this is our duties and do our best to serve the public”. 
 
Six technical staff members who had mixed perceptions about actors’ willingness said that some of 
the actors might be willing to support regulatory compliance, whilst others might not. Actors might be 
reluctant to support regulatory compliance because they knew very little about it. Two clerical staff members 
who were unsure about their willingness to support regulatory compliance said that they need more 
information about it before they could make up their mind. One considered comment from a clerical staff was 
that (Appendix 23, 3.1): 
 
"This is a new thing. I have to know more about it before I can make up my mind to support the 
implementation or not”. 
 
Two clerical staff members were opposed the implementation because they were not trained to 
handle disaster victims. Also the present conditions in the department level could not support regulatory 
compliance implementation. The manager considered that actors in the department level would not support 
the programme’s implementation because it was not easy to grant disaster victims’ demand. She also stressed 
that actors would be willing to support regulatory compliance if they were well informed about regulatory 
compliance implementation.  
One clerical staff declined to comment.  
 
Perceived Ability of Regulatory Compliance on Promoting a ‘Caring Feeling’ and Acceptance of 
Disaster Victims under the MNSC Directive 20 by the Actors 
 
Actors either had mixed opinions or agreed that regulatory compliance would promote a ‘caring feeling’ and 
acceptance of disaster victims under the MNSC Directive 20. Three actors argued that ‘caring feeling’ and 
acceptance could be encouraged even under out regulatory compliance. 
 
a. Department (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
The manager and three clerical staff members mentioned that regulatory compliance would make actors more 
caring and acceptance of disaster victims. The relationship between these technical staff members and disaster 
victims in disaster group would probably be difficult at first, but eventually they would be able to accept 
disaster victims as their understanding increased concerning these disaster victims’ difficulties.  
 The two technical staff members and five clerical staff members had mixed views. They said that 
‘caring feeling’ and acceptance of disaster victims by the actors might increase if they are willing to 
participate. They also presumed that there are actors who will never accept these disaster victims, even with 
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encouragement. They were afraid that these actors would be more aggressive to frighten rather than to help 
disaster victims. They also expressed the views that a ‘caring feeling’ and acceptance of disaster victims 
would be difficult to promote if disaster victims behaved ‘abnormally’. The manager, technical staff and four 
clerical staff members claimed the major success was the building of positive relationship between disaster 
victims in disaster victims’ group. 
 
b. Department (under national level) 
Four technical staff members and two clerical staff members said that regulatory compliance would help to 
promote acceptance and ‘caring feeling’ amongst actors because of the benefit they might get especially in 
understanding the disaster victims problems.  
 Three technical staff members and five clerical staff members had mixed feelings. They argued that 
acceptance and a ‘caring feeling’ might be promoted if actors are active in its promotion. However, they also 
realised that there will always be a section of actors who would make practical approach to disaster victims 
who they favoured with. One technical staff and clerical staff interviewed said that even under out an 
acceptance of regulatory compliance ‘caring feeling’ could be fostered in actors if the department level made 
a great effort to involve both actors and disaster victims in activities outside the accommodation. They stated 
that (Appendix 23, 3.2): 
 
“There will always be a section of actors who will use practical approach to describe disaster victims 
included in disaster victims’ group. They will only select the disaster victims they preferred to. But, if actors 
play their part in preventing this from happening, they will eventually accept these disaster victims”. 
 
“Even though these disaster victims and actors are not placed in the same group, we can still encourage the 
'caring feeling' among these disaster victims. The department level frequently arranged activities for disaster 
victims that involved actors as well. From my daily observation, actors can get along very well with disaster 
victims”. 
 
c. Department (under state level) 
Four technical staff members and three clerical staff members believed that regulatory compliance would 
promote acceptance and ‘caring feeling’ amongst actors and disaster victims. They claimed that actors have 
been very helpful in disaster victims group. Actors have been known to hear the request from disaster victims 
according to their rights that are stated in the MNSC Directive 20. Regulatory compliance would therefore 
reinforce this ‘caring feeling’ in actors. Meanwhile, disaster victims with moderate difficulties who were 
placed in disaster victims’ group had been well accepted by their colleagues. For example expression from 
one technical staff who said that (Appendix 23, 3.2): 
 
“From my observations, actors are very concerned about disaster victims in this department level. For 
example, actors would take turns to hear disaster victims request so that disaster victims might know their 
rights and response to it”.  
   
The manager, three technical staff members and five clerical staff members were unsure because 
they argued that there will always be actors who would discriminate these disaster victims, and thus make 
them more isolated from their colleagues. However, actors will accept disaster victims if they tried not to 
isolate themselves from disaster victims group. 
 
Perceived Willingness of Actors to Attend In-Service Training in Emergency Housing                               
                                                                                      
a. Department (under national level) had tried Direct Contact with the Disaster Victims 
One clerical staff expressed their willingness to attend in-service training because it would widen the scope of 
their work abilities. 
 The manager and one technical staff were skeptical about actors’ willingness to attend training in 
emergency housing. The manager claimed that they would be willing to attend only if someone in their family 
had become a victim under the MNSC Directive 20. They also said that actors in general are not interested in 
regulatory compliance. Three clerical staff members were undecided. They said that they would not volunteer 
to attend in-service training in emergency housing, but would go if directed by the Prime Minister’s 
Department. One form of anxiety and self-doubt is exemplified by the clerical staff who said that (Appendix 
23, 3.3.): 
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“I will go if been directed by my superior. But, I won't volunteer to go. What if I could not deliver what is 
expected from attending the course? I should not have gone in the first place because of personally I just don't 
have what it takes to handle these disaster victims”. 
 
Five clerical staff members were reluctant to attend training in emergency housing because; (1) 
family commitments (training session is too far from home), (2) having no patience to handle disaster victims, 
(3) not being interested in handling these disaster victims since they had been handling disaster victims for a 
long time, and (4) one of them being on the verge of retirement.  
 
b. Department (under national level) 
One clerical staff was willing to attend training in emergency housing in order to diversify their work 
abilities. The clerical staff said that (Appendix 23, 3.3): 
 
“I will go so as to increase the range of my working abilities to include disaster victims under resilience 
difficulties”. 
 
Four technical staff members with mixed perceptions said that there were few actors who might be 
interested. They reasoned that actors might be willing to attend in-service training if they are given more 
information on regulatory compliance, and if the course duration were shorter. One comment that merits 
attention came from the technical staff, who said that (Appendix 23, 3.3): 
 
“If actors are given information on regulatory compliance beforehand, they might be interested. What makes 
actors reluctant to attend emergency housing courses is that they were unsure what they are getting 
themselves into. If they have a rough idea of what this programme is about, maybe they can be persuaded to 
attend courses in emergency housing”. 
 
Five clerical staff members expressed unwillingness to attend in-service training because personal 
commitments and because of they were not interested in handling disaster victims. One of them was unwilling 
to attend in-service training because she would be shortly retiring. Four technical staff members had the 
perception that actors would be reluctant to attend in-service training because of family commitments. They 
claimed the training session was too far from home, and the course duration too long. They believed that 
actors were not interested in the regulatory compliance implementation.  
 
c. Department (under state level) 
The manager and one technical staff believed that very few actors would be willing to attend in-service 
training because of the difficulties in handling disaster victims. However, she also admitted that two to three 
actors in her department level would be willing to accept disaster victims in their groups, if given appropriate 
training. Five clerical staff members were willing to attend because they wanted to learn new working skills. 
One of them stated that (Appendix 23, 3.3): 
 
“I will go because of I can learn something different. Previously I learned how to handle a small group of 
victims, and I hope next time I am adapting to handle bigger crowd”. 
 
Two technical staff members were unsure reasoned that only few actors interested in handling 
disaster victims would be willing to attend in-service training. Clerical staff members might be willing to 
undergo training if the course duration were shortened considerably, and if they could get more information 
about regulatory compliance.  
 Four technical staff members had the perception that actors would be reluctant to attend in-service 
training because; (1) family commitments, and (2) long duration of the course. Three clerical staff members 
interviewed in the department level were reluctant to attend training because family commitments and lack of 
interest in handling disaster victims.   
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